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ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God

Lecture 7-5: Contemporary Science and the Doctrine of God

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Contents 46
ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God
Chapter 0 · Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
  1. Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: Prolegomena: Revelation, Religious Language, and the Knowledge of God
  1. Lecture 1-1: Why Theology Proper Comes First
  2. Lecture 1-2: Calvin's Opening Move — Knowledge of God and Knowledge of Self
  3. Lecture 1-3: General and Special Revelation
  4. Lecture 1-4: Religious Language and Its Limits
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: The Existence of God: Arguments and Their Critics
  1. Lecture 2-1: Can God's Existence Be Proved? Setting the Terms
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Cosmological Argument — From the World to a First Cause
  3. Lecture 2-3: The Teleological and Moral Arguments
  4. Lecture 2-4: The Ontological Argument — From Concept to Necessary Existence
  5. Lecture 2-5: Presuppositionalism and Contemporary Atheism
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: The Incommunicable Attributes of God
  1. Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity
  2. Lecture 3-2: Aseity and Independence
  3. Lecture 3-3: Immutability and Impassibility
  4. Lecture 3-4: Infinity, Eternity, and God's Relation to Time
  5. Lecture 3-5: Omnipresence
  6. Lecture 3-6: The Unity of God
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: The Communicable Attributes and the Names of God
  1. Lecture 4-1: Omniscience — God's Exhaustive and Personal Knowledge
  2. Lecture 4-2: Wisdom and Faithfulness — Knowledge Ordered and Kept
  3. Lecture 4-3: Holiness and Righteousness — Otherness and Moral Purity
  4. Lecture 4-4: Goodness, Love, Grace, and Mercy — Four Related but Distinct Attributes
  5. Lecture 4-5: Sovereignty and Omnipotence — What "God Can Do All Things" Actually Means
  6. Lecture 4-6: The Revealed Names of God — Self-Disclosure Through Covenant History
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: The Trinity I: Biblical Foundations and Historical Formation
  1. Lecture 5-1: The Biblical Foundations of the Trinity
  2. Lecture 5-2: Early Heresies — Monarchianism, Adoptionism, and Modalism
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
  4. Lecture 5-4: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Council of Constantinople
  5. Lecture 5-5: Augustine's Trinitarian Theology and the Filioque Controversy
  6. Lecture 5-6: East and West Compared — Two Starting Points
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: The Trinity II: Orthodox Doctrine and Modern Debates
  1. Lecture 6-1: The Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity
  2. Lecture 6-2: Perichoresis — Mutual Indwelling of the Divine Persons
  3. Lecture 6-3: Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession
  4. Lecture 6-4: The Twentieth-Century Revival of Trinitarian Theology
  5. Lecture 6-5: Social Trinitarianism and Its Critics
  6. Lecture 6-6: Contemporary Debates over Trinitarian Language
Chapter 7 · Chapter 7: Contemporary Challenges to the Doctrine of God
  1. Lecture 7-1: Process Theology — A God Who Grows With the World
  2. Lecture 7-2: Open Theism and the Future God Does Not Yet Know
  3. Lecture 7-3: Moltmann's Crucified God and the Question of Divine Suffering
  4. Lecture 7-4: Panentheism, Ecology, and the Creator/Creature Distinction
  5. Lecture 7-5: Contemporary Science and the Doctrine of God
  6. Lecture 7-6: Answering Postmodernism and the New Atheism
Chapter 8 · Chapter 8: Decrees, Creation, Providence, and Pastoral Application
  1. Lecture 8-1: The Divine Decrees and Predestination
  2. Lecture 8-2: Calvinism, Arminianism, and Molinism on the Decrees
  3. Lecture 8-3: Creation Out of Nothing, and the Age of the Earth
  4. Lecture 8-4: Providence — Preservation, Concurrence, Government, and Miracle
  5. Lecture 8-5: The Problem of Evil and Theodicy
  6. Lecture 8-6: Conclusion — Knowing God, Not Only Knowing About Him

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19 min

This lecture leaves behind the previous three lectures' pattern (a theological revision of classical theism, engaged and then answered) for a different kind of conversation: the relationship between the doctrine of God and the natural sciences, which is genuinely ongoing rather than settled in either direction, and which this lecture refuses to treat as either a solved harmony or a lost war. Three areas are engaged in turn — physics and fine-tuning (building on Chapter 2's teleological argument), neuroscience and the question of divine action within a physically describable universe, and evolutionary biology's challenge to certain readings of providence and design — with serious theologian-scientists represented on more than one side of each question, because this is a conversation with real disagreement inside the church and inside the scientific community, not a single "Christian" position against a single "scientific" one.

