Lecture 8-5: The Problem of Evil and Theodicy
Contents 46
- Lecture 1-1: Why Theology Proper Comes First
- Lecture 1-2: Calvin's Opening Move — Knowledge of God and Knowledge of Self
- Lecture 1-3: General and Special Revelation
- Lecture 1-4: Religious Language and Its Limits
- Lecture 2-1: Can God's Existence Be Proved? Setting the Terms
- Lecture 2-2: The Cosmological Argument — From the World to a First Cause
- Lecture 2-3: The Teleological and Moral Arguments
- Lecture 2-4: The Ontological Argument — From Concept to Necessary Existence
- Lecture 2-5: Presuppositionalism and Contemporary Atheism
- Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity
- Lecture 3-2: Aseity and Independence
- Lecture 3-3: Immutability and Impassibility
- Lecture 3-4: Infinity, Eternity, and God's Relation to Time
- Lecture 3-5: Omnipresence
- Lecture 3-6: The Unity of God
- Lecture 4-1: Omniscience — God's Exhaustive and Personal Knowledge
- Lecture 4-2: Wisdom and Faithfulness — Knowledge Ordered and Kept
- Lecture 4-3: Holiness and Righteousness — Otherness and Moral Purity
- Lecture 4-4: Goodness, Love, Grace, and Mercy — Four Related but Distinct Attributes
- Lecture 4-5: Sovereignty and Omnipotence — What "God Can Do All Things" Actually Means
- Lecture 4-6: The Revealed Names of God — Self-Disclosure Through Covenant History
- Lecture 5-1: The Biblical Foundations of the Trinity
- Lecture 5-2: Early Heresies — Monarchianism, Adoptionism, and Modalism
- Lecture 5-3: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
- Lecture 5-4: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Council of Constantinople
- Lecture 5-5: Augustine's Trinitarian Theology and the Filioque Controversy
- Lecture 5-6: East and West Compared — Two Starting Points
- Lecture 6-1: The Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity
- Lecture 6-2: Perichoresis — Mutual Indwelling of the Divine Persons
- Lecture 6-3: Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession
- Lecture 6-4: The Twentieth-Century Revival of Trinitarian Theology
- Lecture 6-5: Social Trinitarianism and Its Critics
- Lecture 6-6: Contemporary Debates over Trinitarian Language
- Lecture 7-1: Process Theology — A God Who Grows With the World
- Lecture 7-2: Open Theism and the Future God Does Not Yet Know
- Lecture 7-3: Moltmann's Crucified God and the Question of Divine Suffering
- Lecture 7-4: Panentheism, Ecology, and the Creator/Creature Distinction
- Lecture 7-5: Contemporary Science and the Doctrine of God
- Lecture 7-6: Answering Postmodernism and the New Atheism
- Lecture 8-1: The Divine Decrees and Predestination
- Lecture 8-2: Calvinism, Arminianism, and Molinism on the Decrees
- Lecture 8-3: Creation Out of Nothing, and the Age of the Earth
- Lecture 8-4: Providence — Preservation, Concurrence, Government, and Miracle
- Lecture 8-5: The Problem of Evil and Theodicy
- Lecture 8-6: Conclusion — Knowing God, Not Only Knowing About Him
Every lecture in this chapter has been building, whether or not it announced itself as doing so, toward the question this lecture finally states directly: if God has an eternal, comprehensive decree (8-1, 8-2), if he freely created a good world (8-3), and if he preserves, concurs with, and governs everything that happens in it, down to the smallest details (8-4) — then why does evil happen at all, and how can God be cleared of authoring it? This is the oldest and most serious objection to classical theism, restated in every generation, and this lecture treats it with the seriousness it deserves rather than reaching for a single tidy answer that makes the difficulty disappear.
The lecture distinguishes the logical form of the problem (does the mere coexistence of God and evil involve a strict contradiction?) from the evidential form (does the amount and kind of evil actually observed in the world count as evidence against God's existence, even if no strict contradiction is provable?), and then presents three serious, only partly compatible theological responses: the free will defense, soul-making theodicy, and the classical Reformed decretive/moral will distinction already flagged in 8-1 and 8-4. These are not three versions of one answer; they proceed from different underlying commitments (especially about the nature of human freedom) and a reader should not expect them to be smoothly harmonized into a single position by the end of this lecture.
