Lecture 8-2: The Covenant Code and the Ratification of the Covenant
목차 37
- Lecture 1-1: What Torah and Pentateuch Mean, and Why the Difference Matters
- Lecture 1-2: The Shape of the Five Books: Narrative, Law, and the Seams Between Them
- Lecture 1-3: A History of Reading: Jewish, Patristic, Reformation, and Modern
- Lecture 2-1: Mosaic Authorship, Tradition, and the Rise of Source Criticism
- Lecture 2-2: The Documentary Hypothesis in Its Classic Form
- Lecture 2-3: After Wellhausen: Fragment, Supplement, and the Present Debate
- Lecture 3-1: Creation and Flood Accounts: Enuma Elish, Atrahasis, Gilgamesh
- Lecture 3-2: Law Collections: Hammurabi, Eshnunna, and the Covenant Code
- Lecture 3-3: Treaty and Covenant Forms: Hittite Vassal Treaties and Deuteronomy
- Lecture 4-1: Genesis 1 and 2: Two Accounts, One Creator
- Lecture 4-2: Genesis 3-5: Disobedience, Cain, and the Line of Seth
- Lecture 4-3: Genesis 6-11: Flood, the Noahic Covenant, and Babel
- Lecture 5-1: The Call of Abram and the Shape of the Promise
- Lecture 5-2: Covenant, Circumcision, and the Binding of Isaac
- Lecture 5-3: Jacob: Deception, Wrestling, and the Making of Israel
- Lecture 6-1: The Joseph Narrative as Literature
- Lecture 6-2: Providence, Human Evil, and Genesis 50:20
- Lecture 6-3: Jacob's Blessing, Judah, and the Bridge into Exodus
- Lecture 7-1: Oppression, the Midwives, and the Call of Moses
- Lecture 7-2: The Plagues and the Hardening of Pharaoh's Heart
- Lecture 7-3: Passover, the Sea, and Provision in the Wilderness
- Lecture 8-1: Sinai and the Decalogue
- Lecture 8-2: The Covenant Code and the Ratification of the Covenant
- Lecture 8-3: The Golden Calf, Intercession, and the Tabernacle
- Lecture 9-1: The Sacrificial System of Leviticus 1-7
- Lecture 9-2: Priesthood, Purity, and the Day of Atonement
- Lecture 9-3: The Holiness Code and What It Asks of a People
- Lecture 10-1: Census, Camp, and the Order of the Wilderness March
- Lecture 10-2: Rebellion, the Spies, and the Judgment on a Generation
- Lecture 10-3: Balaam, the Second Generation, and the Plains of Moab
- Lecture 11-1: Deuteronomy as Covenant Document and as Sermon
- Lecture 11-2: The Deuteronomic Code and the Question of Centralization
- Lecture 11-3: Blessing, Curse, and the Death of Moses
The Decalogue occupies sixteen verses. The block of law that follows it occupies three chapters, and it is a very different kind of writing. Where the Decalogue says "you shall not steal" and stops, Exodus 21-23 asks what happens if a man steals an ox and slaughters it, and what happens if he still has it alive, and what happens if he cannot pay, and what happens if he was killed while breaking in at night rather than in daylight. This is working law: particular, procedural, concerned with compensation and evidence and edge cases. Scholars call it the Covenant Code, after the phrase "the book of the covenant" in Exodus 24:7.
This lecture does three things with it. First, it describes the collection's actual shape — what is in it, in what order, in what forms, and what is conspicuously mixed together. The Covenant Code does not separate religious law from civil law from social ethics; instructions about altars, about goring oxen, about lending money to the poor, and about three annual festivals stand in one continuous document. That refusal to sort is itself worth noticing, because later Christian theology sorted these laws into categories — moral, ceremonial, civil — that the text does not use.
Second, the lecture takes up slavery. Exodus 21 opens with regulations for Hebrew debt-servants, and later verses address the beating of a slave in terms that most modern readers find shocking. This has to be handled without either of the two easy moves. Defending the text by insisting that ancient servitude was really rather mild is not honest; Exodus 21:21 says of an injured slave "for he is his property," and no amount of context makes that sentence comfortable. But condemning the text by measuring it against a moral consensus that took another three thousand years to form is not analysis either, and it obscures the historically important fact that this same body of law was quoted with equal confidence by nineteenth-century abolitionists and by nineteenth-century defenders of American slavery. We will look at what each side actually did with it.
