Lecture 6-2: Providence, Human Evil, and Genesis 50:20
목차 37
- Lecture 1-1: What Torah and Pentateuch Mean, and Why the Difference Matters
- Lecture 1-2: The Shape of the Five Books: Narrative, Law, and the Seams Between Them
- Lecture 1-3: A History of Reading: Jewish, Patristic, Reformation, and Modern
- Lecture 2-1: Mosaic Authorship, Tradition, and the Rise of Source Criticism
- Lecture 2-2: The Documentary Hypothesis in Its Classic Form
- Lecture 2-3: After Wellhausen: Fragment, Supplement, and the Present Debate
- Lecture 3-1: Creation and Flood Accounts: Enuma Elish, Atrahasis, Gilgamesh
- Lecture 3-2: Law Collections: Hammurabi, Eshnunna, and the Covenant Code
- Lecture 3-3: Treaty and Covenant Forms: Hittite Vassal Treaties and Deuteronomy
- Lecture 4-1: Genesis 1 and 2: Two Accounts, One Creator
- Lecture 4-2: Genesis 3-5: Disobedience, Cain, and the Line of Seth
- Lecture 4-3: Genesis 6-11: Flood, the Noahic Covenant, and Babel
- Lecture 5-1: The Call of Abram and the Shape of the Promise
- Lecture 5-2: Covenant, Circumcision, and the Binding of Isaac
- Lecture 5-3: Jacob: Deception, Wrestling, and the Making of Israel
- Lecture 6-1: The Joseph Narrative as Literature
- Lecture 6-2: Providence, Human Evil, and Genesis 50:20
- Lecture 6-3: Jacob's Blessing, Judah, and the Bridge into Exodus
- Lecture 7-1: Oppression, the Midwives, and the Call of Moses
- Lecture 7-2: The Plagues and the Hardening of Pharaoh's Heart
- Lecture 7-3: Passover, the Sea, and Provision in the Wilderness
- Lecture 8-1: Sinai and the Decalogue
- Lecture 8-2: The Covenant Code and the Ratification of the Covenant
- Lecture 8-3: The Golden Calf, Intercession, and the Tabernacle
- Lecture 9-1: The Sacrificial System of Leviticus 1-7
- Lecture 9-2: Priesthood, Purity, and the Day of Atonement
- Lecture 9-3: The Holiness Code and What It Asks of a People
- Lecture 10-1: Census, Camp, and the Order of the Wilderness March
- Lecture 10-2: Rebellion, the Spies, and the Judgment on a Generation
- Lecture 10-3: Balaam, the Second Generation, and the Plains of Moab
- Lecture 11-1: Deuteronomy as Covenant Document and as Sermon
- Lecture 11-2: The Deuteronomic Code and the Question of Centralization
- Lecture 11-3: Blessing, Curse, and the Death of Moses
Genesis 50:20 is one sentence long and it has occupied theologians for most of two thousand years. Joseph tells his brothers that they meant evil against him and that God meant it for good — the same "it," the same act, two intentions. The verse does not soften either half. It does not say the brothers meant evil and God overruled them afterward. It does not say the brothers were carrying out God's intention and therefore did nothing wrong. It puts both claims in one sentence, joins them with a conjunction, and stops.
The problem this creates has a name in the philosophy of religion: double agency — the question of how one and the same event can be genuinely the act of a free creature and genuinely the act of God, without either collapsing into the other. If God's intention determines the event, in what sense did the brothers do anything they could be blamed for? If the brothers' intention determines the event, in what sense did God do anything more than react well? Every answer that has been given costs something, and the honest way to teach this is to say what each costs.
This lecture does three things. First, it looks closely at what the text actually says, in Genesis 45 as well as Genesis 50, because Joseph makes the claim three times and one of the three is considerably stronger than the others. Second, it sets out the main theological accounts of divine and human agency — Reformed, Thomist, Molinist, Orthodox, and open theist — with named representatives, showing how each reads Genesis 50:20 and where each is under pressure. Third, it takes up the pastoral question, because this verse is misused more often than almost any other in the Pentateuch, and the misuse follows a predictable pattern that can be described precisely.
One thing this lecture will not do is decide. That is not evasion. The text states a double intention and does not explain it, and every account below is an attempt to supply an explanation that the verse withholds. A student should finish this lecture able to state each position fairly, and able to say what Genesis itself commits a reader to — which is less than any of the systems, and more than nothing.
