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BT601E The Pentateuch

Lecture 5-2: Covenant, Circumcision, and the Binding of Isaac

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BT601E The Pentateuch
제 0 장 · Introduction: Why Study the Pentateuch
  1. Introduction: Why Study the Pentateuch
제 1 장 · Chapter 1: Reading the Pentateuch - Name, Shape, and Scope
  1. Lecture 1-1: What Torah and Pentateuch Mean, and Why the Difference Matters
  2. Lecture 1-2: The Shape of the Five Books: Narrative, Law, and the Seams Between Them
  3. Lecture 1-3: A History of Reading: Jewish, Patristic, Reformation, and Modern
제 2 장 · Chapter 2: The Composition Question
  1. Lecture 2-1: Mosaic Authorship, Tradition, and the Rise of Source Criticism
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Documentary Hypothesis in Its Classic Form
  3. Lecture 2-3: After Wellhausen: Fragment, Supplement, and the Present Debate
제 3 장 · Chapter 3: The Ancient Near Eastern World of the Pentateuch
  1. Lecture 3-1: Creation and Flood Accounts: Enuma Elish, Atrahasis, Gilgamesh
  2. Lecture 3-2: Law Collections: Hammurabi, Eshnunna, and the Covenant Code
  3. Lecture 3-3: Treaty and Covenant Forms: Hittite Vassal Treaties and Deuteronomy
제 4 장 · Chapter 4: Genesis 1-11 - Creation and the Primeval History
  1. Lecture 4-1: Genesis 1 and 2: Two Accounts, One Creator
  2. Lecture 4-2: Genesis 3-5: Disobedience, Cain, and the Line of Seth
  3. Lecture 4-3: Genesis 6-11: Flood, the Noahic Covenant, and Babel
제 5 장 · Chapter 5: Genesis 12-36 - The Ancestral Narratives
  1. Lecture 5-1: The Call of Abram and the Shape of the Promise
  2. Lecture 5-2: Covenant, Circumcision, and the Binding of Isaac
  3. Lecture 5-3: Jacob: Deception, Wrestling, and the Making of Israel
제 6 장 · Chapter 6: Genesis 37-50 - Joseph and the Descent into Egypt
  1. Lecture 6-1: The Joseph Narrative as Literature
  2. Lecture 6-2: Providence, Human Evil, and Genesis 50:20
  3. Lecture 6-3: Jacob's Blessing, Judah, and the Bridge into Exodus
제 7 장 · Chapter 7: Exodus 1-18 - Deliverance
  1. Lecture 7-1: Oppression, the Midwives, and the Call of Moses
  2. Lecture 7-2: The Plagues and the Hardening of Pharaoh's Heart
  3. Lecture 7-3: Passover, the Sea, and Provision in the Wilderness
제 8 장 · Chapter 8: Exodus 19-40 - Sinai, Covenant, and Tabernacle
  1. Lecture 8-1: Sinai and the Decalogue
  2. Lecture 8-2: The Covenant Code and the Ratification of the Covenant
  3. Lecture 8-3: The Golden Calf, Intercession, and the Tabernacle
제 9 장 · Chapter 9: Leviticus - Holiness, Sacrifice, and Priesthood
  1. Lecture 9-1: The Sacrificial System of Leviticus 1-7
  2. Lecture 9-2: Priesthood, Purity, and the Day of Atonement
  3. Lecture 9-3: The Holiness Code and What It Asks of a People
제 10 장 · Chapter 10: Numbers - Wilderness and the Failed Generation
  1. Lecture 10-1: Census, Camp, and the Order of the Wilderness March
  2. Lecture 10-2: Rebellion, the Spies, and the Judgment on a Generation
  3. Lecture 10-3: Balaam, the Second Generation, and the Plains of Moab
제 11 장 · Chapter 11: Deuteronomy - The Law Preached
  1. Lecture 11-1: Deuteronomy as Covenant Document and as Sermon
  2. Lecture 11-2: The Deuteronomic Code and the Question of Centralization
  3. Lecture 11-3: Blessing, Curse, and the Death of Moses
제 12 장 · Chapter 12: The Theology of the Pentateuch and Its Afterlife
  1. Lecture 12-1: Covenant, Land, and Blessing: The Theology of the Whole
  2. Lecture 12-2: Law and Gospel: How Christians Have Read the Torah
  3. Lecture 12-3: The Pentateuch in Judaism, in the New Testament, and in the Church Today

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45분

Between the covenant ceremony of Genesis 15 and the death of Sarah in Genesis 23, the Abraham narrative does four things that have generated more theological argument than almost anything else in the Pentateuch. It sends a pregnant Egyptian slave into the desert and has God meet her there. It attaches to the covenant a permanent mark cut into the body of every male in the household, together with a threat against anyone who lacks it. It lets Abraham argue with God about the destruction of a city, on the ground that the judge of all the earth is obliged to do right. And it has God tell Abraham to kill the son through whom the entire promise runs.

