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STEL2E Modern Theology

Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis

Contents 40
STEL2E Modern Theology
Chapter 0 · Introduction: What Is Modern Theology, and Why Study It?
  1. Introduction: What Is Modern Theology, and Why Study It?
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: The Enlightenment Challenge
  1. Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
  2. Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
  3. Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: Nineteenth-Century Liberal Theology
  1. Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
  2. Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
  3. Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: Neo-Orthodoxy — Barth and Brunner
  1. Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
  2. Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
  3. Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: Existentialist and Hermeneutical Theology
  1. Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
  2. Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
  3. Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: Christian Realism and Public Theology
  1. Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
  2. Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: Secularization and Bonhoeffer's Legacy
  1. Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
  2. Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
  3. Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
Chapter 7 · Chapter 7: Rethinking God — Process and Open Theism
  1. Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
  2. Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
  3. Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
Chapter 8 · Chapter 8: Hope, the Cross, and Catholic Renewal
  1. Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
  2. Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
  3. Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
  4. Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
Chapter 9 · Chapter 9: The Trinitarian Renaissance
  1. Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
  2. Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
  3. Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
Chapter 10 · Chapter 10: Liberation, Black, and Global Theologies
  1. Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
  2. Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
  3. Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
Chapter 11 · Chapter 11: Postmodernism, Postliberalism, and Pluralism
  1. Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
  2. Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
  3. Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
  4. Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
Chapter 12 · Chapter 12: Evangelical Theology and the Contemporary Frontier
  1. Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
  2. Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
  3. Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
  4. Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis

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24 min

This closing lecture does two different things, and it is worth naming both clearly before beginning. The first three-quarters of the lecture turns from history to genuinely open questions: the ongoing dialogue between the natural sciences and Christian theology, an ecological critique of how theology has traditionally spoken of creation, and the newest of all this course's questions, what artificial intelligence and transhumanist proposals for radically altering human nature mean for the doctrine that human beings are made in God's image. None of these three areas has the settled shape chapter 11's postmodern debates or even chapter 12's earlier evangelical developments now have; a historian of doctrine writing this course's next edition in fifty years will likely tell this lecture's story very differently than this lecture tells it now, because the story is not yet finished.

The lecture's final section changes register entirely. It is not a fourth frontier topic but a closing synthesis, asking what a working pastor or teacher — someone whose task is not to adjudicate the disagreements this course has traced but to preach, teach, and counsel faithfully within them — should actually carry forward from twelve chapters spanning roughly three centuries of theological argument.

What these 24 minutes give you

  • State Ian Barbour's fourfold typology for relating science and theology (conflict, independence, dialogue, integration) and describe John Polkinghorne's own position within that typology.
  • Describe Sallie McFague's ecological critique of traditional models of God and creation, her constructive organic proposal, and a fair criticism of it.
  • State, without resolving them, the genuinely open theological questions transhumanism and artificial intelligence raise for the doctrine of the *imago Dei*.
  • Name at least three specific threads — one methodological, one substantive, one pastoral — that this course's closing synthesis identifies as worth carrying forward from the whole course.
  • Explain how Genesis 1:27, Romans 8:19-22, Psalm 19:1, and 2 Timothy 4:7 each function in this lecture's argument, and why a closing lecture in a history-of-doctrine course quotes a verse about finishing a race.

Four texts anchor this lecture's different sections, the first citation in this lecture marked accordingly and each later citation marked as a return to an already-introduced text.

Psalm 19:1 reads: "The heavens declare the glory of God. The expanse shows his handiwork." (World English Bible) Lecture 12-2 already cited this verse for Plantinga's epistemological purpose — as an example of non-inferential, properly basic belief. This lecture returns to the same verse for a different purpose entirely: as a text long read, by figures from Calvin through contemporary scientist-theologians like Polkinghorne, as licensing serious, reverent attention to the created world the natural sciences study, rather than treating scientific inquiry as a rival to, rather than a further instance of, the "declaring" the psalm describes.

Romans 8:19-22 reads: "For the creation waits with eager expectation for the children of God to be revealed. For the creation was subjected to vanity, not of its own will, but because of him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself also will be delivered from the bondage of decay into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groans and travails in pain together until now." (WEB) This passage supplies ecological theology's most frequently cited biblical text, read there as evidence that the created order's own destiny, not only humanity's, is bound up in the gospel's scope — a claim this lecture's ecological theology section examines directly.

