Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
Contents 40
- Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
- Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
- Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
- Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
- Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
- Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
- Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
- Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
- Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
- Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
- Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
- Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
- Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
- Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
- Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
- Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
- Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
- Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
- Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
- Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
- Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
- Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
- Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
- Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
- Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
- Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
- Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
- Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
- Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
- Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
- Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
- Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
- Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
- Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
- Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
- Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
- Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis
On 8 April 1966, Time magazine ran a cover carrying only three words in red letters on a black background: "Is God Dead?" It was one of the most talked-about magazine covers of the decade, and it announced, to an audience far wider than academic theology usually reaches, that a small number of American theologians — chiefly Thomas J. J. Altizer and William Hamilton — were arguing, in some sense, that the answer was yes. The movement that produced this cover story burned brightly and briefly: it drew intense public attention for roughly two or three years in the mid-1960s, provoked outrage, curiosity, and parody in roughly equal measure, and then declined almost as quickly as it had risen, leaving behind a smaller and more lasting scholarly footprint than its brief fame might suggest.
This lecture treats "death of God" theology carefully, because the phrase invites exactly the kind of caricature this course warns against. "God is dead" did not mean, for either Altizer or Hamilton, a straightforward atheist claim that no deity of any kind has ever existed, argued the way an atheist philosopher might argue it. It meant something considerably more specific and more theologically freighted, drawing on a line of thought traceable to Hegel and Nietzsche, both already introduced earlier in this course. Getting that specificity right, and being honest about how briefly and thinly the movement was actually developed before it declined, is this lecture's main task.
What these 20 minutes give you
- State what Altizer and Hamilton actually meant by "the death of God," distinguishing it from straightforward atheism.
- Trace the movement's philosophical debts to Hegel's dialectic (introduced in chapter 1) and Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God in *The Gay Science* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.
- Explain the *Time* magazine cover's role in the movement's public visibility and describe accurately how brief the movement's period of prominence actually was.
- Identify the movement's real theological and institutional limits, including why it declined so quickly and why it never became more than a minority position even within the already-liberal wing of American Protestant theology.
- Distinguish death-of-God theology clearly from both Bonhoeffer's prison fragments (lecture 6-1) and Cox's *The Secular City* (lecture 6-2), each of which is sometimes loosely lumped together with it in popular summary.
The theological weight of this lecture falls less on constructive scripture use by the death-of-God theologians themselves, who drew comparatively little on biblical , and more on what classical Christian scripture says about God's own changelessness — the doctrine the movement's proponents most directly denied.
Numbers 23:19, part of Balaam's oracle over Israel, states the classical position with unusual directness: "God is not a man, that he should lie, nor the son of man, that he should repent. Has he said, and will he not do it? Or has he spoken, and will he not make it good?" (World English Bible) This verse was already introduced in chapter 7's treatment of as a text classical theists press against any account of God changing; here it does comparable work against the far more radical claim that God's transcendent reality could simply cease.
Philippians 2:7, already examined in lecture 6-1 for Bonhoeffer's use of it, returns here from the opposite direction: "but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men." (WEB) Altizer in particular drew on a version of kenotic, language in his own account of God's incarnate "death" in Christ — though, as the lecture below explains, he pushed the kenosis considerably further than the classical doctrine of the itself does, treating the self-emptying not as the eternal Son taking on human nature while remaining fully God, but as something closer to the wholesale absorption and disappearance of a transcendent God into the historical, immanent process of the world.
1. Two thinkers, one label, two different arguments
"Death of God theology" is not a single, unified position; it names a loose grouping of a small number of American theologians writing in the early-to-mid 1960s who shared vocabulary and a general cultural moment more than they shared a single argument. The two most cited figures illustrate how much variation the label covers.
Thomas J. J. Altizer, teaching at Emory University, developed the most philosophically ambitious version of the position, drawing heavily and explicitly on Hegel's dialectical account of Spirit unfolding through history (already introduced in chapter 1) and on William Blake's poetic vision of a self-emptying, self-negating divine. In books including The Gospel of Christian Atheism (1966), Altizer argued that the incarnation itself was the event of God's "death": the transcendent, wholly other God of genuinely and permanently emptied himself into Jesus Christ and, through Christ, into the ongoing historical and cosmic process, so that a transcendent God "beyond" the world no longer exists as a separate reality to be encountered. On this reading, God has not vanished into nothing; God has poured himself entirely into the immanent, historical world, and can therefore no longer be addressed as a distinct, transcendent Other standing over against that world. Altizer described this not as a loss to be mourned but, in a move continuous with Hegel's dialectic, as a completion — Christian faith's own inner logic finally worked all the way through to what he took to be its genuine conclusion.