이 31분으로 얻는 것
- State the double agency problem in your own words, using Genesis 50:20 as the test case, and explain why Genesis 45:8 makes the problem sharper rather than easier.
- Describe the Reformed, Thomist, Molinist, Orthodox, and open theist accounts of the relation between divine and human action, naming a representative figure for each.
- Explain what each account has to say about Genesis 50:20 and identify the main objection each faces.
- Distinguish what Genesis 50:19-20 asserts from what later theological systems infer from it.
- Identify the conditions under which Joseph makes his statement, and explain why repeating the sentence outside those conditions changes what it does.
Joseph said to them, “Don’t be afraid, for am I in the place of God? As for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save many people alive. — Genesis 50:19-20
World English Bible
Joseph said to his brothers, “Come near to me, please.” They came near. “He said, I am Joseph, your brother, whom you sold into Egypt. Now don’t be grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that you sold me here, for God sent me before you to preserve life. — Genesis 45:4-5
WEB
So now it wasn’t you who sent me here, but God, and he has made me a father to Pharaoh, lord of all his house, and ruler over all the land of Egypt. — Genesis 45:8
WEB
When Joseph’s brothers saw that their father was dead, they said, “It may be that Joseph will hate us, and will fully pay us back for all of the evil which we did to him.” — Genesis 50:15
WEB
Read verse 19 before verse 20, because the order matters and it is usually skipped. Joseph's first move is not a doctrine of . It is a refusal of a position. "Am I in the place of God?" is a rhetorical question with an obvious answer: no, and therefore judgment on his brothers is not his to give. The theological statement in verse 20 comes second, and it comes as the ground for that refusal. Joseph is not explaining how the universe works. He is explaining why he is not going to retaliate.
The verb translated "meant" is the same in both halves: Hebrew hashab, which means to think, plan, calculate, devise. It is the ordinary word for forming an intention. Applying it identically to the brothers and to God is what generates the difficulty; a text that used a weaker verb for one side would not.
This is the sharper form of the claim, and it is worth noticing that it is sharper. In 50:20 both parties act. In 45:8 Joseph appears to deny that the brothers acted at all: "it wasn’t you who sent me here, but God." Read flatly, that is not double agency but a straightforward substitution of one agent for another. Any account of this text has to handle 45:8 as well as 50:20, and accounts that emphasize human freedom generally read 45:8 as a Hebrew idiom of relative emphasis — a way of saying "not so much you as God" — while accounts that emphasize divine determination read it as saying what it appears to say. Both readings of the idiom are defensible in Hebrew. Neither can claim the verse without argument.
And this is the setting of the famous verse, which is almost always quoted without it. Seventeen years after the reconciliation of chapter 45, the brothers still expect retaliation, and they fabricate a deathbed instruction from their father to protect themselves (50:16-17). Genesis 50:20 is spoken into that: to frightened people who are lying to him, about a crime they committed, by the man who suffered it. It is not a serene meditation. It is what a wronged person says to stop a family from destroying itself.
1. What the text asserts, and what it leaves open
Begin by separating the assertions from the inferences.
Genesis asserts, in Joseph's mouth, that the brothers formed an evil intention and acted on it; that God formed a good intention regarding the same events; that the outcome — the preservation of many lives during famine — was God's purpose; and that Joseph is therefore not in a position to punish. The narrator adds an assertion of his own at several points, most explicitly at 39:2-3 and 39:21, that God was with Joseph throughout.
Genesis does not assert how the two intentions relate. It does not say whether God decreed the brothers' act, permitted it, foreknew it, or responded to it. It does not say whether the brothers could have done otherwise. It does not say when God formed the good intention — before the act, at the act, or in the working out of consequences. It does not distinguish between God intending the evil act itself and God intending the good end that the act was made to serve. Every one of these distinctions is important, and every one of them is supplied by the reader.
That is not a criticism of Genesis. Narrative works this way. But it means that the confidence with which a given tradition reads its own doctrine of providence out of 50:20 should be inspected, in every tradition, including one's own.
2. The double agency problem stated precisely
Suppose an event E — the selling of Joseph. Consider three claims:
- The brothers freely intended and performed E, and are morally responsible for it.
- God intended E, in such a way that E's occurrence was not merely foreseen but purposed.
- God is not the author of evil, and is not morally responsible for the brothers' sin.
