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ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God

Lecture 7-1: Process Theology — A God Who Grows With the World

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Contents 46
ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God
Chapter 0 · Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
  1. Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: Prolegomena: Revelation, Religious Language, and the Knowledge of God
  1. Lecture 1-1: Why Theology Proper Comes First
  2. Lecture 1-2: Calvin's Opening Move — Knowledge of God and Knowledge of Self
  3. Lecture 1-3: General and Special Revelation
  4. Lecture 1-4: Religious Language and Its Limits
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: The Existence of God: Arguments and Their Critics
  1. Lecture 2-1: Can God's Existence Be Proved? Setting the Terms
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Cosmological Argument — From the World to a First Cause
  3. Lecture 2-3: The Teleological and Moral Arguments
  4. Lecture 2-4: The Ontological Argument — From Concept to Necessary Existence
  5. Lecture 2-5: Presuppositionalism and Contemporary Atheism
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: The Incommunicable Attributes of God
  1. Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity
  2. Lecture 3-2: Aseity and Independence
  3. Lecture 3-3: Immutability and Impassibility
  4. Lecture 3-4: Infinity, Eternity, and God's Relation to Time
  5. Lecture 3-5: Omnipresence
  6. Lecture 3-6: The Unity of God
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: The Communicable Attributes and the Names of God
  1. Lecture 4-1: Omniscience — God's Exhaustive and Personal Knowledge
  2. Lecture 4-2: Wisdom and Faithfulness — Knowledge Ordered and Kept
  3. Lecture 4-3: Holiness and Righteousness — Otherness and Moral Purity
  4. Lecture 4-4: Goodness, Love, Grace, and Mercy — Four Related but Distinct Attributes
  5. Lecture 4-5: Sovereignty and Omnipotence — What "God Can Do All Things" Actually Means
  6. Lecture 4-6: The Revealed Names of God — Self-Disclosure Through Covenant History
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: The Trinity I: Biblical Foundations and Historical Formation
  1. Lecture 5-1: The Biblical Foundations of the Trinity
  2. Lecture 5-2: Early Heresies — Monarchianism, Adoptionism, and Modalism
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
  4. Lecture 5-4: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Council of Constantinople
  5. Lecture 5-5: Augustine's Trinitarian Theology and the Filioque Controversy
  6. Lecture 5-6: East and West Compared — Two Starting Points
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: The Trinity II: Orthodox Doctrine and Modern Debates
  1. Lecture 6-1: The Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity
  2. Lecture 6-2: Perichoresis — Mutual Indwelling of the Divine Persons
  3. Lecture 6-3: Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession
  4. Lecture 6-4: The Twentieth-Century Revival of Trinitarian Theology
  5. Lecture 6-5: Social Trinitarianism and Its Critics
  6. Lecture 6-6: Contemporary Debates over Trinitarian Language
Chapter 7 · Chapter 7: Contemporary Challenges to the Doctrine of God
  1. Lecture 7-1: Process Theology — A God Who Grows With the World
  2. Lecture 7-2: Open Theism and the Future God Does Not Yet Know
  3. Lecture 7-3: Moltmann's Crucified God and the Question of Divine Suffering
  4. Lecture 7-4: Panentheism, Ecology, and the Creator/Creature Distinction
  5. Lecture 7-5: Contemporary Science and the Doctrine of God
  6. Lecture 7-6: Answering Postmodernism and the New Atheism
Chapter 8 · Chapter 8: Decrees, Creation, Providence, and Pastoral Application
  1. Lecture 8-1: The Divine Decrees and Predestination
  2. Lecture 8-2: Calvinism, Arminianism, and Molinism on the Decrees
  3. Lecture 8-3: Creation Out of Nothing, and the Age of the Earth
  4. Lecture 8-4: Providence — Preservation, Concurrence, Government, and Miracle
  5. Lecture 8-5: The Problem of Evil and Theodicy
  6. Lecture 8-6: Conclusion — Knowing God, Not Only Knowing About Him

