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ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God

Lecture 7-4: Panentheism, Ecology, and the Creator/Creature Distinction

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Contents 46
ST1E Systematic Theology I: The Doctrine of God
Chapter 0 · Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
  1. Introduction: What the Doctrine of God Is, and Why It Comes First
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: Prolegomena: Revelation, Religious Language, and the Knowledge of God
  1. Lecture 1-1: Why Theology Proper Comes First
  2. Lecture 1-2: Calvin's Opening Move — Knowledge of God and Knowledge of Self
  3. Lecture 1-3: General and Special Revelation
  4. Lecture 1-4: Religious Language and Its Limits
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: The Existence of God: Arguments and Their Critics
  1. Lecture 2-1: Can God's Existence Be Proved? Setting the Terms
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Cosmological Argument — From the World to a First Cause
  3. Lecture 2-3: The Teleological and Moral Arguments
  4. Lecture 2-4: The Ontological Argument — From Concept to Necessary Existence
  5. Lecture 2-5: Presuppositionalism and Contemporary Atheism
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: The Incommunicable Attributes of God
  1. Lecture 3-1: Classifying the Attributes, and Divine Simplicity
  2. Lecture 3-2: Aseity and Independence
  3. Lecture 3-3: Immutability and Impassibility
  4. Lecture 3-4: Infinity, Eternity, and God's Relation to Time
  5. Lecture 3-5: Omnipresence
  6. Lecture 3-6: The Unity of God
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: The Communicable Attributes and the Names of God
  1. Lecture 4-1: Omniscience — God's Exhaustive and Personal Knowledge
  2. Lecture 4-2: Wisdom and Faithfulness — Knowledge Ordered and Kept
  3. Lecture 4-3: Holiness and Righteousness — Otherness and Moral Purity
  4. Lecture 4-4: Goodness, Love, Grace, and Mercy — Four Related but Distinct Attributes
  5. Lecture 4-5: Sovereignty and Omnipotence — What "God Can Do All Things" Actually Means
  6. Lecture 4-6: The Revealed Names of God — Self-Disclosure Through Covenant History
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: The Trinity I: Biblical Foundations and Historical Formation
  1. Lecture 5-1: The Biblical Foundations of the Trinity
  2. Lecture 5-2: Early Heresies — Monarchianism, Adoptionism, and Modalism
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea
  4. Lecture 5-4: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Council of Constantinople
  5. Lecture 5-5: Augustine's Trinitarian Theology and the Filioque Controversy
  6. Lecture 5-6: East and West Compared — Two Starting Points
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: The Trinity II: Orthodox Doctrine and Modern Debates
  1. Lecture 6-1: The Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity
  2. Lecture 6-2: Perichoresis — Mutual Indwelling of the Divine Persons
  3. Lecture 6-3: Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession
  4. Lecture 6-4: The Twentieth-Century Revival of Trinitarian Theology
  5. Lecture 6-5: Social Trinitarianism and Its Critics
  6. Lecture 6-6: Contemporary Debates over Trinitarian Language
Chapter 7 · Chapter 7: Contemporary Challenges to the Doctrine of God
  1. Lecture 7-1: Process Theology — A God Who Grows With the World
  2. Lecture 7-2: Open Theism and the Future God Does Not Yet Know
  3. Lecture 7-3: Moltmann's Crucified God and the Question of Divine Suffering
  4. Lecture 7-4: Panentheism, Ecology, and the Creator/Creature Distinction
  5. Lecture 7-5: Contemporary Science and the Doctrine of God
  6. Lecture 7-6: Answering Postmodernism and the New Atheism
Chapter 8 · Chapter 8: Decrees, Creation, Providence, and Pastoral Application
  1. Lecture 8-1: The Divine Decrees and Predestination
  2. Lecture 8-2: Calvinism, Arminianism, and Molinism on the Decrees
  3. Lecture 8-3: Creation Out of Nothing, and the Age of the Earth
  4. Lecture 8-4: Providence — Preservation, Concurrence, Government, and Miracle
  5. Lecture 8-5: The Problem of Evil and Theodicy
  6. Lecture 8-6: Conclusion — Knowing God, Not Only Knowing About Him

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18 min

Chapter 3 (3-2) established the creator/creature distinction as the ground of divine aseity: God has life in himself, and the world is genuinely other than God, dependent on him for its existence without being any part of his own being. Panentheism — literally "all-in-God" — proposes a middle position between classical theism (God and the world are wholly distinct) and pantheism (God simply is the world, nothing more): the world exists, in some sense, within God or as part of God's own being — sometimes pictured as the world being God's "body" — while God is also more than the world, exceeding it. This lecture states panentheism's case, with particular attention to why contemporary ecological theology has reached for it as a resource for grounding environmental responsibility, before engaging classical theism's objection from the creator/creature distinction and asking, honestly, whether classical theism has adequate resources of its own for ecological responsibility without panentheism's metaphysics.

