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STEL2E Modern Theology

Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy

Contents 40
STEL2E Modern Theology
Chapter 0 · Introduction: What Is Modern Theology, and Why Study It?
  1. Introduction: What Is Modern Theology, and Why Study It?
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: The Enlightenment Challenge
  1. Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
  2. Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
  3. Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: Nineteenth-Century Liberal Theology
  1. Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
  2. Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
  3. Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: Neo-Orthodoxy — Barth and Brunner
  1. Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
  2. Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
  3. Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: Existentialist and Hermeneutical Theology
  1. Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
  2. Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
  3. Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: Christian Realism and Public Theology
  1. Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
  2. Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: Secularization and Bonhoeffer's Legacy
  1. Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
  2. Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
  3. Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
Chapter 7 · Chapter 7: Rethinking God — Process and Open Theism
  1. Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
  2. Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
  3. Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
Chapter 8 · Chapter 8: Hope, the Cross, and Catholic Renewal
  1. Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
  2. Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
  3. Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
  4. Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
Chapter 9 · Chapter 9: The Trinitarian Renaissance
  1. Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
  2. Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
  3. Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
Chapter 10 · Chapter 10: Liberation, Black, and Global Theologies
  1. Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
  2. Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
  3. Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
Chapter 11 · Chapter 11: Postmodernism, Postliberalism, and Pluralism
  1. Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
  2. Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
  3. Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
  4. Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
Chapter 12 · Chapter 12: Evangelical Theology and the Contemporary Frontier
  1. Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
  2. Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
  3. Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
  4. Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis

Jump to the key points ↓

23 min

Lecture 11-2 described George Lindbeck's proposal that doctrine functions as the grammar of a community's language and form of life, and connected that proposal to the wider postliberal judgment that Christian theology need not, and should not, seek a foundation acceptable to some supposedly neutral outside reason. This lecture continues that same trajectory in two further, related directions: Stanley Hauerwas's account of the church as a distinct, morally formative community with its own story and practices, and John Milbank's considerably sharper argument, in Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (1990), that "secular reason" was never neutral to begin with and that every account of social and political reality is, whether it admits it or not, already theological or anti-theological, never simply non-theological.

Both figures share Lindbeck's basic postliberal instinct — that Christian theology does not need to translate itself into a supposedly universal secular idiom to be intellectually respectable — but each pushes it in a distinct direction worth tracing separately: Hauerwas toward ecclesiology and Christian ethics, Milbank toward a comprehensive critique of the entire discipline of social theory. This lecture also makes good on a connection this course's fifth chapter previewed: Hauerwas's project is, in real part, a direct continuation of a criticism first flagged in lecture 5-2, where H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture typology was noted to have drawn later criticism from Hauerwas (and John Howard Yoder before him) for quietly favoring certain answers to the Christ-and-culture question over others.

What these 23 minutes give you

  • Explain Hauerwas's central claim that the church's primary social task is to *be* the church — a distinct, visible community whose shared story, practices, and character formation are themselves its most important ethical and political contribution, rather than a supplier of general ethical principles addressed to the wider society.
  • State the specific criticism Hauerwas (building on Yoder) made of H. Richard Niebuhr's *Christ and Culture* typology from lecture 5-2, and explain concretely why the criticism was that the typology was not a neutral descriptive scheme.
  • Explain John Milbank's central argument in *Theology and Social Theory* — that "secular reason," including the modern discipline of social theory itself, has no theologically neutral standing but rests on its own, usually unacknowledged, quasi-theological or anti-theological assumptions, and that this makes room for theology to reclaim, rather than defer to, the analysis of social reality.
  • Distinguish Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy from Hauerwas's narrative ethics on the specific point of ambition: Hauerwas's project is chiefly an account of Christian ecclesial and ethical practice, while Milbank's is a comprehensive metacritique of an entire modern academic discipline.
  • Identify at least one substantial criticism each position has received, stated as a fair critic would state it.

Two passages speak directly to the theme both figures in this lecture share: the church understood as a distinct people, formed by its own story and practices, whose relationship to the surrounding society is one of principled difference rather than straightforward assimilation.

