Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
Contents 40
- Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
- Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
- Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
- Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
- Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
- Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
- Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
- Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
- Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
- Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
- Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
- Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
- Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
- Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
- Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
- Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
- Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
- Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
- Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
- Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
- Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
- Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
- Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
- Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
- Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
- Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
- Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
- Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
- Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
- Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
- Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
- Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
- Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
- Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
- Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
- Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
- Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis
Lecture 11-1 described a philosophical current that made Enlightenment reason's claim to neutral, universal standing look, to a growing number of thinkers, like one historically located story among others rather than the view from nowhere it presented itself as. This lecture takes up the first of this chapter's two theological responses to that current: George Lindbeck's postliberal theology, developed above all in his 1984 book The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age.
Lindbeck, a Lutheran theologian who taught for most of his career at Yale — the book's proposal is often, for this reason, called "the Yale school" — was not primarily doing philosophy of religion for its own sake. He was diagnosing what he judged to be a genuine impasse in twentieth-century theology, an impasse this course's own earlier chapters have already traced from two different directions: liberal theology's experiential foundation, running from Schleiermacher (chapter 2) through the method-of-correlation approaches of chapter 4, on one side, and an older propositionalist orthodoxy that treated doctrines as straightforward factual claims, on the other. Lindbeck proposed what he called a third way, and this lecture states his proposal in the terms Lindbeck himself used, since the vocabulary — "cultural-linguistic," "intratextual," doctrine as "grammar" — is doing real argumentative work, not merely decorative work.
What these 22 minutes give you
- State Lindbeck's threefold typology of theories of religion and doctrine: the "cognitive-propositionalist" model, the "experiential-expressivist" model, and his own proposed "cultural-linguistic" model, and explain what each model claims doctrine actually *is*.
- Explain the central claim of the cultural-linguistic model — that a religion functions like a language and a form of life, and that doctrines function like the grammatical rules that govern how that language may correctly be spoken — including why this claim is meant to avoid the vulnerabilities Lindbeck identified in both of the other two models.
- Explain what Lindbeck meant by "intratextuality" — the proposal that a religious community's own scriptural and narrative world should absorb and interpret the wider world, rather than being interpreted and validated by categories drawn from outside that world (directly against Schleiermacher's method from lecture 2-1).
- Identify why this proposal counts as postliberal theology finding postmodern philosophy an unexpected ally, connecting the "grammar of a form of life" language to Wittgenstein's later philosophy and to the challenge to Enlightenment universalism this chapter's first lecture introduced.
- Describe at least one substantial criticism Lindbeck's proposal received, and state it in a form a critic would recognize as fair.
Two passages, both from , are useful for thinking about Lindbeck's claim that doctrine functions less like a set of freestanding factual propositions and more like a rule that shapes an entire way of living inside a received tradition.
Psalm 119:105 reads: "Your word is a lamp to my feet, and a light for my path." (World English Bible) The image is worth sitting with carefully for what it does and does not claim. A lamp does not give the walker a complete aerial map of the whole journey laid out in advance, available to be surveyed all at once from outside; it illuminates the ground immediately underfoot, step by step, sufficient for the walker to keep walking rightly without stumbling. This is close to, though not identical with, what Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic model claims doctrine does: doctrine functions less as a freestanding, from-nowhere description of metaphysical facts about God (the cognitive-propositionalist model) and more as a rule that shapes right walking, step by step, inside a form of life the walker already inhabits — a rule for living faithfully within the community's world rather than, first and foremost, a set of claims to be assessed by a standard external to that world.
Proverbs 22:6 reads: "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it." (WEB) The verse describes formation into a way of living through disciplined practice sustained over time, rather than through the transmission of isolated propositions to be individually assessed and assented to. This is close to the heart of what Lindbeck meant by describing religion as a "cultural-linguistic" system: a person becomes competent in a religious tradition roughly the way a person becomes a fluent native speaker of a language — not chiefly by learning and assenting to a list of grammatical rules stated as propositions, but by being immersed in the practices, stories, and community life of the tradition until its grammar becomes second nature. It would be a mistake to read either verse as a first-century or Old Testament anticipation of a twentieth-century philosophical thesis about religious language — that would be exactly the kind of anachronism this course warns against. What both verses do offer, honestly, is scriptural language for formation-through-practice that Lindbeck's proposal, developed on entirely different, mostly Wittgensteinian and anthropological grounds, turns out to resonate with.
1. The impasse Lindbeck diagnosed
The Nature of Doctrine opens by naming what Lindbeck judged to be a genuine crisis for ecumenical theology and for theology generally: after roughly two centuries of vigorous theological argument, neither of the two dominant twentieth-century models of what a religious doctrine actually is had proven able to make real, lasting sense of how doctrines function — both in how believers actually use them and in how traditions that disagree doctrinally can ever be reconciled, or even understand precisely what they are disagreeing about.