What these 18 minutes give you

  • Define panentheism precisely and distinguish it from both classical theism and pantheism, stating what each position affirms and denies about the relationship between God and the world.
  • Explain why contemporary ecological theology has found panentheism attractive as a ground for environmental responsibility, and state that motivation in terms its advocates would recognize as fair.
  • State the classical objection to panentheism from the creator/creature distinction (Chapter 3's aseity), and explain what is at stake in maintaining that distinction.
  • Present classical theism's own resources (stewardship, the goodness of creation, God's ongoing providential relation to what he made) for ecological responsibility that does not require panentheist metaphysics.

For the creation waits with eager expectation for the children of God to be revealed. For the creation was subjected to vanity, not of its own will, but because of him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself also will be delivered from the bondage of decay into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groans and travails in pain together until now." — Romans 8:19-22

World English Bible

For by him all things were created, in the heavens and on the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers; all things have been created through him, and for him. He is before all things, and in him all things are held together." — Colossians 1:16-17

WEB

Both texts are claimed by advocates on both sides of this lecture's debate, which is itself instructive. Panentheists point to Colossians 1:17's "in him all things are held together" as evidence that creation's ongoing existence is not merely externally sustained by God the way a builder sustains a house he no longer touches, but intimately, continuously bound up with God's own being. Classical theists read the same verse as a straightforward statement of providential sustaining causation — God actively upholds everything he made in existence, moment by moment, precisely because it is other than him and would lapse into nonbeing without his continuous sustaining will — which requires no panentheist metaphysics at all. Romans 8:19-22's picture of a groaning, longing creation is central to ecological theology generally, on both a panentheist and a classical construal: creation is not a neutral backdrop to the human drama of salvation but has its own destiny, described as bound up with "the liberty of the glory of the children of God," which this lecture treats as itself a serious ground for ecological responsibility, independent of how the debate over panentheism is resolved.

1. What panentheism claims, precisely

Panentheism in brief

Panentheism has to be defined carefully, because it occupies contested territory between two positions this course has already engaged and can be easily confused with either. holds that God and the world are really, wholly distinct: the world is not any part of God, and God's being is entire and complete without it (, Chapter 3). Pantheism holds that God simply is the world, or the world simply is God, with no remainder — "God" becomes another name for the totality of what exists, with no transcendent being beyond it. Panentheism proposes a genuinely third position: the world exists within God, as (on one common image, associated with process theologian Charles Hartshorne's later work and popularized further by others) something like the world is God's "body," the way a human body is genuinely part of a person while the person is more than merely their body — God includes the world as part of his own being, while also transcending it, having a reality, on most panentheist accounts, beyond what the world alone comprises. Panentheism is not, on its own advocates' understanding, a denial that God transcends the world (which would collapse it into pantheism); it is a claim that the world's existence is internal to, not merely external and other to, God's own being — a real metaphysical claim about the mode of the world's relation to God, not merely a poetic way of saying God is "close" to creation.

2. Why ecological theology has reached for panentheism

The motivating concern deserves to be stated fully and fairly, because it responds to a real and urgent problem. Ecological theologians — a diverse group spanning process-influenced thinkers, some strands of Catholic and Orthodox eco-theology, and figures such as Sallie McFague, who develops the world-as-God's-body image at length in Models of God (1987) — have argued that classical theism's sharp creator/creature distinction has historically underwritten, even if it did not require, a picture of creation as mere raw material for human use: if the world is wholly other than God, existing only to be governed and used by the humans God set over it (Genesis 1:28's dominion mandate, read in an exploitative register), then damaging or exhausting the created order carries no cost to God himself and only an instrumental cost to humanity's own long-term interests. Panentheism, its ecological advocates argue, closes this gap directly and viscerally: if the world is, in some real sense, part of God's own being, then to despoil a forest, drive a species to extinction, or poison a river is not merely bad of someone else's property — it is, in some real sense, an injury to God himself, which panentheists argue gives environmental responsibility a theological weight and urgency that an external, unaffected creator cannot supply as directly. This is a serious argument responding to a genuinely urgent crisis, not an academic curiosity, and it should not be dismissed as merely fashionable.

3. The classical objection from the creator/creature distinction

Classical theism's objection follows directly from Chapter 3's account of aseity and returns to a concern already raised against in 7-1, though panentheism's metaphysical claim is more direct: if the world is, in any sense, part of God's own being, then God's own being includes something contingent, changeable, and finite as one of its constituents — which is incompatible with the classical claim that God's being is entirely necessary, infinite, and independent of anything else (Chapter 3, 3-2 and 3-4). A further, specifically theological worry concerns the effects of sin and evil: if the world is part of God, then moral evil committed within the world — genocide, cruelty, every sin catalogued across Scripture — becomes, in some sense, internal to God's own being as well, which classical theists argue makes God complicit in evil in a far more direct way than any classical account of or permission does, and threatens the moral distinction between Creator and creation that undergirds any creaturely act "sin" against God rather than merely a disturbance within God. Colossians 1:16 itself, on the classical reading, states the creator/creature relationship the panentheist reading has to work against directly: "all things were created... through him, and for him" is the language of an agent bringing into being, and sustaining for his own purposes, something distinct from himself — not the language of a whole containing its own parts.