1 Peter 2:11-12 reads: "Beloved, I beg you as foreigners and pilgrims, to abstain from fleshly lusts, which war against the soul; having good behavior among the nations, so in that of which they speak against you as evildoers, they may by your good works, which they see, glorify God in the day of visitation." (World English Bible) The letter's language of "foreigners and pilgrims" (elsewhere translated "aliens and strangers" or "sojourners") describes a community whose primary identity and citizenship lie elsewhere, even as it continues to live visibly within, and in view of, a surrounding society that does not share its story. This is close to the heart of Hauerwas's ecclesiology: the church's public witness is not primarily a set of policy proposals addressed to that surrounding society in its own terms, but the visible, embodied "good behavior" — the distinctive character and practice — of a community that knows itself first as belonging somewhere else.

Philippians 3:20 reads: "For our citizenship is in heaven, from where we also wait for a Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ." (WEB) Paul's language of citizenship (politeuma) is directly political vocabulary, addressed to a congregation in a Roman colony whose members held, or aspired to, Roman citizenship as a mark of civic status and belonging. Paul's claim that the Philippian church's true citizenship is in heaven does not instruct believers to withdraw from public life altogether — Hauerwas himself has been consistently and explicitly clear, against a common misreading of his work, that his position is not simple sectarian withdrawal from society — but it does relativize their primary civic identity, in a way structurally similar to what both Hauerwas and Milbank argue theology must do to the modern nation-state's own claims on the church's ultimate loyalty and to social theory's claim to be the discipline that authoritatively describes social reality on its own, non-theological terms.

1. Hauerwas: the church's social task is to be the church

Stanley Hauerwas, working chiefly at Notre Dame and then Duke across a long and prolific career, is associated above all with a single, repeated, deliberately provocative claim: that the church's most important contribution to society is not a set of ethical principles, policy positions, or moral arguments addressed to the wider public in terms that public could, in principle, find persuasive apart from Christian conviction, but the church's own faithful existence as a distinct, visible community — a people formed, over time and through disciplined practice, by a particular story (centered on Jesus Christ) into a particular kind of character that the wider society does not, and often cannot, produce on its own terms.

This claim rests on an account of ethics considerably different from the kind of general, universally applicable moral reasoning modern moral philosophy since Kant had typically aimed at. For Hauerwas, moral character is not primarily a matter of correctly applying abstract, universally binding principles to particular situations through detached rational calculation; it is formed, over a lifetime, by the particular stories a community tells and the particular practices (worship, the Eucharist, confession, the ordinary discipline of congregational life) it sustains, which train a person's perception, imagination, and habituated response before any explicit act of rational moral deliberation even begins. On this account, the church does not primarily need better arguments to offer the wider public; it needs to be, visibly and over time, the kind of community whose character bears witness to the truthfulness of the story it tells — witness rather than argument as the church's primary mode of public presence, though Hauerwas has repeatedly clarified that this does not mean the church has nothing at all to say in public terms, only that its most important public contribution is who it is rather than a set of freestanding propositions it could offer independent of that identity.

2. The criticism of H. Richard Niebuhr's typology, made specific

Lecture 5-2 introduced H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture and its fivefold — Christ against culture, Christ of culture, Christ above culture, Christ and culture in paradox, Christ transforming culture — noting there that later critics, including Hauerwas, argued the typology quietly favored certain answers over others. This lecture can now state that criticism with the specificity 5-2 only previewed.

Hauerwas and John Howard Yoder (a Mennonite theologian whose own account of Christian pacifism and church-as-distinct-community deeply shaped Hauerwas's own project) argued that Niebuhr's typology, despite presenting itself as a neutral, descriptive taxonomy of five equally available theological options, was not actually neutral in this way. The typology's very structure — a spectrum running from "against" through several mediating positions to "transforming" — already builds in an implicit value judgment favoring the mediating and especially the "transforming" positions as more mature, more historically responsible, and more adequate than the "against culture" position, which Niebuhr's own chapter on it (focused on the historic peace churches, including the Anabaptist tradition Yoder himself worked within) tended, Hauerwas and Yoder argued, to present less sympathetically and in less developed theological terms than the positions Niebuhr's own sympathies favored. On this reading, Niebuhr's "Christ transforming culture" position — which Niebuhr himself, in the book's own concluding pages, comes closest to endorsing as the most adequate — was not neutrally derived from the five-way comparison but was, in a real sense, already assumed before the comparison began, with the other four positions arranged to make it look like the natural resting point of a fair survey. Hauerwas's own constructive project, with its insistence that the church's primary task is to be a distinct community rather than to seek influence by transforming the wider culture on the wider culture's own terms, can be read as a direct, sustained argument for something closer to a chastened, non-withdrawing version of Niebuhr's "against culture" position — precisely the option Hauerwas judged Niebuhr's typology had least fairly represented.