This lecture takes those four in order, and gives most of its space to the last. The chapter on Moriah — called in Jewish tradition the Aqedah, "the binding," after the verb used in Genesis 22:9 — is a text where evasion is easy and common. It is possible to teach Genesis 22 as a lesson about trust and never mention that the command is to burn a child, that children were in fact burned in the ancient Near East, and that other parts of the Hebrew Bible take the trouble to deny that Yahweh ever commanded it. This lecture does not take that route. It asks directly what the chapter does with child sacrifice, sets out the three main answers, and shows why none of them disposes of the difficulty entirely.

Two further arguments run through the lecture. The first concerns conditionality. Genesis 15 gives a covenant in which one party passes between the pieces and the human party sleeps; Genesis 17 gives a covenant that opens with "walk before me, and be blameless" and ends by threatening excision for the uncircumcised. Whether these are two covenants, two aspects of one, or two sources, is a live question with real theological consequences, and this lecture presents three answers without choosing among them. The second concerns Hagar. The narrative treats her in ways that are hard to reconcile with each other — she is used, abused, sent away twice, and she is also the only person in the Hebrew Bible who gives God a name. The lecture reports both and does not smooth them.

이 45분으로 얻는 것

  • Describe the legal and social background of Genesis 16 and state precisely what the narrative does and does not say in Hagar's favour.
  • Set out the tension between the covenant of Genesis 15 and the covenant of Genesis 17, and explain three ways scholars and theologians have accounted for it.
  • Explain what was and was not distinctive about circumcision in its ancient Near Eastern setting, and why the sign is attached to this particular promise.
  • State the three main readings of Genesis 22 in relation to child sacrifice, together with the evidence and the weakness of each.
  • Summarise Kierkegaard's "teleological suspension of the ethical" and give at least three distinct lines of objection to it, including Jon D. Levenson's.

After these things, God tested Abraham, and said to him, “Abraham!” He said, “Here I am.” He said, “Now take your son, your only son, whom you love, even Isaac, and go into the land of Moriah. Offer him there for a burnt offering on one of the mountains which I will tell you of.” — Genesis 22:1-2

World English Bible

Read the second verse slowly. The command is delivered through a chain of appositions, each one narrowing and each one raising the cost: your son, your only son, whom you love, even Isaac. The Hebrew adds a particle of entreaty to the imperative, something like "take, please," which is unusual in a divine command and which the rabbis noticed. Nothing here is neutral. The narrator has arranged the sentence so that by the time the destination is named, everything that can be lost has been listed.

1. Hagar, and what the text does with her

Genesis 16 opens with a problem and a legal solution:

Now Sarai, Abram’s wife, bore him no children. She had a handmaid, an Egyptian, whose name was Hagar. Sarai said to Abram, “See now, Yahweh has restrained me from bearing. Please go in to my handmaid. It may be that I will obtain children by her.” Abram listened to the voice of Sarai. — Genesis 16:1-2 (WEB)

The arrangement was ordinary. The Laws of Hammurabi, in provisions numbered 144-147 in the standard editions, deal with exactly this case: a wife who has not borne children may give a slave woman to her husband, and the collection then regulates what happens if the slave becomes arrogant toward her mistress — the mistress may not sell her but may reduce her again to slave status. Marriage documents from Nuzi contain similar clauses. Genesis 16 is describing a recognised institution, not an improvisation, and readers who treat Sarai's proposal as a uniquely faithless act are importing a judgement the ancient setting does not support.

What follows is not ordinary. Hagar conceives, looks on her mistress with contempt, is dealt with harshly, and runs. In the wilderness she is found by the angel of Yahweh, who asks her where she has come from and where she is going, and then does three things. He tells her to go back and submit. He gives her a promise of innumerable descendants in the same terms used for Abram. And he announces the birth and the name of her son — the first annunciation in the Bible, and it is given to an Egyptian slave woman.