Third, the lecture reads Exodus 24, the ratification ceremony: an altar, twelve pillars, sacrifices, a book read aloud, blood thrown in two directions, and then a meal eaten by seventy elders in the presence of God. This is the moment the covenant becomes binding, and it is also the passage the Letter to the Hebrews reaches for when it wants to explain what a covenant costs.
이 36분으로 얻는 것
- Describe the structure and contents of the Covenant Code and identify the main formal types of law within it, including the motive clauses that are unusually frequent in it.
- Set out what Exodus 21 regulates about servitude, what it does not abolish, and how Deuteronomy 15 differs — and explain why this comparison matters.
- Present, with named representatives, the ways this material was used in nineteenth-century arguments both for and against slavery.
- State the case that the Covenant Code depends directly on Mesopotamian law collections, and the case against it, naming a scholar on each side.
- Explain what happens in Exodus 24:3-11 and how Hebrews 9 reuses it, including where Hebrews' account goes beyond what Exodus reports.
He took the book of the covenant and read it in the hearing of the people, and they said, “All that Yahweh has spoken will we do, and be obedient.” Moses took the blood, and sprinkled it on the people, and said, “Look, this is the blood of the covenant, which Yahweh has made with you concerning all these words.” — Exodus 24:7-8
World English Bible
You shall not wrong an alien, neither shall you oppress him, for you were aliens in the land of Egypt. “You shall not take advantage of any widow or fatherless child. — Exodus 22:21-22
WEB
If you buy a Hebrew servant, he shall serve six years and in the seventh he shall go out free without paying anything. — Exodus 21:2
WEB
Three elements are worth marking before we begin. The is read aloud — it is a document, and the people are placed under something whose contents they have heard. The people answer, and their answer is recorded twice (24:3 and again here), which gives the ceremony the character of a formal agreement rather than an imposition. And blood is applied to both parties: half thrown against the altar, half on the people. Whatever the blood means — and the text does not explain it — it is placed on both sides of the relationship.
This is the Covenant Code's characteristic move. The command is followed by a reason, and the reason is a memory: you know what this feels like. Legal collections elsewhere in the ancient Near East rarely argue with their subjects; they issue rulings. This one keeps explaining itself, and the explanations are usually either historical ("you were aliens") or theological ("for I am gracious," 22:27).
And this is where the difficult section begins. Note what the sentence assumes and what it commands. It assumes that a Hebrew can be bought. It commands that he be released in the seventh year without payment. The regulation is real and it is limited, and holding both halves of that sentence in view is the whole task of the middle section of this lecture.
1. What is in the Covenant Code
The collection runs from Exodus 20:22 to 23:33. Its outer frame is religious: it opens with altar law (20:22-26) and closes with festival law and promises about the conquest (23:14-33). Between those, it moves through material that a modern legal system would distribute across half a dozen separate codes.
The opening altar law is worth a moment because of where the course is going. "You shall make an altar of earth for me… In every place where I record my name I will come to you and I will bless you" (20:24, WEB). This envisages multiple legitimate places of sacrifice. Deuteronomy 12 will insist on one chosen place. Lecture 11-2 takes up what to make of that; here it is enough to register that the tension exists and that it is one of the main pieces of evidence in the centralization debate.
Then the case law. Servitude (21:2-11). Capital offences: homicide, striking a parent, kidnapping, cursing a parent (21:12-17). Bodily injury, including the famous formula about eye for eye (21:18-27). The goring ox, in a series of graduated cases depending on whether the animal had a known history of goring (21:28-36). Theft and restitution (22:1-4). Damage by grazing and by fire (22:5-6). Bailment — goods left with a neighbour for safekeeping — and the oath procedure when there are no witnesses (22:7-15). Seduction (22:16-17). A short run of religious and moral absolutes (22:18-20). Then the social provisions: the resident alien, the widow and orphan, lending without interest, the garment taken in pledge (22:21-27). Then judicial integrity: no false report, no following a crowd to do evil, no bribes, no perversion of a poor person's lawsuit, and the striking requirement to return a personal enemy's stray animal and help unload the beast of someone who hates you (23:1-9). Then the sabbatical year and the Sabbath (23:10-12), and the three annual pilgrimage festivals (23:14-19).
Two formal features deserve attention.
