Lecture 2-5: Presuppositionalism and Contemporary Atheism
Contents 46
- Lecture 1-1: Why Theology Proper Comes First
- Lecture 1-2: Calvin's Opening Move — Knowledge of God and Knowledge of Self
- Lecture 1-3: General and Special Revelation
- Lecture 1-4: Religious Language and Its Limits
- Lecture 2-1: Can God's Existence Be Proved? Setting the Terms
- Lecture 2-2: The Cosmological Argument — From the World to a First Cause
- Lecture 2-3: The Teleological and Moral Arguments
- Lecture 2-4: The Ontological Argument — From Concept to Necessary Existence
- Lecture 2-5: Presuppositionalism and Contemporary Atheism
- Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity
- Lecture 3-2: Aseity and Independence
- Lecture 3-3: Immutability and Impassibility
- Lecture 3-4: Infinity, Eternity, and God's Relation to Time
- Lecture 3-5: Omnipresence
- Lecture 3-6: The Unity of God
- Lecture 4-1: Omniscience — God's Exhaustive and Personal Knowledge
- Lecture 4-2: Wisdom and Faithfulness — Knowledge Ordered and Kept
- Lecture 4-3: Holiness and Righteousness — Otherness and Moral Purity
- Lecture 4-4: Goodness, Love, Grace, and Mercy — Four Related but Distinct Attributes
- Lecture 4-5: Sovereignty and Omnipotence — What "God Can Do All Things" Actually Means
- Lecture 4-6: The Revealed Names of God — Self-Disclosure Through Covenant History
- Lecture 5-1: The Biblical Foundations of the Trinity
- Lecture 5-2: Early Heresies — Monarchianism, Adoptionism, and Modalism
- Lecture 5-3: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
- Lecture 5-4: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Council of Constantinople
- Lecture 5-5: Augustine's Trinitarian Theology and the Filioque Controversy
- Lecture 5-6: East and West Compared — Two Starting Points
- Lecture 6-1: The Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity
- Lecture 6-2: Perichoresis — Mutual Indwelling of the Divine Persons
- Lecture 6-3: Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession
- Lecture 6-4: The Twentieth-Century Revival of Trinitarian Theology
- Lecture 6-5: Social Trinitarianism and Its Critics
- Lecture 6-6: Contemporary Debates over Trinitarian Language
- Lecture 7-1: Process Theology — A God Who Grows With the World
- Lecture 7-2: Open Theism and the Future God Does Not Yet Know
- Lecture 7-3: Moltmann's Crucified God and the Question of Divine Suffering
- Lecture 7-4: Panentheism, Ecology, and the Creator/Creature Distinction
- Lecture 7-5: Contemporary Science and the Doctrine of God
- Lecture 7-6: Answering Postmodernism and the New Atheism
- Lecture 8-1: The Divine Decrees and Predestination
- Lecture 8-2: Calvinism, Arminianism, and Molinism on the Decrees
- Lecture 8-3: Creation Out of Nothing, and the Age of the Earth
- Lecture 8-4: Providence — Preservation, Concurrence, Government, and Miracle
- Lecture 8-5: The Problem of Evil and Theodicy
- Lecture 8-6: Conclusion — Knowing God, Not Only Knowing About Him
This closing lecture of the chapter examines two developments that do not fit neatly into the "classical argument plus objection" pattern of Lectures 2-2 through 2-4. The first, presuppositional apologetics, associated most influentially with the Dutch-American Reformed theologian Cornelius Van Til, does not offer a fourth argument alongside the cosmological, teleological, moral, and ontological arguments; it argues that the whole project those three lectures pursued concedes something it should not have — that there is a religiously neutral standpoint from which the evidence for and against God's existence could be weighed like any other empirical or philosophical question. The second, contemporary atheism in its "New Atheism" form (associated chiefly with Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, and Daniel Dennett, whose most influential books appeared in a cluster between 2004 and 2007), is not a philosophical school in the way Hume or Kant represent one, but a real, culturally significant, and philosophically serious opponent this course engages directly rather than dismissing.