Genesis 50:20 appears to affirm 1 and 2. Nearly every theological tradition insists on 3. The difficulty is that 1, 2, and 3 are hard to hold together without either weakening one of them or introducing a distinction that does some heavy lifting. The main positions can be sorted by which move they make.
3. Five accounts
This is a point where readers will not agree.
The Reformed account: an eternal decree that includes free acts. John Calvin treats Joseph's case directly in the Institutes (I.17-18), and it functions there as one of his primary examples. On his account, nothing occurs outside God's decree, including the sinful acts of creatures; but God and the creature intend different things in the same act, and moral responsibility attaches to the intention. The brothers acted from envy and greed, which is why they sinned; God acted to preserve life, which is why God did not. Calvin refuses the term "bare permission" — he thinks it is an evasion that leaves God's governance less than the Bible claims — and holds that God wills the event while remaining untainted by the creature's motive.
The strength of the position is that it takes both halves of 50:20 with equal seriousness and does not need to weaken either. The standing objection is that distinguishing intentions does not obviously distinguish responsibility: if God decreed that the brothers would form precisely that envious intention, it is not clear that the decree leaves them the kind of freedom that grounds blame. Paul Helm, in The Providence of God (1993) and later work, defends the position with a compatibilist account of freedom — freedom as acting according to one's own desires without external constraint, which is compatible with those desires being determined. Critics respond that compatibilist freedom is not the kind of freedom moral responsibility requires. That dispute is philosophical rather than exegetical, and it is not going to be settled from Genesis.
The Thomist account: primary and secondary causality. Thomas Aquinas frames the question differently, and this framing is the standard one in Catholic theology. God is the primary cause of everything that exists and acts, but God causes precisely by causing creatures to be genuine causes in their own right (Summa Theologiae I q.19 a.8; q.105 a.5). A free creature acting freely is not an exception to divine causality but an instance of it: God moves the will in a manner suited to its nature, which is to say, freely. Evil, on this account, is not a positive thing that requires a cause; it is a privation, a lack of the good that ought to be present, and God causes the act's being without causing its defect.
The strength here is that it does not place God and the creature on the same causal level competing for the same space — which is arguably the mistake that makes the problem look insoluble. The objection is that the privation account of evil, however satisfying metaphysically, can seem thin when applied to a concrete atrocity; and that critics from the Reformed side and from the free-will side both suspect that the distinction between causing the act and not causing the defect is doing more work than it can bear.
Molinism: middle knowledge. The Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, in his Concordia (1588), proposed a third kind of divine knowledge between the knowledge of necessary truths and the knowledge of what God has decided to do. God knows, prior to any decree, what any possible free creature would freely do in any possible circumstance — these are counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and knowledge of them is scientia media, "middle knowledge." Providence then works by God's choosing which circumstances to actualize, knowing what free creatures will freely do in them. On this account God can intend the good outcome of Joseph's sale without decreeing the brothers' sin: God knew what they would freely do if placed in those circumstances, and God's providential arrangement takes that free act up into a larger purpose.
Molinism was revived in the late twentieth century by Alvin Plantinga, and defended in detail by Thomas Flint and William Lane Craig. Its attraction is that it appears to secure libertarian freedom — the power to do otherwise — while preserving robust providence. The standard objection is the "grounding objection," pressed among others by Robert Adams and William Hasker: what makes a counterfactual of creaturely freedom true, before the creature exists and before God has decided anything? If nothing grounds it, there is nothing there to be known. Molinists have answers; the debate continues.
Eastern Orthodox synergy. Orthodox theology tends not to frame the question as a competition between two causes at all, and is generally reluctant to systematize providence in the way the Western debates do. Its central category is synergeia, cooperation: salvation and the working out of God's purposes involve genuine human participation, not as a contribution added to grace from outside but as the created response grace itself enables. John of Damascus, in An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, distinguishes God's antecedent will (what God wills for its own sake, always good) from God's consequent will (what God wills in response to creaturely choices, including permitting and judging), and locates evil entirely on the creaturely side. Maximus the Confessor's distinction between the natural will and the deliberative mode of willing works in a similar direction.
Read this way, Genesis 50:20 says that the brothers' deliberative choice was theirs and evil, and that God's antecedent will for good was never displaced by it. The objection most often raised from the Western side is that the antecedent-consequent distinction risks making providence reactive; Orthodox writers reply that the objection presupposes a temporal and causal framing they do not accept.
