Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
Contents 40
- Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
- Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
- Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
- Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
- Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
- Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
- Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
- Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
- Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
- Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
- Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
- Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
- Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
- Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
- Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
- Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
- Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
- Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
- Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
- Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
- Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
- Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
- Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
- Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
- Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
- Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
- Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
- Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
- Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
- Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
- Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
- Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
- Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
- Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
- Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
- Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
- Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis
Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976) was, by any measure, one of the twentieth century's most influential New Testament scholars, a pioneer of form criticism who spent most of his career at Marburg - the same university where, in the 1920s, Martin Heidegger was his colleague and, for a period, his close intellectual companion. This lecture studies the proposal Bultmann is best remembered for outside technical New Testament studies: demythologization (Entmythologisierung), first presented in a 1941 lecture and developed across his career, most accessibly in the essay collection Kerygma and Myth (the English title given to Kerygma und Mythos, a set of essays by Bultmann and his critics first published in German in 1948).
Demythologization is frequently summarized, including by hostile critics, as an attempt to strip Christianity of everything supernatural and reduce it to a purely human ethical philosophy. That summary is a caricature this lecture works to correct - not because Bultmann's actual proposal escapes serious criticism (it does not, and the second half of this lecture states that criticism fully), but because a caricature is easy to dismiss and a fair statement of the position is not, and history-of-doctrine work owes every figure it studies the second kind of engagement. Bultmann's own stated aim was not to discard the gospel but to make it hearable again by a modern person for whom the New Testament's ancient cosmology - a three-tiered universe of heaven above, earth in the middle, and hell below, populated by demons, angels, and miraculous interventions - is no longer a live cosmological possibility, the way it plainly was for the New Testament's first readers.
What these 23 minutes give you
- State what Bultmann meant by "myth" in this technical sense, distinguishing it from the ordinary English sense of "myth" as a false story.
- Explain Bultmann's distinction between myth and *kerygma* (proclamation), and what he thought demythologization accomplishes for the kerygma rather than against it.
- Describe how Bultmann's use of Heidegger's categories of authentic and inauthentic existence (from lecture 4-1) shapes his account of what the kerygma actually calls a hearer to.
- State, in terms Barth and other critics themselves used, the central objection to demythologization - that it reduces the resurrection to a subjective event in the believer's consciousness rather than something that happened to Jesus.
- Identify at least one place where you think the criticism is fair and one place where you think Bultmann's defenders have a genuine response, without treating either side as simply correct.
If Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain, and your faith also is in vain.
But Thomas, one of the twelve, called Didymus, wasn't with them when Jesus came. The other disciples therefore said to him, "We have seen the Lord!" But he said to them, "Unless I see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my hand into his side, I will not believe." After eight days again his disciples were inside, and Thomas was with them. Jesus came, the doors being locked, and stood in the midst, and said, "Peace be to you." Then he said to Thomas, "Reach here your finger, and see my hands. Reach here your hand, and put it into my side. Don't be unbelieving, but believing." Thomas answered him, "My Lord and my God!" Jesus said to him, "Because you have seen me, you have believed. Blessed are those who have not seen, and have believed.
1 Corinthians 15:14 (World English Bible)
Paul's argument in 1 Corinthians 15 stakes everything, in the most direct terms available anywhere in the New Testament, on the resurrection having actually happened as a real event - not a truth Christian faith could survive losing, reinterpreted some other way, but the very thing the whole structure of Christian preaching depends on. This verse is the single text most often quoted against Bultmann's program, precisely because Bultmann's account of the resurrection (discussed below) treats it primarily as an event of significance for the believer's own self-understanding rather than as a publicly, historically verifiable event of the kind Paul appears to be defending a few verses later, where he lists named witnesses "most of whom are still alive" (15:6) as if their availability for questioning mattered to his case.
John 20:24-29 (WEB)
This episode is worth sitting with at length precisely because it resists an easy verdict on the debate this lecture states. On one reading, it supports Bultmann's emphasis on faith rather than sight: Jesus's closing words bless "those who have not seen, and have believed," which sounds like faith untethered from a demand for physical, verifiable evidence - exactly the kind of faith Bultmann thought demythologization frees a modern hearer to have, since a modern hearer likewise cannot touch Jesus's wounds. On another reading, the passage cuts the other way just as hard: the entire scene is built around Thomas's demand for and receipt of physical, bodily verification of a physically risen Jesus, described in the most concretely bodily terms the Gospels use anywhere (fingers, nail prints, a hand in a side wound), which is difficult to square with an account of the resurrection as a purely existential event in the disciples' own consciousness rather than something that happened to a physical body Thomas could have touched. Both readings deserve to be heard; this lecture does not adjudicate between them for you.