Bringing these two together in one closing lecture is deliberate. Van Til's critique of "neutral" natural theology and the New Atheists' critique of religious belief as irrational both, in different ways, force this chapter to reckon with whether the entire apparatus of 2-1 through 2-4 — arguments, objections, cumulative cases — is even the right terrain on which the question of God's existence should be fought. This lecture does not resolve that larger question; it makes sure you understand both challenges on their own strongest terms before Chapter 7 returns to develop the New Atheism's arguments in more philosophical depth alongside postmodernism's challenge to universal truth claims generally.
What these 20 minutes give you
- State Van Til's central claim that no reasoning is religiously neutral, and explain what he means by saying unbelieving thought is simultaneously dependent on and in rebellion against the God it denies.
- Explain how presuppositionalism's approach to apologetics differs in its basic strategy from the evidentialist approach of Lectures 2-2 through 2-4.
- Identify the central arguments of at least two New Atheist authors (for example, Dawkins's "who designed the designer" objection and Hitchens's argument from religious violence) in their strongest form, not a caricature.
- Explain 1 Peter 3:15's charge to give "a reason for the hope" and connect it to why this course treats both classical apologetics and its critics as worth taking seriously.
The fear of Yahweh is the beginning of knowledge; but the foolish despise wisdom and instruction." — Proverbs 1:7
World English Bible
But sanctify the Lord God in your hearts; and always be ready to give an answer to everyone who asks you a reason concerning the hope that is in you, with humility and fear:" — 1 Peter 3:15
WEB
Proverbs 1:7's claim — that the fear of Yahweh is "the beginning" (Hebrew reshith, first in order, foundational) of knowledge, not merely one input alongside others weighed neutrally — is close to the heart of Van Til's argument in this lecture: if all genuine knowledge is founded on the fear of God, then reasoning that proceeds as though God's existence were simply one hypothesis among others, to be assessed by a standard external to and independent of him, has already misdescribed what knowledge is. 1 Peter 3:15, by contrast, commands believers to be ready to "give an answer" (Greek apologia, the term from which "apologetics" derives) — reasoned, articulate response to a real question from a real questioner — and it is worth noting Peter commands this "with humility and fear," aimed at a genuine outsider asking a genuine question, not at winning an argument for its own sake. Both texts matter for how this lecture's two subjects — presuppositionalism and the New Atheism — should be approached: with the intellectual seriousness 1 Peter 3:15 requires, and without conceding, as Proverbs 1:7 warns against, that reasoning without reference to God is simply neutral ground.
1. Van Til's presuppositionalism
Cornelius Van Til (1895-1987), a Dutch-American Reformed theologian who taught apologetics at Westminster Theological Seminary for over four decades, developed a distinctive approach to the defense of Christian belief that breaks with the evidentialist strategy Lectures 2-2 through 2-4 largely followed. (the approach broadly shared by Aquinas, Craig, and most of the arguments examined so far in this chapter, whatever their internal disagreements) proceeds by presenting evidence and argument the unbeliever is invited to weigh using reasoning both parties already share, hoping the weight of evidence moves a fair-minded skeptic toward theism. Van Til rejected the premise that such shared, neutral reasoning exists at all. His central claim, developed across works including The Defense of the Faith (1955), is that there is no religiously neutral standpoint from which anyone — believer or unbeliever — reasons: every act of reasoning already operates within a framework of prior commitments (a "presupposition") about what reality, knowledge, and logic themselves fundamentally are, and Van Til argued that only the Christian framework — a triune God who created and providentially sustains an orderly, knowable universe, and created human minds capable of knowing it — actually makes sense of the fact that reasoning, logic, and scientific inquiry work at all.
Van Til's specific charge against the unbeliever is not merely that they lack evidence, but that their position is internally incoherent in a particular way he called simultaneously dependent and in rebellion: the unbeliever depends, in practice, on a universe orderly enough to reason about, laws of logic stable enough to trust, and a moral order real enough to make ethical claims meaningful — all of which, Van Til argued, only the Christian God's existence actually accounts for — while at the same time denying the very God whose existence alone makes that dependence intelligible. On this view, presenting the unbeliever with more cosmological or teleological evidence, as Lectures 2-2 and 2-3 do, does not address the actual problem, because the unbeliever's framework for assessing any evidence at all is already compromised; what is needed instead is a "transcendental" argument (borrowing the term loosely from Kant, though putting it to a very different use) showing that the very possibility of logic, science, and morality presupposes the truth of Christian theism, such that denying Christian theism leaves the denier unable to account for the intelligibility of their own denial.