What these 21 minutes give you
- Distinguish the logical and evidential forms of the problem of evil, and explain why most contemporary philosophers of religion, including non-theists, regard the logical form as largely answered while the evidential form remains a live debate.
- State the free will defense (Alvin Plantinga), soul-making theodicy (John Hick), and the classical Reformed decretive/moral will distinction, each in terms its own defenders would recognize as fair.
- Explain why these three responses are only partly compatible rather than three compatible pieces of one larger answer.
- Distinguish a theodicy (a philosophical/theological account of why God permits evil) from pastoral care in the presence of suffering, and explain why this course treats the two as related but distinct tasks.
As for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save many people alive." — Genesis 50:20
World English Bible
We know that all things work together for good for those who love God, to those who are called according to his purpose." — Romans 8:28
WEB
Genesis 50:20 is placed first deliberately, because it is not a general philosophical statement but Joseph's own verdict on a specific, personal evil — his brothers' betrayal and sale into slavery — decades after the fact, spoken by the person who actually suffered it. The text holds "you meant evil" and "God meant it for good" as both true of the very same act, without either clause softening or excusing the other; this is the same two-level structure Lecture 8-4's concurrence doctrine already introduced, now applied directly to the hardest case that doctrine has to handle.
1. The logical problem: has philosophy actually answered it?
The logical problem of evil, in its classical form (associated with J. L. Mackie's mid-twentieth-century restatement), argues that the following three claims cannot all be true together: God is omnipotent, God is wholly good, and evil exists. If God is omnipotent, the argument runs, he could eliminate all evil; if he is wholly good, he would want to; since evil manifestly exists, at least one of the first two claims must be false. It is worth stating plainly, because this is a point of genuine and fairly wide agreement across the philosophy of religion rather than a live three-way debate: most philosophers, theist and atheist alike, now regard Alvin Plantinga's free will defense (developed most rigorously in The Nature of Necessity, 1974) as having successfully answered the logical problem in its strict, deductive form. Plantinga's argument does not claim to explain why God actually permits the specific evils that occur; it claims only that it is not a strict logical contradiction to hold that an omnipotent, wholly good God might have a morally sufficient reason — the possibility of a world containing genuinely free creatures, with the real risk of moral evil that genuine freedom carries, being of greater value than a world without either the freedom or the risk — for permitting the evil that exists. Even committed atheist philosophers such as William Rowe have granted that the logical argument, in its strict form, no longer succeeds.
2. The evidential problem: the harder, unresolved question
Conceding the logical problem does not settle the matter, and this lecture does not present it as though it did. The evidential problem of evil, which Rowe himself developed as the sharper successor argument, contends that even if God and evil are not strictly logically incompatible, the sheer amount, intensity, and apparently gratuitous character of much of the suffering actually observed in the world — suffering that seems to serve no discernible greater good, such as a fawn dying slowly and alone in a forest fire, to use Rowe's own example, unseen and unable to build character in anyone — counts as significant evidence against theism, even if it does not amount to a strict disproof. This argument remains genuinely contested and philosophically live in a way the logical problem no longer is, and this lecture treats it as the more serious challenge a mature Christian should actually wrestle with, rather than resting content with having answered Mackie's older, now largely conceded argument.
3. This is a point where readers will not agree. Three theodicies, only partly compatible
What a is
A theodicy is an attempt to give a positive account of why God permits the evil that actually occurs, going beyond the free will defense's more modest claim that no contradiction is involved. Three serious theological traditions offer theodicies, and this lecture presents each on its own terms before noting where they genuinely conflict with one another, rather than presenting them as compatible layers of a single answer.
