Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
Contents 40
- Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
- Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
- Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
- Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
- Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
- Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
- Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
- Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
- Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
- Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
- Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
- Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
- Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
- Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
- Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
- Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
- Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
- Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
- Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
- Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
- Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
- Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
- Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
- Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
- Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
- Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
- Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
- Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
- Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
- Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
- Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
- Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
- Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
- Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
- Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
- Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
- Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis
Ritschl and Harnack, examined in the previous lecture, trusted historical-critical method to do a specific, bounded job: separate Jesus's original ethical essence from the church's later doctrinal accretion, and hand back a Christianity still confidently, uniquely true, only cleaner and more recoverable than before. Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923), a theologian and philosopher of religion working at Heidelberg and later Berlin, took the same historical-critical commitment Ritschl and Harnack relied on and applied it with a consistency neither of them had - and reached a conclusion neither of them wanted. If the tools of historical-critical method are genuinely reliable and genuinely neutral, Troeltsch argued, they cannot be applied selectively: the same method that lets a scholar dissect Jesus's teaching from its later doctrinal wrapping must, without exception, be applied to Christianity as a whole, exactly as it would be applied to Buddhism, Islam, or any other historical religious phenomenon. And once that consistent application is made, Christianity's traditional claim to be uniquely, finally, or absolutely true among the world's religions becomes very difficult to sustain on historical grounds alone.
This is usually called Troeltsch's crisis of historicism, and this chapter's principle names exactly why it belongs here rather than as an isolated methodological footnote: liberal theology set out, across Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and Harnack, to rescue Christian faith from Kant's philosophical critique by relocating its foundation onto historical and experiential ground the critique could not reach. Troeltsch shows that the historical ground itself, taken with full seriousness, generates a crisis of its own - one liberal theology's own chosen method could not resolve from within itself. That unresolved crisis is precisely the door chapter 3's Karl Barth and Emil Brunner will walk back through, rejecting not just Troeltsch's conclusion but the entire liberal starting point that led to it.
What these 22 minutes give you
- State Troeltsch's principle of historical method - correlation, criticism (or methodological doubt), and analogy - and explain why he argued it must be applied to every religion without exception, Christianity included.
- Explain, in Troeltsch's own terms, why consistent application of this principle relativizes Christianity's traditional claim to unique or final truth among the history of religions.
- Describe Troeltsch's own proposed way of living with this conclusion - a qualified, historically conditioned validity of Christianity "for us," rather than either abandoning faith or reasserting an absolute claim the historical method cannot support.
- Explain why this lecture calls Troeltsch's crisis "liberal theology's own method turning back on itself," rather than an attack mounted from outside the liberal tradition.
- Summarize why chapter 3 presents neo-orthodoxy as a response built specifically to escape this crisis, rather than as a simple return to theology as it existed before Schleiermacher.
Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, today, and forever.
That which has been is that which shall be; and that which has been done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.
Hebrews 13:8 (World English Bible)
This verse states, in its plainest and most direct form, exactly the kind of claim Troeltsch's historicism puts under the greatest pressure: that Jesus Christ's identity and significance are not merely a product of, or relative to, any one historical moment, but constant across all of them. If Troeltsch's principle of analogy is correct - that every event, including events described in Christian sources, must be judged by the same patterns of cause and probability that govern all other historical events, with nothing treated as a unique exception outside those patterns - then a claim like Hebrews 13:8 becomes, from a strictly historical point of view, either a theological confession standing outside what historical method alone can verify, or a claim historical method itself must treat with the same skepticism it would bring to a similar claim made by any other religious tradition about its own founder. Troeltsch himself did not consider this an argument against making the confession; he considered it a demonstration that the confession's grounding is theological and confessional rather than something by itself can establish or guarantee, and this lecture returns to exactly that distinction below.
Ecclesiastes 1:9 (WEB)
Qoheleth's observation that history moves in repeating patterns, with nothing genuinely new under the sun, is close in spirit to Troeltsch's principle of analogy - the working assumption of the historian that present experience of how events unfold is a reliable guide to how similar events must have unfolded in the past, since human nature and the patterns of cause and effect do not fundamentally change from one era to another. It is worth noting, in fairness to the text, that Ecclesiastes reaches this observation as part of a broader meditation on the limits of purely this-worldly wisdom, and the book does not conclude by treating "nothing new under the sun" as the final word on reality - it ends by counseling fear of God and the keeping of his commandments (Ecclesiastes 12:13) as a perspective that relativizes, without simply cancelling, everything observed under the sun. That structure - a hard-headed observation about historical and worldly patterns, held together with a theological claim the observation alone cannot generate - is close to the tension this lecture asks the student to sit with in Troeltsch's own project.