What these 19 minutes give you

  • State the fine-tuning argument in physics and both the theistic and naturalistic responses to it (multiverse proposals among them) without overstating what either side has actually established.
  • Explain the question neuroscience raises for divine action — whether a physically closed universe leaves room for God to act — and state more than one theological response to it.
  • Distinguish evolutionary biology's challenge to certain readings of providence and design from a challenge to the doctrine of creation as such, and state why this distinction matters.
  • Name at least two serious theologian-scientists (e.g., John Polkinghorne, Alister McGrath) and represent their actual positions rather than a caricature of "science versus religion."

The heavens declare the glory of God. The expanse shows his handiwork. Day after day they pour out speech, and night after night they display knowledge. There is no speech nor language, where their voice is not heard. Their voice has gone out through all the earth, their words to the end of the world." — Psalm 19:1-4

World English Bible

Then Yahweh answered Job out of the whirlwind... 'Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth? Declare, if you have understanding... when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?'" — Job 38:1, 4, 7 (WEB), survey of Job 38-39

Psalm 19 has long served as a biblical warrant for taking the natural world seriously as a genuine, if non-verbal, witness to God (, engaged fully in Chapter 1, 1-3) — a text this lecture treats as licensing serious scientific inquiry into creation's structure rather than viewing it with suspicion. Job 38-39's long divine speech, surveyed rather than quoted in full here, takes an entirely different tone: Yahweh answers Job's demand for an explanation of his suffering not with an argument but with a sustained, unanswerable tour of creation's scale and strangeness — wild goats giving birth, the ostrich's odd disregard for her own eggs, the war horse's fearlessness, weather patterns beyond human command — the cumulative effect of which is to put human understanding, including Job's own and by extension every scientific inquirer's, in its proper, creaturely place before a Creator whose ways exceed human comprehension. This lecture treats both texts as true at once: creation genuinely displays God's glory and rewards careful study (Psalm 19), and no amount of that study licenses the conclusion that a finite mind has thereby comprehended God (Job 38-39) — a needed corrective on both sides of the debate below.

1. Physics: fine-tuning and its responses

Chapter 2 (2-3) introduced the in its classical (Paley's watchmaker) and contemporary (fine-tuning) forms. This lecture picks the conversation up specifically as a live scientific-theological question rather than a settled argument. The fine-tuning observation itself is not seriously disputed among physicists: a number of fundamental physical constants (the strength of gravity, the cosmological constant, the ratio of the electromagnetic force to gravity, among others) fall within an extraordinarily narrow range that permits the formation of stable stars, chemistry, and, eventually, life; small deviations in either direction, in most of these constants, would produce a universe incapable of supporting any complex structure at all. What is disputed is what to conclude from this observation. Theistic physicists and philosophers (Robin Collins, William Lane Craig, and the physicist-turned-theologian John Polkinghorne among them) argue that intentional design by a fine-tuning agent is, at minimum, a live and rationally respectable explanation, and for some the best available one. The leading naturalistic response is the multiverse hypothesis: if there exist a vast or infinite number of universes with randomly varying physical constants, then a universe capable of supporting life is exactly what we should expect to observe eventually, purely by chance, among that vast ensemble, with no need for design — we simply find ourselves, unsurprisingly, in one of the (perhaps very rare) universes that could produce observers capable of noticing the fine-tuning at all. Serious philosophers of science on both sides note that the multiverse hypothesis is not currently testable by any known method and carries its own significant theoretical costs, so choosing between "one universe, designed" and "many universes, one of which had to be life-permitting" is, at present, a matter of philosophical inference from indirect evidence on both sides, not a straightforward empirical decision either way. This lecture states that honestly rather than declaring fine-tuning either a proof of God or a settled non-issue.