Then comes the verse that has no parallel:

She called the name of Yahweh who spoke to her, “You are a God who sees,” for she said, “Have I even stayed alive after seeing him?” — Genesis 16:13 (WEB)

The narrator says that Hagar called the name of Yahweh. Elsewhere in Genesis people call on the name of Yahweh, or name a place. Hagar names God. The name she gives, El Roi, "God who sees" or "God of seeing," is her own coinage and the narrative preserves it.

That is one side of the account. The other is that the same angel who promises her a nation orders her back into the household she fled, and that in Genesis 21 she and the boy are sent into the wilderness of Beersheba with bread and a skin of water, and the water runs out. God hears the boy, opens Hagar's eyes to a well, and repeats the promise; the boy lives. But the narrative has by then twice put a slave woman and her child in a desert.

Hagar and the text

This is a point where readers will not agree. How to hold those together is genuinely disputed, and the dispute is not only academic. Phyllis Trible, in Texts of Terror (1984), read Hagar as one of several biblical women whose suffering the text records without redressing, and argued that a reader's first obligation is to let the record stand rather than convert it into a lesson. Delores S. Williams, in Sisters in the Wilderness (1993), developed a reading from within the African American womanist tradition in which Hagar — a slave woman, used for reproduction, driven out, meeting God in the wilderness and surviving — has been a central rather than a marginal biblical figure for readers whose own history matched hers. A third strand notes what the narrative gives Hagar that it gives almost no one else: the naming of God, an annunciation, a promise of nationhood, and a divine hearing in the desert, and argues that the text's sympathies are not with Sarah at these points. And Hagar and Ishmael occupy a large place in Islamic tradition, where Hagar's search for water at Mecca is commemorated in the rites of the pilgrimage — a reception history that is not an interpretation of Genesis but is worth knowing, since it means that these chapters are read as ancestral by more than one living community.

What is not defensible is a reading that resolves the difficulty by deciding in advance that everything the narrative reports must be approved by it. Genesis reports the harsh treatment, reports the expulsion, and reports God's attention to Hagar, and it does not tell the reader how to reconcile them.

2. Genesis 17: a covenant with a condition and a mark

Genesis 17 restates the thirteen years after Ishmael's birth, and the restatement differs from Genesis 15 in tone from its first line.

When Abram was ninety-nine years old, Yahweh appeared to Abram, and said to him, “I am God Almighty. Walk before me, and be blameless. I will make my covenant between me and you, and will multiply you exceedingly.” — Genesis 17:1-2 (WEB)

I will establish my covenant between me and you and your seed after you throughout their generations for an everlasting covenant, to be a God to you and to your seed after you. I will give to you, and to your seed after you, the land where you are traveling, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession. I will be their God.” — Genesis 17:7-8 (WEB)

God said to Abraham, “As for you, you will keep my covenant, you and your seed after you throughout their generations. This is my covenant, which you shall keep, between me and you and your seed after you. Every male among you shall be circumcised. You shall be circumcised in the flesh of your foreskin. It will be a token of the covenant between me and you. — Genesis 17:9-11 (WEB)

The uncircumcised male who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin, that soul shall be cut off from his people. He has broken my covenant.” — Genesis 17:14 (WEB)

Set that beside Genesis 15, where Abram sleeps and a furnace and a torch pass between the pieces alone. Genesis 15 has no requirement attached. Genesis 17 opens with an imperative ("walk before me, and be blameless"), states a duty ("you will keep my covenant"), and closes the circumcision section with a sanction. And yet the same chapter calls the covenant "everlasting" twice and gives the land as "an everlasting possession."

This is a point where readers will not agree. Three accounts of the tension are current, and each has serious defenders.

Two kinds of covenant. Moshe Weinfeld, in an influential 1970 article in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, distinguished two ancient Near Eastern legal instruments: the vassal treaty, in which a subordinate king undertakes obligations and is threatened with curses, and the royal grant, in which a king rewards a loyal servant with land or office in perpetuity, obligating himself rather than the recipient. On Weinfeld's analysis the Abrahamic and Davidic covenants belong to the grant type and the Sinai covenant to the treaty type. Meredith Kline argued a related distinction from a Reformed standpoint. This account explains the unconditional flavour of Genesis 15 and the promise sections of 17. Its weakness is that the grant/treaty division has been criticised as too tidy: Gary Knoppers, among others, has argued that the actual grant documents contain conditional language more often than Weinfeld allowed, so the two categories overlap.

