Lecture 7-3: Moltmann's Crucified God and the Question of Divine Suffering
Contents 46
- Lecture 1-1: Why Theology Proper Comes First
- Lecture 1-2: Calvin's Opening Move — Knowledge of God and Knowledge of Self
- Lecture 1-3: General and Special Revelation
- Lecture 1-4: Religious Language and Its Limits
- Lecture 2-1: Can God's Existence Be Proved? Setting the Terms
- Lecture 2-2: The Cosmological Argument — From the World to a First Cause
- Lecture 2-3: The Teleological and Moral Arguments
- Lecture 2-4: The Ontological Argument — From Concept to Necessary Existence
- Lecture 2-5: Presuppositionalism and Contemporary Atheism
- Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity
- Lecture 3-2: Aseity and Independence
- Lecture 3-3: Immutability and Impassibility
- Lecture 3-4: Infinity, Eternity, and God's Relation to Time
- Lecture 3-5: Omnipresence
- Lecture 3-6: The Unity of God
- Lecture 4-1: Omniscience — God's Exhaustive and Personal Knowledge
- Lecture 4-2: Wisdom and Faithfulness — Knowledge Ordered and Kept
- Lecture 4-3: Holiness and Righteousness — Otherness and Moral Purity
- Lecture 4-4: Goodness, Love, Grace, and Mercy — Four Related but Distinct Attributes
- Lecture 4-5: Sovereignty and Omnipotence — What "God Can Do All Things" Actually Means
- Lecture 4-6: The Revealed Names of God — Self-Disclosure Through Covenant History
- Lecture 5-1: The Biblical Foundations of the Trinity
- Lecture 5-2: Early Heresies — Monarchianism, Adoptionism, and Modalism
- Lecture 5-3: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
- Lecture 5-4: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Council of Constantinople
- Lecture 5-5: Augustine's Trinitarian Theology and the Filioque Controversy
- Lecture 5-6: East and West Compared — Two Starting Points
- Lecture 6-1: The Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity
- Lecture 6-2: Perichoresis — Mutual Indwelling of the Divine Persons
- Lecture 6-3: Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession
- Lecture 6-4: The Twentieth-Century Revival of Trinitarian Theology
- Lecture 6-5: Social Trinitarianism and Its Critics
- Lecture 6-6: Contemporary Debates over Trinitarian Language
- Lecture 7-1: Process Theology — A God Who Grows With the World
- Lecture 7-2: Open Theism and the Future God Does Not Yet Know
- Lecture 7-3: Moltmann's Crucified God and the Question of Divine Suffering
- Lecture 7-4: Panentheism, Ecology, and the Creator/Creature Distinction
- Lecture 7-5: Contemporary Science and the Doctrine of God
- Lecture 7-6: Answering Postmodernism and the New Atheism
- Lecture 8-1: The Divine Decrees and Predestination
- Lecture 8-2: Calvinism, Arminianism, and Molinism on the Decrees
- Lecture 8-3: Creation Out of Nothing, and the Age of the Earth
- Lecture 8-4: Providence — Preservation, Concurrence, Government, and Miracle
- Lecture 8-5: The Problem of Evil and Theodicy
- Lecture 8-6: Conclusion — Knowing God, Not Only Knowing About Him
Chapter 3 (3-3) stated the classical doctrine of divine impassibility: God does not suffer or undergo emotional change as creatures do. Jürgen Moltmann's 1972 book The Crucified God is the single most influential twentieth-century argument that this doctrine cannot be sustained at the very point where Christian theology is most exposed — the cross. This lecture treats Moltmann's argument as what it is: not a modern innovation adopted casually or for its own sake, but a considered theological response to the problem of evil and to a specific historical catastrophe (Moltmann wrote as a German who had been a young prisoner of war and returned home to a country reckoning with the Holocaust), arguing that only a God who himself suffers in the event of the cross can be good news to a world that has suffered as the twentieth century's victims suffered. The lecture states Moltmann's case in full before turning to the classical tradition's own resources — which are more substantial than "God does not suffer, full stop" — for affirming God's real, costly engagement with suffering without simply abandoning impassibility.
What these 18 minutes give you
- State Moltmann's central claim in *The Crucified God* — that the cross is an event within the Trinity's own life in which the Father suffers the loss of the Son and the Son suffers abandonment by the Father — and explain the pastoral and historical concerns that motivate it.
- Distinguish "patripassianism" (the ancient heresy that the Father himself suffered on the cross, condemned as a form of modalism) from Moltmann's more careful claim about what happens between the Father and the Son.
- State the classical doctrine of impassibility with the qualifications Chapter 3 already built in, and show what resources it has for affirming genuine divine engagement with suffering.
- Explain why this remains, in this course's own judgment, one of the most actively and legitimately debated points in contemporary theology, not a settled question either side has already won.