. A minority position, developed in English-language theology from the 1990s by John Sanders (The God Who Risks, 1998), Gregory Boyd, Clark Pinnock, and others, and sharing some emphases with Terence Fretheim's exegetical work on Genesis and Exodus. Open theists hold that the future free acts of creatures are not yet there to be known — not because God's knowledge is limited, but because there is no fact yet to know — and that God therefore works responsively, with genuine risk, bringing good out of what creatures actually do. On this reading Genesis 50:20 is exactly right and needs no softening: the brothers meant evil, and God, in response to and through that evil, brought about good. The "meaning for good" is God's real work within the events, not a script written in advance.
The attraction is that it takes the emotional and moral texture of the narrative at face value and does not require God to have intended the pit. The objections are substantial: mainstream Catholic, Orthodox, Reformed, and Lutheran theology have all judged open theism to conflict with divine and as classically understood, and critics argue that a God who does not know future free acts cannot make the kind of promises Genesis has God making — including the promise in Genesis 15:13-16 about four hundred years in a foreign land, which is a promise about the far side of a great many free human choices.
4. Where the text presses back on all of them
Two features of Genesis resist tidy incorporation into any of the five.
The first is the retrospective character of Joseph's statements. He does not say in the pit, or in Potiphar's house, or in prison, that God means this for good. He says it in chapter 45 and again in chapter 50, after the outcome is visible. Whatever the metaphysics, the epistemology of the narrative is unambiguous: the meaning of the events was not available while they were happening, not even to the person who would eventually state it. Any account of providence drawn from this text that produces confident real-time explanations of current suffering has drawn something the text does not supply.
The second is that Genesis never withdraws the word evil. The brothers themselves use it — "all of the evil which we did to him" (50:15, WEB) — and Joseph does not correct them. He tells them not to be afraid; he does not tell them they were mistaken about what they did. A providence reading that ends with "so it was not really evil after all" has contradicted the verse it is built on.
5. The pastoral question
This verse has a characteristic misuse, and it is worth describing exactly, because "do not misuse it" is useless advice without a description.
Using the verse carefully
Joseph's statement holds under three conditions. It is spoken afterward, when the outcome is visible. It is spoken by the sufferer, not about someone else's suffering. And it is spoken to the people who caused the harm, as the reason he will not retaliate. Each condition is doing work. Remove the first and you get a claim about a future no one can see. Remove the second and you get a third party explaining someone else's pain to them. Remove the third and you lose the verse's actual function, which is the refusal of revenge.
The common pastoral use — telling a person in the middle of loss that God has a plan and this is part of it — removes all three at once. It is not that the resulting sentence is necessarily false; several of the positions above would say something in its vicinity is true. It is that the sentence is not the one Joseph said, it is being said by the wrong person at the wrong time, and it asks the sufferer to supply a meaning that in Genesis was only available in retrospect. There is a further problem where the harm was caused by a person: a premature appeal to divine purpose can function, whether or not it is intended to, as pressure on the injured party to stop treating the injury as an injury. Genesis does not do this. It lets the brothers be afraid for seventeen years and lets Joseph weep repeatedly (42:24; 43:30; 45:2; 50:17), and only then gives him the sentence.
None of this makes Genesis 50:20 unusable. It makes it a text about what a wronged person may eventually be able to say, rather than a text about what a comforter may say on their behalf.
The diagram is arranged so that the five columns are read as answers to the single question in the top panel, and so that each column's cost is visible on the same card as its claim. The bottom panel is the check: any account that claims Genesis 50:20 as its own proof text should be tested against the three lines there.
6. Further Reading
- John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, I.16-18 — the Joseph narrative is one of Calvin's own worked examples.
- Paul Helm, The Providence of God, Contours of Christian Theology (InterVarsity Press, 1993).
- Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, qq. 19, 22, 103-105 — on divine will, providence, and the government of creatures.
- Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso (Cornell University Press, 1988).
- Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Cornell University Press, 1998); and William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God (Baker, 1987).
- John of Damascus, An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, book 2, chapters 29-30 — antecedent and consequent will.
- John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence, rev. ed. (InterVarsity Press, 2007) — the fullest open theist statement; see also Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible (Baker, 2000).
- Terence E. Fretheim, The Book of Genesis, New Interpreter's Bible 1 (Abingdon, 1994), and God and World in the Old Testament (Abingdon, 2005).