One covenant, unconditional in promise and conditional in participation. On this reading, the covenant's existence and its ultimate outcome rest on the divine oath of Genesis 15, while an individual's membership in it is conditional: the uncircumcised male is cut off from his people, not the promise from the family. The covenant continues; the person forfeits a place in it. This is the reading most Christian has taken, and it is also close to how the Jewish tradition has generally handled 17:14, where the sanction is understood to fall on the individual. Its weakness is that 17:14 says the uncircumcised man "has broken my covenant," which is stronger language than a purely individual forfeiture requires.

A difference of sources. In classical source criticism, Genesis 15 and Genesis 17 are assigned to different documents, chapter 17 being a Priestly account with its characteristic vocabulary — El Shaddai, "everlasting covenant," the concern with the sign and the precise age — and chapter 15 belonging to older material. On this account the tension is not a theological structure but the seam between two presentations of the covenant, each self-consistent. Whether one accepts it depends on questions treated in chapter 2 of this course, and it is worth noting that accepting the source analysis does not by itself dissolve the theological problem: the book as it stands contains both chapters, and any reader of the finished text has to deal with both.

3. Circumcision: not a new practice, a new meaning

Circumcision was not invented in Genesis 17. It was practised in Egypt — Egyptian reliefs depict the operation, and Herodotus reports it — and Jeremiah 9:25-26 lists Egypt, Judah, Edom, Ammon, Moab and desert peoples together as circumcised, which implies the practice was widespread among Israel's neighbours. The Philistines are the standing exception, which is why "the uncircumcised" works as an insult against them specifically.

What Genesis 17 does is not to introduce a rite but to attach one to a promise. Three features distinguish the biblical version. It is performed on the eighth day after birth rather than at puberty or marriage, which detaches it from any rite of passage into adulthood and makes it a mark of belonging received before the recipient can consent or understand. It is required of the whole household, including slaves bought with money (17:12-13), so it defines a community rather than a bloodline only. And it is called a sign — a token of a covenant, in the same category as the rainbow of Genesis 9, but carried in the body of the person rather than placed in the sky.

The location is not incidental. The covenant's central unfulfilled promise is descendants, and the mark is cut into the organ of generation. Every act by which the promise could advance is performed by a body that carries the sign of the promise. That observation is old and is found in both Jewish and Christian commentators; it is also the kind of neat correspondence this course has warned about, and it should be held as an observation about the text's arrangement rather than as a proof of anything.

Paul's argument in Romans 4 turns on chronology: Abraham was reckoned righteous in Genesis 15, before the circumcision of Genesis 17, and therefore the reckoning did not depend on the sign. Christian traditions have then differed over what follows. A line running from the early church through Reformed covenant theology has read baptism as standing where circumcision stood, and has used Genesis 17 to argue for ; Catholic and Orthodox theology reaches infant baptism by other routes and does not rest it on this analogy in the same way; Baptist traditions reject the analogy, arguing that the sign of the new covenant is attached to profession rather than to household membership. This course does not settle that, and Genesis 17 does not address it — the analogy is a theological construction built on the chapter, not a claim the chapter makes.

4. Genesis 18: the argument at Sodom

Between the covenant and the Aqedah stands a conversation that is difficult to place in any system.

Abraham drew near, and said, “Will you consume the righteous with the wicked? What if there are fifty righteous within the city? Will you consume and not spare the place for the fifty righteous who are in it? Be it far from you to do things like that, to kill the righteous with the wicked, so that the righteous should be like the wicked. May that be far from you. Shouldn’t the Judge of all the earth do right?” — Genesis 18:23-25 (WEB)

Several things are worth noticing. First, the chapter supplies a reason for Abraham being told at all, and it is the promise of 12:3 restated as a :

For I have known him, to the end that he may command his children and his household after him, that they may keep the way of Yahweh, to do righteousness and justice; to the end that Yahweh may bring on Abraham that which he has spoken of him.” — Genesis 18:19 (WEB)

The one through whom the nations are to be blessed is informed about the destruction of a city, and immediately begins to argue against it.