William Hamilton, at Colgate Rochester Divinity School, argued a considerably less metaphysically elaborate version. Hamilton's "death of God" language described primarily an experience: contemporary Western believers, himself included, could no longer locate a felt, existentially available sense of God's presence in prayer, worship, or ordinary life, whatever might be true at the level of abstract metaphysics. Hamilton was more cautious than Altizer about turning this experiential observation into a full constructive doctrine, and his later work moved toward Christology and social ethics — a turn to Jesus as an ethical figure worth following even without a felt sense of the transcendent Father — rather than toward Altizer's speculative Hegelian system.
A third figure often grouped alongside them, though with real reservations from Altizer and Hamilton themselves about how closely his project matched theirs, was the rabbi and Holocaust theologian Richard Rubenstein, whose After Auschwitz (1966) argued that the traditional covenantal God of Jewish theology could not be affirmed after the Holocaust without making God either powerless to prevent it or a party to it, and that "death of God" language named this specific post-Holocaust theological crisis rather than a general nineteenth-century Nietzschean argument. Grouping Rubenstein's position too closely with Altizer's Hegelian metaphysics or Hamilton's felt absence risks flattening a genuinely distinct argument, arrived at from a genuinely distinct starting point, into a single undifferentiated "1960s movement."
2. The Nietzschean and Hegelian background
The phrase itself did not originate with these theologians. Friedrich Nietzsche's parable of the madman in The Gay Science (1882), and the proclamation repeated in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, announced "God is dead" as a description of European culture's own trajectory: the intellectual and moral authority that belief in God had once supplied to Western civilization had, in Nietzsche's diagnosis, been effectively killed by the culture's own advancing rationalism, science, and secular morality, whether or not people had yet noticed or come to terms with the consequences. Nietzsche's own point was mainly diagnostic and cultural rather than a metaphysical claim about a divine being literally expiring, and it was delivered as a warning about the vertigo this loss would cause once its consequences were fully felt, not as good news.
Altizer's use of the same phrase inherited Nietzsche's cultural diagnosis but wrapped it inside a Hegelian metaphysical structure Nietzsche himself did not share: for Altizer, God's "death" was not only, or even primarily, a fact about Western culture's loss of belief, but a genuine event in the divine life itself, God's own dialectical self-negation into the world, continuous with Hegel's account (already examined in chapter 1) of Spirit's progressive self-realization through historical negation. This is worth stating carefully because it is easy to flatten: Nietzsche's proclamation and Altizer's theology use the identical phrase to make two philosophically different kinds of claim, one primarily cultural-diagnostic and one primarily metaphysical, and Altizer's own writing draws on both without always distinguishing them as sharply as a careful reader would want.
3. The Time cover and the movement's real scale
The 8 April 1966 Time cover, and the long feature article inside it profiling Altizer, Hamilton, and several adjacent figures, gave the movement a level of public visibility wildly disproportionate to its actual size, institutional weight, or duration. The movement had no seminary, no denomination, no journal of its own, and never commanded more than a handful of visible proponents even at its peak; most American academic theologians, including most of the liberal Protestant theologians this course has already examined, regarded it as a provocative minority position rather than a mainstream development, and several of the more prominent neo-orthodox and existentialist theologians examined in earlier chapters published direct rebuttals within the same few years.
By the early 1970s the movement had effectively dissolved as an organized position. Altizer continued to publish idiosyncratic, Hegelian-inflected theological and literary work for decades afterward, largely outside the theological mainstream and without the wide public audience of the mid-1960s. Hamilton moved his own work toward social ethics and eventually toward a much more limited, largely autobiographical engagement with the question, later stepping back from theological writing altogether for a period. No later major movement in systematic or historical theology claims direct descent from death-of-God theology in the way, for example, that later feminist and process theologies drew directly and explicitly on earlier twentieth-century sources.
Why the decline, and what it does and does not show: several factors plausibly contributed — the movement's thin institutional base, its unusually narrow circle of proponents, the difficulty of sustaining ordinary church life, preaching, or on Altizer's Hegelian premises, and simple changes in American theological fashion as the 1960s gave way to 's very different (and, as chapter 10 will show, far more durable) critique of the theological status quo. It is worth resisting two opposite overstatements here. The movement's rapid public decline does not by itself prove Altizer's or Hamilton's arguments were refuted point by point in scholarly debate; a position can fade from prominence for institutional and cultural reasons that are largely independent of whether its arguments were ever actually answered. At the same time, the movement's genuine thinness — a handful of proponents, no lasting institutional base, limited direct scholarly descent — means claims that death-of-God theology represented a major, lasting turn in twentieth-century theology considerably overstate its actual scale and durability relative to the very wide public attention it received in 1966.