Mixed forms. Most of the middle is casuistic — the if-then case law described in lecture 3-2, and standard across the ancient Near East. But apodictic commands ("you shall not oppress an alien") appear throughout, not segregated into a block. Albrecht Alt's classification remains useful for describing the two forms; his further claim that the apodictic form was distinctively Israelite has been substantially eroded by later comparative work, and it should not be relied on.
Motive clauses. This is the Covenant Code's most distinctive formal feature, studied in detail by Berend Gemser and later by Rifat Sonsino. Roughly a fifth of its laws attach a reason. Hammurabi's laws do not do this except in the prologue and epilogue. The effect is that the collection addresses its subjects as people who are expected to understand why, and it grounds the "why" in a shared history rather than in royal authority.
2. Slavery: what the text does, and what it does not do
This is a point where readers will not agree, and the disagreement is not confined to scholars. Let us be exact about what Exodus 21 contains.
It provides that a Hebrew debt-servant serves six years and goes free in the seventh, without payment (21:2). It provides that a man who came in single leaves single, and one who came in married leaves with his wife (21:3). It provides — and this is one of the hard verses — that if the master gave him a wife, she and any children remain the master's, and he leaves alone (21:4). It provides a procedure for a servant who chooses to stay permanently: he says so, is brought to the door, and his ear is pierced with an awl (21:5-6). It treats a daughter sold as a female servant under different rules, with obligations of maintenance and marital status attached to the buyer and an obligation of release if those are not met (21:7-11). It makes kidnapping a person and selling him a capital offence (21:16). It says that a master who strikes a servant so that the servant dies under his hand "shall surely be punished," and then adds that if the servant survives a day or two the master is not punished, "for he is his property" (21:20-21). And it provides that a master who destroys a servant's eye or knocks out a tooth must release that servant free (21:26-27).
Four observations, in order of increasing difficulty.
First, this is regulation, not endorsement in the abstract. The institution is assumed to exist and is constrained: with a term limit, a release procedure, protection of the servant's body enforced by automatic manumission, and a capital prohibition on the trade in kidnapped persons. That last provision is not incidental. The trade that carried millions of Africans across the Atlantic was in kidnapped persons, and Exodus 21:16 prescribes death for it. This is a legitimate and important point, and it was made repeatedly by nineteenth-century abolitionists.
Second, the constraints are unevenly distributed. The six-year limit in Exodus 21:2 applies to a Hebrew servant. Leviticus 25:44-46 distinguishes the terms available to foreigners. The Covenant Code does not universalize what it protects.
Third, Exodus 21:20-21 says what it says. A master who beats a servant to death is punished; a master whose beating leaves the servant alive for a day or two is not, and the stated reason is proprietary. It is possible to observe that the master suffers loss either way and that this is how the ancient legal category of property functioned; it is not possible to make the sentence say something other than what it says. Students should also notice that this is the only place in the Covenant Code where a human being is described in that vocabulary, and that the immediately following verses (21:26-27) grant freedom for the loss of an eye or a tooth — a provision with no parallel in Hammurabi, where the corresponding injury to a slave is compensated with silver paid to the owner.
Fourth, and this is the point that a course in the must not skip: the Pentateuch itself is not stable on this material. Deuteronomy 15:12-18 gives the same six-year rule and then adds two things Exodus does not have. It applies the rule explicitly to "a Hebrew man, or a Hebrew woman" (15:12). And it requires that the released servant not go empty-handed:
When you let him go free from you, you shall not let him go empty. You shall furnish him liberally out of your flock, out of your threshing floor, and out of your wine press. As Yahweh your God has blessed you, you shall give to him. You shall remember that you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and Yahweh your God redeemed you. Therefore I command you this thing today. — Deuteronomy 15:13-15 (WEB)
Leviticus 25 goes further again, in a different direction, tying release to the jubilee and insisting that Israelites are not to be treated as slaves at all because they are God's servants. Whatever account one gives of the literary relationship between these three bodies of law — and lecture 11-2 sets out the options — the plain fact is that the Torah legislates this institution three times and does not legislate it identically. Any argument that treats "the biblical position on slavery" as a single fixed thing has already gone wrong.
3. How this material was actually used
The nineteenth-century American debate is the clearest case study available, and it is instructive precisely because both sides were quoting the same chapters.