Second, Abraham's argument is not a plea for mercy. It is a legal argument about consistency: to destroy the righteous with the wicked would treat them alike, and that is not what a judge does. The final clause — "Shouldn't the Judge of all the earth do right?" — presumes a standard that God can be expected to meet, and the narrative lets the presumption stand without rebuke.

Third, the bargaining stops at ten. Abraham does not go to one. Whatever the reason — the usual suggestion is that ten represents a minimal community rather than a scattering of individuals — the text does not press to the limit, and the city is destroyed.

This episode is worth holding in mind through the next section, because the same man who argues that God must not kill the righteous with the wicked says nothing at all in Genesis 22.

5. Genesis 22: the binding

The narrative. The chapter is seventeen verses of the sparest narration in the Bible. God tests Abraham. Abraham rises early, saddles, splits wood, and travels three days. He tells the servants to wait. He puts the wood on Isaac. They walk together. Isaac asks about the lamb; Abraham answers that God will provide one; they walk on together. Abraham builds the altar, binds his son, lays him on the wood, takes the knife. The angel calls. A ram is caught in a thicket. Abraham names the place.

Isaac spoke to Abraham his father, and said, “My father?” He said, “Here I am, my son.” He said, “Here is the fire and the wood, but where is the lamb for a burnt offering?” Abraham said, “God will provide himself the lamb for a burnt offering, my son.” So they both went together. — Genesis 22:7-8 (WEB)

Yahweh’s angel called to him out of the sky, and said, “Abraham, Abraham!” He said, “Here I am.” He said, “Don’t lay your hand on the boy, neither do anything to him. For now I know that you fear God, since you have not withheld your son, your only son, from me.” — Genesis 22:11-12 (WEB)

Erich Auerbach opened Mimesis (1946) with a comparison of this chapter to a passage of Homer, and the observation he drew from it has not been improved on: the Homeric passage externalises everything, while the Genesis narrative gives almost nothing — no landscape, no description of faces, no report of what anyone feels — and is therefore, in his phrase, fraught with background. The silences are the technique. Abraham's three-day journey is one clause. Sarah is not mentioned. Isaac's age is not given, nor his reaction after the angel speaks; in fact Isaac and Abraham are never again recorded speaking to each other in Genesis, and Abraham returns to the servants alone in verse 19, which readers have noticed for centuries.

Child sacrifice was not hypothetical. The command in 22:2 asks for a olah, a burnt offering — the sacrifice in which the whole animal is burned. It is important to be clear that in the ancient Near East this was a thing that was sometimes done with children. The literary evidence is Israelite and hostile: 2 Kings 3:27 reports the king of Moab sacrificing his eldest son on the wall during a siege; 2 Kings 16:3 and 21:6 accuse Judean kings of passing their sons through the fire; Jeremiah and Ezekiel denounce the practice at Topheth in the valley of Hinnom. The archaeological evidence is Punic: the enclosures at Carthage and other western Phoenician sites, containing urns with the burned remains of infants and young animals, have been debated for decades — some specialists read them as sacrificial precincts matching the classical reports, others as cemeteries for infants who died naturally, and the argument continues over the skeletal age data. What is not in dispute is that the biblical writers believed the practice existed and regarded it with horror.

Two other biblical facts belong here. First, the itself states that the firstborn belong to Yahweh, and then requires that human firstborn be redeemed rather than given (Exodus 13:2, 13:11-15; 34:19-20; Numbers 18:15-16). The claim is asserted and the payment is substituted. Second, Jeremiah takes the trouble to deny explicitly that Yahweh ever commanded child sacrifice — that it never entered his mind (Jeremiah 7:31; 19:5) — and Ezekiel 20:25-26 makes a much stranger statement, that God gave statutes that were not good and defiled them through their offerings of the firstborn. These verses show a live argument inside the about what Israel's God had and had not demanded.

Three readings of what Genesis 22 does with this. This is a point where readers will not agree.

It is a polemic against child sacrifice. On this reading the chapter's purpose is to show that Israel's God does not want what the neighbouring gods want: the command is issued, the obedience is complete, and at the last moment the practice is stopped and an animal substituted. The chapter is then an argument, in narrative form, for the redemption of the firstborn. The strength of this reading is that it takes the ram seriously and connects the chapter to a real Israelite institution. Its weakness is that the chapter never says child sacrifice is wrong. It says the test is passed. If the purpose were to condemn the practice, the narrative had an obvious way to say so and did not.

