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STEL2E Modern Theology

Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil

Contents 40
STEL2E Modern Theology
Chapter 0 · Introduction: What Is Modern Theology, and Why Study It?
  1. Introduction: What Is Modern Theology, and Why Study It?
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: The Enlightenment Challenge
  1. Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
  2. Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
  3. Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: Nineteenth-Century Liberal Theology
  1. Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
  2. Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
  3. Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: Neo-Orthodoxy — Barth and Brunner
  1. Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
  2. Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
  3. Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: Existentialist and Hermeneutical Theology
  1. Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
  2. Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
  3. Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: Christian Realism and Public Theology
  1. Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
  2. Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: Secularization and Bonhoeffer's Legacy
  1. Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
  2. Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
  3. Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
Chapter 7 · Chapter 7: Rethinking God — Process and Open Theism
  1. Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
  2. Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
  3. Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
Chapter 8 · Chapter 8: Hope, the Cross, and Catholic Renewal
  1. Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
  2. Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
  3. Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
  4. Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
Chapter 9 · Chapter 9: The Trinitarian Renaissance
  1. Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
  2. Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
  3. Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
Chapter 10 · Chapter 10: Liberation, Black, and Global Theologies
  1. Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
  2. Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
  3. Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
Chapter 11 · Chapter 11: Postmodernism, Postliberalism, and Pluralism
  1. Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
  2. Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
  3. Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
  4. Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
Chapter 12 · Chapter 12: Evangelical Theology and the Contemporary Frontier
  1. Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
  2. Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
  3. Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
  4. Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis

Jump to the key points ↓

25 min

Lecture 7-1 described a philosophical system built largely outside of, and prior to, Christian theology. This lecture turns to what happened when Christian theologians picked that system up and asked, systematically, what a working Christian theology built on Whitehead's and Hartshorne's foundations would actually look like — not simply a metaphysics with a chapter added on God, but a constructive theology addressing sin, salvation, providence, and, above all, the single problem process theologians have argued their system handles better than any classical alternative: the problem of evil.

John B. Cobb Jr. and David Ray Griffin, both working out of the Claremont School of Theology's Center for Process Studies (which Cobb co-founded), did more than any other figures to turn Whitehead's dense academic metaphysics into a working, teachable Christian theology, most accessibly in their jointly authored Process Theology: An Introduction (1976), still the standard entry point to the movement for seminary students encountering it for the first time. Their central constructive claim is a claim about the very nature of divine power: God's power, on a Whiteheadian Christian theology, is persuasive rather than coercive — and this lecture's task is to explain exactly what that distinction means, why process theologians think it solves the problem of evil more successfully than classical theism does, and why classical theists, and not only classical theists, have replied that this account of divine power is difficult to square with the Bible's own repeated language of God's decisive, sovereign action in history.

What these 25 minutes give you

  • Explain Cobb and Griffin's development of a working Christian process theology from Whitehead's philosophical system, and identify the Center for Process Studies as its institutional home.
  • Distinguish "persuasive" from "coercive" divine power as process theology uses the terms, and explain how each actual occasion's own "creativity" or self-determination is essential to the distinction.
  • Explain how process theology's account of divine power is offered as an answer to the problem of evil — specifically, why genuine evil, on this account, arises from creaturely resistance to God's persuasive aim rather than from God's own design, permission, or limitation.
  • State the standard criticism of this account — that it is difficult to reconcile with biblical language of God's sovereign, decisive action in history — in a form both a process theologian and a critic would recognize as a fair statement of the disagreement.
  • Identify at least one further difficulty raised against process theology beyond the sovereignty criticism (for example, questions about prayer, miracle, or the nature of divine promises) and state it fairly.

The criticism this lecture states against 's account of divine power rests most heavily on biblical texts describing God acting decisively and unilaterally in history — texts process theologians must, on their own terms, either reinterpret or set within a wider frame rather than read as straightforward reports of divine coercive action.

Exodus 15:1-3 records the Song of the Sea, sung by Moses and Israel immediately after crossing the Red Sea: "Then Moses and the children of Israel sang this song to Yahweh, and said, 'I will sing to Yahweh, for he has triumphed gloriously. The horse and his rider he has thrown into the sea. Yah is my strength and song. He has become my salvation. This is my God, and I will praise him; my father's God, and I will exalt him. Yahweh is a man of war. Yahweh is his name.'" (World English Bible) The song's own theological claim is direct and unqualified: Yahweh himself "has thrown" horse and rider into the sea, a single, decisive, unilateral act of deliverance the text attributes to God without any suggestion that the outcome depended on Pharaoh's army freely responding to a divine invitation they were equally free to refuse. This is precisely the kind of text a persuasive-power account of divine action has the most difficulty accommodating on its own terms.

