Lecture 2-2: The Cosmological Argument — From the World to a First Cause
Contents 46
- Lecture 1-1: Why Theology Proper Comes First
- Lecture 1-2: Calvin's Opening Move — Knowledge of God and Knowledge of Self
- Lecture 1-3: General and Special Revelation
- Lecture 1-4: Religious Language and Its Limits
- Lecture 2-1: Can God's Existence Be Proved? Setting the Terms
- Lecture 2-2: The Cosmological Argument — From the World to a First Cause
- Lecture 2-3: The Teleological and Moral Arguments
- Lecture 2-4: The Ontological Argument — From Concept to Necessary Existence
- Lecture 2-5: Presuppositionalism and Contemporary Atheism
- Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity
- Lecture 3-2: Aseity and Independence
- Lecture 3-3: Immutability and Impassibility
- Lecture 3-4: Infinity, Eternity, and God's Relation to Time
- Lecture 3-5: Omnipresence
- Lecture 3-6: The Unity of God
- Lecture 4-1: Omniscience — God's Exhaustive and Personal Knowledge
- Lecture 4-2: Wisdom and Faithfulness — Knowledge Ordered and Kept
- Lecture 4-3: Holiness and Righteousness — Otherness and Moral Purity
- Lecture 4-4: Goodness, Love, Grace, and Mercy — Four Related but Distinct Attributes
- Lecture 4-5: Sovereignty and Omnipotence — What "God Can Do All Things" Actually Means
- Lecture 4-6: The Revealed Names of God — Self-Disclosure Through Covenant History
- Lecture 5-1: The Biblical Foundations of the Trinity
- Lecture 5-2: Early Heresies — Monarchianism, Adoptionism, and Modalism
- Lecture 5-3: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
- Lecture 5-4: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Council of Constantinople
- Lecture 5-5: Augustine's Trinitarian Theology and the Filioque Controversy
- Lecture 5-6: East and West Compared — Two Starting Points
- Lecture 6-1: The Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity
- Lecture 6-2: Perichoresis — Mutual Indwelling of the Divine Persons
- Lecture 6-3: Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession
- Lecture 6-4: The Twentieth-Century Revival of Trinitarian Theology
- Lecture 6-5: Social Trinitarianism and Its Critics
- Lecture 6-6: Contemporary Debates over Trinitarian Language
- Lecture 7-1: Process Theology — A God Who Grows With the World
- Lecture 7-2: Open Theism and the Future God Does Not Yet Know
- Lecture 7-3: Moltmann's Crucified God and the Question of Divine Suffering
- Lecture 7-4: Panentheism, Ecology, and the Creator/Creature Distinction
- Lecture 7-5: Contemporary Science and the Doctrine of God
- Lecture 7-6: Answering Postmodernism and the New Atheism
- Lecture 8-1: The Divine Decrees and Predestination
- Lecture 8-2: Calvinism, Arminianism, and Molinism on the Decrees
- Lecture 8-3: Creation Out of Nothing, and the Age of the Earth
- Lecture 8-4: Providence — Preservation, Concurrence, Government, and Miracle
- Lecture 8-5: The Problem of Evil and Theodicy
- Lecture 8-6: Conclusion — Knowing God, Not Only Knowing About Him
The cosmological argument is the oldest and, by most accounts, the most durable of the classical arguments for God's existence: it reasons from some general feature of the observed universe (that things are caused, that things exist contingently rather than necessarily, that the universe appears to have begun) to a first, uncaused, necessary cause of everything else. This lecture examines the argument in two forms separated by roughly seven centuries: Thomas Aquinas's first three "ways" from the Summa Theologiae (1265-1274), which argue from motion, causation, and contingency without any claim about the universe having a temporal beginning; and the kalam cosmological argument, revived and defended most prominently by the contemporary philosopher William Lane Craig, which argues specifically from the universe's beginning to a cause of that beginning.