The free will defense, extended from its logical-problem-answering role into a fuller theodicy, holds (in its libertarian form, associated with Plantinga and, in earlier form, Augustine's own account of as a genuinely free choice) that moral evil exists because God gave creatures a genuine, libertarian freedom to choose good or evil, and a world containing that kind of freedom, even with its real risk, is of greater value than a world of creatures who could not meaningfully choose at all. This account has real explanatory power for moral evil (evil caused by free creaturely choices, such as Joseph's brothers' betrayal) but faces a harder task with natural evil — earthquakes, disease, the forest fire in Rowe's fawn example — since these are not obviously the product of any creature's free choice at all, though some defenders extend the account by attributing natural evil to the fall's broader corruption of the created order (Romans 8:19-22, already engaged in Chapter 7) or to the free choices of fallen spiritual beings.
Soul-making theodicy, developed by John Hick (drawing on the second-century theologian Irenaeus as an alternative to the Augustinian free-will framework), holds that God did not create humanity morally and spiritually mature from the start but placed genuinely immature creatures in an environment — including one containing real difficulty, hardship, and even suffering — precisely because moral and spiritual character can only be developed, not simply installed, through the process of freely responding well or badly to real challenges. On this view, a world with no possibility of suffering would also be a world incapable of producing the deepest kinds of courage, compassion, and dependence on God; evil's permission is justified by its unique, otherwise-unavailable contribution to genuine moral formation. Hick's theodicy has real pastoral resonance for some kinds of suffering (Romans 5:3-4's "suffering produces perseverance" is a New Testament text soul-making theodicy can appeal to) but strains badly, as many critics including some sympathetic to Hick's broader project have pointed out, when applied to suffering that destroys the sufferer rather than forming them — an infant's death, or suffering so severe and prolonged that it breaks a person rather than building them, which is a significant share of the evidential problem's hardest cases.
The classical Reformed account, already previewed in 8-1's asymmetry discussion and 8-4's flagged difficulty, holds that God ordains the occurrence of evil (nothing, including evil, falls outside his comprehensive decree and government) without being its author or being morally culpable for it, by distinguishing God's decretive will (what he has sovereignly determined will occur, including permitting specific evils for his own wise purposes) from his moral or preceptive will (what he commands and approves). On this view, God can decree that an evil act occur — meaning he ordains, in his sovereign governing of history, that the circumstances allowing it will obtain — while that same act remains genuinely, fully sinful and culpable on the part of the human agent who freely wills and performs it, precisely because concurrence (8-4) allows the same event to be, at two irreducibly different levels, both God's sovereign ordaining and the creature's own free and blameworthy act. Genesis 50:20, quoted above, is this position's clearest single text: the same betrayal is fully, culpably "evil" as the brothers' own free intention, and fully "for good" as God's own sovereign meaning of the very same event — not two competing interpretations to choose between, but two true descriptions operating at different levels, exactly as concurrence requires.
These three accounts are not simply three compatible facets of one comprehensive answer, and stating why matters more than gesturing at a false harmony. The free will defense and soul-making theodicy both typically presuppose a libertarian account of human freedom — that a free choice is one that was not causally determined and genuinely could have gone otherwise — which is precisely the account of freedom the classical Reformed position's compatibilism (a free choice is one that flows from the agent's own will and desires, even if that will was itself decreed and effectually worked by God) denies is even the correct definition of freedom. A Reformed theologian who accepts concurrence and the decretive/moral will distinction as a full account of moral evil has less need of Hick's soul-making framework to explain why God permits evil in the first place, since the decretive will already supplies a sufficient reason (God's own wise purposes) without requiring that every instance of suffering be traceable to a specific formative benefit for the sufferer — which is precisely soul-making theodicy's chief vulnerability. Conversely, a libertarian free-will theodicist typically regards the compatibilist account of freedom the Reformed position relies on as not being genuine freedom at all, which means the Reformed answer to "why does God permit evil" looks, from a libertarian vantage point, uncomfortably close to making God respond to a self-generated dilemma of his own decree's causing. This lecture states this incompatibility honestly rather than resolving it, consistent with this course's practice throughout Chapter 8: a reader is free to judge which framework's account of human freedom is correct, but should not expect this lecture to have quietly smuggled that judgment past them.