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18 min

Chapter 3 argued that God is immutable (he does not change in his being, will, or character) and, by implication, that his power is unconditioned by anything outside himself. Process theology denies both claims, and it does not deny them casually. It is a serious, sustained philosophical and theological tradition, built first by the mathematician-turned-philosopher Alfred North Whitehead and given explicitly theological form by his student Charles Hartshorne, and it has produced working theologians and biblical scholars for a century, not merely a school of philosophy that happens to mention God. This lecture states process theology's account of God — a God genuinely affected by, and growing through, the world's history — as its own proponents would recognize it, identifies the concerns that make it attractive (chiefly the problem of evil and a felt need for a God who is actually responsive to prayer and history), and then states the classical objection: that a God who depends on the world for his own becoming has surrendered exactly the aseity and sovereignty Chapter 3 argued belong to God alone.

What these 18 minutes give you

  • State Whitehead's process metaphysics and Hartshorne's theological development of it (dipolar theism, the "consequent nature" of God) in terms a process theologian would accept as fair.
  • Explain why process theology's motivating concerns — the problem of evil and a God genuinely responsive to the world — are serious concerns and not merely a rhetorical launching pad for revising the doctrine of God.
  • State the classical objection that process theology compromises divine aseity and sovereignty (Chapter 3), and explain what is actually at stake in that objection.
  • Identify what a classical theist can and cannot concede to process theology's critique of an unmoved, unaffected God.

For I, Yahweh, don't change; therefore you, sons of Jacob, are not consumed." — Malachi 3:6

World English Bible

God is not a man, that he should lie, nor the son of man, that he should repent. Has he said, and will he not do it? Or has he spoken, and will he not make it good?" — Numbers 23:19

WEB

These two texts are the natural starting point for anyone defending classical , and process theologians know them as well as their critics do; the argument between the two positions is not over whether these verses exist but over what kind of claim they are making. Malachi's "I don't change" sits in a passage about Yahweh's faithfulness to "sons of Jacob" who have themselves changed, wandered, and returned — the claim on the table is that God's covenant commitment is reliable across Israel's changing history, not (on one reading) a metaphysical claim about whether anything at all happens in God's inner life. Numbers 23:19 is spoken by Balaam specifically about God's reliability to keep a spoken blessing, against Balak's hope that Balaam could be paid to reverse it. Classical theists read both texts as teaching, and requiring, full ontological immutability; a sympathetic reader of has to at least see why a text about covenant reliability does not by itself settle a metaphysical question about whether God's own experience is affected by the world. This lecture takes up that disagreement directly rather than assuming the classical reading is the only one available from the text.

1. Whitehead's process metaphysics, briefly

Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) did not set out to write a doctrine of God; he set out to replace the substance metaphysics that had run from Aristotle through Descartes with what he called "process" or "organism" philosophy. On Whitehead's account, the basic units of reality are not enduring substances that have properties and occasionally change them, but momentary events of experience — "actual occasions" — each of which comes into being by absorbing ("prehending") every prior actual occasion relevant to it, achieves a brief moment of unified experience, and then perishes, becoming itself a datum for the next generation of occasions. Nothing simply sits still and has properties; everything is process, becoming, event. This is a genuinely different picture of what it means for anything — a stone, a human self, or God — to exist at all, and it is worth taking seriously as metaphysics before asking what it does to theology, because process theology's account of God is not an arbitrary add-on; it follows from applying this metaphysics consistently to everything, including God.