Genesis 1:27 reads: "God created man in his own image. In God's image he created him; male and female he created them." (WEB) This is the text underlying every question this lecture's transhumanism section raises, and its brevity is itself significant: Genesis states the doctrine without defining, in the text itself, exactly which human capacity or feature constitutes the image — a long-standing interpretive question this lecture's frontier section shows becoming newly urgent rather than newly answered.

2 Timothy 4:7 reads: "I have fought the good fight. I have finished the course. I have kept the faith." (WEB) This lecture cites Paul's valedictory words, written near the end of his own life, for their fitness to a course's own closing lecture — not as a claim that this course's material is now settled the way Paul's own race was finished, but as a text naming what faithfulness looks like at an ending: not certainty about every remaining question, but a life's work honestly completed on the terms actually given.

1. Science and theology: Barbour's typology and Polkinghorne's practice

Ian Barbour's Religion in an Age of Science (1990) supplied the framework most subsequent discussion of science and theology's relationship still uses, a fourfold of possible relations: conflict (science and religion make competing claims about the same territory, and one side must be wrong — the framework, chapter 6's Harvey Cox debate already touched, that both scientific and religious partisans sometimes prefer for its clarity, even though most working scientists and theologians reject it as too simple); independence (science and religion address entirely separate domains — empirical fact and existential meaning, roughly Stephen Jay Gould's later "non-overlapping magisteria" proposal — a view that avoids conflict at the cost of leaving little for the two fields to say to each other); dialogue (science and theology can genuinely inform and constrain each other's questions and concepts without either being reduced to the other); and integration (the strongest relation, aiming at a single coherent worldview that draws on both, as 's relationship to modern physics in chapter 7 partly attempted).

John Polkinghorne, a working particle physicist who left a Cambridge professorship in 1979 to train and be ordained as an Anglican priest, gives this typology its most sustained working example from within Barbour's "dialogue" category specifically. Polkinghorne describes himself as a "bottom-up thinker," reasoning from the actual particulars of scientific evidence and experience toward theological conclusions rather than deducing conclusions from theological first principles and fitting evidence to them afterward — a methodological commitment he treats as itself scientifically formed. His own natural theology is deliberately modest by comparison with the classical proofs chapter 1 showed Kant closing off as demonstrative knowledge-claims: Polkinghorne speaks instead of scientific evidence (the fine-tuning of physical constants for life, the intelligibility of the universe to mathematical reasoning) as consonant with, rather than proof of, theism — evidence that fits comfortably within a theistic account of reality without functioning as a deductive argument compelling that account. This is a considerably more cautious claim than the pre-Kantian theistic proofs made, and Polkinghorne states it as such.

2. Ecological theology: McFague's critique and its cost

Sallie McFague's Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (1987) and The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (1993) press a different and more directly critical question: whether 's traditional models of God — transcendent, ruling the world from outside it, imaged as king, father, or lord — have functioned, whatever their original intent, to legitimate human domination and exploitation of the natural world, by picturing God's relation to creation as analogous to a monarch's relation to a kingdom he rules but does not share embodied life with. McFague's argument is historical and practical rather than purely conceptual: models shape behavior, and a model that pictures the created world as a possession to be ruled rather than a body to be inhabited has, she argues, made ecological destruction easier to justify or ignore than a different model would have.

McFague's constructive proposal replaces the monarchical model with an organic one: the universe as, in some qualified sense, "the body of God," with God's relation to creation pictured as more intimate and interdependent than classical transcendent theism generally allows — a proposal with clear affinities, which McFague herself acknowledges, to process theology's panentheism from chapter 7 (Whitehead's dipolar God, genuinely affected by and changing with the world) and, in a different register, to the Trinitarian relational ontology Zizioulas developed in chapter 9, though McFague's own argument proceeds independently of Zizioulas's Cappadocian sources.

Ecology and God's transcendence

This is a point where readers will not agree. Critics — including theologians broadly sympathetic to McFague's ecological concern itself — have argued her organic model risks the same difficulty process theology already faced in chapter 7: that picturing God as bound up organically with the world's own being compromises the transcendence and otherness Barth insisted in chapter 3 is essential to any coherent doctrine of God, and makes it harder rather than easier to explain how God could act decisively, from beyond the world's own limitations, to redeem a world McFague's own texts (Romans 8:19-22 among them) describe as genuinely groaning and in need of a deliverance it cannot supply from within itself. McFague and her sympathizers respond that this objection assumes exactly the transcendent-monarchical picture her critique targets, and that a God who shares creaturely vulnerability, rather than ruling it from an untouched distance, is theologically no less capable of redemptive action and arguably more credible after the twentieth century's catastrophes — the same territory Moltmann's suffering God from chapter 8 already opened, though McFague's ecological application and panentheistic leanings go further than Moltmann's own position did. Both the ecological concern and the transcendence concern are pressed by serious, well-informed theologians, and this course does not resolve which should prevail.

