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ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God

Lecture 7-2: Open Theism and the Future God Does Not Yet Know

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Contents 46
ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God
Chapter 0 · Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
  1. Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: Prolegomena: Revelation, Religious Language, and the Knowledge of God
  1. Lecture 1-1: Why Theology Proper Comes First
  2. Lecture 1-2: Calvin's Opening Move — Knowledge of God and Knowledge of Self
  3. Lecture 1-3: General and Special Revelation
  4. Lecture 1-4: Religious Language and Its Limits
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: The Existence of God: Arguments and Their Critics
  1. Lecture 2-1: Can God's Existence Be Proved? Setting the Terms
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Cosmological Argument — From the World to a First Cause
  3. Lecture 2-3: The Teleological and Moral Arguments
  4. Lecture 2-4: The Ontological Argument — From Concept to Necessary Existence
  5. Lecture 2-5: Presuppositionalism and Contemporary Atheism
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: The Incommunicable Attributes of God
  1. Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity
  2. Lecture 3-2: Aseity and Independence
  3. Lecture 3-3: Immutability and Impassibility
  4. Lecture 3-4: Infinity, Eternity, and God's Relation to Time
  5. Lecture 3-5: Omnipresence
  6. Lecture 3-6: The Unity of God
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: The Communicable Attributes and the Names of God
  1. Lecture 4-1: Omniscience — God's Exhaustive and Personal Knowledge
  2. Lecture 4-2: Wisdom and Faithfulness — Knowledge Ordered and Kept
  3. Lecture 4-3: Holiness and Righteousness — Otherness and Moral Purity
  4. Lecture 4-4: Goodness, Love, Grace, and Mercy — Four Related but Distinct Attributes
  5. Lecture 4-5: Sovereignty and Omnipotence — What "God Can Do All Things" Actually Means
  6. Lecture 4-6: The Revealed Names of God — Self-Disclosure Through Covenant History
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: The Trinity I: Biblical Foundations and Historical Formation
  1. Lecture 5-1: The Biblical Foundations of the Trinity
  2. Lecture 5-2: Early Heresies — Monarchianism, Adoptionism, and Modalism
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
  4. Lecture 5-4: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Council of Constantinople
  5. Lecture 5-5: Augustine's Trinitarian Theology and the Filioque Controversy
  6. Lecture 5-6: East and West Compared — Two Starting Points
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: The Trinity II: Orthodox Doctrine and Modern Debates
  1. Lecture 6-1: The Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity
  2. Lecture 6-2: Perichoresis — Mutual Indwelling of the Divine Persons
  3. Lecture 6-3: Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession
  4. Lecture 6-4: The Twentieth-Century Revival of Trinitarian Theology
  5. Lecture 6-5: Social Trinitarianism and Its Critics
  6. Lecture 6-6: Contemporary Debates over Trinitarian Language
Chapter 7 · Chapter 7: Contemporary Challenges to the Doctrine of God
  1. Lecture 7-1: Process Theology — A God Who Grows With the World
  2. Lecture 7-2: Open Theism and the Future God Does Not Yet Know
  3. Lecture 7-3: Moltmann's Crucified God and the Question of Divine Suffering
  4. Lecture 7-4: Panentheism, Ecology, and the Creator/Creature Distinction
  5. Lecture 7-5: Contemporary Science and the Doctrine of God
  6. Lecture 7-6: Answering Postmodernism and the New Atheism
Chapter 8 · Chapter 8: Decrees, Creation, Providence, and Pastoral Application
  1. Lecture 8-1: The Divine Decrees and Predestination
  2. Lecture 8-2: Calvinism, Arminianism, and Molinism on the Decrees
  3. Lecture 8-3: Creation Out of Nothing, and the Age of the Earth
  4. Lecture 8-4: Providence — Preservation, Concurrence, Government, and Miracle
  5. Lecture 8-5: The Problem of Evil and Theodicy
  6. Lecture 8-6: Conclusion — Knowing God, Not Only Knowing About Him

Jump to the key points ↓

20 min

Chapter 4 (4-1) stated the classical doctrine of omniscience: God's knowledge is exhaustive, including of individual persons and, on the classical account, of every future event, free human choices included. Open theism, a position developed within evangelical Protestant theology over the last several decades by theologians including Clark Pinnock, Gregory Boyd, John Sanders, and William Hasker, denies exactly this last piece: God, on their account, knows everything that can be known, including every possibility and probability about the future, but the free choices of creatures do not yet exist to be known, and so even God does not know them until they happen. This lecture states open theism's case in its strongest form — its own biblical texts, its own account of why this actually honors both divine omniscience and human freedom rather than diminishing either — before turning to the classical Reformed and Arminian objections that, despite disagreeing sharply with each other everywhere else in this course, both largely reject open theism, and for different reasons worth distinguishing carefully.