2. Neuroscience and the question of divine action

A different kind of question arises from neuroscience and, more broadly, from the picture many contemporary physicists and philosophers of science hold of a "causally closed" physical universe — the assumption that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, such that there is, in principle, no gap in the causal chain for a non-physical agent (including God) to act into without violating or superseding a physical law. If brain states fully account for thought, decision, and even religious experience in purely neurochemical terms, does this leave any coherent sense in which God can act in the world, answer prayer, or communicate with a human mind, short of a miracle that suspends the laws of nature altogether? Theologians and scientists working on this question (a body of work sometimes called "theology and science" or "divine action theory," with John Polkinghorne, Nancey Murphy, and Robert John Russell among its most serious contributors) have proposed several distinct responses, and this lecture states more than one rather than adjudicating a winner. Some appeal to quantum indeterminacy — since quantum events are not, on the standard interpretation, fully determined by prior physical states, they propose this as a possible "causal joint" where God could act within, not against, the physical order's own openness, though critics on both theological and scientific grounds question whether quantum-level indeterminacy could plausibly account for large-scale, meaningful divine action. Others (Polkinghorne among them) propose that classical physics' apparent determinism is itself less complete than once thought (chaos theory shows many systems are exquisitely sensitive to initial conditions in ways not fully specifiable even in principle), leaving room for what Polkinghorne calls "active information" input by God without energy input that would violate conservation laws. Still others, more skeptical of finding a scientific "gap" for divine action at all, argue theologically that God's primary agency operates at a different level of causation entirely from secondary physical causes (a position with roots in Aquinas's own account of primary and secondary causation, engaged further in Chapter 8's discussion of , 8-4) such that God does not need a gap in the physical causal chain to act, because divine action and physical causation are not competing for the same causal space to begin with. This last position denies the premise that "causal closure" and "genuine divine action" are actually in tension, rather than trying to locate a gap within it.

3. Evolutionary biology: what is, and is not, actually challenged

Evolutionary biology's challenge needs careful scoping, because it is frequently overstated on both sides. The scientific case for evolution by natural selection as the mechanism producing the diversity of life over deep time is not, among working biologists, seriously disputed, and this course does not treat it as an open scientific question. What is genuinely challenged, and remains a live theological question, is not "did life develop over time through natural processes" but rather two more specific things: first, certain readings of the classical design argument that assumed a designed structure must be one that could not plausibly have arisen through any unguided natural process, a criterion evolutionary biology's account of gradual adaptation directly undercuts for many biological structures once thought to require direct special creation; and second, certain readings of providence that pictured God's care for creation as visible primarily in static, benevolent order, which sits uneasily beside the genuinely wasteful, often violent character of the evolutionary process itself (mass extinctions, predation, and the enormous number of evolutionary "dead ends") over hundreds of millions of years prior to any human sin entering the picture. Evangelical theologian-scientists have responded to this second challenge in more than one way, and Chapter 8 (8-3) will survey the range of positions on Genesis and origins more fully; for this lecture's purposes, the relevant point is that "evolution" and "atheism" are not, as popular debate sometimes assumes, a single package — a substantial body of serious Christian biologists and theologians (Francis Collins, former director of the National Institutes of Health and the Human Genome Project, prominent among them) hold both evolutionary biology and full-blooded Christian theism without treating the two as in tension, while other serious Christian scientists and theologians remain unpersuaded that current evolutionary theory has fully reckoned with the theological problem of pre-human natural evil, or hold other reservations about the science itself. This is presented as a genuine, internally diverse conversation, not a settled consensus this course adjudicates.