It is about the firstborn's real claim, transformed rather than denied. Jon D. Levenson, in The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son (1993), argued that the claim of God on the firstborn son was a genuine and long-lived element of Israelite religion, not a foreign contamination, and that texts like Genesis 22 transform it — the son is given, is as good as dead, and is returned — rather than simply abolishing it. Levenson traced the resulting pattern of the beloved son who is handed over and restored through Isaac, Joseph, and later Jewish and Christian material. The strength of this reading is that it explains why the Bible's own statements on the subject are conflicted rather than uniform. Its cost is that it makes the claim on the child more real than most readers want it to be.

It is a test of Abraham, and the sacrifice question is secondary. The chapter says in verse 1 that God tested Abraham, and in verse 12 that the test's object was fear of God demonstrated by not withholding the son. On this reading the narrative is about whether the one who has received the promise will hold the promise's bearer more tightly than the one who promised. Its strength is that it is what the text says about itself. Its weakness is that it treats the content of the command as interchangeable — as though the test would have been the same test if it had concerned property — which the piling of appositions in verse 2 contradicts.

These readings are not fully exclusive, and most serious commentators combine them. None removes the difficulty, and a teacher who presents any one of them as having removed it is overstating.

Kierkegaard. In Fear and Trembling (1843), published under the pseudonym Johannes de Silentio, Søren Kierkegaard used Genesis 22 to argue that faith cannot be reduced to ethics. The ethical, in his usage, is the universal — what can be stated in general terms and justified to anyone. Abraham's act cannot be justified in those terms: as a general principle, killing one's son is murder, and no argument from the general can make it otherwise. If Abraham is a man of faith rather than a would-be murderer, then there is a relation to the absolute that suspends the ethical for the sake of something higher — a "teleological suspension of the ethical." Kierkegaard's Abraham is therefore isolated: he cannot explain himself, because explanation means stating the case in universal terms, and that is precisely what he cannot do. Hence the pseudonym: the man of silence.

Four objections deserve to be stated.

The moral objection. If the ethical can be suspended by a claimed absolute relation, nothing distinguishes Abraham from anyone else who claims one. Immanuel Kant had already made the point in The Conflict of the Faculties (1798), writing that Abraham should have answered the supposed divine voice by saying that he could be certain killing his son was wrong but could not be certain the voice was God's. Kierkegaard knew the objection and did not think it could be answered from the outside; his readers have often thought that concession fatal.

The Jewish objection. Jon D. Levenson has argued that Kierkegaard's reading abstracts Abraham from everything that makes him Abraham. In Genesis he is not a solitary individual facing the absolute; he is a man who has received a promise of descendants, and Isaac is that promise. The chapter's tension is not between an individual and a universal moral law, but between the promise and the one who made it. And in Jewish tradition the Aqedah has been read communally and liturgically rather than existentially: it is read on Rosh Hashanah, the ram's horn recalls the ram of the thicket, and the rite invokes the of the ancestors — zekhut avot — on behalf of their descendants. That is a very different use of the chapter from Kierkegaard's.

The exegetical objection. Kierkegaard's account relies on the possibility that Abraham was wrong, that from the outside the act is indistinguishable from murder, and that faith is therefore a risk taken in the dark. The narrator does not leave the reader in the dark. Verse 1 tells us it is a test before Abraham takes a step, and verse 12 supplies the verdict. The narrative reader always knows what Abraham does not, which changes the situation the philosophical reading describes.

The reading of Isaac. Kierkegaard's Isaac is passive, an object of the act. Jewish interpretation from the rabbinic period onward often reads Isaac as an adult and a willing participant — the ages given in some midrashic calculations make him thirty-seven — and some midrashim go further, speaking of Isaac's blood or ashes as though the sacrifice were in some sense accomplished. Whatever one thinks of those readings, they show that the chapter's silence about Isaac has been filled in more than one direction, and Kierkegaard filled it in one.