2. Hartshorne's dipolar God

Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000) took Whitehead's framework and built out of it an explicitly theological doctrine of God usually called "dipolar theism": God has two poles or aspects, a "primordial nature" (God's abstract, unchanging character and his valuation of all possibilities, which does answer to something like the classical attributes of eternal wisdom and goodness) and a "consequent nature" (God's concrete, ever-growing experience of the actual world, which changes constantly as new events occur and are taken up into God's own experience). On this account, God does not create the world from absolute independence and then remain unaffected by it; God is genuinely enriched, moved, and in that sense changed by every actual event in the world's history — a child's joy, a person's suffering, an act of injustice, all become part of God's own experience and shape what God is like going forward. Hartshorne's God is the "most moved mover," a phrase deliberately reversing Aristotle's unmoved mover: supremely responsive rather than supremely detached, and for that reason, on Hartshorne's account, more worthy of worship, not less.

3. What process theology actually gives up, and why it thinks the trade is worth it

Consistently applied, this metaphysics requires giving up several things holds together: divine immutability (God's consequent nature genuinely changes), classical (God does not coerce outcomes but "lures" or persuades every actual occasion toward the best possibility available to it, because on process metaphysics no agent, including God, can unilaterally determine what a genuinely free occasion will do), and creation out of nothing (most process thinkers hold that God has always been in relation to some world or other, everlastingly, rather than that the world had an absolute beginning from nothing). Process theologians consider this an acceptable, even necessary, cost, for at least two serious reasons that this lecture should not minimize.

The first is the problem of evil, which Chapter 8 (8-5) will take up in its classical forms. Process theology's answer is structurally different from any of those: because God cannot coerce any actual occasion, including a human choice or the workings of a diseased cell, God is not the ultimate cause, even permissively, of evil in the world — evil arises from the genuine, real freedom Whitehead's metaphysics grants to every actual occasion, freedom God did not create in the classical sovereign sense and cannot simply override. A theologian drawn to process thought will say this solves the classical dilemma (an all-powerful, all-good God who nonetheless permits horrendous evil) by denying the first premise cleanly, rather than qualifying it awkwardly as most classical theodicies do.

The second is the felt inadequacy of a God who is, on the classical account, unmoved by anything that happens — a God, in the most literal sense, unaffected by a worshiper's grief or a martyr's suffering. Process theologians read the classical doctrine of (developed in Chapter 3 and returned to directly in 7-3) as importing a Greek philosophical ideal of self-sufficiency that never sat comfortably beside the biblical God who grieves (Genesis 6:6), relents (Jonah 3:10), and is described, again and again, in language of genuine emotional response to his people. A God who is really moved by the world, they argue, is closer to that biblical portrait than a God whose emotions are, on the classical account, only analogical or purely metaphorical projections onto an unchanging being.

4. The classical objection

Chapter 3 (3-2) argued for divine : God has life in himself and depends on nothing outside himself for his existence, character, or blessedness. The classical objection to process theology follows directly from that lecture and can be stated precisely. If God's consequent nature is genuinely constituted, event by event, by what happens in the world, then God's own concrete actuality depends on the world for what it becomes — which means the world is not merely something God freely creates and sustains but something God, in an important sense, needs in order to be who he now concretely is. Classical theism holds this exactly backward: God's blessedness, being, and character are complete in himself, logically and really prior to and independent of any creature, and the world exists because God freely chose to create it, adding nothing to what God already was. On the classical reading, process theology has not found a more biblical God; it has made God a needy, developing being whose fullness is achieved rather than possessed, and in doing so it has surrendered the very thing that makes God, rather than the highest and best creature, the proper object of worship: God does not need what he is worshiped for giving.

A second, related objection concerns divine power. If God can only "lure" and never determine outcomes, then God's victory over evil — the confidence, for instance, of Romans 8:28 that God works all things for good, or of Revelation's promise that evil is finally and decisively defeated — becomes at best a hope that persuasion will eventually work on every future actual occasion, never a guarantee grounded in God's own sovereign power. Classical theists press this hard: a God who cannot guarantee the outcome of history is a God whose promises are, strictly, only best guesses, however well-informed, and the entire biblical language of divine oath, covenant, and promise assumes a God who "will not go back on his word" (Numbers 23:19) in a stronger sense than "will keep trying to persuade the world toward it."

