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ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God

Lecture 4-1: Omniscience — God's Exhaustive and Personal Knowledge

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Contents 46
ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God
Chapter 0 · Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
  1. Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: Prolegomena: Revelation, Religious Language, and the Knowledge of God
  1. Lecture 1-1: Why Theology Proper Comes First
  2. Lecture 1-2: Calvin's Opening Move — Knowledge of God and Knowledge of Self
  3. Lecture 1-3: General and Special Revelation
  4. Lecture 1-4: Religious Language and Its Limits
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: The Existence of God: Arguments and Their Critics
  1. Lecture 2-1: Can God's Existence Be Proved? Setting the Terms
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Cosmological Argument — From the World to a First Cause
  3. Lecture 2-3: The Teleological and Moral Arguments
  4. Lecture 2-4: The Ontological Argument — From Concept to Necessary Existence
  5. Lecture 2-5: Presuppositionalism and Contemporary Atheism
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: The Incommunicable Attributes of God
  1. Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity
  2. Lecture 3-2: Aseity and Independence
  3. Lecture 3-3: Immutability and Impassibility
  4. Lecture 3-4: Infinity, Eternity, and God's Relation to Time
  5. Lecture 3-5: Omnipresence
  6. Lecture 3-6: The Unity of God
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: The Communicable Attributes and the Names of God
  1. Lecture 4-1: Omniscience — God's Exhaustive and Personal Knowledge
  2. Lecture 4-2: Wisdom and Faithfulness — Knowledge Ordered and Kept
  3. Lecture 4-3: Holiness and Righteousness — Otherness and Moral Purity
  4. Lecture 4-4: Goodness, Love, Grace, and Mercy — Four Related but Distinct Attributes
  5. Lecture 4-5: Sovereignty and Omnipotence — What "God Can Do All Things" Actually Means
  6. Lecture 4-6: The Revealed Names of God — Self-Disclosure Through Covenant History
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: The Trinity I: Biblical Foundations and Historical Formation
  1. Lecture 5-1: The Biblical Foundations of the Trinity
  2. Lecture 5-2: Early Heresies — Monarchianism, Adoptionism, and Modalism
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
  4. Lecture 5-4: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Council of Constantinople
  5. Lecture 5-5: Augustine's Trinitarian Theology and the Filioque Controversy
  6. Lecture 5-6: East and West Compared — Two Starting Points
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: The Trinity II: Orthodox Doctrine and Modern Debates
  1. Lecture 6-1: The Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity
  2. Lecture 6-2: Perichoresis — Mutual Indwelling of the Divine Persons
  3. Lecture 6-3: Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession
  4. Lecture 6-4: The Twentieth-Century Revival of Trinitarian Theology
  5. Lecture 6-5: Social Trinitarianism and Its Critics
  6. Lecture 6-6: Contemporary Debates over Trinitarian Language
Chapter 7 · Chapter 7: Contemporary Challenges to the Doctrine of God
  1. Lecture 7-1: Process Theology — A God Who Grows With the World
  2. Lecture 7-2: Open Theism and the Future God Does Not Yet Know
  3. Lecture 7-3: Moltmann's Crucified God and the Question of Divine Suffering
  4. Lecture 7-4: Panentheism, Ecology, and the Creator/Creature Distinction
  5. Lecture 7-5: Contemporary Science and the Doctrine of God
  6. Lecture 7-6: Answering Postmodernism and the New Atheism
Chapter 8 · Chapter 8: Decrees, Creation, Providence, and Pastoral Application
  1. Lecture 8-1: The Divine Decrees and Predestination
  2. Lecture 8-2: Calvinism, Arminianism, and Molinism on the Decrees
  3. Lecture 8-3: Creation Out of Nothing, and the Age of the Earth
  4. Lecture 8-4: Providence — Preservation, Concurrence, Government, and Miracle
  5. Lecture 8-5: The Problem of Evil and Theodicy
  6. Lecture 8-6: Conclusion — Knowing God, Not Only Knowing About Him