Thornton Stringfellow, a Baptist minister in Virginia, published A Brief Examination of Scripture Testimony on the Institution of Slavery in 1841 and expanded it repeatedly. His argument ran through the Pentateuch: the patriarchs held servants; the Mosaic law regulated the institution rather than abolishing it; God gave laws about it and therefore did not regard it as inherently sinful; and the New Testament nowhere commands emancipation. It was a scriptural argument, made by a man who knew the texts, and it persuaded a great many people.
Albert Barnes, a Presbyterian minister in Philadelphia, answered at length in An Inquiry into the Scriptural Views of Slavery (1846). His counter-argument did not deny that the Pentateuch regulates servitude. It distinguished the institution the Pentateuch regulates from the institution then existing in the American South: term-limited rather than perpetual, with automatic manumission for injury, without a race-based hereditary category, and — decisively — with a death penalty on the man-stealing that supplied the American system. Barnes also pressed the direction of the legislation: a law that requires release, requires provision at release, and frees a man for a lost tooth is not moving toward the plantation.
Frederick Douglass, who had been enslaved, made a different and sharper argument. In his 1852 address "What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?" and elsewhere he refused to argue the on its opponents' terms at all, insisting that a religion which could be produced as a defence of the slaveholder had made itself into something other than Christianity. His attack was aimed less at the text than at the use.
Two lessons for a student of the Pentateuch. The first is that the pro-slavery reading was not stupid; it was a real reading of real verses, and it failed for reasons that have to be argued rather than assumed. The second is that Barnes's method — asking what direction a body of law is moving, and refusing to identify an ancient institution with a modern one merely because a translation uses the same English word — is a method, not a trick, and it can be tested. Willard Swartley's Slavery, Sabbath, War, and Women traces this whole controversy in detail and is the best single entry into it.
4. Where did these laws come from?
This is a point where readers will not agree. The Covenant Code's resemblance to Mesopotamian law is not in dispute. The goring-ox laws of Exodus 21:28-36 have close counterparts in the Laws of Eshnunna (sections 53-55) and in Hammurabi (sections 250-252). The deposit and bailment provisions, the treatment of miscarriage caused by a brawl, the graduated penalties for negligence — these move through the same conceptual territory in the same order.
Copying or shared law
David P. Wright has argued, in Inventing God's Law (2009), that the resemblance is too close and too systematic to be explained by shared legal culture, and that the Covenant Code was composed as a direct literary reworking of the Laws of Hammurabi, probably in the Neo-Assyrian period when copies of Hammurabi were demonstrably in circulation. His case rests on the sequence of topics as much as on individual laws: he argues that the Covenant Code follows Hammurabi's order over long stretches.
Bruce Wells and others have contested this. Their reply is that legal topics tend to fall into a natural order in any agrarian society (injury, then animals, then property, then deposits), that the specific rulings differ at crucial points, and that the direct-dependence model requires a chain of transmission for which there is no direct evidence. Raymond Westbrook, whose comparative work on ancient Near Eastern law underlies much of this discussion, argued for a shared regional legal tradition — a common stock of cases and solutions that scribes across the region drew on — rather than for one text copying another.
The differences between the collections are as instructive as the similarities, and lecture 3-2 set them out: no class-graded penalties in the Covenant Code, no death penalty for property offences, and the presence of the motive clauses discussed above. These differences hold whichever account of the literary relationship turns out to be right, which is worth saying because the two questions are frequently confused. Whether the Covenant Code copied Hammurabi is a question about scribes. Whether the Covenant Code shares Hammurabi's values is a question about its contents, and on that question the answer is visibly no.
5. The ratification: Exodus 24
The covenant becomes binding in Exodus 24, and the chapter is odd in a way that has generated a long discussion.
It opens with an instruction for Moses, Aaron, Nadab, Abihu and seventy elders to come up and "worship from a distance," with Moses alone approaching (24:1-2). Then, without transition, the scene is at the foot of the mountain, and Moses is telling the people the words and writing them down (24:3-4). Then the ceremony:
Moses took half of the blood and put it in basins, and half of the blood he sprinkled on the altar. — Exodus 24:6 (WEB)
The book is read; the people answer; the remaining blood goes on the people (24:7-8). And then the seventy go up after all:
They saw the God of Israel. Under his feet was like a paved work of sapphire stone, like the skies for clearness. He didn’t lay his hand on the nobles of the children of Israel. They saw God, and ate and drank. — Exodus 24:10-11 (WEB)
Two observations and one disagreement.