4. Keeping this lecture's subject distinct from 6-1 and 6-2
This chapter's overview diagram already flagged the risk of running Bonhoeffer, Cox, and the death-of-God theologians together into one undifferentiated "1960s secular theology," and this lecture's material makes the risk concrete. Bonhoeffer's prison fragments never denied God's transcendence; if anything, as lecture 6-1 showed, they assumed it while asking how a mature, non-religious idiom could speak of it. Cox's The Secular City argued that a fully transcendent, sovereign God authorizes and blesses the secularizing of created things, political structures, and static values, precisely because God remains sovereign over the process. Altizer's position is different in kind from both: it is a claim that the transcendent God of classical theism has, through the incarnation and the historical process that followed it, ceased to exist as a separate, "wholly other" reality distinguishable from the immanent world. Later popular writing, and even some academic summaries written after the fact, have sometimes cited Bonhoeffer's "religionless Christianity" as an anticipation of, or warrant for, Altizer's position specifically. Bethge and most careful Bonhoeffer scholars reject this connection; Bonhoeffer's own devotional life and his explicit references to prayer and Christ's lordship in the same letters sit uneasily beside a reading that would make him a forerunner of a position asserting God's transcendent reality has ended altogether. The lexical overlap between "a world come of age" and "the death of God" is real; the theological content behind each phrase is not the same, and this course does not treat them as one continuous argument.
6. Further Reading
- Altizer, Thomas J. J. The Gospel of Christian Atheism. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966.
- Altizer, Thomas J. J., and William Hamilton. Radical Theology and the Death of God. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966.
- Hamilton, William. The New Essence of Christianity. Rev. ed. New York: Association Press, 1966.
- Rubenstein, Richard L. After Auschwitz: Radical Theology and Contemporary Judaism. 2nd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1974.
- Roberts, Tom A. Contesting Spirit: Nietzsche, Affirmation, Religion. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. (On Nietzsche's proclamation and its later theological appropriations.)
In short
- "Death of God" theology was a loose grouping of a few American theologians in the mid-1960s. The 8 April 1966 Time cover, "Is God Dead?", made it famous.
- Altizer drew on Hegel and Blake. He said the incarnation was God's "death": a transcendent God emptied himself permanently into Christ and the world. This is a metaphysical claim.
- Hamilton described mainly an experience: believers could no longer feel God's presence. Rubenstein argued from the Holocaust. The lecture says these are three distinct arguments.
- Nietzsche's "God is dead" was mainly a cultural diagnosis. Altizer used the phrase in a different, metaphysical way.
- The movement had no seminary, journal or denomination and dissolved by the early 1970s. Fading is not the same as refutation, and the movement was thin and small.
Topic: The brief 1960s "death of God" movement, its different arguments, and its roots in Hegel and Nietzsche.
Remember: "God is dead" did not mean simple atheism. Altizer, Hamilton and Rubenstein meant different things, and the movement was far smaller than its publicity suggested.
Caution: Do not lump it with Bonhoeffer or Cox. They kept God's transcendence. Also, the movement's decline does not prove its arguments were refuted point by point.
One line to carry into ministry: When someone says "God is dead," ask what they mean: a lost feeling, a lost culture of belief, or a claim about God's being.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Altizer's position and Hamilton's position are both labeled "death of God theology," but this lecture argues they are meaningfully different claims — one metaphysical, one experiential. What is lost when a single label covers both?
- Nietzsche's "God is dead" and Altizer's theological use of the same phrase are described here as making different kinds of claims, one cultural-diagnostic and one metaphysical. Reread the lecture's account of each: do you think Altizer was faithful to Nietzsche's original point, or did he repurpose Nietzsche's language for a different argument?
- The lecture cautions against two opposite overstatements about the movement's rapid decline. State both overstatements in your own words, and explain why avoiding one does not automatically mean falling into the other.
- Richard Rubenstein's post-Holocaust argument is grouped with, but also distinguished from, Altizer's and Hamilton's positions. What does Rubenstein's specifically post-Holocaust starting point change about the argument, compared to a Hegelian or an experiential starting point?
- Compare the death-of-God movement's *Time* magazine visibility to its actual institutional durability. What does this gap suggest about the relationship between a theological position's public prominence and its lasting scholarly influence?