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18 min

Every Christian tradition represented in this course confesses that God knows things. The disagreement this lecture has to state honestly is not whether God knows, but how much, and in what way. Classical Christian theology — Reformed, Lutheran, Catholic, and Orthodox alike — has historically confessed that God's knowledge is exhaustive: he knows every fact that has ever been true, is true, or will be true, including the free decisions of every creature who has not yet made them. A minority contemporary position, open theism, denies exactly that last clause, arguing that God cannot know as settled fact what a genuinely free creature has not yet freely decided. This lecture states the classical position with care, previews the open theist alternative honestly enough that you could explain it back to someone who holds it, and leaves the extended argument between them for Chapter 7, where open theism receives a full hearing rather than a caricature.

Omniscience is also the clearest test case for this chapter's opening warning against domestication. It is tempting to think of God's knowledge as an extremely large database, or as the knowledge of an infinitely well-read scholar — more of the same kind of knowing a human being does, just without the gaps. Psalm 139 will not let that stand. The psalmist is not describing an unusually informed deity; he is describing a knowledge that is personal before it is comprehensive, one that knows him from the inside, in his sitting down and rising up, before he speaks a word.

What these 18 minutes give you

  • State the classical doctrine of divine omniscience precisely: that God's knowledge is exhaustive, certain, and personal, not merely extensive.
  • Distinguish omniscience considered as a bare property (knowing many facts) from the biblical portrait of God's knowledge as inescapably personal (Psalm 139).
  • Summarize open theism's central claim about the future and the reason its advocates give for holding it, accurately enough to represent the position fairly.
  • Identify why this dispute matters practically, not only academically, for how a believer understands prayer, providence, and being known by God.

Yahweh, you have searched me, and you know me. You know my sitting down and my rising up. You perceive my thoughts from afar. You search out my path and my lying down, and are acquainted with all my ways. For there is not a word on my tongue, but, behold, Yahweh, you know it altogether. You hem me in behind and before. You laid your hand on me. This knowledge is beyond me. It's lofty. I can't attain it." — Psalm 139:1-6

World English Bible

There is no creature that is hidden from his sight, but all things are naked and laid open before the eyes of him to whom we must give an account." — Hebrews 4:13

WEB

1. The classical doctrine stated

The traditional formulation, shared across the Reformed, Lutheran, and Catholic streams of this course's readership, holds that God's knowledge has three properties at once, and it is worth separating them because each answers a different objection. First, God's knowledge is exhaustive: he knows all things — every actual event past, present, and future, every possible event that never occurs, and (per the Molinist proposal examined fully in Chapter 8) on some accounts even what any free creature would freely choose under any circumstance that never comes to pass. Second, God's knowledge is certain: God does not merely have well-grounded beliefs or high-probability estimates about the future; what God knows will occur, occurs, without exception, because God's knowledge does not depend on inference from evidence the way human knowledge does. Third, and this is the point Psalm 139 forces onto the table before any of the philosophical machinery, God's knowledge is personal: it is not knowledge of facts about a person collected from a distance but knowledge of the person, the way "I know my father's arthritis" and "I know my father" are different kinds of statements about the same man.

Aquinas grounds exhaustive divine knowledge in God's own being rather than in God's access to an external world of facts. Because God is the cause of all that exists, and because God's knowledge of a thing is (on Aquinas's account) not derived by looking at the thing but is bound up with God's causing it to be, God's knowledge is not limited by anything outside himself the way a human knower's information is limited by what evidence happens to reach them. Calvin, writing four centuries later and far more interested in Scripture's own vocabulary than in the metaphysics of divine causation, arrives at exhaustive foreknowledge from a different direction: the sheer weight of biblical texts in which God announces the outcome of events — including free human choices — before they occur (Isaiah 46:9-10, engaged fully in Chapter 7, is Calvin's characteristic proof text). Aquinas and Calvin disagree about a great deal in this course, but on the bare claim that God knows the future exhaustively and with certainty, they are not disagreeing with each other at all; they are both disagreeing, centuries in advance, with .