These two versions are often run together in popular presentation, but they are structurally different arguments and this lecture keeps them distinct. Aquinas's first three ways do not need the universe to have had a beginning in time at all — his argument works even on the (Aristotelian) assumption of an eternal universe, because his target is a cause the universe depends on right now for its existence, not a cause temporally prior to a first moment. The kalam argument's logic, by contrast, depends essentially on the universe having begun to exist, which is why its contemporary defenders lean so heavily on cosmological evidence (the Big Bang, the expansion of the universe) that Aquinas had no access to and did not need. After presenting both, the lecture engages a serious philosophical objection to cosmological reasoning generally, associated with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, which questions whether reasoning about causes within the universe licenses any inference about a cause of the universe as a whole.
What these 20 minutes give you
- State Aquinas's first three ways (from motion, from efficient causation, and from contingency) in your own words, and explain what each argues the universe cannot be the ultimate explanation of.
- Explain the structural difference between Aquinas's ways (which do not require a temporal beginning) and the kalam cosmological argument (which does).
- State the kalam argument's two premises and its conclusion, and identify what evidence its contemporary defenders cite for the second premise.
- State Hume's and Kant's objections to inferring a cause of the universe from causes observed within the universe, and explain what a defender of the cosmological argument would need to answer to meet them.
Before the mountains were born, before you had formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, you are God." — Psalm 90:2
World English Bible
By faith, we understand that the universe has been framed by the word of God, so that what is seen has not been made out of things which are visible." — Hebrews 11:3
WEB
Psalm 90:2 states, in the form of worship rather than argument, exactly the conclusion the reasons toward: God's existence is not bounded by the world's beginning, because God's own being does not depend on anything coming before it — he is "from everlasting to everlasting." Hebrews 11:3 makes an epistemological claim worth pausing over before treating this lecture's philosophical arguments as though they operated independently of it: the verse says the created status of the visible universe is understood by faith, not derived from a chain of philosophical inference alone. This does not make the cosmological argument worthless — Hebrews itself, three verses later, commends reasoned confidence that "he who comes to God must believe that he exists" (11:6, quoted in Lecture 2-1) — but it is a caution against treating Aquinas's or the kalam argument's success as itself sufficient for saving faith, a caution this lecture's engagement with Kierkegaard (2-1) already raised from a different angle.
1. Aquinas's first three ways
In Summa Theologiae I, Question 2, Article 3, Aquinas offers five arguments ("ways") for God's existence. The first three all share a common structure — an observed feature of the world, an argument that this feature cannot be self-explanatory or regress infinitely, and a conclusion identifying God as the terminus of the explanatory chain.
The first way, from motion (more precisely, change: the Aristotelian sense of anything moving from potentiality to actuality), observes that whatever is changing is being changed by something else already actual — nothing actualizes its own potential. If that changer is itself changing, it too requires a changer, and so on. Aquinas argues this series cannot regress infinitely, because without a first changer, "unmoved" itself, there would be no subsequent changers either — the whole series depends, at every moment, on something not itself dependent on being changed. "This everyone understands to be God," Aquinas concludes.
The second way, from efficient causation, runs structurally in parallel: nothing can be the efficient cause of itself (that would require it to exist prior to itself, which is impossible), so every caused thing depends on a prior cause. As in the first way, Aquinas argues an infinite regress of causes, all themselves dependent, could not account for there being any causation actually occurring now, and concludes there must be a first, uncaused efficient cause.
The third way, from contingency, is often considered the strongest of the three and works somewhat differently. It observes that everything we encounter is contingent — it exists, but might not have; it comes into being and passes away. Aquinas argues that if everything that exists were merely contingent, then at some point (given infinite time) nothing at all would have existed, since contingent things, left long enough, eventually fail to exist — and if nothing ever existed, nothing could have brought anything into existence now, since existence cannot arise from non-existence with no external cause. Since something does exist now, not everything can be merely contingent; there must be something that exists necessarily — that cannot fail to exist, and does not derive its existence from anything else. This, Aquinas says, "all men speak of as God."