Isaiah 46:9-10 makes an even broader claim about the shape of history as a whole: "Remember the former things of old: for I am God, and there is no one else; I am God, and there is none like me; declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times things that are not yet done; saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." (WEB) The prophet's claim here is not only that God acts decisively in a single episode, as at the sea, but that God's own "counsel" — God's determinate plan and purpose — reliably "shall stand" and God "will do" what God has determined to do, language that at minimum strains, and on many readings directly contradicts, an account in which the outcome of history at every point remains genuinely open to whether creaturely occasions freely take up or freely resist God's offered aim.

1. From Whitehead's metaphysics to a working Christian theology

Whitehead's own late writing on religion, especially the closing chapters of Process and Reality and his shorter Religion in the Making (1926), gestures toward theological implications without working out a systematic Christian theology in any detail; Whitehead was, after all, not a confessing theologian constructing doctrine for a church. The work of turning process philosophy into a full, constructive Christian theology — a doctrine of sin, of Christ, of salvation, of the church, of eschatology, each reworked along Whiteheadian lines — fell to a following generation, and John B. Cobb Jr. did more of that constructive work, across a career spanning more than half a century at the Claremont School of Theology, than any other single figure. Cobb's own early and influential book A Christian Natural Theology (1965) first laid out how a Whiteheadian metaphysics could ground specifically Christian doctrine rather than remaining a generic philosophy of religion, and Cobb went on to found, with the philosopher David Ray Griffin, the Center for Process Studies at Claremont in 1973, which became and largely remains the institutional and publishing center of the entire process theology movement in North America.

Cobb and Griffin's jointly authored Process Theology: An Introduction (1976) remains the standard textbook introduction precisely because it takes Whitehead's technical apparatus — actual occasions, prehension, the primordial and consequent poles, eternal objects — and restates it in terms a theological student without a prior background in process philosophy can follow, while showing concretely how each Christian doctrine looks when reworked along process lines: sin as a creature's persistent resistance to, or falling short of, the best aim God offers at each moment; salvation as the ongoing process of a creature (and, ultimately, all creatures together) more fully taking up God's aims; and eschatology reconceived not primarily as a future terminal event but as the everlasting preservation of every achieved value within God's own consequent experience, the doctrine 7-1 described as process theology's distinctive alternative to a separate afterlife.

2. Persuasive power, not coercive power

The doctrine that has done the most to make process theology attractive to many pastors and theologians working directly with human suffering is its account of divine power, and it is worth stating the distinction with real precision rather than the vaguer language ("God doesn't force people to do things") it sometimes gets compressed into in popular summary.

On process theology's account, every actual occasion — every momentary event of experience making up the world, all the way from the simplest physical events to the most complex moments of human decision — possesses, as a basic feature of what it is to exist at all within Whitehead's system, some genuine measure of self-determination, which process theologians call "creativity." No actual occasion is wholly determined by prior causes; each one takes the data given to it (its actual past, together with the "initial aim" God offers, as 7-1 described) and does something with that data that is not fully reducible to, or predictable from, the data alone. This is not a claim process theologians limit to human free will specifically; it is, on their account, a metaphysical feature of every actual occasion whatsoever, though the degree of genuine self-determination available to a given occasion varies enormously — a moment in the experience of an electron has vastly less freedom available to it than a moment of complex human deliberation.

Given this metaphysics, God's power cannot, even in principle, be coercive in the sense of unilaterally overriding an occasion's own self-determination and simply making it become whatever God wills — not because God chooses to refrain from a coercive power God otherwise possesses, but because, on process metaphysics, no such coercive power is available to be exercised by anyone, including God, over an actual occasion's own moment of self-constitution; to override an occasion's self-determination entirely would be, on this system, simply to replace that occasion with a different one, not to control the original one. What God's power actually consists in, on this account, is persuasive: God offers each occasion, at the start of its own process of becoming, the best possible "initial aim" available to it given its actual circumstances — the most valuable, most richly harmonious possibility it could take up — and then that occasion is genuinely free to take up that aim fully, to take it up partially and modify it, or to resist and fall short of it, with God's own subsequent aims to later occasions adjusting, moment by moment, to the actual, freely chosen course the world has in fact taken.