The first model, which Lindbeck called "cognitive-propositionalist," treats church doctrines as straightforward factual claims or truth-claims about objective realities — closer to the older propositionalist orthodoxy this lecture's overview mentioned, and, in a looser sense, the kind of confident factual assertion the classical theistic proofs Kant criticized (chapter 1) had assumed doctrine could be. Lindbeck judged this model's chief weakness to be its difficulty explaining genuine doctrinal development and change: if a doctrine is simply a fixed factual proposition, it becomes hard to explain how the church can coherently develop its understanding of a doctrine over centuries — refining, for instance, its Trinitarian and Christological formulas across the ecumenical councils — without either denying real development occurred or conceding the earlier formulations were simply mistaken propositions now corrected.
The second model, which Lindbeck called "experiential-expressivist," treats doctrines as secondary, culturally variable expressions or symbolizations of a prior, more fundamental religious experience — the inner feeling or awareness that generates the doctrine rather than the doctrine itself being primary. This is, in substance if not in Lindbeck's own vocabulary, a direct description of Schleiermacher's method from lecture 2-1: doctrine as the church's linguistic and conceptual articulation of the shared feeling of absolute dependence, with the feeling itself, not any particular doctrinal formula, functioning as the stable, universal core running beneath the historically variable doctrinal expressions different traditions and periods have given it. Lindbeck judged this model's chief weakness to be almost the mirror image of the first model's: if doctrine is merely a secondary symbolic expression of a deeper, prior, universal religious experience common to all traditions, it becomes very difficult to explain why real, substantive doctrinal disagreement between traditions should matter at all, or even to say clearly what, if anything, traditions are actually disagreeing about once the doctrinal language is treated as secondary dressing on a shared experiential core.
2. The cultural-linguistic proposal
Lindbeck's own proposal, drawing on the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and on cultural-anthropological accounts of religion (particularly Clifford Geertz's work on religion as a cultural system), treats a religious tradition as functioning like a comprehensive language together with a corresponding form of life — a comprehensive interpretive scheme, embodied in myths, narratives, and ritual practices, that structures the whole of a believing community's experience and understanding of self, other people, and the world, rather than being generated by, or straightforwardly expressive of, some more fundamental experience that precedes and stands independent of the language.
On this model, church doctrines function less like the individual factual claims of the cognitive-propositionalist model and less like the variable expressions of the experiential-expressivist model, and more like the grammatical rules of that comprehensive religious language — rules that govern what can and cannot be coherently and faithfully said and done within the community's own way of speaking and living, without each doctrinal formula needing to be treated, first and foremost, as an isolated, freestanding factual assertion about the furniture of the universe. Lindbeck's favorite illustration is the 's Christological formula: on the cultural-linguistic reading, the rule "the Father and the Son are of one substance (homoousios)" functions less like a piece of speculative metaphysical information delivered from outside any particular community's practice, and more like a second-order grammatical rule specifying how first-order Christian language about Jesus and God may, and may not, coherently be used if it is to remain recognizably and faithfully Christian — a rule generated from within, and answerable to, the church's own scriptural narrative and worshipping practice.
3. Intratextuality
A second key term from Lindbeck's proposal is "intratextuality." Where the experiential-expressivist model tends, in Lindbeck's account, to work from outside the tradition inward — testing a doctrine's adequacy against some independently available account of universal human religious experience, or against Enlightenment reason's own categories, the way chapter 2's liberal theologians sought a foundation Kant's critique could not touch — Lindbeck proposed the reverse movement. A genuinely faithful, cultural-linguistic theology, he argued, should work intratextually: it should let the community's own scriptural world, its own comprehensive narrative and set of practices, absorb and redescribe the wider world in its own terms, rather than accepting some external framework as the neutral standard against which the tradition's own claims must first prove themselves acceptable.
This is stated here as directly as Lindbeck himself stated it, because the contrast with Schleiermacher's method from lecture 2-1 is exact and deliberate on Lindbeck's part: where Schleiermacher sought to relocate Christian doctrine's foundation somewhere a general, universally available human religious feeling could ground it — a foundation that, not coincidentally, Enlightenment reason's critique could not touch precisely because it made no external, checkable claim — Lindbeck argued that Christian theology does not need, and should not seek, any such universally available, tradition-neutral foundation in the first place. The community's own scriptural and doctrinal grammar is where theology properly begins and ends, on its own terms, answerable to its own internal criteria of coherence and faithfulness rather than to a supposedly neutral external standard.
4. Why this counts as finding postmodern philosophy an ally
It should now be possible to see precisely why postliberal theology can be described as finding postmodernism "an unexpected ally against Enlightenment foundationalism," rather than one more threat theology has to defend itself against. Lecture 11-1 described the postmodern critique's central move as an argument that Enlightenment reason's claim to occupy a neutral, view-from-nowhere standpoint, from which every particular tradition's claims could be judged by a supposedly universal standard, is itself a historically and culturally located story rather than the tradition-transcending vantage it claimed to be. Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic model accepts, and builds theological argument directly on top of, essentially that same premise: if there is no neutral, tradition-independent standpoint from which religious claims must first prove themselves before any particular tradition's own internal grammar may be trusted, then Christian theology is released from an apologetic burden (chapter 2) had spent a century and a half trying, and in Lindbeck's judgment failing, to discharge — the burden of translating Christian doctrine into terms a supposedly neutral, universal reason could independently verify. Postliberal theology can instead speak confidently and particularly, in its own scriptural and doctrinal idiom, exactly because — on Lindbeck's postmodern-adjacent premise — no other tradition, including a supposedly neutral secular reason, actually occupies a more privileged, less particular standpoint either.