This is not a fringe or eccentric position within Reformed theology — it has shaped the apologetic method taught at several confessionally Reformed seminaries and has notable contemporary defenders (Greg Bahnsen's published 1985 debate with the atheist philosopher Gordon Stein remains a widely cited example of presuppositional method in live debate). It is also seriously contested, including by other evangelical apologists who remain committed to natural theology: critics of Van Til (including some in the Reformed tradition itself) have argued that his sharp rejection of any common ground with unbelievers is difficult to square with Romans 1:19-20's claim (Chapter 1, Lecture 1-3) that God's invisible attributes are "clearly seen" and "understood" by unbelievers "through the things that are made" — language that seems to presuppose unbelievers can, and to some real extent do, reason accurately about the natural order, which is closer to evidentialism's assumption than Van Til's sharper antithesis allows.
Starting points compared
This is a point where readers will not agree. Natural theology's reach — already flagged as contested in Lectures 2-1 through 2-4 — reaches its sharpest form here. Aquinas, Craig, and the evidentialist tradition generally hold that reasoning about God's existence can proceed on shared, common ground with unbelievers, even if that reasoning does not by itself produce saving faith. Van Til and the presuppositionalist tradition hold that no such neutral shared ground exists, and that apologetics must begin by exposing this rather than trying to argue on the unbeliever's own (illusory) neutral terms. Both traditions claim biblical warrant (Romans 1 is central to both arguments, read in different ways), and both have serious, ongoing contemporary defenders; this course does not adjudicate between them.
2. The New Atheism
"New Atheism" names a cluster of bestselling books published in the mid-2000s — Sam Harris's The End of Faith (2004), Richard Dawkins's The God Delusion (2006), Daniel Dennett's Breaking the Spell (2006), and Christopher Hitchens's God Is Not Great (2007) — sharing a combativeness and a public prominence that distinguished them from earlier, more academic atheistic philosophy of religion, though their individual arguments draw on that older tradition considerably more than their popular reception sometimes credited. Two of the most philosophically serious and frequently repeated arguments deserve engagement here on their strongest terms.
Dawkins, a biologist by training, argues in The God Delusion that positing God as an explanation for the universe's complexity (the kind of move Lecture 2-3's makes) generates an immediate and, he argues, fatal regress: a being capable of designing and sustaining a universe as complex as ours would itself have to be at least as complex as what it explains, and so invoking God to explain complexity merely relocates the problem — "who designed the designer?" — without actually solving it, whereas natural selection, Dawkins's own specialty, explains the emergence of complexity from simplicity without requiring a prior, even-more-complex designer. This objection deserves a real answer, not a dismissal: 's response (already implicit in this chapter's earlier lectures, and developed further in Chapter 3's treatment of ) is that Dawkins's argument assumes God is a complex being requiring explanation the same way a complex physical structure does, when the classical doctrine of God under discussion in this course holds instead that God is simple (not composed of parts, Chapter 3, Lecture 3-1) and necessarily existent (Lecture 2-2's third way and Lecture 2-4's ontological argument both converge on this) — a different category of explanation than any complex, contingent designer within the universe, and so not obviously vulnerable to the same regress. Whether this response actually satisfies Dawkins's objection, or merely restates the disputed claim that God's existence and complexity are of a fundamentally different order than the universe's, is itself contested, and a fair reader should recognize this is not an easy knockdown in either direction.
Hitchens, in God Is Not Great, presses a different and more historically documented case: that religious belief, across history, has been a persistent and disproportionate cause of violence, oppression, and the suppression of free inquiry — his subtitle, "How Religion Poisons Everything," names the thesis directly. This argument does not attempt to disprove God's existence philosophically; it argues, more practically, that religious belief's actual historical and social record counts heavily against it, whatever the philosophical arguments of 2-2 through 2-4 might independently establish. A serious response has to grant the historical record Hitchens cites is real — the , the Inquisition, sectarian violence across many religious traditions and centuries are not inventions — while also engaging the counter-evidence and counter-argument: that the twentieth century's most lethal ideologically-driven violence (under explicitly atheistic regimes in the Soviet Union, Maoist China, and Cambodia) suggests the connection Hitchens draws is not specifically between religion and violence but more generally between any totalizing ideology, religious or secular, and violence when wedded to unchecked political power — a response Hitchens himself anticipated and disputed in his book, arguing (contestably) that such regimes functioned as substitute religions with their own dogma and cult of personality. This is a genuine, ongoing historical and philosophical argument, not one this lecture can settle, and Chapter 7's return to the New Atheism (Lecture 7-6) will take it up again alongside postmodernism's challenge to universal truth claims more broadly.