4. Classical theism's own resources for ecological responsibility

Having stated panentheism's motivating concern fairly, this lecture does not concede that classical theism is left without resources of its own, and stating those resources carefully matters, because the alternative is letting environmental concern default to whichever theology sounds most urgent rather than to what is actually true. First, the doctrine of creation itself: Genesis 1's repeated refrain that God saw what he had made and it was "good," prior to and independent of any human use of it, establishes the created order's own worth before God — not derivative merely from its usefulness to humanity, but declared good by its Creator on its own terms, across six days, before humanity is even created on the sixth. Second, the dominion mandate (Genesis 1:28, 2:15) has always had a minority-but-persistent classical reading, gaining renewed emphasis in recent decades, as stewardship rather than exploitation: "to work it and to keep it" (Genesis 2:15) uses a Hebrew verb (shamar) elsewhere translated "guard" or "keep watch over," language of careful custodianship rather than extraction. Third, and returning to this lecture's own scripture passage, Romans 8:19-22's picture of a creation "groaning" under the effects of and awaiting its own future liberation gives classical theism a robust eschatological ground for ecological concern that requires no panentheist metaphysics at all: creation matters to God, has its own future in God's redemptive purposes, and its degradation is a real evil within a providentially governed world God actively sustains (Colossians 1:17), even though creation remains genuinely other than God rather than part of him. On this classical account, damaging creation is a serious wrong against what God has made, values, sustains, and intends to redeem — a wrong classical theism can and should treat with full seriousness — without requiring the further, metaphysically costly claim that the injury is also, somehow, an injury to God's own being.

5. Where the disagreement actually sits

Stated honestly, this is not a dispute over whether ecological responsibility matters — both classical theists and panentheist ecological theologians agree that it does, urgently. The dispute is over what kind of theological ground best supports that responsibility, and over the independent metaphysical question of whether the world's existence is internal or external to God's own being, which cannot be settled merely by asking which answer makes for better environmental ethics. Classical theism should resist two temptations here: dismissing panentheism's ecological motivation as merely trendy (it responds to a real and worsening crisis), and conceding the metaphysics because the ethical payoff sounds more direct (a theological claim is not made true by the practical usefulness of believing it).


Three Views of God and the World Classical Theism God wholly other than the world; world entirely outside God's own being, dependent on him Aseity preserved (Ch. 3) Panentheism World exists within God's own being (God's "body"), while God also exceeds and transcends the world Injury to world = injury to God Pantheism God simply is the world; no remainder, no being beyond the totality of what exists No transcendence at all

5. Going to the Sources

Read Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Fortress Press, 1987), chapter 3, where the "world as God's body" model is developed at length and its ecological payoff argued directly. For a philosophically careful defense of panentheism as a distinct position (not simply a loose metaphor), read Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, eds., In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God's Presence in a Scientific World (Eerdmans, 2004) — note the title's own borrowing of Acts 17:28's language, itself a text panentheists sometimes invoke and classical theists read as Paul's use of pagan poetry making a much more modest point about God's providential nearness. For the classical creator/creature distinction defended directly against panentheism, read Robert Jenson's or, more accessibly, the relevant chapter of Michael Horton's The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way (Zondervan, 2011) on the doctrine of creation.

In short

  • Panentheism means "all-in-God." The world exists within God's own being, sometimes pictured as God's "body," while God also exceeds it. It differs from classical theism and from pantheism, where God simply is the world.
  • Ecological theologians, including Sallie McFague, turn to it because harm to creation would then be harm to God, which gives environmental duty great weight.
  • Classical theism objects: if the world is part of God, God includes what is finite, and moral evil becomes internal to him. Colossians 1:16 describes a Creator who makes what is distinct.
  • Classical theism has its own grounds for care: God called creation good (Genesis 1), Genesis 2:15 means guarding it, and creation awaits redemption (Romans 8:19-22).
  • Both sides agree ecological duty matters. They differ on its best ground, and a claim is not true merely because it has good ethical results.

Topic: This lecture compares panentheism, classical theism and pantheism, and asks whether care for the environment needs panentheism's view of God and the world.

Remember: Classical theism keeps the world distinct from God, yet still gives strong reasons to protect it: God made it good, sustains it and will redeem it.

Caution: Panentheism is not pantheism, since God also transcends the world. The lecture also warns against dismissing its ecological concern as fashion.

One line to carry into ministry: Teach care for creation as a duty to what God has made, valued and promised to renew.

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Check yourself

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Reflection and discussion

  • State panentheism's central metaphysical claim in one sentence, distinguishing it clearly from both classical theism and pantheism. Where, precisely, would a reader most easily confuse panentheism with one of the other two, and why?
  • Ecological theologians argue that classical theism's creator/creature distinction has historically underwritten an exploitative view of creation. Is this a fair criticism of classical theism itself, or a criticism of how some classical theists have misapplied the doctrine? Defend your answer with reference to Genesis 1 and 2.
  • This lecture argues that a theological claim should not be adopted merely because it produces a desirable ethical outcome. Do you agree with this principle in general? Can you think of a case, inside or outside this debate, where following it would require giving up a conclusion you find attractive for other reasons?

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What next

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