"You who have purer eyes than to see evil, and who cannot look on perversity, why do you tolerate those who deal treacherously, and keep silent when the wicked swallows up the man who is more righteous than he," — Habakkuk 1:13 (WEB)
Habakkuk's own complaint — voiced to God directly, in Scripture's own words, not merely by a modern skeptic — shows that the tension this lecture has been describing is not a modern philosophical invention imported into the text from outside; the biblical writers themselves felt its force and gave it voice as prayer rather than resolving it tidily before moving on.
4. Theodicy is not pastoral care, and this lecture is not the grading screen
It is worth closing this lecture by naming a distinction this course has already committed to in its treatment of essay grading and pastoral material elsewhere: a theodicy is a philosophical and theological account, offered in the abstract, of why God's permission of evil is not incompatible with his goodness and power. It is not, and was never meant to be, something a person in the middle of acute grief needs recited to them. Job's own friends, notably, offer something closer to a theodicy — an attempted explanation for Job's suffering — and God's verdict on their speeches is that they "have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my servant Job has" (Job 42:7), a striking judgment against confident theodicizing addressed directly at a sufferer. Lecture 8-6 takes up what the doctrine of God actually offers pastorally, in place of a theodicy recited at the wrong moment; this lecture's task was the harder, colder philosophical work that has to be done honestly first, precisely so that 8-6 does not have to do it badly at a hospital bedside.
5. Going to the Sources
- Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Eerdmans, 1974) — a more accessible presentation of the free will defense than the fuller technical treatment in The Nature of Necessity, written for a wide audience.
- John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (Harper & Row, 1966; rev. 1977), especially the chapters distinguishing the "Augustinian" and "Irenaean" theodicy traditions — the original, full statement of soul-making theodicy in Hick's own terms.
- Calvin, Institutes I.18 ("God So Uses the Works of the Ungodly, and So Bends Their Minds to Carry Out His Judgments, that He Remains Pure from Every Stain") — Calvin's own extended treatment of how God can be said to work through evil deeds without being their author.
In short
- The logical problem of evil says God's goodness, God's power and the existence of evil cannot all be true. Most philosophers, including atheists such as William Rowe, now think Plantinga's free will defense has answered it.
- The evidential problem remains open. It says the amount and apparently pointless character of some suffering, such as Rowe's dying fawn, counts as evidence against God.
- The free will defense says real freedom is worth its risk of moral evil. It explains moral evil better than natural evil, which defenders sometimes link to the fall (Romans 8:19-22) or to fallen spiritual beings.
- Soul-making theodicy, from John Hick after Irenaeus, says hardship forms character. Critics say it fails for suffering that destroys people, such as an infant's death.
- The classical Reformed account distinguishes God's decretive will from his moral will. Genesis 50:20 shows the same act as the brothers' evil and as God's good purpose.
- The first two accounts assume libertarian freedom and the third assumes compatibilist freedom, so they do not fit together. A theodicy is also not pastoral care, as Job 42:7 suggests.
Topic: This lecture compares the logical and evidential problems of evil and three theodicies: the free will defense, soul-making and the Reformed decretive and moral will distinction.
Remember: The logical problem is widely seen as answered, but the evidential problem is still open. The three responses rest on different views of human freedom, so they are only partly compatible.
Caution: The lecture does not blend the three answers into one or claim to explain every evil. It also does not treat a theodicy as what a grieving person needs to hear.
One line to carry into ministry: Do not recite explanations to someone in acute grief. Job 42:7 shows God judging confident theodicizing against a sufferer.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- The lecture argues that most philosophers now regard the logical problem of evil as answered, while the evidential problem remains genuinely unresolved. Why might a Christian still want to think carefully about the evidential problem, even after the logical problem has been "won"?
- Genesis 50:20 holds "you meant evil" and "God meant it for good" as both fully true of the same act. Try to state, in your own words, why this is not simply a contradiction, drawing on Lecture 8-4's account of concurrence.
- The lecture argues the free will defense, soul-making theodicy, and the classical Reformed account rest on incompatible views of what "freedom" even means. Does this incompatibility trouble you, or do you think it is possible for Christians to disagree about the deep metaphysics of freedom while still agreeing on everything that matters practically about God's goodness? Explain your reasoning.