5. What can, and cannot, be conceded

Not everything about the classical response should sound like simple denial. Classical theists across traditions increasingly grant that process theology names a real problem: a doctrine of impassibility stated so strongly that God is entirely unmoved, in any sense, by the world's suffering risks sounding like indifference rather than transcendence, and Chapter 3's own careful qualification of impassibility (God does not suffer as creatures do, involuntarily and against his will, but this does not mean God is emotionally inert) already anticipates this. What classical theism will not concede is the metaphysical claim that God's own being is constituted by, and therefore dependent on, the world's actual history. The disagreement, at bottom, is over whether God's engagement with the world can be full, real, and responsive without also being constitutive of who God is — classical theism says yes; process theology, applying Whitehead's metaphysics consistently, says the distinction cannot be maintained.


Classical Theism vs. Process Theology's God Classical Theism (Ch. 3) Immutable — being, will, character fixed, not becoming Omnipotent — can determine outcomes, not only persuade Aseity — God's fullness owes nothing to the world Creation ex nihilo — the world had an absolute beginning Process Theology (Whitehead/Hartshorne) Dipolar — primordial nature fixed, consequent nature ever-growing Persuasive power — "lures" every occasion, cannot coerce it God's concrete actuality is constituted by the world's history Everlasting relation to some world or other, no absolute beginning

5. Going to the Sources

Read Charles Hartshorne's The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God (Yale University Press, 1948), especially chapter 1, where he sets out dipolar theism directly and explicitly names classical theism (Aquinas, Anselm) as his target. For a shorter and more accessible entry, John B. Cobb Jr. and David Ray Griffin's Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition (Westminster John Knox, 1976) lays out Whitehead's metaphysics for a theological readership without assuming prior philosophical training. For the classical rebuttal from within analytic philosophy of religion, Richard Creel's Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge University Press, 1986) engages process theology's critique of impassibility directly and defends a qualified classical position.

In short

  • Process theology, built by Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, sees reality as events of experience that are always becoming, rather than as enduring substances.
  • Hartshorne's dipolar God has an unchanging primordial nature and a consequent nature that grows with every event in the world. God is the "most moved mover."
  • This view gives up divine immutability, classical omnipotence (God "lures" but does not coerce) and, for most process thinkers, creation out of nothing.
  • Two serious concerns motivate it. God is then not the cause of evil, and God is truly moved by suffering, as when God grieves in Genesis 6:6.
  • The classical objection is that a God constituted by the world depends on it, which gives up aseity and makes God's promises only hopes.
  • Classical theists can grant that impassibility must not sound like indifference. They refuse to say God's being depends on the world.

Topic: This lecture explains process theology's God, who grows through the world's history, and the classical objection that this surrenders God's independence and sovereignty.

Remember: The central question is whether God can be fully responsive to the world without being constituted by it. Classical theism says yes. Process theology says no.

Caution: Process theology is a serious tradition with real concerns, not a careless revision. Malachi 3:6 and Numbers 23:19 do not by themselves settle a metaphysical question.

One line to carry into ministry: Take seriously the pain behind the question "Does God feel this?" and answer it without giving up that God needs nothing to be God.

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Reflection and discussion

  • Process theology argues that a God who cannot be moved by the world is not worthy of worship, and classical theism argues that a God who depends on the world for his own becoming is not worthy of worship either. State each side's criterion for what makes God "worthy of worship" as precisely as you can, and identify exactly where the two criteria conflict.
  • Malachi 3:6 and Numbers 23:19 are both used by classical theists to establish immutability. Read each verse again in light of this lecture's discussion of what kind of claim it makes (covenant reliability versus full ontological immutability). Which reading do you find more persuasive, and why?
  • Process theology's solution to the problem of evil (God cannot coerce, so God is not responsible even permissively) trades one difficulty for another (God cannot guarantee that evil will ever actually be overcome). Is this a trade classical theism should envy, or one it should be glad to avoid? Defend your answer with reference to a specific biblical promise.

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What next

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