Christian reception, briefly. Early Christian writers read the chapter typologically: a father, a beloved and only son, wood carried up a hill, three days, and a substitute provided. Melito of Sardis in the second century developed the comparison; it recurs throughout patristic and medieval and in Christian art. Hebrews 11:17-19 takes a different line, reading Abraham as having concluded that God could raise the dead, and receiving Isaac back "in a figure." A student should be able to distinguish these readings from what Genesis 22 says on its own; is a way of reading a text in the light of a later claim, and it is not the same operation as exegesis, whatever one thinks of its legitimacy.

Sarah and Hagar in Galatians 4. Paul, arguing in Galatians 4:21-31 against requiring Gentile converts to be circumcised, treats the two women as an allegory — his own word — in which Hagar stands for the covenant from Sinai and slavery, and Sarah for the free woman and the promise. Two comments and no more. First, Paul says he is allegorising, and the reading is not offered as the sense of Genesis. Second, the allegory reverses the ordinary associations, since it aligns the covenant at Sinai with the slave woman, and its polemical target is a first-century argument about circumcising Gentiles, not the ancestral narrative. Using Galatians 4 as a lens on Genesis 16 and 21 produces a picture in which Hagar means bondage, and Genesis does not say that about her.

The diagram compares the covenant of Genesis 15 with the covenant of Genesis 17 element by element, and lists the three explanations of the difference. The amber row marks where the comparison strains.

Two Covenant Chapters, One Abraham Genesis 15 and Genesis 17 compared, and three accounts of the difference Element Genesis 15 Genesis 17 Opening words to Abram "Don't be afraid... I am your shield" "Walk before me, and be blameless" Divine name used Yahweh El Shaddai ("God Almighty") Abram's posture Deep sleep; a horror of darkness Falls on his face; laughs (17:17) Obligation on Abram None stated "You will keep my covenant" (17:9) Sign or ratification Fire passes between cut animals Circumcision, on the eighth day Sanction (where the strain is) Implied self-curse on the party who passes — but inferred, not said "cut off from his people... he has broken my covenant" (17:14) Three accounts of the difference Two kinds of covenant Royal grant vs vassal treaty (Weinfeld; Kline) Objection: real grant texts also carry conditions One covenant, two levels Promise unconditional; membership conditional Objection: 17:14 says the covenant itself is broken Two sources Ch. 17 assigned to P; ch. 15 to older material Objection: the finished book still contains both chapters

6. Further Reading

  • Jon D. Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son: The Transformation of Child Sacrifice in Judaism and Christianity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). The most important single treatment of Genesis 22 in relation to child sacrifice, and the source of the critique of Kierkegaard summarised above.
  • Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin, 1985). Read the primary text before reading accounts of it; the "Problemata" are short.
  • Phyllis Trible, Texts of Terror: Literary-Feminist Readings of Biblical Narratives (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), and Delores S. Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1993). Two different readings of Hagar, from different starting points; the second is not a variant of the first.
  • Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. Willard Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), chapter 1. The classic account of Genesis 22's narrative reticence.
  • Moshe Weinfeld, "The Covenant of Grant in the Old Testament and in the Ancient Near East," Journal of the American Oriental Society 90 (1970): 184-203. The grant/treaty distinction in its original statement; read with Gary N. Knoppers, "Ancient Near Eastern Royal Grants and the Davidic Covenant: A Parallel?," JAOS 116 (1996): 670-697, for the criticism.
  • Jon D. Levenson, Inheriting Abraham: The Legacy of the Patriarch in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). On how the three traditions have claimed the same figure, including the differences their claims conceal.
  • Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 16-50, Word Biblical Commentary 2 (Dallas: Word, 1994). Detailed exegesis of chapters 16-22 with full bibliography.
  • Nahum M. Sarna, Genesis, JPS Torah Commentary (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989). Particularly useful on circumcision, on the Aqedah's place in Jewish , and on the ancient Near Eastern legal background of Genesis 16.
  • Francesca Stavrakopoulou, King Manasseh and Child Sacrifice: Biblical Distortions of Historical Realities (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004). Argues that child sacrifice was a more accepted part of Israelite religion than the biblical polemic admits; a strong statement of a minority position, worth reading against Levenson.