3. Milbank: secular reason was never neutral

John Milbank's Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (1990) shares Hauerwas's and Lindbeck's basic postliberal instinct but extends it into a far more comprehensive and, in the secondary literature, far more contested argument. Milbank's target is not primarily Niebuhr's typology or a particular account of Christian ethics but the entire modern discipline of social theory — sociology, political theory, and the broader tradition of "secular reason" that discipline assumes it can operate within, describing and explaining social and political reality on terms that are simply non-theological, neutral, and available to any rational observer regardless of religious commitment.

Milbank's central historical and philosophical claim is that this supposedly neutral secular space never actually existed as neutral in the first place. Tracing the genealogy of modern social theory back through its formative sources — including, among others, Machiavelli's account of political power, the social contract tradition, and nineteenth-century sociology's own founding figures — Milbank argues that each of these supposedly secular accounts of society in fact rests on its own substantive, usually unacknowledged, theological or anti-theological assumptions about human nature, will, power, and the ultimate shape of reality, assumptions inherited, transformed, or reacted against from an earlier explicitly theological tradition, rather than arrived at from some tradition-independent, purely rational starting point. "Secular reason," on Milbank's account, is not the absence of theology; it is itself a rival theology (or, in some of its more nihilistic modern forms, an explicitly anti-theology), dressed in the borrowed and now-unacknowledged clothing of neutrality.

The constructive conclusion Milbank draws from this genealogical argument is considerably bolder than Lindbeck's or even Hauerwas's: since no genuinely neutral, non-theological standpoint for analyzing social reality actually exists, theology need not, and should not, defer to social theory's own self-presentation as a discipline standing above or prior to theological commitment. Theology can, and on Milbank's account should, offer its own account of social reality — grounded specifically in a theological vision of peaceable, non-violent relationship rooted in the doctrine of the and modeled on the practice of the church — as a genuine rival to, rather than a supplement for, modern social theory's own account, on the grounds that theology's account, unlike social theory's several competing modern accounts (which Milbank reads as variously rooted in an ultimately violent, competitive ontology), is capable of imagining human sociality as fundamentally harmonious rather than fundamentally conflictual.

4. Where Hauerwas and Milbank differ

It is worth being precise about scope, since the two positions are easily run together under the single label "postliberal" or "Radical Orthodoxy," even though only Milbank's own project uses the latter term for itself. Hauerwas's ambition is considerably more modest and more practically oriented: an account of Christian ecclesial community, character formation, and ethics, argued largely through close engagement with particular ethical questions (just war and pacifism, medicine and disability, the character of Christian universities) rather than through a single comprehensive metaphysical or historical argument. Milbank's ambition is considerably more sweeping: a metacritique of an entire modern academic discipline's foundational self-understanding, argued through a dense, often demanding engagement with the history of philosophy and social theory from Machiavelli through Marx to postmodern thought, aimed at displacing secular reason's claimed authority wholesale rather than at describing how a particular Christian community should live within a society that continues to grant that authority to itself.

5. A substantial criticism of each

Is doctrine only grammar?

This is a point where readers will not agree. Hauerwas's project has drawn sustained criticism, including from other theologians broadly sympathetic to his basic postliberal instincts, on the specific charge of "sectarianism" or "" — the worry that an ecclesiology this focused on the church's own distinct story and practice risks abandoning any real, substantive engagement with, or responsibility for, the wider society the church continues, in fact, to live within, leaving Hauerwas's account unable to say much of anything constructive about, for instance, a specific piece of public legislation or a specific act of state violence beyond restating the church's own call to nonviolence from outside the situation. Hauerwas has repeatedly and explicitly denied that his position amounts to sectarian withdrawal, arguing that a church faithfully being itself is not the same as a church retreating from public life, but critics, including James Gustafson (Hauerwas's own teacher) in an influential and sharply worded critique, have continued to press whether this denial is fully successful in practice.