1. The principle of historical method
Troeltsch's most influential methodological statement, laid out in his 1898 essay "On Historical and Dogmatic Method in Theology" and developed further across his career, names three interlocking principles that, he argues, any consistent historical-critical method must accept together, not selectively. The principle of criticism, or methodological doubt, holds that historical judgments are always only probable, never absolutely certain, and must remain permanently open to revision in light of new evidence - no historical claim, including a claim made in a religious text, is exempt from this ordinary historical fallibility. The principle of analogy holds that the historian can only judge past events by the patterns of cause, probability, and human experience available in the present; an event that violates every pattern of present experience - most pointedly, a miracle, up to and including a bodily resurrection - cannot simply be accepted as historical fact on the text's own say-so, because the historian has no other access to the past except by analogy with what is observed to happen now. And the principle of correlation holds that historical events do not occur in isolation; every event is causally interconnected with its surrounding historical, social, and cultural context, so that no religious phenomenon, including Christianity's origin, can be understood as an unconditioned break into history from entirely outside the historical web of causes that produced it.
Troeltsch's decisive move, and the one that makes him more consistent than Ritschl or Harnack rather than more radical for its own sake, is to insist that these three principles cannot be applied to secular history while being quietly suspended whenever Christian claims are at stake. If a scholar's confidence in historical method is genuine - and Ritschl and Harnack's own essence/accretion project depended on exactly that confidence - then Christianity's origins, including its central claims about Jesus, must be studied by analogy, correlation, and open-ended critical doubt exactly as any other ancient religious movement would be studied, with no special exemption carved out because the tradition happens to be one's own.
2. The crisis this generates
Applied consistently, this principle generates a conclusion neither Schleiermacher, Ritschl, nor Harnack had drawn, though each of their projects arguably pointed toward it. If Christianity's history must be studied by the same critical tools, on the same terms, as the history of Buddhism, Islam, or any other religious tradition, then Christianity's traditional claim to unique or final revealed truth - not simply one valuable religious development among others, but the definitive self-disclosure of God to humanity - becomes very difficult to establish by historical method alone. Historical method, on Troeltsch's own account of what it can do, can describe Christianity's development, compare it usefully with other religious traditions, and assess the relative historical probability of specific claimed events within it; what it cannot do, without ceasing to be historical method and becoming theological confession instead, is certify any one religious tradition among the many it studies as uniquely and absolutely true rather than one significant historical development standing alongside comparably significant developments elsewhere. Troeltsch's 1902 study The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions states this conclusion directly and is usually treated as the central document of what this lecture, following the wider secondary literature, calls the crisis of historicism.
It bears repeating, in line with this chapter's principle, exactly what kind of crisis this is. Troeltsch did not reach this conclusion as an opponent of Christianity working to discredit it from outside; he reached it as a serious, believing theologian following historical-critical method - the very method Ritschl and Harnack had relied on to distinguish Jesus's essential ethical core from later doctrinal accretion - to what he judged was its honest, consistent conclusion. This is precisely why this crisis belongs to 's own internal story rather than functioning as an external attack: the crisis is generated by liberal theology's own chosen tool, applied with full seriousness, turning back on liberal theology's own confidence that this tool could deliver a still-absolute Christianity, only cleaned of later accretion.
3. Troeltsch's own answer, and why it satisfied almost no one
Troeltsch did not conclude from this that Christian faith should be abandoned, and it would misrepresent him to state his position as pure relativism with no remainder. His own proposed resolution, developed most fully in later essays including material prepared for lectures he did not live to deliver (he died in 1923), argued that Christianity could still be affirmed as valid and even, in a carefully qualified sense, as the highest religious development available to European culture specifically - valid "for us," given the actual historical and cultural situation Europeans stood in - without claiming the kind of unconditioned, culture-transcending finality that earlier theology, including Schleiermacher's, Ritschl's, and Harnack's own confident claims for Christianity's superiority, had assumed. This is a serious and carefully argued position, not an evasion, but it satisfied almost no one on either side of the debate it provoked. More traditionally orthodox critics judged that a Christianity valid only "for us," relative to one culture's historical situation, had already conceded the substance of what made Christianity's central claims worth making in the first place - that God had actually, objectively acted in Jesus Christ for the salvation of the whole world, not merely for the cultural convenience of nineteenth-century Europeans. And more thoroughly relativist critics, sympathetic to Troeltsch's historical method but less invested in preserving any special status for Christianity even in qualified form, argued that Troeltsch had not actually followed his own method to its full conclusion, and that a genuinely consistent historicism could not privilege any one tradition's validity "for" any group without smuggling back in exactly the kind of special pleading the method was supposed to rule out.
Is "validity for us" enough?
This is a point where readers will not agree. Whether Troeltsch's qualified "validity for us" is a stable, honest resting place for a historically serious Christian theology, or an unstable compromise that neither historical method nor Christian confession can actually accept on its own terms, remains a genuinely contested question in the study of modern theology, and this course states both sides rather than declaring a winner.