3. Why this chapter engages both, and closes here
Van Til's critique and the New Atheists' critique come from opposite directions and should not be confused with each other: Van Til argues the evidentialist project of Lectures 2-2 through 2-4 concedes too much neutral ground to unbelief; the New Atheists argue that project, evaluated on its own evidentialist terms, still fails to establish theism convincingly. Holding both in view at the chapter's close is meant to keep this course honest about what it has and has not accomplished. This chapter has presented real arguments with real philosophical force, engaged real and serious objections to each, and named where Christians themselves disagree about how much weight any of this reasoning can bear. It has not delivered — and did not set out to deliver — a knockdown proof compelling assent from every rational person, of the kind Lecture 2-1 warned against expecting in the first place. What it has tried to do is exactly what 1 Peter 3:15 asks: prepare a reasoned answer, offered with humility, for anyone who asks the reason for the hope that is in you.
5. Going to the Sources
- Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (1955), Part One, "The Christian Theory of Knowledge" — Van Til's own extended statement of why he holds no reasoning is religiously neutral.
- Greg Bahnsen vs. Gordon Stein, "The Great Debate: Does God Exist?" (University of California, Irvine, 1985) — a full transcript or recording is widely available and shows presuppositional method applied in live debate against a philosophically trained atheist opponent.
- Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (2006), Chapter 4, "Why There Almost Certainly Is No God" — Dawkins's own full statement of the "who designed the designer" argument, in the context of his larger case.
In short
- Cornelius Van Til held that no reasoning is religiously neutral. Every thinker reasons from presuppositions, and only the Christian framework explains why logic, science and morality work.
- He said the unbeliever is both dependent on and in rebellion against God. So he favoured a transcendental argument (that logic and morality presuppose Christian theism) over piling up evidence.
- Critics, including some Reformed, say Van Til's sharp break with common ground sits badly with Romans 1:19-20. The lecture says both sides claim biblical warrant and does not choose.
- The New Atheists include Harris, Dawkins, Dennett and Hitchens. Dawkins asks "who designed the designer?" Classical theism replies that God is simple and necessary, though the lecture says this is contested.
- Hitchens argues from religious violence. The lecture grants the record is real, notes that atheist regimes also did violence, and keeps 1 Peter 3:15 as the model: an answer given with humility and fear.
Topic: This lecture presents Van Til's presuppositional apologetics and the New Atheist challenge, two critiques that come from opposite directions.
Remember: Van Til says the evidentialist project concedes too much neutral ground to unbelief, while the New Atheists say it fails even on its own terms.
Caution: The chapter does not claim a knock-down proof, and it does not decide between presuppositional and evidential apologetics. Each side has serious defenders.
One line to carry into ministry: Answer honest questions about your hope with reasons, humility and respect, as 1 Peter 3:15 asks.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Van Til argues the unbeliever is simultaneously "dependent on and in rebellion against" the God they deny. Restate this claim in your own words with a concrete example (for instance, trusting the laws of logic while denying their ultimate ground), and evaluate the Romans 1:19-20 objection raised against Van Til's sharp antithesis.
- Dawkins's "who designed the designer" objection and classical theism's response (that God is simple and necessary, not complex and contingent) are both stated in this lecture. Which side do you find more persuasive, and what would you need to know more about (perhaps from Chapter 3's fuller treatment of divine simplicity) before deciding?
- 1 Peter 3:15 commands giving "an answer... with humility and fear" to "everyone who asks." How should that posture shape the way a Christian engages a New Atheist argument like Hitchens's case from religious violence — differently than, say, a purely academic philosophical exchange might be conducted?