2. Why "exhaustive knowledge of many facts" is not yet the whole doctrine

It would be possible to affirm everything in the paragraph above and still miss what Psalm 139 is actually claiming. The psalm does not open with a claim about the extent of God's information ("Yahweh knows everything that has ever happened"); it opens with a claim about being searched ("Yahweh, you have searched me, and you know me"). The Hebrew verb behind "searched" carries the sense of a careful, deliberate investigation — not indifferent passing over the psalmist the way a camera passes over a room, but attention that is directed, specific, and inescapable. Verses 2 through 4 make the scope of that attention almost uncomfortably concrete: sitting down, rising up, a thought perceived from a distance, a path and a lying-down searched out, a word not yet on the tongue already known. The psalm is not primarily an argument for the doctrine of omniscience; it is a description of what it feels like from the inside to be known that way, and its emotional register (climaxing, in the verses beyond this lecture's citation, in "such knowledge is too wonderful for me") is worship, not textbook definition.

This matters for how the doctrine should actually be taught and preached. A God whose omniscience is presented as a large stockpile of facts is a God about whom omniscience is an interesting true statement. A God whose omniscience is presented the way Psalm 139 presents it is a God from whom, as the psalm goes on to say explicitly, there is nowhere to flee — and this can be read, depending on the state of the reader's conscience, either as the most comforting fact in the universe or the most alarming one. Hebrews 4:13 supplies the New Testament's own gloss on exactly that ambivalence: "There is no creature that is hidden from his sight, but all things are naked and laid open before the eyes of him to whom we must give an account." The verse does not stop at "God knows"; it moves immediately to accountability, which is Hebrews' own signal that omniscience, biblically stated, is never merely descriptive.

3. Open theism's alternative, stated fairly

Open theism, associated principally with Clark Pinnock and Gregory Boyd among contemporary evangelical theologians, denies one specific piece of the classical doctrine: that God's knowledge of future free creaturely choices is exhaustive and settled in the way God's knowledge of the past is settled. The argument is not that God is ignorant, careless, or limited in the way a finite creature is limited. The argument, in its most serious form, runs like this: if a choice is genuinely free in the libertarian sense — meaning the agent could, all factors held constant, have chosen otherwise — then there is, at the moment before the choice, no fact of the matter yet about which way the choice will go. On this view, saying "God does not yet know what Sarah will freely choose tomorrow" is not a statement about a gap in God's knowledge, the way "the professor does not know what is in the sealed envelope" is a gap; it is a statement that there is, strictly speaking, nothing yet there to be known, because the fact will not exist until Sarah's free choice brings it into being. Pinnock and Boyd argue that this framework, far from diminishing God, actually protects two things has trouble holding together: a God who takes real risks and can be genuinely surprised, disappointed, or pleased by how history unfolds (rather than merely narrating a script he already wrote), and human freedom in a strong, libertarian sense unconstrained even by God's own prior knowledge of the outcome.

Open theists point to biblical texts that, read at face value, seem to describe God discovering something, changing his mind, or being surprised — Genesis 6:6 ("Yahweh was sorry that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him in his heart") is the paradigm case, and it will receive full treatment alongside the classical Reformed and Arminian responses to it in Chapter 7. This lecture's task is only to make sure you can state the open theist position accurately, in its own terms, before the extended debate; it is a live position held by serious, professing evangelical theologians, not a fringe error, and this course takes care not to hand you positions like this one as cardboard.