3. Transhumanism and artificial intelligence: the newest questions

Transhumanism — the proposal that human beings should use emerging technology to deliberately transcend current biological limitations, whether through genetic modification, radical life extension, or the merging of human cognition with artificial systems — and the parallel rise of increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence together raise a genuinely new set of questions for the doctrine of the imago Dei that no earlier chapter in this course could have addressed, because the technologies posing the questions did not yet exist when earlier chapters' theologians wrote.

The questions cluster around what, exactly, Genesis 1:27's declaration that humanity bears God's image is claiming humanity possesses, since the text itself does not specify. If the image consists chiefly in a rational or cognitive capacity, does an artificial system that increasingly matches or exceeds specific human cognitive performances thereby raise a question about whether image-bearing could, even in principle, extend beyond biological humanity — or does such a proposal mistake a narrowly cognitive account of the image for the whole of what the doctrine actually claims, an account many theologians have long argued is too thin even apart from artificial intelligence, since it would seem to diminish the image-bearing status of humans whose cognitive capacities are limited by disability or age? If, instead, the image consists chiefly in relationship — the capacity to be addressed by God and to respond, which both Barth's christological account from chapter 3 and Brunner's "point of contact" already located relationship at the center of, each in their own way — what follows for an artificial system that can convincingly simulate relational address without any settled account of whether anything is actually present to receive or return it? And if radical technological alteration changes human embodiment or cognition to a degree its proponents describe as a genuine transition beyond the biologically human, does the image persist through that alteration, and on what theological grounds would an answer either way be given?

This course states these as open questions because they are open questions. Serious theological engagement with transhumanism and artificial intelligence is recent, genuinely unsettled, and drawn from thinkers across very different theological traditions with no scholarly consensus resolving any of the questions just named. A history-of-doctrine course closing in 2026 can report that the questions are being asked seriously and can state what is actually at stake in each; it cannot yet report how, or whether, they will be settled, because the discipline itself does not yet know.

4. Closing synthesis: what a working pastor or teacher should carry forward

Twelve chapters have traced roughly three centuries of theologians answering, revising, or rejecting the Enlightenment challenge chapter 1 named at the start, and disagreeing, often sharply and among people equally committed to the gospel, about how to do so. A specialist historian of doctrine finishing this course has a map of that disagreement, chapter by chapter and figure by figure. A working pastor or teacher, whose task tomorrow morning is not to write the next chapter in the history of doctrine but to preach a text, teach a class, or counsel a grieving parishioner, needs something more usable than the map alone. Three threads from across this course are worth naming explicitly as what should travel from the historian's map into the pastor's or teacher's actual work.

The first is methodological, and it is this course's most repeated caution: elegance is a warning sign. Chapter after chapter has shown a theologian's own tidy, coherent system running into a real difficulty precisely where the system's internal logic pressed hardest — Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence in chapter 2, Barth's near-total rejection of natural theology in chapter 3, process theology's persuasive-power solution to the problem of evil in chapter 7. A pastor formulating their own theology under the pressure of an actual pastoral situation — a question about suffering, about another religion, about a technology none of this course's cited theologians lived to see — should treat their own most satisfying, most elegantly connected answer with the same suspicion this course has asked its readers to apply to Schleiermacher, Barth, and Whitehead alike.

The second is substantive, and it concerns the disagreements themselves rather than the caution about system-building. This course has named real, unresolved disagreements among faithful and serious theologians repeatedly — Barth against Brunner in chapter 3, process against classical theism and against classical theism in chapter 7, social trinitarianism's promise and its tritheism risk in chapter 9, liberation and Black theology's reception in chapter 10, religious pluralism against its evangelical critics in chapter 11, and, in this very chapter, McFague's ecological model against the transcendence it appears to compromise. None of these are failures of theology to reach a conclusion it should have reached; they are, this course has argued throughout, evidence that faithful, careful readers of the same gospel have reached different conclusions on questions genuinely difficult enough to produce that outcome. A pastor or teacher who has followed this course's own practice of stating each side as its own defenders would state it is better equipped to teach a congregation containing exactly this kind of real disagreement than one who has only ever heard one side stated fairly.