Common misreading
A crucial point often missed in popular summaries: none of these three arguments requires the universe to have had a temporal beginning. Aquinas, following Aristotle, was open to the philosophical possibility of an eternal universe (though he held, on the authority of revelation rather than philosophical demonstration, that the universe in fact began — see Chapter 8's treatment of creatio ex nihilo). His three ways argue for a cause the universe depends on right now, at every moment of its existence, whether or not that existence stretches back infinitely. This is why they are sometimes called arguments from ongoing dependency rather than arguments from a first temporal event — a distinction that matters for understanding why the kalam argument, discussed next, is a genuinely different piece of reasoning, not simply a modern restatement of Aquinas.
2. The kalam cosmological argument
"Kalam" (Arabic for "speech" or "argument," referring to a genre of medieval Islamic theological argumentation) names a cosmological argument developed by medieval Muslim theologians including al-Ghazali, and revived for contemporary philosophy of religion most influentially by William Lane Craig, beginning with his 1979 book The Kalam Cosmological Argument. Unlike Aquinas's ways, the kalam argument depends essentially on the universe having had a beginning, and its structure is a simple syllogism:
- Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
- The universe began to exist.
- Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Premise 1 is defended philosophically (Craig argues that an actual infinite regress of past events is metaphysically impossible, and also appeals to the intuition that something cannot come from absolutely nothing without a cause) and premise 2 is defended with a combination of philosophical argument (against an infinite past, on similar grounds) and scientific evidence — chiefly the standard Big Bang cosmological model, which places a finite beginning to the universe's expansion roughly 13.8 billion years ago, and the observed expansion of the universe (Edwin Hubble's 1929 discovery) taken as evidence the universe is not static or eternal but had a starting point. Craig then argues, from the nature of the conclusion, that this cause must be beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful — since it is the cause of all space, time, matter, and physical law coming into existence — and, he further argues (more contestably), that only a personal agent with libertarian free will could account for a timeless cause producing a temporally bounded effect, since an impersonal cause with its full set of necessary and sufficient conditions in place from eternity would produce its effect from eternity as well.
Note carefully what this argument does and does not claim to establish on its own. Even granting both premises and the argument's validity, the conclusion is "the universe has a cause" — the further steps to a personal, powerful, immaterial cause, and further still to the triune God of Christian faith, require additional argument (some of it supplied by 2-3's , some by revelation, which no philosophical argument in this chapter substitutes for). Craig himself is explicit that the kalam argument, by itself, gets you to something like a "Creator of the universe," not yet to the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.
3. Hume's and Kant's objection
The most serious philosophical objection to cosmological reasoning of both kinds comes from David Hume (1711-1776), developed in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (published posthumously, 1779), and echoed with a somewhat different emphasis by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). Hume's central worry is that the whole inference illegitimately extends a pattern of reasoning valid within the universe to the universe as a whole — a different and much larger kind of claim than the causal reasoning we ordinarily rely on can support. We learn "every event has a cause" from repeated observation of particular events being caused by particular prior events; but we have never observed universes coming into being, and so we have no basis, Hume argues, for assuming the same causal principle that governs billiard balls and falling trees applies to the origin of all space, time, and matter as a single totality. Through his character Philo, Hume also raises what is called the "taxicab problem" (a term coined later by Schopenhauer to describe this kind of move): if everything that begins to exist needs a cause, why does the first cause get to be dismissed from the boarding of that principle, as though the demand for explanation can be dropped exactly when it becomes inconvenient?
Kant's version of the objection, developed as one of his four "antinomies of pure reason," argues that the cosmological argument covertly relies on the ontological argument (examined in Lecture 2-4) to get from "a necessary being exists" to "that necessary being is God" — smuggling in, Kant claims, an unjustified assumption that a necessary being must have all the traditional divine attributes (, , perfect goodness), when nothing in the cosmological reasoning itself established that the necessary first cause has those properties rather than being, say, a necessary but non-personal physical singularity.