What these 20 minutes give you

  • State open theism's central claim precisely: not that God's knowledge is limited or imperfect, but that the future free choices of creatures are not yet "there" to be known even by an omniscient God.
  • Present open theism's own biblical case (texts of divine "regret," apparent surprise, and conditional prophecy) as its proponents would state it.
  • Explain why classical Calvinists and classical Arminians, despite their sharp disagreement over the divine decrees (developed in Chapter 8), both typically reject open theism, and distinguish their two different reasons for doing so.
  • Identify what open theism is trying to protect (libertarian human freedom, a God who genuinely risks and responds) and assess whether classical theism has other resources for protecting the same thing without open theism's revision of omniscience.

Remember the former things of old: for I am God, and there is no one else; I am God, and there is none like me; declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times things that are not yet done; saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." — Isaiah 46:9-10

World English Bible

Yahweh was sorry that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him in his heart." — Genesis 6:6

WEB

These two texts sit on opposite sides of the debate this lecture states, and stating them side by side rather than resolving one by explaining away the other is the discipline this lecture commits to. Isaiah 46:9-10 is as strong a biblical statement of exhaustive foreknowledge as exists anywhere in Scripture: God declares "the end from the beginning," and the specific thing declared from the beginning is that his own counsel — not merely his general character — "shall stand." Classical theists read this as settling the question outright. Genesis 6:6 is one of a recurring set of texts (Jonah 3:10; 1 Samuel 15:11, 35; Exodus 32:14) in which God is described as being "sorry," changing his announced course of action, or reacting to something as though it were, for him, genuinely new information. Open theists read these texts at face value, as God's own testimony to his actual experience of time and human choice, and press classical theists to say plainly why Isaiah 46 should govern the reading of Genesis 6 rather than the reverse.

1. What open theism actually claims

's central and most easily misstated claim needs to be stated with precision, because both its critics and its casual defenders often blur it. Open theists are not claiming that God's knowledge is imperfect, incomplete with respect to anything that actually exists to be known, or that God could in principle learn something a smarter being might already know. They affirm that God knows exhaustively everything that is, in their technical vocabulary, "knowable" — every fact about the past and present, every possibility for the future, and (on most versions) every probability, given God's perfect knowledge of every causal factor in play. What they deny is that a genuinely free future choice — a choice not yet made, and which the creature making it could still make otherwise — is the kind of thing that can be known in advance of its being made, by anyone, including God. On this view, the "future" with respect to free choices is not a fixed, settled fact waiting to be perceived (as holds) but a field of genuine, open possibilities, some more probable than others, which becomes settled only when the choice is actually made. This is why the position calls itself "open theism": the future is, in the relevant sense, ontologically open, not merely epistemically hidden from limited creatures the way it is hidden from us.

2. The motivating concerns

Two concerns drive open theism, and both deserve to be stated as their advocates would state them before any objection is raised. The first is libertarian freedom: open theists (like Arminians, though for a further reason developed below) hold that genuine human freedom requires that a person could, up to the moment of choice, have done otherwise. If God already and exhaustively knows, from eternity, exactly what a person will choose, open theists argue, then that choice was already settled before the person made it, and "could have done otherwise" becomes, at best, a claim about unrealized logical possibility rather than genuine, live freedom at the moment of decision. Classical Arminians deny this inference (more below); open theists accept it and conclude that exhaustive foreknowledge of free choices is simply incompatible with the freedom they think Scripture and moral responsibility require.