Milbank's project has drawn a comparably sharp criticism from a different direction: a number of critics, including theologians who share Milbank's basic theological commitments, have argued that Milbank's genealogical claim — that every secular account of social reality rests on its own unacknowledged theology — proves considerably less than Milbank wants it to prove. Even granting that no secular social theory is genuinely "neutral" in Milbank's strong sense, critics have argued, it does not automatically follow that Christian theology's own account is therefore true, correct, or even more coherent than its rivals; showing that every position has some substantive starting point is not, by itself, an argument for the superiority of any one particular starting point over the others, and some critics have judged Milbank's own confident claim that a specifically Trinitarian theological ontology of peace is demonstrably superior to every rival social theory's supposedly violent ontology to be considerably less demonstrated than asserted. This remains, in the secondary literature on Radical Orthodoxy, a genuinely contested and unresolved methodological question.

Two Postliberal Projects, Different Ambitions Both reject a neutral secular standard; they differ in scope Hauerwas: Narrative Ethics The church's social task is to BE the church — a distinct, story-formed community Scope: Christian ecclesiology and ethics, argued case by case Criticized as sectarian/fideist Milbank: Radical Orthodoxy "Secular reason" was never neutral — every social theory rests on its own theology Scope: metacritique of the whole discipline of social theory Criticized: proves less than claimed Connects back to ch. 5 H. R. Niebuhr's typology was not neutral (with Yoder) Builds on ch. 11-1 and 11-2 No neutral standpoint means theology need not defer Shared postliberal instinct Theology speaks in its own idiom, not a borrowed secular one

6. Further Reading

  • Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (University of Notre Dame Press, 1983) — Hauerwas's most systematic early statement of narrative ethics and the church's social task.
  • Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony, 25th anniversary ed. (Abingdon Press, 2014) — a more accessible, widely read statement of the same argument aimed at a pastoral and congregational audience.
  • John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 2nd ed. (Eerdmans, 1994) — the foundational statement of Yoder's own account of Christian pacifism and ecclesial distinctiveness that shaped Hauerwas's project.
  • John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Blackwell, 2006) — the primary text of Radical Orthodoxy, with a substantial new introduction responding to two decades of criticism.
  • James M. Gustafson, "The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, the Church, and the University," Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America 40 (1985) — Gustafson's influential critique of Hauerwas's project by his own former teacher.

In short

  • Stanley Hauerwas holds that the church's main social task is to be the church: a visible community formed by Christ's story and by practices such as worship and the Eucharist.
  • Hauerwas and John Howard Yoder said H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture typology was not neutral. Its structure favored the "transforming" answer over "Christ against culture".
  • John Milbank argues that "secular reason", including modern social theory, was never neutral. It rests on unacknowledged theological or anti-theological assumptions.
  • Milbank concludes that theology should offer its own account of social life, rooted in the Trinity and peace, as a rival to social theory. Hauerwas's project is narrower, about church practice and ethics.
  • Critics call Hauerwas sectarian, a charge he denies. Critics say Milbank proves less than he claims, since every position having a starting point does not show which one is true.

Topic: This lecture presents Hauerwas's view of the church as a distinct, story-formed community and Milbank's argument that secular reason is not neutral.

Remember: Both thinkers refuse to translate Christian faith into a supposedly neutral secular language. Hauerwas aims at church life and ethics; Milbank aims at a whole academic discipline.

Caution: Hauerwas says he is not calling for withdrawal from society. Whether that denial succeeds, and whether Milbank's case works, remain disputed in the lecture.

One line to carry into ministry: Let the church's worship and shared life be its first witness, while staying answerable to the neighbors around it.

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Reflection and discussion

  • Hauerwas argues that the church's primary public contribution is who it is, not a set of arguments the wider public could, in principle, be persuaded by. Does this account leave the church with anything to say to a specific, urgent public controversy, or does the criticism that it risks sectarian withdrawal have real force?
  • Restate, in your own words, exactly why Hauerwas and Yoder judged H. Richard Niebuhr's *Christ and Culture* typology from lecture 5-2 not to be neutral. Having read both lectures, do you find the criticism persuasive?
  • Milbank claims that every account of social reality, including every supposedly secular one, is already theological or anti-theological. If this genealogical claim is granted, does it follow, as Milbank argues, that Christian theology's own account should therefore be preferred — or does showing every position has some substantive starting point leave the question of which starting point is true entirely open?
  • Both 1 Peter 2:11-12 and Philippians 3:20 use civic and political language ("foreigners and pilgrims," "citizenship") to describe the church's relationship to the society it lives within. Does this scriptural language support Hauerwas's account of the church as a distinct community more than it supports a vision of the church seeking to transform the wider culture on that culture's own terms, or can it be read either way?

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What next

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