He was despised, and rejected by men; a man of suffering, and acquainted with disease. He was despised as one from whom men hide their face; and we didn't respect him." — Isaiah 53:3
World English Bible
Surely he has borne our sickness, and carried our suffering; yet we considered him plagued, struck by God, and afflicted." — Isaiah 53:4
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For we don't have a high priest who can't be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, but one who has been in all points tempted like we are, yet without sin." — Hebrews 4:15
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Isaiah 53 is the Old Testament's own witness to a suffering, despised figure whom the New Testament identifies as the Messiah, and Hebrews 4:15 makes the same point from the other direction: the church's confession that Jesus Christ, fully God and fully man, was genuinely "touched with the feeling of our infirmities" is not a marginal claim but a central pastoral ground for approaching him at all (Hebrews 4:16 immediately draws the conclusion — "let us therefore draw near with boldness"). No party in this debate denies that the incarnate Son suffered in his human nature; the disagreement, stated precisely below, is over whether that suffering reaches, or must reach, God's own divine nature and the 's inner life, or whether Christ's full humanity is itself sufficient ground for saying God has drawn near to human suffering without requiring that divine be given up.
1. The historical and pastoral occasion for Moltmann's argument
Jürgen Moltmann (1926-2024) was drafted into the German army as a teenager near the end of the Second World War, captured by British forces, and held for several years as a prisoner of war — years in which, by his own account, he first encountered serious Christian faith, partly through a chaplain's gift of a New Testament and Psalms. He returned to a Germany confronting Auschwitz, and his theological career cannot be separated from the question that confronted his entire generation of German theologians: what can be said about God after Auschwitz, and can any theology that has not reckoned with mass atrocity be taken seriously as an answer to it? The Crucified God (1972) is Moltmann's mature answer, and it should not be read as an academic exercise in revising one attribute for its own sake. Moltmann's target is what he calls "theism" — a God secure in his own untouched blessedness, watching history, including its horrors, from a position of total invulnerability — and his claim is that this God cannot be the God revealed at the cross, and that a theology which cannot say God himself was somehow present in and touched by Golgotha's horror has, in the end, nothing to say to Auschwitz's horror either.
2. What Moltmann actually argues
Moltmann's argument works from within a Trinitarian framework, and this matters for stating it fairly: he is not simply saying "God suffered on the cross" in a way that collapses Father, Son, and Spirit into one suffering subject. He argues that the cross is an event that takes place within the Trinity's own relations: the Son experiences real abandonment by the Father (Moltmann takes Jesus's cry of dereliction, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?", with full theological seriousness, as marking an actual rupture in the Father-Son relation, not merely Jesus's subjective sense of abandonment), and the Father, correspondingly, suffers the grief of losing the Son — what Moltmann calls, borrowing and adapting a phrase, the Father's own grief, distinct from but really parallel to the Son's own suffering. The Spirit, on Moltmann's account, is the bond of love proceeding from this event, uniting Father and Son again in the resurrection and opening a place, within God's own trinitarian history, for the world's suffering to be taken up into God rather than held at a distance from him. The theological payoff, for Moltmann, is direct: the doctrine of the Trinity is not an abstract puzzle about how three can be one, but the church's own way of stating that God himself, in his own triune life, has already entered and borne the very worst that history can do — which means no sufferer's suffering, however extreme, places that sufferer outside of or unaccompanied by God.
3. Distinguishing Moltmann's claim from patripassianism
This lecture has to be precise here, because Moltmann's critics have sometimes accused him of simply reviving patripassianism, the ancient heresy (touched on in Chapter 5's discussion of Monarchianism) that the Father himself was crucified and suffered directly, which the church rejected because it erased the real distinction between the Father and the Son. Moltmann explicitly and repeatedly denies this charge: he does not say the Father suffered physical crucifixion, or that the Father and Son are the same suffering subject. He distinguishes the Son's suffering (real, including physical death, in his human nature, undergone directly) from the Father's suffering (a distinct grief — the grief of a father losing a son — undergone by the Father as Father, not as though the Father had become incarnate and died). Whether this distinction is stable enough to escape the patripassianist charge is itself a live question among Moltmann's critics and remains part of the debate; the fair statement is that Moltmann intends a real distinction between Father's and Son's respective sufferings and explicitly repudiates patripassianism as such, whatever one judges about whether his account fully avoids its logic.
4. The classical objection, precisely stated
's objection to Moltmann begins where Chapter 3 (3-3) left the doctrine of impassibility: if God — Father, Son in his divine nature, or Spirit — can suffer, then God's blessedness and perfection are not, after all, unconditioned by anything outside himself, and God becomes vulnerable to created reality in a way that compromises the very Chapter 3 (3-2) established. A God capable of being made to suffer by the actions of creatures is, on the classical reading, a God who can be acted upon and diminished by his own creation — which classical theism holds is incompatible with God being the self-sufficient source of all being rather than one being, however exalted, among others capable of being affected by the world's evils. There is also a specifically Christological worry: classical Christology (developed at Chalcedon, and assumed but not fully argued in this course, which belongs to a later course in this sequence) holds that Christ's two natures, divine and human, are united in one person without confusion, change, division, or separation — and one of the reasons for insisting the natures are not confused is precisely to preserve the classical claim that the divine nature, as such, does not suffer, while the human nature genuinely does, and the one person of the Son can therefore be truly said to have suffered "according to his human nature" without requiring that divinity itself became capable of suffering. Moltmann's critics worry that his account blurs exactly this distinction, attributing suffering to the divine nature (or at least to the Father, who has no human nature to suffer in) in a way classical Christology was built to avoid.