The second concern is pastoral and devotional as much as philosophical: open theists want a God who genuinely responds to prayer, genuinely grieves and rejoices as history unfolds, and genuinely takes risks in relationship with his creatures, rather than a God whose relationship to the world is, in some sense, already fully scripted from eternity. Gregory Boyd, in particular, has argued pastorally that open theism gives real comfort to people wrestling with tragedy: a terrible event need not be something God specifically foreknew and included in an eternal plan, but can instead be a genuine evil that grieved God as it happened, arising from a genuinely open, risk-laden world rather than from a blueprint God wrote in eternity. This is not a minor point for open theists; it is presented as making God more, not less, worthy of trust and worship in the face of suffering.

3. Open theism's biblical case

Open theists build their case on a cluster of texts read at face value rather than accommodated to a prior philosophical commitment to timeless exhaustive knowledge. Genesis 6:6, quoted above, has God "sorry" that he made humanity — language open theists take as genuine testimony to a God surprised and grieved by how badly things turned out, not merely an anthropomorphic figure of speech. Genesis 22:12, where God tells Abraham after the binding of Isaac, "now I know that you fear God," is read as God genuinely learning something about Abraham's character through the test, not already knowing the outcome from eternity. Jonah 3:10 and Jonah 4:2 present God relenting from announced judgment on Nineveh's repentance — Jonah's own complaint is that he knew God was "a gracious God, and merciful," slow to anger and ready to relent, which open theists read as itself evidence that changing course in response to genuinely new events is simply part of who God is. 1 Samuel 15:11 has God saying, "I regret that I have made Saul king," using the same verb-family as Genesis 6:6. Open theists argue that classical theism has to explain away an entire recurring category of biblical language as pure anthropomorphism, while their own account can read these texts as straightforwardly meaning what they say — and that this is a genuine interpretive cost classical theism pays that open theism does not.

4. The classical Reformed objection

Reformed theology's rejection of open theism follows directly from its doctrine of the divine decrees (previewed here, developed fully in Chapter 8): God has ordained, from eternity, everything that comes to pass, including the free choices of creatures, which are genuinely free (they proceed from the creature's own will, according to its own nature and desires) while also being certain from eternity because God has ordained them. On this account, exhaustive foreknowledge is not merely compatible with human freedom but is required by God's sovereign decree: God knows the future exhaustively because he has ordained it, not because he is watching it unfold from some vantage point outside time. Isaiah 46:9-10 is, on this reading, exactly the kind of text open theism cannot accommodate: God's declaring the end from the beginning and his counsel "standing" is not a claim about probabilistic forecasting from perfect knowledge of present causes but a claim about God's own sovereign determination of what the end will be. The Reformed objection to open theism, then, is that it denies exhaustive divine sovereignty over history, not merely exhaustive divine knowledge — the two are, for Reformed theology, the same claim stated from two angles.

5. The classical Arminian objection

This is the point at which the three-way landscape named in Chapter 4 (4-1) has to be kept in view, because Arminian theology's objection to open theism is not the Reformed objection and should not be flattened into it. Classical Arminians affirm libertarian human freedom just as open theists do — a person could genuinely have chosen otherwise — and yet classical Arminianism has always affirmed exhaustive divine foreknowledge of free future choices, holding the two together rather than resolving the tension by denying one of them. The Arminian move, worked out with particular precision by Jacobus Arminius himself and later by philosophers defending a "simple foreknowledge" position, is that God's foreknowledge of a free choice does not cause the choice; God simply, timelessly or exhaustively, knows what the creature will freely do, in the same way that a person watching a race from a hilltop overlooking the whole track sees the runners' positions without causing them. On this account, foreknowledge and libertarian freedom are not in tension at all, because knowing that something will happen is not the same as determining that it will happen — a distinction open theists reject as unstable when applied to genuinely open future contingents, but which Arminians consider entirely coherent. Arminians therefore reject open theism not because it threatens divine sovereignty in the Reformed sense (Arminian theology already qualifies sovereignty to make room for libertarian freedom) but because they consider it an unnecessary and biblically costly concession: it gives up a real, exhaustive foreknowledge Scripture repeatedly attributes to God (Isaiah 46:9-10; Psalm 139:1-6, treated in Chapter 4; Acts 15:18) without needing to, since Arminian theology already has, in its own view, a coherent account of how libertarian freedom and exhaustive foreknowledge fit together.