The third is pastoral, and it returns to where chapter 1 began. Every theologian this course has traced was answering a question posed by their own historical moment — Kant's critique, the crisis of 1914, the world come of age, postmodern suspicion of metanarratives, and now the sciences, ecology, and artificial intelligence this lecture has just named. A pastor or teacher's own moment will pose its own questions, some already visible in this lecture's frontier section and others not yet imagined by anyone. The task this course's whole method has modeled — describing a position fairly before evaluating it, naming a real disagreement rather than forcing a false consensus, and treating a too-neat connection as a reason for more scrutiny rather than less — is not itself a set of conclusions to inherit. It is closer to what 2 Timothy 4:7 names at the end of an actual life's work: not the claim that every question has been answered, but that the particular course set before this reader has, in fact, been run.

Three Frontier Questions, One Closing Task Open questions above, the carry-forward below Science and Theology Barbour's typology; Polkinghorne's "consonance," not proof Ps 19:1 Ecological Theology McFague's organic model against transcendence — a live, named disagreement Rom 8:19-22 Transhumanism and AI What constitutes the imago Dei — genuinely open, not yet settled Gen 1:27 What travels to a pastor's or teacher's actual work Methodological: elegance is a warning sign Substantive: real disagreements among faithful readers are not failures Pastoral: every moment poses its own question — 2 Tim 4:7

6. Further Reading

  • Ian G. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science (Harper & Row, 1990) — the source of the fourfold typology this lecture uses.
  • John Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction (SPCK / Fortress Press, 1998) — Polkinghorne's own concise statement of "bottom-up" dialogue between the two disciplines.
  • Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Fortress Press, 1987) — McFague's critique of monarchical models and her organic alternative.
  • Sallie McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (Fortress Press, 1993) — McFague's fuller constructive statement.
  • Noreen Herzfeld, In Our Image: Artificial Intelligence and the Human Spirit (Fortress Press, 2002) — an early and still-influential theological engagement with AI and the imago Dei.
  • Brent Waters, Christian Moral Theology in the Emerging Technoculture: From Posthuman Back to Human (Ashgate, 2014) — a critical Christian engagement with transhumanist proposals.

In short

  • Ian Barbour's typology of science and theology has four types: conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration. John Polkinghorne works in dialogue, reasoning "bottom-up" and calling scientific evidence consonant with theism, not proof of it.
  • Sallie McFague argues that monarchical models of God helped justify domination of nature. She proposes an organic model of the world as, in a qualified sense, "the body of God".
  • Critics say her model compromises God's transcendence and the ability to redeem a world that groans (Romans 8:19-22). McFague's side replies that a God who shares vulnerability can still redeem. The lecture settles neither.
  • Transhumanism and artificial intelligence raise open questions about the imago Dei (Genesis 1:27): whether it is cognitive or relational, and whether it survives radical alteration.
  • The closing synthesis names three threads for pastors: elegance is a warning sign, real disagreements among faithful readers are not failures, and each moment poses its own questions.

Topic: This lecture surveys three open frontiers (science, ecology, and AI with transhumanism) and closes the course with what a working pastor or teacher should carry forward.

Remember: Describe a position fairly before judging it, name real disagreements instead of forcing agreement, and treat your own most elegant answer with suspicion.

Caution: The lecture calls the frontier questions open and offers no answers. Polkinghorne's "consonance" is not a proof, and McFague's critics and defenders are both treated as serious.

One line to carry into ministry: Teach each side of a hard question as its own defenders would, and be honest that faithful Christians have reached different conclusions.

Review every summary in this course →

Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • Explain, in your own words, the difference between Polkinghorne's "consonance" language and a claim that scientific evidence proves God's existence. Why does the lecture connect this specifically back to Kant's critique from chapter 1?
  • State McFague's ecological critique and the transcendence-based criticism of her organic model, each as its own side would state it. Which concern do you find more pressing, and can you state the position you find less persuasive in a form its defenders would recognize as fair before explaining why you disagree?
  • Pick one of the *imago Dei* questions this lecture raises about artificial intelligence (the cognitive account, the relational account, or the question of alteration through technology). What would each of Genesis 1:27, Barth's christological account of relationship (chapter 3), and Brunner's point of contact (chapter 3) suggest about how to approach it — and does the lecture's own caution against forcing a too-neat answer apply to your own reasoning here?
  • The lecture names three threads to carry forward: methodological, substantive, and pastoral. Choose one theologian from any earlier chapter in this course and explain, concretely, how one of these three threads would change how you personally would teach that theologian's position to a congregation or a classroom.

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What next

The lecture ends here. What follows was written by its readers.