핵심 요약

  • Genesis 16's arrangement — Sarai giving her Egyptian slave Hagar to Abram to obtain children — matches a documented ancient institution (Laws of Hammurabi §§144-147, Nuzi marriage documents), but what follows is not ordinary: Hagar alone, of anyone in the Hebrew Bible, is said to have named God, El Roi, "God who sees" (16:13), even as the same narrative twice sends her and her son into the wilderness.
  • Genesis 15 and Genesis 17 present the covenant differently — 15 has Abram asleep while a furnace and torch pass between cut animals with no stated obligation, while 17 opens "walk before me, and be blameless," states a duty, and threatens excision for the uncircumcised (17:14) — and three explanations are current: Moshe Weinfeld's two-covenant-types distinction (royal grant versus vassal treaty), a single covenant unconditional in promise but conditional in individual membership, or an assignment of the chapters to different sources (Priestly for 17, older material for 15).
  • Circumcision was not new in Genesis 17 — it was practiced in Egypt and among Israel's neighbors except the Philistines (Jeremiah 9:25-26) — but the biblical version is distinctive in being performed on the eighth day (before consent is possible), required of the whole household including purchased slaves (17:12-13), and called a token/sign in the same category as the rainbow of Genesis 9.
  • In Genesis 18:23-25 Abraham argues that "the Judge of all the earth" must not kill the righteous with the wicked at Sodom, and the narrative lets the presumption of a standard God must meet stand without rebuke — a contrast the lecture holds in mind through Genesis 22, where the same man says nothing when told to sacrifice Isaac.
  • Genesis 22 (the Aqedah) has three main readings — a polemic against child sacrifice (with Exodus 13 and Numbers 18's redemption of the firstborn as evidence), Jon Levenson's argument that the firstborn's real claim is transformed rather than denied, and a test of Abraham's fear of God (the text's own stated reading, 22:1, 22:12) — and Kierkegaard's "teleological suspension of the ethical" in Fear and Trembling draws objections from Kant (the moral objection), Levenson (Abraham is not an isolated individual but a promise-bearer), the text itself (the reader is told in verse 1 it is a test, unlike Kierkegaard's Abraham), and rabbinic tradition's frequent portrayal of Isaac as a willing adult participant.

If you remember nothing else from this lecture: Between Genesis 15 and 23 the Abraham narrative does four things that generate outsized theological argument: it sends Hagar into the desert twice while also making her the only person in the Bible who names God (El Roi, 16:13); it attaches to the covenant a circumcision mark and a sanction ("cut off... he has broken my covenant," 17:14) that sits in real tension with the unconditional, sleeping-Abram covenant of Genesis 15; it lets Abraham argue at Sodom that the Judge of all the earth must do right (18:25); and it commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac in Genesis 22, where the piling of appositions in the command itself ("your son, your only son, whom you love, even Isaac") shows the cost was not incidental to the test. Genesis 22 is read as anti-sacrifice polemic, as Levenson's transformation of a real and ancient claim on the firstborn, or as simply a test of fear of God — and each reading leaves something unexplained, which is also true of Kierkegaard's philosophical use of the chapter: his "teleological suspension of the ethical" draws the objection, from Kant onward, that nothing then distinguishes Abraham from any other person claiming a private absolute, and from Levenson the objection that Kierkegaard's isolated individual is not the Abraham of Genesis, who is bound to a specific promise that Isaac himself embodies.

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묵상 및 토론

  • The same Abraham who argues in Genesis 18 that the Judge of all the earth must not kill the righteous with the wicked says nothing in Genesis 22. Is the silence a characterisation, an accident of two traditions placed side by side, or something else? What would count as evidence either way?
  • Hagar names God, and is twice sent into a desert. A reader has to decide what to do with a narrative that reports both without comment. Which of the readings surveyed above does most justice to the whole account, and what does it have to leave out?
  • Genesis 17:14 says the uncircumcised man "has broken my covenant." Does that language fit better with the "one covenant, two levels" account or with the grant/treaty distinction? Argue the case using the verse rather than the system.
  • Kierkegaard held that Abraham could not explain himself, because explanation means stating the case in universal terms. Is the narrator's verdict in verse 1 — that this is a test — an explanation in that sense? Does knowing it change what the chapter asks of a reader?
  • Levenson argues that the claim of God on the firstborn son was a real element of Israelite religion which Genesis 22 transforms rather than abolishes. What evidence in the Pentateuch supports him, and what is the cost of accepting his account?
  • Paul explicitly calls Galatians 4:21-31 an allegory. Does that make it easier or harder to say that his reading of Hagar is not the sense of Genesis 16? What responsibility does a preacher have when the New Testament reads an Old Testament figure in a way the Old Testament does not?

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