3. An answer to the problem of evil

Process theologians present this account of persuasive power as the movement's strongest constructive achievement, and it is worth stating why in the strongest form process theologians themselves would state it, since this is the doctrine the movement has most consistently offered as superior to 's own attempts to answer the same question.

Classical theism, holding that God possesses the power to unilaterally prevent any particular evil, has to explain why an all-good, all-powerful God permits the specific evils that in fact occur — the traditional "problem of evil," addressed across centuries of from Augustine's account of evil as a privation of good through free will to more recent free-will and soul-making defenses. Process theologians argue that this whole problem, in its classical form, rests on a premise their own metaphysics denies: the premise that God possesses unilateral coercive power over creaturely occasions and simply chooses, for some further reason, not to exercise it to prevent a given evil. If that premise is false — if God's power genuinely is, and can only be, persuasive, because no other kind of power over a self-determining occasion is available even to God — then God is not the kind of being who could have unilaterally prevented a given act of cruelty or a given natural disaster's harm by simply overriding it, and the classical problem of evil, which asks why an all-powerful God permitted a preventable evil, does not arise in the same form at all. Genuine evil, on process theology's account, arises from actual occasions — including, prominently, human choices, but also including the sheer complexity and partial resistance built into a world composed of billions of genuinely self-determining occasions interacting with one another — falling short of, or actively resisting, the best aim God offered them, not from God's own design, God's own permission of a preventable harm, or a limitation God imposed on an otherwise unlimited power.

4. The standard criticism, stated fairly

The most persistent and, many theologians across several traditions have argued, most serious criticism of process theology's account of divine power is that it is difficult, and on many readings simply impossible, to reconcile with the Bible's own repeated language of God's sovereign, unilateral, decisive action in history — precisely the kind of language this lecture's scripture section quoted from Exodus 15 and Isaiah 46. The Song of the Sea does not present Pharaoh's army as freely, if reluctantly, taking up a divine aim that happened to result in their own destruction in the water; it presents Yahweh as the direct, active subject who "threw" them into the sea, a single decisive act the text attributes without qualification to God alone. Isaiah 46:9-10's claim that God's "counsel shall stand" and that God "will do all my pleasure" reads, on its most natural sense, as a claim about the reliable, guaranteed outcome of history as a whole, not merely God's persistent, ultimately uncertain persuasive influence upon a genuinely open future. Critics — a group including not only Thomist and Reformed classical theists but also open theists, whose own quite different revision of classical foreknowledge 7-3 will cover, since open theists affirm exactly this kind of decisive divine sovereignty that process theology denies — have argued that a theology unable to affirm, on its own terms, that God simply did divide the sea or simply will accomplish God's declared purpose has given up something the biblical text itself will not let go of.

Process theologians have offered several replies, each worth stating fairly rather than dismissing. Some argue that biblical language of God's decisive, unilateral action should itself be read, consistently with process metaphysics, as the ancient narrator's own culturally available way of describing an outcome that in fact resulted from an overwhelming, historically extraordinary convergence of persuasively influenced natural and human factors — not a false description, on this reading, but a pre-scientific, non-technical one, comparable to how the Bible elsewhere describes weather or illness in agency-language without thereby committing modern readers to a literal divine hand moving each raindrop. Others have argued that the sheer scale and repetition of biblical language describing God's decisive sovereignty should be taken as evidence that process theology's revision of classical divine power, whatever its philosophical merits addressing the problem of evil, has understated how strongly and how differently Scripture speaks of God's own agency compared to Whitehead's system — a genuine internal tension within process theology that some of its own defenders, including some within the broader process and open-and-relational theology conversation, have continued to work on rather than treating as settled.

5. A further difficulty: prayer, promise, and miracle

Beyond the sovereignty criticism, a further, related difficulty has been pressed against process theology's account of prayer and miracle specifically. If God's power is exhaustively persuasive, never coercive, then a petitionary prayer asking God to heal a specific illness, or a biblical promise that a specific outcome will certainly occur, cannot be requests or guarantees that God will unilaterally bring about a particular result; at most, on process theology's own terms, prayer can be understood as one further influence on the situation — perhaps altering, in some way process theologians have offered several different accounts of, the range of possibilities God is then able to persuasively offer to the occasions involved, or as a discipline shaping the one who prays to be more receptive to God's own aims. Critics have asked whether this account of prayer's efficacy, however carefully constructed, still amounts in practice to the classical, and biblical, confidence that God is able, and sometimes does choose, to act decisively and unilaterally in answer to prayer — a confidence expressed not only in the Exodus narrative this lecture has already cited but across the biblical prayers of individuals asking God to act, rather than merely to influence.