- Claus Westermann, Genesis 37-50: A Commentary, trans. John J. Scullion (Augsburg, 1986) — on the literary function of Joseph's speeches in chapters 45 and 50.
핵심 요약
- Genesis 50:20 uses the same Hebrew verb,
hashab("to plan, devise"), for both the brothers' evil intention and God's good intention regarding the identical event — and Genesis 45:8 states the claim even more sharply, "it wasn't you who sent me here, but God," which reads as substitution of agents rather than double agency unless taken as an idiom of relative emphasis. - Five theological accounts handle the double-agency problem differently: the Reformed account (Calvin, Paul Helm) holds an eternal decree covers the free act itself, with responsibility tracking differing intentions; the Thomist account (Aquinas) has God as primary cause working through creatures as genuine secondary causes, with evil as privation rather than a caused thing; Molinism (Luis de Molina, defended by Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig) posits middle knowledge of what free creatures would do in any circumstance; Orthodox synergy (John of Damascus) distinguishes God's antecedent will (always good) from consequent will (responding to creaturely choice); and open theism (John Sanders, Gregory Boyd) holds God does not yet know future free acts and works responsively at genuine risk.
- Two features of the text resist every theological system built on it: Joseph's statements are strictly retrospective (never made in the pit, in Potiphar's house, or in prison — only after the outcome is visible, in chapters 45 and 50), and Genesis never withdraws the word "evil" — the brothers call it that in 50:15 and Joseph does not correct them.
- Genesis 50:19-20's statement holds under three specific conditions that are usually stripped away in pastoral misuse: it is spoken afterward, by the sufferer himself, and to the people who caused the harm, as the stated reason he will not retaliate (50:19, "Am I in the place of God?") — removing any one of the three changes what the sentence is doing.
- The setting of the verse is not serene: it comes seventeen years after the reconciliation of chapter 45, spoken to brothers who still expect retaliation and who have just fabricated a deathbed instruction from Jacob to protect themselves (50:15-17), and only after Joseph has already wept repeatedly at 42:24, 43:30, 45:2, and 50:17.
If you remember nothing else from this lecture: Genesis 50:20 uses one verb, hashab, for both the brothers' evil intention and God's good intention toward the same event, and Genesis 45:8 states the claim even more starkly by seeming to substitute God for the brothers as the one who "sent" Joseph to Egypt — a double-agency problem that five major theological traditions (Reformed, Thomist, Molinist, Orthodox, and open theist) resolve in incompatible ways, each at a stated cost the lecture insists on naming rather than hiding. What the text itself will not let any of them do is soften either half: it never withdraws the word "evil" (the brothers use it themselves at 50:15 and Joseph does not correct them), and Joseph's theological statement is strictly retrospective, spoken only after the outcome is visible and never once during the actual suffering. The verse's real pastoral function is narrower and more precise than its common use: it holds only when spoken afterward, by the sufferer, to the people who caused the harm, as the stated reason for not retaliating (50:19) — and it comes seventeen years after the reconciliation, to brothers who still fear revenge and have just lied about a deathbed instruction, which is a very different scene from a bystander telling someone mid-loss that "God has a plan."
스스로 확인해 보세요
읽었는지가 아니라 설명할 수 있는지를 묻는 것입니다. 체크는 이 기기에만 저장됩니다.
묵상 및 토론
- Genesis 45:8 says "it wasn’t you who sent me here, but God," while Genesis 50:20 says both parties intended the act. Are these two ways of saying the same thing, or does the first say something stronger? Work out what difference your answer makes to the positions surveyed in this lecture.
- Calvin refuses the phrase "bare permission" because he thinks it makes God's governance less than Scripture claims. The Thomist and Orthodox accounts both use something like permission. Read Genesis 37-50 with the question: does the narrative anywhere require more than permission, and if so where?
- Each of the five accounts is asked to pay a cost, listed in the diagram. Which cost do you find hardest to accept, and — a different question — which do you think is hardest to defend against the text of Genesis?
- Joseph's statement is retrospective. What follows for someone teaching this passage to a congregation that includes people currently in the middle of serious suffering? Try writing one sentence you would be willing to say, and one you would not.
- The brothers say "all of the evil which we did to him" and Joseph does not correct them. What does that non-correction rule out among the readings of providence on offer?
- Suppose a student says: "The disagreement between these five positions does not affect how I read Genesis; it only affects what I say afterward." Is that right? Find a place in Genesis 37-50 where the choice of position actually changes the reading of a verse.