4. What is actually at stake

It would be a mistake to treat this as a purely academic dispute about the metaphysics of time and freedom, interesting only to philosophers. Classical theists worry that open theism, whatever its motivations, ultimately compromises the confidence believers can place in God's promises about the future — if God does not yet know what free creatures will do, then predictive prophecy, providential guarantees like Romans 8:28, and confident intercessory prayer for another person's free response all rest on somewhat less certain ground than the classical tradition has historically offered. Open theists respond that classical theism's confidence comes at the cost of a God who cannot be genuinely responsive to prayer or genuinely moved by a changed heart, because everything, including the prayer and the change, was already exhaustively known and, on stronger versions of the classical doctrine, already decreed (a connection this lecture only flags — the divine decrees are Chapter 8's subject, not this one's). Both sides think the other's God is diminished in some way that matters pastorally, not merely philosophically, and that is worth sitting with rather than resolving here.


Two Readings of "God Knows the Future" Classical theism (Aquinas, Calvin, and the Reformed, Lutheran, and Catholic mainstream) Future free choices are already a settled fact, and God knows that fact with certainty, exhaustively. Protects: certainty of promise and prophecy Open theism (Pinnock, Boyd — a live, minority evangelical view; engaged fully in Ch. 7) A libertarian-free choice is not yet a fact until made — so there is, strictly, nothing yet there for God to know. Protects: strong libertarian freedom and divine risk Both sides affirm exhaustive knowledge of the past and present. The dispute is narrower — and sharper — than it first appears.

5. Going to the Sources

  • Psalm 139 in full (not only verses 1-6) — the psalm moves from being known (vv. 1-6) to being inescapably present to God (vv. 7-12, previewed in Chapter 3's lecture on ) to a prayer for God to search the psalmist's heart (vv. 23-24), which is worth noticing as the psalm's own final move: knowledge of this kind becomes, for the psalmist, something to ask for more of, not merely a fact to affirm.
  • Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, Q. 14 ("The Knowledge of God"), articles 1-13, especially article 13 on God's knowledge of future contingent things — the single most sustained classical treatment of exactly the question this lecture opens.
  • Gregory Boyd, God of the Open Future (or the shorter statement of his position in the four-views volume Divine Foreknowledge), for open theism stated by one of its own leading contemporary advocates rather than by its critics.

In short

  • Classical theology says God's knowledge is exhaustive, certain and personal. Reformed, Lutheran, Catholic and Orthodox traditions all hold that he knows the future, including free choices.
  • Aquinas grounds this in God as the cause of all things. Calvin grounds it in biblical texts such as Isaiah 46:9-10. Both agree that the knowledge is exhaustive.
  • Psalm 139 shows that God's knowledge is personal. He searches and knows the psalmist, and Hebrews 4:13 links it to accountability.
  • Open theism, held by Clark Pinnock and Gregory Boyd, says free choices not yet made are not yet knowable, so God does not know them.
  • Open theists point to texts like Genesis 6:6. Chapter 7 treats the debate fully.
  • Each side thinks the other's God is diminished in a way that matters for prayer and promise.

Topic: This lecture states the classical doctrine of God's knowledge and fairly describes open theism's disagreement about the future.

Remember: In Psalm 139, God's knowledge is personal first. He knows you, not only facts about you.

Caution: Open theists are serious evangelical theologians. They do not claim God is ignorant or weak, and the lecture does not settle the debate.

One line to carry into ministry: Tell people that God knows them fully, which can bring both comfort and accountability.

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Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • Psalm 139:1-6 moves from "you have searched me" to "such knowledge is too wonderful for me" (in the verses just beyond this lecture's citation). Why might a doctrine of omniscience presented only as an abstract property ("God knows all facts") miss what the psalm is actually doing?
  • State, in your own words and as fairly as you can, the single strongest reason open theists give for denying that God exhaustively knows future free choices. Do not state the objection to it yet — just the position itself.
  • If God's knowledge of the future were less than exhaustive, what (if anything) would change about how you would pray for another person's free response — a friend's conversion, a family member's decision? Does your answer depend on which position in this lecture you find more persuasive?

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What next

The lecture ends here. What follows was written by its readers.