1. Bultmann's project and his working definition of "myth"
Bultmann's proposal begins from a diagnosis about communication rather than a prior decision about doctrine. The New Testament, he observed, speaks constantly in the idiom of an ancient near-Eastern and Hellenistic cosmology now genuinely obsolete: a universe with heaven literally above the sky and hell literally below the earth, connecting the two by a physical and descent; a world in which sickness is caused by demons and healed by exorcism; a story in which the end of history will be inaugurated by a Son of Man visibly descending on the clouds. Bultmann's technical term for this entire framework is "myth" - not, importantly, "myth" in the ordinary English sense of a story known to be false or invented, but myth in a more specific, borrowed sense: the use of this-worldly, objectifying language (spatial location, physical causation, datable events) to express a truth that is not actually about the observable, spatiotemporal world in the way the language's surface grammar suggests.
On this definition, the New Testament's mythological language is not simply an error to be corrected, as if the New Testament writers had made a scientific mistake modern astronomy has since fixed; it is, rather, an inevitable vehicle, given the only cosmology its writers had available to them, for expressing a claim about human existence that is not itself reducible to that cosmology. "The real purpose of myth," Bultmann wrote in his founding 1941 essay, "is not to present an objective picture of the world as it is, but to express man's understanding of himself in the world in which he lives." Myth, in other words, is anthropology (an account of human existence) told in the borrowed grammar of cosmology (an account of the physical universe) - and Bultmann's proposal is to translate the anthropology out of that borrowed grammar rather than to insist a modern hearer first accept the ancient cosmology as literally true before the gospel can address them at all.
This is the crucial move that separates demythologization from simple debunking, and it is the move Bultmann's critics most often either miss or reject. Bultmann did not propose to remove the myth and discard whatever it had been dressed in; he proposed to interpret the myth - to ask what existential claim about human life the mythological language was making, and to state that claim directly, in language a modern hearer, who no longer shares the ancient cosmology, can actually hear as an address to their own existence rather than dismiss as an outdated claim about the physical universe. "The of the resurrection," Bultmann wrote, ties Jesus's cross and resurrection together as a single saving event that calls the hearer to a specific, concrete decision, and demythologizing that kerygma is meant to make the decision harder to evade, not easier - by removing the excuse that a modern, scientifically literate hearer can reject the gospel simply because they cannot accept a three-tiered cosmology, when Bultmann's own claim is that accepting that cosmology was never actually what the gospel was asking of anyone.
2. Kerygma, myth, and Heidegger's authentic existence
This is exactly where Heidegger's categories from lecture 4-1 do their work in Bultmann's proposal. The kerygma - the proclamation the New Testament makes, centrally, that God has acted decisively in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ - calls its hearer, on Bultmann's reading, to a specific existential decision: to abandon a self-secured, self-justifying mode of existence (which Bultmann, following Paul's own language about "life according to the flesh," treats as the New Testament's own name for what Heidegger called inauthentic existence, life lived by anxious self-securing rather than open trust) and to accept instead a new self-understanding grounded entirely outside oneself, in God's own prior act - what Bultmann calls, again following Paul, "life according to the Spirit," and what maps closely onto Heidegger's authentic existence, life that has stopped fleeing its own finitude and taken hold of its genuine possibilities.
On this reading, the cross calls the hearer to die to the old, self-securing mode of existence, and the resurrection calls the hearer to a new life of faith lived out of that death - and both, crucially, are events that happen to the hearer, in the act of authentic decision the proclamation calls for, rather than primarily events reported about something that happened to Jesus's corpse two thousand years ago and that a modern hearer is now asked to accept as a fact of ancient history before faith can begin. Bultmann's famous, and famously controversial, formulation is that "Christ has risen into the kerygma" - the resurrection's reality, for Bultmann, is located in the proclamation's continuing power to call hearers to authentic faith today, not primarily in a past, publicly observable event that historical inquiry could in principle confirm or disconfirm the way it investigates any other ancient claim.
3. The sharp criticism, stated fairly
Critics disagree
This is a point where readers will not agree. Bultmann's account of the resurrection drew immediate, serious criticism from a wide range of theologians, and Karl Barth - whose own theology of God's free, objective self-revelation in Christ, studied across chapter 3, stands about as far as possible from locating revelation's reality in the believer's own existential decision - was among the sharpest. Barth's objection, echoed by many others including some of Bultmann's own former students, was not merely that demythologization makes theology fashionable or trendy but that it inverts the New Testament's actual claim: Paul in 1 Corinthians 15 argues that if the resurrection did not happen as an event to Christ - if Christ "has not been raised" (15:14, studied above) - then Christian faith is worthless, precisely because faith's object, for Paul, is something that happened to Jesus and only secondarily something that then happens to the believer. On Barth's reading, Bultmann has quietly reversed that order: the resurrection's reality has become dependent on, rather than the ground of, the believer's own existential appropriation, so that a proclamation that once claimed "Christ is risen, therefore you may believe" has been rewritten as something closer to "Christ is risen in your believing" - and critics argued this leaves Christian faith with no more objective anchor than any other purely subjective religious experience, exactly the charge Barth had spent his whole career leveling against Schleiermacher's very different nineteenth-century project (studied in lecture 2-1).