The blood ceremony has no exact parallel elsewhere in the Old Testament. Blood is applied to altars constantly, and to priests at their ordination, and to the mercy seat on the Day of Atonement. Blood thrown on an entire people is unique to this passage. What it signifies is not stated. Proposals include a ratification oath in which the blood represents the fate of a covenant-breaker (the same logic as the divided animals in Genesis 15), a purification of the people for the encounter that follows, and a joining of the two parties by a shared substance. Exodus offers no gloss, and interpreters should be careful about supplying one with confidence.
The meal is astonishing and the narrator seems to know it. "He didn't lay his hand on the nobles" is a note of relief: they saw God and were not destroyed. Compare Exodus 33:20, "You cannot see my face, for man may not see me and live" — a flat statement, in the same book, that sits uneasily beside 24:10-11. The tension is old and has been handled in several ways: the vision here is partial (the text describes only what was under his feet), or the two passages come from different traditions with different theologies of seeing God, or the sentences address different kinds of seeing. Ernest Nicholson devoted a monograph, God and His People, largely to Exodus 24, and concluded among other things that the chapter's difficulties are not resolved by any simple partition of it into sources. That conclusion is worth carrying: this is a passage where the source-critical tools produce less clarity than they do elsewhere.
Finally, the reuse. Hebrews 9:18-22 cites this scene to argue that the first covenant was inaugurated with blood, and draws the general conclusion that "apart from shedding of blood there is no remission." Two details reward attention. Hebrews mentions water, scarlet wool and hyssop, and says Moses sprinkled the book itself and the tabernacle and its vessels — none of which Exodus 24 reports. These elements appear elsewhere in the Pentateuch, in purification rites, and Hebrews may be drawing on a wider ritual tradition, or on a version of the story current in the first century. A careful reader should notice the difference rather than harmonize it silently. And the argument Hebrews builds is a Christian argument about the significance of Christ's death; it is not a claim about what Moses and the elders understood themselves to be doing. Reading Exodus 24 as if its participants had Hebrews 9 in mind is a category error, however legitimate the later reading may be on its own terms.
Two things the diagram is meant to make visible. The first is the frame: religious material at both ends, case law in the middle, and no internal boundary anywhere between what a later theologian would call ceremonial, civil and moral law. The threefold classification is a tool of later Christian theology — it is worked out systematically in Thomas Aquinas and taken up by the Reformed confessions — and it can be a useful tool, but it is imposed on this collection rather than found in it. The second is that the ceremony of Exodus 24 has two endings that do not sit easily together: a solemn ratification with blood, and a meal in which seventy men see God and survive. The chapter puts them side by side and offers no bridge.
6. Further Reading
- Brevard S. Childs, The Book of Exodus: A Critical, Theological Commentary (Westminster, 1974). The commentary sections on 21-24 remain the best starting point.
- Raymond Westbrook (ed.), A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, 2 vols. (Brill, 2003). The reference work for the comparative material; the introduction sets out Westbrook's own view of a shared legal tradition.
- David P. Wright, Inventing God's Law: How the Covenant Code of the Bible Used and Revised the Laws of Hammurabi (Oxford, 2009). The direct-dependence case, argued at full length.
- Bruce Wells, "The Covenant Code and Near Eastern Legal Traditions: A Response to David P. Wright," Maarav 13 (2006). The most focused reply; read it alongside Wright rather than instead of him.
- Ernest W. Nicholson, God and His People: Covenant and Theology in the Old Testament (Oxford, 1986). Includes his sustained work on Exodus 24 and its difficulties.
- Willard M. Swartley, Slavery, Sabbath, War, and Women: Case Issues in Biblical Interpretation (Herald Press, 1983). Traces the nineteenth-century slavery controversy through the actual arguments on both sides.
- Christopher J. H. Wright, Old Testament Ethics for the People of God (IVP Academic, 2004). A theological treatment of Israel's law that takes the social legislation seriously without apologetics.
- Joshua A. Berman, Created Equal: How the Bible Broke with Ancient Political Thought (Oxford, 2008). Argues for the distinctiveness of the Pentateuch's social vision; read critically, since the thesis is strong and the evidence is contested.