A serious contemporary defender of the cosmological argument has responses to both objections, and this lecture states them so you can weigh them rather than treating either side as obviously right. Against Hume: defenders argue the taxicab problem misunderstands the argument's actual claim — the premise is not "everything needs a cause" without qualification, but "everything that begins to exist needs a cause," and a necessarily existing, beginningless first cause is precisely the kind of thing the principle was never meant to cover, not an arbitrary exception carved out to save the argument. Against Kant: defenders like Craig argue the properties attributed to the first cause (timelessness, immateriality, immense power) are derived directly from what is required to cause the beginning of all space, time, and matter, not smuggled in from the ontological argument — though getting from those properties all the way to a personal being, as noted above, requires the additional, more contestable step Craig supplies with his freedom-of-the-will argument, and a critic can reasonably resist that further step even while granting the argument's first two premises.
Weight of the argument
This is a point where readers will not agree. How much philosophical weight the cosmological argument can bear — whether Hume's and Kant's objections leave it merely weakened or effectively defeated — remains genuinely disputed among philosophers of religion who agree on a great deal else. Craig and other contemporary defenders (Robin Collins, J. P. Moreland) hold the argument, properly qualified, survives these objections. Other theistic philosophers (some in the Reformed epistemology tradition following Plantinga, from Lecture 2-1) are considerably more skeptical that natural theology can carry this much weight and prefer to rest theistic belief on other grounds entirely.
5. Going to the Sources
- Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part I, Question 2, Article 3 — the Five Ways in Aquinas's own Latin-to-English wording; read all five even though this lecture covers only the first three, to see how the fourth (from degrees of perfection) and fifth (from the governance of things, a version of the teleological argument) differ in structure.
- William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (1979) or, for a more accessible entry point, his and J. P. Moreland's Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (2003), chapter 20 — Craig's contemporary defense of both premises with the scientific evidence discussed above laid out in full.
- David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), Part IX — Philo's statement of the objection to cosmological reasoning, in Hume's own dialogue form.
In short
- Aquinas's first three ways argue from motion, efficient causation and contingency. Each says the chain of dependent things needs a first, unmoved, uncaused or necessary source.
- These ways argue from ongoing dependence, not from a beginning in time. They work even if the universe had no beginning.
- The kalam argument says whatever begins to exist has a cause, and the universe began to exist, so it has a cause. William Lane Craig cites the Big Bang for the second premise.
- Hume asked whether causes inside the universe license a claim about the universe as a whole. Kant said the argument secretly depends on the ontological argument. Defenders reply that only things that begin need causes.
- Even if successful, kalam reaches a Creator, not yet the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Craig, Collins and Moreland defend it. Some Reformed epistemologists are more skeptical.
Topic: This lecture presents Aquinas's first three ways and the kalam cosmological argument, then the objections of Hume and Kant.
Remember: Aquinas's ways argue from the universe's present dependence on God, while the kalam argument depends on the universe having had a beginning. They are different arguments.
Caution: Even a successful cosmological argument only establishes a cause with certain properties, not the triune God, and philosophers still dispute whether Hume and Kant defeat it.
One line to carry into ministry: Use these arguments as modest pointers to a Creator, and let revelation, not argument alone, carry the full Christian message.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Explain in your own words why Aquinas's first three ways do not depend on the universe having had a temporal beginning, while the kalam argument does. Why does this difference matter for evaluating each argument's strengths and weaknesses?
- Hume's "taxicab problem" objection asks why the first cause is allowed to be exempted from the very causal principle the argument relies on. Restate the standard reply (that the principle only ever covered things that *begin* to exist) in your own words, and say whether you find it satisfying.
- Craig's kalam argument, even if fully successful, only establishes a cause with certain abstract properties (timeless, immaterial, powerful) — not yet the personal, triune God of Christian faith. What kind of additional argument or evidence would be needed to close that gap, and does Lecture 2-3's teleological and moral arguments supply any of it?