Persuasive Power and the Problem of Evil Cobb and Griffin's central constructive claim Classical theism God has coercive power; chooses not to override every evil for reasons theodicy must supply Problem: why does an all-powerful, all-good God permit this evil? Process theology God's power can only be persuasive — no coercive power over a self-determining occasion is available even to God Evil: occasions resist or fall short of God's offered aim The criticism: Exod 15:1-3 and Isa 46:9-10 describe God acting decisively and unilaterally, not merely persuasively Process replies: such texts describe outcomes in the ancient narrator's agency-idiom — a live, contested reply, not a settled one

6. Further Reading

  • John B. Cobb Jr. and David Ray Griffin, Process Theology: An Introduction (Westminster Press, 1976) — the standard textbook statement of the constructive Christian process theology this lecture covers.
  • John B. Cobb Jr., A Christian Natural Theology: Based on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead (Westminster Press, 1965) — Cobb's earlier and more technical grounding of Christian doctrine in Whitehead's metaphysics.
  • David Ray Griffin, God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy (Westminster Press, 1976) — the fullest process-theological treatment of the problem of evil this lecture summarizes.
  • Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, The End of Evil: Process Eschatology in Historical Context (State University of New York Press, 1988) — a process-theological account of eschatology and final redemption of evil, extending Cobb and Griffin's project.
  • D. A. Carson, How Long, O Lord? Reflections on Suffering and Evil, 2nd ed. (Baker Academic, 2006) — a classical-theist engagement with the problem of evil, useful for comparing an alternative approach to the same question this lecture covers.

In short

  • John Cobb and David Ray Griffin, working at Claremont's Center for Process Studies, turned Whitehead's philosophy into a working Christian theology, with sin, salvation and eschatology reworked along process lines.
  • In process theology, God's power is persuasive, not coercive. God offers each moment its best "initial aim," and each moment is free to accept, modify or resist it.
  • Process theologians say this answers the problem of evil: evil comes from creatures resisting God's aim, not from God's design or permission, because God could never override their self-determination.
  • The standard criticism is that this fits badly with Exodus 15:1-3 and Isaiah 46:9-10, where God acts decisively and God's counsel "shall stand." Thomists, Reformed theologians and open theists press it.
  • Process replies say such texts use an ancient agency idiom, or admit an unresolved tension. A further difficulty is whether petitionary prayer and miracle can mean more than influence.

Topic: Cobb and Griffin's Christian process theology, its claim that God's power is persuasive, how this answers evil, and the criticisms it faces.

Remember: In process theology God cannot coerce, because no one can override a self-determining occasion. God only persuades, and evil comes from creatures resisting God's best aim.

Caution: Process theologians do not say God chooses to hold back power. They say coercive power over creatures is not available at all. Critics reply that Scripture speaks of God acting decisively.

One line to carry into ministry: When you explain suffering, be clear whether you are claiming God could have stopped it, and know that traditions answer that question very differently.

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Reflection and discussion

  • State Cobb and Griffin's persuasive-power solution to the problem of evil in the strongest form a process theologian would state it. Does it fully dissolve the classical problem of evil, or does it relocate the problem elsewhere (for example, into a question of why God's persuasive aims are so often and so severely resisted)? Defend your answer.
  • Read Exodus 15:1-3 again. Can you construct, in the terms process theology itself supplies, a reading of this text consistent with persuasive rather than coercive divine power? What would such a reading have to say about Pharaoh's army's own "creativity" and self-determination at the moment of their deaths?
  • Process theology's account of prayer reinterprets petitionary prayer as an influence on a situation rather than a request for unilateral divine action. Is this a live option for a theology that also wants to affirm the New Testament's own repeated confidence that God acts, and sometimes acts decisively, in answer to prayer? What would have to be true for the two positions to be compatible?
  • This lecture noted that open theists, covered in 7-3, share process theology's rejection of exhaustive divine determinism but strongly reject process theology's denial of coercive divine power. Before reading 7-3, what do you think allows open theists to affirm genuine creaturely freedom without also denying that God can act unilaterally and decisively in history?

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What next

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