핵심 요약
- The Covenant Code (Exodus 20:22-23:33) mixes casuistic case law with apodictic commands throughout rather than sorting them, and roughly a fifth of its laws attach a motive clause grounded in shared history ("you were aliens in the land of Egypt," 22:21) or God's character ("for I am gracious," 22:27) — a feature Berend Gemser and Rifat Sonsino note has no real counterpart in Hammurabi outside its prologue and epilogue.
- Exodus 21 regulates rather than abolishes Hebrew debt-servitude: a six-year term with free release (21:2), automatic manumission for a lost eye or tooth (21:26-27), and a capital penalty for kidnapping and selling a person (21:16) — yet 21:20-21 excuses a master whose beaten servant survives a day or two "for he is his property," and Deuteronomy 15:12-15 later adds both an explicit extension to women and a requirement to send the freed servant away materially provisioned, which Exodus 21 does not include.
- In the nineteenth-century American debate, Thornton Stringfellow's 1841 pro-slavery argument and Albert Barnes's 1846 reply both worked from the same Pentateuchal chapters; Barnes's decisive move was to distinguish the Covenant Code's term-limited, non-hereditary servitude (backed by a death penalty on kidnapping) from the race-based perpetual system of the American South, rather than to deny that Exodus regulates servitude at all.
- The goring-ox laws (Exodus 21:28-36) closely parallel the Laws of Eshnunna (53-55) and Hammurabi (250-252); David P. Wright argues in Inventing God's Law (2009) that the Covenant Code directly reworks Hammurabi based on shared sequence of topics, while Bruce Wells and Raymond Westbrook argue for a shared regional legal tradition instead, since specific rulings diverge and no direct transmission chain is evidenced.
- Exodus 24's ratification ceremony divides sacrificial blood between the altar and the people (24:6-8) and is followed immediately by seventy elders who "saw God, and ate and drank" (24:10-11) without being struck — sitting uneasily against Exodus 33:20's flat statement that no one can see God and live, a tension Ernest Nicholson's God and His People concludes is not resolved by simple source division.
If you remember nothing else from this lecture: The Covenant Code (Exodus 21-23) is working law — casuistic, procedural, unsorted into the later categories of moral, civil, and ceremonial — and its treatment of Hebrew debt-servitude holds together provisions that constrain the institution (a six-year release, automatic manumission for bodily injury, a capital penalty for kidnapping) with the flatly proprietary language of 21:20-21, "for he is his property," which no amount of ancient-Near-Eastern context makes comfortable and no modern outrage makes simple, since Deuteronomy 15 and Leviticus 25 each modify the same institution differently within the same Torah. The nineteenth-century American slavery debate shows both sides quoting these same chapters in good faith, with Albert Barnes's distinction between term-limited biblical servitude and hereditary chattel slavery doing more textual work than either side's opponents credited. The Covenant Code's resemblance to Hammurabi's laws (especially the goring-ox provisions) is real and disputed as to cause, but the two collections' values visibly diverge regardless of literary relationship. And the covenant is finally ratified in Exodus 24 with a blood rite unique in the Old Testament, immediately followed by seventy elders eating a meal in God's presence and surviving — a scene Hebrews 9 reaches for to explain what a covenant costs, while adding ritual details Exodus itself never reports.
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묵상 및 토론
- Roughly a fifth of the laws in the Covenant Code give a reason, and the reasons are usually memory ("you were aliens in the land of Egypt") or the character of God ("for I am gracious"). What kind of obedience does a law that argues with you expect, compared with a law that simply rules?
- Exodus 21:16 makes kidnapping and selling a person a capital crime; Exodus 21:21 says of a beaten servant "he is his property." Both sentences are in the same chapter. How would you describe, without flattening either, what this body of law is doing with servitude?
- Deuteronomy 15 gives the same six-year rule as Exodus 21 and adds a requirement to send the freed servant away supplied. What does the existence of two non-identical versions in the same Torah imply about how the Pentateuch's law should be read?
- Stringfellow and Barnes quoted the same chapters and reached opposite conclusions. Identify the interpretive move each of them made that the other rejected. Which of those moves can be tested against the text, and which cannot?
- David Wright argues the Covenant Code is a literary reworking of Hammurabi; Bruce Wells and Raymond Westbrook argue for a shared regional legal tradition. Suppose Wright is right. Which theological claims about this material, if any, would have to change?
- Exodus 24:11 says the elders saw God and ate and drank; Exodus 33:20 says no one can see God and live. Set out at least two ways of holding both sentences, and say what each way costs.