A second, related criticism presses on Bultmann's own working definition of myth. If "myth" names any this-worldly, objectifying language used to express a truth about human existence, critics asked, what non-arbitrary line stops the entire , and not merely its ancient cosmological trappings, from being classified as myth and demythologized in the same way - a worry that some of Bultmann's own theological heirs (including several essayists in the Kerygma and Myth volume itself) pushed considerably further than Bultmann himself was willing to go, arguing that a consistently applied demythologizing method has no principled stopping point short of dissolving the entire objective content of Christian doctrine into existential statements about the interpreter's own self-understanding.
Bultmann's defenders, for their part, argued that this criticism trades on exactly the confusion Bultmann's technical definition of myth was meant to dissolve: to say the resurrection's saving significance is located in its continuing call to faith is not, on their reading, to deny that something real happened to Jesus, but to insist that what kind of reality is at stake - an eschatological act of God, not an event straightforwardly continuous with other datable historical occurrences that ordinary could confirm the way it confirms a battle or a treaty - has been misdescribed by demanding it meet the standard of "objective, publicly available history" in the first place. Whether that response actually answers Barth's objection, or merely restates the disagreement in different terms, is precisely the kind of question this course leaves for the student to weigh rather than settling in advance; both Bultmann and his critics were serious, careful theologians defending positions they had thought through at length, and neither side should be dismissed as having simply failed to notice the other's point.
4. A note on scope
Bultmann's technical New Testament scholarship - his pioneering work in form criticism, his massive commentary on John's Gospel, his historical reconstruction of the earliest church's oral traditions - is a separate body of work from demythologization specifically, and a scholar can accept a great deal of Bultmann's historical-critical method while rejecting demythologization's theological proposal, or vice versa; the two are logically separable even though they came from the same person and the same broadly skeptical estimate of how much can be known about the historical Jesus behind the Gospels' theological presentation of him. This lecture, following the chapter's scope, addresses only the theological proposal.
6. Further Reading
- Rudolf Bultmann et al., Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch, trans. Reginald H. Fuller (Harper Torchbooks, 1961).
- Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).
- Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/1, trans. G. W. Bromiley (T&T Clark, 1956), §59, for Barth's own constructive account of the resurrection against which his criticism of Bultmann should be read.
- David Fergusson, Bultmann (Geoffrey Chapman, 1992).
- Roger A. Johnson, ed., Rudolf Bultmann: Interpreting Faith for the Modern Era (Fortress Press, 1987).
- N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Fortress Press, 2003), for a major modern historical-critical argument on the opposite side of the question Bultmann raised.
In short
- Bultmann used "myth" in a technical sense. It means ancient, this-worldly language, such as a three-tiered universe and demons, used to express a claim about human existence. It does not mean "false story."
- Demythologization means interpreting the myth, not discarding it. The aim is to make the gospel hearable for modern people who no longer share the ancient cosmology.
- Using Heidegger's categories, Bultmann read the kerygma (the proclamation of the cross and resurrection) as a call to leave self-securing life "according to the flesh" for life "according to the Spirit."
- Barth and others objected, citing 1 Corinthians 15:14, that Bultmann made the resurrection depend on the believer's decision, not on something that happened to Christ.
- Defenders replied that God's act is a different kind of event from ordinary history. The lecture leaves the dispute open.
Topic: Bultmann proposed demythologization to make the New Testament message speak to modern people, and Barth and others sharply criticised how it treats the resurrection.
Remember: Bultmann wanted to interpret the New Testament's ancient world-picture, not remove the gospel. For him, "myth" is a way of speaking about human existence.
Caution: Do not dismiss Bultmann as saying the Gospels are made up, and do not treat the criticism as settled. The lecture gives both sides and names no winner.
One line to carry into ministry: Explain the gospel in words your listeners can hear, but ask whether your explanation still says that something happened to Christ.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Bultmann distinguishes "myth" (an ancient cosmology expressing an existential claim) from "myth" in the ordinary sense of a known falsehood. Does that technical redefinition change how you evaluate his proposal, compared to hearing it as "Bultmann says the Gospels are made-up stories"?
- This lecture presents John 20:24-29 as a text that can be read to support either side of the debate over demythologizing the resurrection. Which reading do you find more persuasive, and why - and can you state the other side's reading in a form its own proponents would recognize as fair?
- Barth's objection is that demythologization makes the resurrection's reality depend on the believer's decision rather than grounding that decision. Restate this objection in your own words, as carefully as you can, before deciding whether you find it persuasive.
- Bultmann's defenders argue that demanding the resurrection meet the standard of "ordinary, publicly available history" misdescribes what kind of event an act of God is. Is this a fair response to the criticism, or does it concede the criticism while trying to redefine the terms of the argument?
- This lecture notes that some of Bultmann's own students pushed demythologization further than Bultmann himself accepted. What does it tell you about a theological method when even its author draws a line its followers do not respect?