5. What classical theism can concede, and what it will not
This is a point where the disagreement should not be resolved by authorial fiat, and stating it honestly requires naming what classical theism's own resources already allow, because the caricature of impassibility as flat divine indifference to suffering is not, in fact, what the careful classical tradition has always taught. Chapter 3 already qualified impassibility as meaning God does not suffer involuntarily, against his will, the way creatures are overtaken by suffering — not that God is emotionally inert or unmoved by the world in every sense. Thomas Weinandy, a contemporary Catholic theologian who has written the most sustained recent defense of impassibility (Does God Suffer?, 2000), argues that God's love for the world is, if anything, more intense and more perfectly realized than any creaturely love precisely because it is not qualified or diminished by the passivity, the being-acted-upon, that creaturely suffering involves — God's compassion is a fully active, freely willed engagement with the world's suffering, not a passive undergoing of it, and Weinandy argues this makes God's solidarity with sufferers more complete, not less, than a vulnerable God's could be. And no classical theist has ever denied that the Son genuinely suffered, really and to the point of death, in his human nature at the cross — Hebrews 4:15's "one who has been in all points tempted like we are" is not a metaphor for classical theology either. What classical theism will not concede is Moltmann's further claim that God's own divine nature, as such, or the Trinity's own inner relations, were themselves altered or made vulnerable by the cross. The disagreement is genuinely narrower than it first appears — both sides affirm real, costly divine engagement with human suffering at the cross — and genuinely real: whether that engagement requires attributing suffering to God's own being, or whether Christ's full humanity is itself sufficient ground for the church's confidence that God has drawn near, is a question this course states rather than settles, in keeping with the contested-points discipline named at the start of this course.
5. Going to the Sources
Read Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology (1972; English translation, SCM Press, 1974), especially chapter 6, "The Crucified God," where the Trinitarian argument summarized above is made directly. For the classical rebuttal, read Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), especially the introduction and chapter 1, where Weinandy states the case for impassibility as compatible with, and even required by, full divine love and compassion. For the historical-theological background on why the early church rejected patripassianism as a form of Monarchianism, revisit Chapter 5 (5-2) of this course.
In short
- Jürgen Moltmann wrote The Crucified God (1972) after the war and in the shadow of Auschwitz. He argues that a God untouched by suffering has nothing to say to its victims.
- For Moltmann, the cross is an event within the Trinity. The Son is truly abandoned by the Father, and the Father grieves the loss of the Son.
- Moltmann denies patripassianism, the ancient heresy that the Father himself was crucified. Critics still ask whether his distinction between Father's grief and Son's suffering holds.
- Classical theism objects that a God who can be made to suffer loses aseity, and that Chalcedon places suffering in Christ's human nature only.
- Thomas Weinandy argues that God's active compassion is more complete than passive suffering. Everyone agrees the Son truly suffered as man (Hebrews 4:15).
- The disagreement is narrower than it looks. It concerns whether suffering must belong to God's own being.
Topic: This lecture sets Moltmann's claim that the cross is a suffering within God against the classical doctrine of impassibility, which says God does not suffer as creatures do.
Remember: Both sides affirm that God has drawn near to human suffering at the cross at real cost. They differ on whether this requires suffering in God's own divine nature.
Caution: Classical impassibility does not mean God is indifferent. Moltmann does not claim the Father was crucified. The lecture settles neither side.
One line to carry into ministry: Tell sufferers plainly that Christ truly suffered and that God has drawn near, before explaining any theory of how.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Moltmann argues that a theology which cannot say God was himself present in and touched by the cross's horror has nothing to say to history's worst atrocities. State this argument in its strongest form, in your own words, before evaluating it.
- This lecture distinguishes Moltmann's claim (a real distinction between the Father's grief and the Son's suffering) from patripassianism (the Father himself crucified and suffering directly). Do you think Moltmann's distinction holds up under his own critics' pressure, or does his account collapse back into the heresy he explicitly denies holding? Defend your answer with specific reference to what each position actually claims.
- Weinandy argues that an impassible God's compassion is more complete than a passible God's could be, because it is fully active rather than partly a passive undergoing. Is this a satisfying answer to Moltmann's pastoral concern, or does it risk sounding, to a sufferer, like exactly the kind of untouched invulnerability Moltmann was writing against? Explain your reasoning.