5. A substantial criticism
This is a point where readers will not agree. Lindbeck's proposal drew serious criticism from several directions, and this lecture states one line of criticism as its own proponents would state it. A number of critics, including theologians broadly sympathetic to confessional Christianity, have argued that the cultural-linguistic model, for all its philosophical sophistication, risks a genuine cost to Christian truth-claims: if doctrine functions chiefly as intra-communal grammar governing what may coherently be said within a particular community's form of life, it becomes considerably less clear in what sense Christian doctrine is making a claim that could actually be true or false about a reality that exists independently of, and prior to, the Christian community's own language and practice — precisely the kind of realist truth-claim the cognitive-propositionalist model, whatever its other weaknesses, had straightforwardly affirmed. Lindbeck's own response to this line of criticism, developed further in later essays defending and refining The Nature of Doctrine, insisted that the cultural-linguistic model does not deny doctrines can be true in an ordinary, realist sense — his account of "categorial adequacy" and of doctrine's capacity for genuine, if grammatically mediated, truth was meant to preserve exactly this — but critics have continued to press the question of whether that defense is fully successful, or whether the model's own internal logic pulls more strongly toward a non-realist reading than Lindbeck himself wanted to allow. This remains, in the secondary literature on Lindbeck, a live and unresolved question rather than one this course settles.
6. Further Reading
- George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, 25th anniversary ed. (Westminster John Knox Press, 2009) — the primary text, with a new introduction assessing the book's reception a quarter-century on.
- George A. Lindbeck, "The Church's Mission to a Postmodern Culture," in Postmodern Theology: Christian Faith in a Pluralist World, ed. Frederic B. Burnham (Harper & Row, 1989) — Lindbeck's own shorter statement connecting the cultural-linguistic proposal explicitly to postmodern philosophy.
- Bruce D. Marshall, ed., Theology and Dialogue: Essays in Conversation with George Lindbeck (University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) — a collection of critical and constructive responses from theologians working directly with Lindbeck's proposal.
- William C. Placher, Unapologetic Theology: A Christian Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation (Westminster John Knox Press, 1989) — a related postliberal proposal developing themes close to Lindbeck's, useful for seeing the movement beyond its single most famous statement.
- Paul J. DeHart, The Trial of the Witnesses: The Rise and Decline of Postliberal Theology (Blackwell, 2006) — a substantial critical assessment tracing both the influence and the internal difficulties of the postliberal proposal, including the realism question raised in this lecture.
In short
- George Lindbeck saw an impasse in twentieth-century theology between two models of doctrine. The first, "cognitive-propositionalist", treats doctrines as fixed factual claims. The second, "experiential-expressivist", treats them as expressions of a prior experience, as in Schleiermacher.
- Lindbeck judged the first model weak on doctrinal development and the second weak on explaining why real disagreement matters.
- His "cultural-linguistic" model treats a religion as a language and form of life, and doctrines as grammar rules. He read the Nicene "of one substance" (homoousios) formula this way.
- "Intratextuality" means the community's own scriptural world absorbs and interprets the wider world, not the reverse. This fits the postmodern doubt about neutral reason.
- Critics ask whether doctrine can still be true or false about a reality beyond the community's language. Lindbeck said yes; critics are not all satisfied.
Topic: This lecture presents George Lindbeck's postliberal proposal that doctrine works like the grammar of a religious language and way of life.
Remember: On Lindbeck's view, doctrines are rules governing how Christian language may faithfully be spoken and lived, learned by immersion in the community's practices, like a native language.
Caution: Lindbeck says doctrines can still be true in an ordinary sense. Critics doubt his defense is fully successful, and the lecture leaves that question open.
One line to carry into ministry: Form people in the church's stories, worship, and practices, not only in lists of beliefs to agree with.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic model is offered as a genuine third way, not a compromise position between the other two. Having read this lecture, do you find it a genuinely distinct third option, or does it, in your judgment, lean closer to one of the other two models than Lindbeck himself claimed?
- This lecture connected Lindbeck's proposal to Schleiermacher's method from lecture 2-1 as a direct contrast. State, in your own words, exactly what Lindbeck thought was wrong with Schleiermacher's strategy of grounding doctrine in a universal feeling Kant's critique could not touch.
- The criticism section noted that some readers worry the cultural-linguistic model makes it unclear whether doctrine can be true or false about a reality independent of the community's own language. Does Lindbeck's response (that "categorial adequacy" preserves real, if grammatically mediated, truth) satisfy this worry, in your judgment, or does the model's own internal logic pull toward a different conclusion?
- Lindbeck's model treats becoming a competent Christian believer as something closer to becoming fluent in a language than to assenting to a checklist of propositions. What, if anything, is lost — and what, if anything, is gained — by describing Christian formation this way?