6. Reading the "regret" texts without open theism's conclusion

Classical theists of both Reformed and Arminian stripes typically respond to open theism's biblical case not by denying the texts exist but by arguing that reading Genesis 6:6 or 1 Samuel 15:11 as literal, non-anthropomorphic claims about God's changing knowledge or experience proves too much if applied consistently. The same chapter of 1 Samuel that has God "regret" making Saul king (15:11) also has Samuel state, in the same chapter, "the Strength of Israel will not lie nor repent; for he is not a man, that he should repent" (1 Samuel 15:29) — two verses apart, describing the same event, using both registers of language. Classical theists take this juxtaposition as textual evidence that the biblical authors themselves used covenantal, relational, "regret" language to describe God's real but non-deceptive engagement with a genuinely unfolding history, while also affirming, in the same breath, that God does not change or "repent" in the way a limited creature does. Open theists respond that this is precisely the kind of forced harmonization that treats one register of biblical language (Numbers 23:19's "not a man, that he should... repent") as literally authoritative and the other (1 Samuel 15:11's "I regret") as merely figurative, without textual warrant for privileging one over the other — and the disagreement, honestly stated, does not resolve on of either text alone but on a prior judgment about which kind of biblical language should govern the reading of the other.


Three Positions on Foreknowledge and Freedom Reformed Exhaustive foreknowledge because God has decreed the future (compatibilist freedom) Rejects open theism: denies sovereign decree Arminian Exhaustive foreknowledge of choices God does not cause (libertarian freedom, simple foreknowledge) Rejects open theism: unnecessary concession Open Theism The free future is not yet "there" to be known — God knows all possibilities and probabilities, not outcomes Protects libertarian freedom and a genuinely risking God

5. Going to the Sources

Read Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (InterVarsity Press, 1994) — the book that put open theism on the evangelical map, with Rice's chapter laying out the biblical case this lecture summarizes. For the classical Reformed response, read D. A. Carson, The God Who Is There material on open theism, or more directly Bruce Ware's God's Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism (Crossway, 2000), which engages Pinnock and Boyd by name and text. For the Arminian rejection specifically (important because it is not the same argument as the Reformed one), read Roger Olson's Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities (InterVarsity Press, 2006), chapter 8, which distinguishes classical Arminianism's affirmation of exhaustive foreknowledge from open theism's denial of it.

In short

  • Open theists (Clark Pinnock, Gregory Boyd, John Sanders, William Hasker) hold that God knows everything knowable, but free choices not yet made are not yet there to be known, even by God.
  • They are driven by two concerns: libertarian freedom (a person could have done otherwise) and a God who truly responds, grieves and takes risks.
  • They read texts such as Genesis 6:6, Genesis 22:12, Jonah 3:10 and 1 Samuel 15:11 at face value. Classical theism, they say, must explain these away as anthropomorphism.
  • Reformed theologians object that God knows the future because he has decreed it. Open theism, they say, denies God's sovereignty over history.
  • Arminians affirm both libertarian freedom and exhaustive foreknowledge. They object that open theism gives up foreknowledge without need (Isaiah 46:9-10).
  • Classical theists point to 1 Samuel 15:11 and 15:29, two verses apart. The dispute turns on which kind of biblical language governs the other.

Topic: This lecture presents open theism's claim that God does not know future free choices, and explains why Reformed and Arminian theologians reject it for different reasons.

Remember: Open theism does not say God's knowledge is poor. It says free future choices are not yet real things to be known.

Caution: Do not merge the Reformed and Arminian objections into one "traditional" objection. Arminians keep both freedom and foreknowledge, while Reformed theologians ground foreknowledge in God's decree.

One line to carry into ministry: When people ask whether God was surprised by tragedy, honour the biblical language of grief and also the promise that God's counsel stands.

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Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • State, in your own words and without using the word "open," what open theism means by saying the future is not yet "there" to be known. Then state the classical objection to this claim as precisely as you can. Where exactly do the two sides disagree — about God's knowledge, or about what kind of thing "the future" is?
  • This lecture argues that Reformed and Arminian theologians reject open theism for different reasons. Restate both reasons in one sentence each, and explain why collapsing them into a single "traditionalist" objection would misrepresent the Arminian position specifically.
  • 1 Samuel 15:11 ("I regret that I have made Saul king") and 1 Samuel 15:29 ("he is not a man, that he should repent") appear two verses apart in the same chapter. Propose your own reading of why the same biblical author used both kinds of language about God so close together, and test your proposal against both the open theist and the classical reading given in this lecture.

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What next

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