4. Why this crisis, and not an earlier one, provoked neo-orthodoxy's break
It is worth being precise about why this particular crisis, rather than any of the specific doctrinal disputes examined earlier in this chapter, is usually credited with provoking the sharpest and most consequential reaction in the whole of modern theology. Schleiermacher's redescription of doctrine, and even Harnack's Hellenization thesis, could in principle be debated and revised while still leaving intact the basic liberal confidence that a historically serious, intellectually respectable theology was achievable on liberal terms - a matter of getting the details of the historical reconstruction right. Troeltsch's crisis is different in kind: it suggests that the liberal project's own foundational method, applied honestly and consistently rather than selectively, cannot in principle deliver the confident, still-absolute Christianity liberal theologians from Schleiermacher onward had hoped historical-critical rigor would secure. That is not a detail to be corrected within the liberal method; it is evidence, to those who found Troeltsch's argument convincing, that the entire liberal strategy of grounding Christian truth-claims on ground historical-critical method could certify was misconceived from the start.
This is exactly the diagnosis Karl Barth, the central figure of chapter 3, reached from his own direction and for his own historically specific reasons - the catastrophic collapse of the liberal culture-Protestant confidence he had been trained in, at the outbreak of the First World War, discussed in lecture 3-1. Barth's is not, this course argues, a simple return to pre-Enlightenment theology as though Kant, Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Harnack, and Troeltsch had never written; it is a new construction built by theologians who had absorbed the entire liberal argument this chapter has traced, concluded that Troeltsch's crisis showed the whole liberal strategy to be a dead end, and set out to build a theology whose authority did not depend on historical-critical method being able to certify it in the first place - grounding revelation instead in God's own free self-disclosure, a claim historical method is not equipped to adjudicate one way or the other. Whether that move successfully escapes Troeltsch's crisis, or merely relocates the same problem once more, is a question chapter 3 puts back to the student in its own terms.
6. Further Reading
- Ernst Troeltsch, The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions, trans. David Reid (John Knox Press, 1971; German original 1902, revised 1912).
- Ernst Troeltsch, "The Historical and the Dogmatic Method in Theology" (1898), in Religion in History, trans. James Luther Adams and Walter F. Bense (Fortress Press, 1991).
- Sarah Coakley, Christ Without Absolutes: A Study of the Christology of Ernst Troeltsch (Oxford University Press, 1988).
- Trutz Rendtorff, ed., Troeltsch-Studien, vol. 1-, an ongoing German critical series on Troeltsch's work (Gütersloher Verlagshaus).
- B. A. Gerrish, "Jesus, Myth, and History: Troeltsch's Stand in the 'Christ-Myth' Debate," The Journal of Religion 55, no. 1 (1975).
In short
- Troeltsch took the historical-critical method of Ritschl and Harnack and applied it without exception, to Christianity as to Buddhism, Islam or any other religion.
- He named three principles: criticism (historical judgments are only probable), analogy (the past is judged by patterns seen now, so a miracle such as a bodily resurrection cannot rest on a text alone), and correlation (every event is tied to its context).
- Applied consistently, historical method alone cannot certify Christianity as uniquely or finally true. This is the crisis of historicism, and it came from inside liberal theology.
- Troeltsch proposed that Christianity is valid "for us," not abandoned and not absolute. Orthodox critics said this concedes too much, and thorough relativists said it was inconsistent.
- This crisis helps explain Barth's neo-orthodoxy, which grounds revelation in God's free self-disclosure, something historical method cannot judge.
Topic: This lecture explains Troeltsch's principles of historical method and the crisis they create for any claim that Christianity is uniquely or absolutely true.
Remember: Troeltsch was a believing theologian following liberal theology's own method to its honest conclusion, not an outside attacker.
Caution: Troeltsch did not conclude that faith should be abandoned. The lecture states both criticisms of his "valid for us" position and declares no winner.
One line to carry into ministry: History can describe and compare, but it cannot by itself confirm the confession that God acted in Christ, so be clear about what kind of claim we are making.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- State Troeltsch's three principles - criticism, analogy, correlation - in your own words, and explain why he argued they must apply to Christianity exactly as they apply to any other religion.
- Hebrews 13:8 claims Jesus Christ is "the same yesterday, today, and forever." How does Troeltsch's principle of analogy put pressure on a claim like this one, and how would you personally respond to that pressure?
- This lecture argues that Troeltsch's crisis is generated by liberal theology's "own chosen method turning back on itself," rather than by an attack from outside the tradition. Do you find that framing persuasive? What would it look like for a critique to instead come genuinely "from outside"?
- Troeltsch's own resolution proposed that Christianity is valid "for us" without claiming unconditioned finality. State one criticism of this position from a more traditionally orthodox direction and one from a more thoroughly relativist direction. Which pressure do you find harder to answer?
- This chapter has traced three relocations - feeling, ethical essence, and historical method - each solving the previous one's problem while creating a new one. Looking back across all three lectures, what do you think is the single most important thing liberal theology got right, and what do you think is the single most important thing it left unresolved?