4. Two theologian-scientists, and why naming them matters

Two figures deserve naming specifically because they represent serious, working engagement rather than either capitulation to a caricatured "science" or retreat into a caricatured "faith." John Polkinghorne (1930-2021) was a working theoretical physicist (he helped establish the existence of the quark) who left physics for Anglican priesthood in mid-career and spent the rest of his life writing at the intersection of the two fields, consistently arguing for what he called a "bottom-up" theology that takes scientific evidence seriously as data for theological reflection while maintaining a fully orthodox Christian faith, including the resurrection. Alister McGrath (b. 1953) trained first as a molecular biophysicist before becoming a theologian, and has written extensively (A Scientific Theology, three volumes, 2001-2003, among other works) defending the compatibility of serious science and serious Christian orthodoxy while criticizing both scientific overreach into metaphysical claims science cannot actually establish and religious overreach into scientific claims theology has no competence to settle. Naming both matters because their example itself argues against this lecture's title challenge being, at bottom, a forced choice between competent science and orthodox faith — both men held, without apparent internal contradiction across long and serious careers, both at once.


Three Live Conversations, Not One "Science vs. Religion" War Physics: Fine-Tuning Observation not disputed Design vs. multiverse — neither currently testable against the other Neuroscience: Divine Action Quantum indeterminacy, chaos theory's "active information," or denying the tension exists at all Evolution: Design and Providence Mechanism not disputed; old design-argument criteria and providence-as-static-order are what get challenged

5. Going to the Sources

Read John Polkinghorne, Science and Providence: God's Interaction with the World (SPCK, 1989; reissued Templeton Foundation Press, 2005), especially the chapters on chaos theory and "active information," for the primary statement of one theologian-scientist's divine-action proposal in his own words. For fine-tuning specifically, read Robin Collins's chapter "The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe" in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (2009, eds. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland). For the range of evangelical positions on evolution and providence, read Alister McGrath, A Fine-Tuned Universe: The Quest for God in Science and Theology (Westminster John Knox, 2009), and Francis Collins, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief (Free Press, 2006), for a working geneticist's own account of holding both without contradiction.

In short

  • Science and the doctrine of God are in ongoing conversation, with serious believers on more than one side. Psalm 19 invites study of creation. Job 38-39 reminds us that study never comprehends God.
  • Fine-tuning of physical constants is not disputed. Theistic thinkers such as Robin Collins and John Polkinghorne see design as a respectable explanation. Others propose a multiverse. Neither can currently be tested.
  • Neuroscience raises whether a causally closed universe leaves room for God to act. Responses include quantum indeterminacy, Polkinghorne's "active information," and Aquinas's primary and secondary causation.
  • Evolution is not disputed. It challenges some design arguments and some views of providence, not the doctrine of creation itself.
  • Francis Collins holds evolution and Christian faith together, while others doubt evolution has answered pre-human natural evil. Polkinghorne and Alister McGrath also hold science and orthodoxy together.

Topic: This lecture explores how physics, neuroscience and evolutionary biology bear on the doctrine of God, without treating the matter as a war between science and religion.

Remember: Each area is a live conversation. Careful Christians and scientists disagree within each one, and no single position is presented as the Christian answer.

Caution: The lecture does not say fine-tuning proves God or that evolution disproves him. It separates challenges to certain readings of design and providence from challenges to creation itself.

One line to carry into ministry: Welcome questions from science with curiosity, and let both Psalm 19 and Job 38-39 shape how confidently you speak.

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Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • The multiverse hypothesis and the design hypothesis both explain the observation of fine-tuning, and this lecture states that neither is currently testable against the other. What kind of evidence, if any, do you think could ever settle this question empirically? If none could, does that make the disagreement meaningless, or simply philosophical rather than scientific?
  • Job 38-39's answer to Job's suffering is not an argument but a tour of creation's scale and strangeness, ending in Job's own silence (Job 40:4-5) rather than a resolved intellectual position. What do you make of using a passage that resists explanation to introduce a lecture that spends most of its time offering explanations? Is there a tension there, or does Job 38-39 belong at a different point in the argument than where a fine-tuning argument belongs?
  • This lecture names Francis Collins as a working geneticist who holds full-blooded evolutionary biology and full-blooded Christian orthodoxy without treating them as in tension. Do you find this kind of example persuasive as a response to "evolution versus faith," or does it only show that contradiction is psychologically possible for one person, not that the two positions are actually compatible? Explain your reasoning.

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What next

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