Lecture 5-1: Churches and the Nation
목차 27
- Lecture 1-1: The Korean Anomaly
- Lecture 1-2: The Lens of World Christianity
- Lecture 1-3: Reading the Sources Fairly
- Lecture 2-1: Books from Beijing
- Lecture 2-2: The Ancestral Rites and the Persecutions
- Lecture 2-3: The Martyrs and Their Memory
- Lecture 4-1: What Happened
- Lecture 4-2: Practices Born of Revival
- Lecture 4-3: What Did the Revival Do?
- Lecture 5-1: Churches and the Nation
- Lecture 5-2: The Shrine Crisis
- Lecture 5-3: Remembering Collaboration and Resistance
- Lecture 6-1: The Church of the North
- Lecture 6-2: The Korean War
- Lecture 6-3: Anticommunism and the Church in North Korea Today
- Lecture 7-1: Explosive Growth
- Lecture 7-2: A Church That Keeps Dividing
- Lecture 7-3: The Churches and Democratization
- Lecture 8-1: Korea as a Sending Church
- Lecture 8-2: The Immigrant Church
- Lecture 8-3: Korea in Global Christian Networks
When Japan made Korea a protectorate in 1905 and annexed it in 1910, the Protestant churches were young — most congregations were less than twenty years old — and the Catholic Church was only a generation past its last great persecution. Yet within fifteen years the churches were at the centre of the largest protest movement in Korea's colonial history. On 1 March 1919, sixteen of the thirty-three men who signed the Declaration of Independence were Protestant Christians. The Catholic Church, by contrast, was almost entirely absent as an institution, because its bishops had decided it must be.
This lecture asks how that came about. It looks first at the Christian schools, which trained a generation of Korean leaders; then at the "105-person incident" of 1911-13, when the colonial police accused leading Christians of plotting to assassinate the Governor-General; then at the March First Movement itself, including the massacre at Jeamni church; and finally at the Catholic decision to stay out, which was a considered policy with its own reasons, not an accident or simple timidity.
A warning at the start. It is easy to tell this part of the story as proof that Korean Christianity was patriotic from the beginning. That story is not false, but it is selective. Many Christians took no part in the national movement; some Christian leaders counselled against it; and the missionaries who ran the schools were, officially, committed to political neutrality. This lecture tries to keep all of that in view.
이 27분으로 얻는 것
- Explain why Christian schools and churches became centres of Korean national feeling in the first decade of colonial rule, using Ahn Chang-ho and Yi Seung-hun of Osan as examples.
- Describe the "105-person incident" (1911-13): what the colonial authorities alleged, what happened at the trials, and why it mattered to the churches.
- Give the religious make-up of the thirty-three signers of the 1919 Declaration of Independence and describe the churches' part in the movement and the losses they suffered, including at Jeamni.
- Explain the reasons for the Catholic Church's non-involvement in 1919, as the Catholic mission itself understood them, and how Korean Catholics have looked back on that choice.
Seek the peace of the city where I have caused you to be carried away captive, and pray to Yahweh for it; for in its peace you shall have peace. — Jeremiah 29:7
World English Bible
Let every soul be in subjection to the higher authorities, for there is no authority except from God, and those who exist are ordained by God. — Romans 13:1
WEB
But Peter and the apostles answered, “We must obey God rather than men. — Acts 5:29
WEB
Three texts, three stances — and every one of them was preached in Korea between 1905 and 1919. Missionaries who urged Korean Christians to keep out of politics leaned on Romans 13:1 and on Jeremiah's counsel to seek the welfare of the city of one's exile. Koreans who joined the national movement could answer that Korea was not their exile but their home, and that Peter did not obey the council when it forbade him to speak. The point here is not that one reading is correct. It is that in 1919 the question of which verse governed was the living question, and Christians of equal sincerity answered it differently.
1. Schools as the nation's nursery
In the years around 1905, Koreans who wanted their country to survive often concluded that it needed modern education: science, mathematics, history, foreign languages, and a new kind of citizen. The old Confucian academies could not supply that, and the Korean state was too weak to build a school system quickly. The missions could. By the time of annexation, Protestant and Catholic missions and Korean Christians together ran hundreds of schools, from village primary schools to secondary schools and colleges in Seoul and Pyongyang.
Two men show how Christian faith and national hope were joined in these schools.
Ahn Chang-ho (An Ch'ang-ho, 1878-1938) was converted as a young man in a mission school in Seoul and spent years in the United States among Korean labourers. He returned in 1907 and helped found the New People's Association (Sinminhoe), a secret society for national self-strengthening, and the Daeseong School in Pyongyang (1908). His programme stressed character, honesty and education as the foundation of any future independence — what the historian Kenneth Wells has called "self-reconstruction nationalism". Ahn was a Presbyterian who did not make his faith the centre of his public programme, and historians debate how far his ethic was Christian and how far it was a modern civic ethic that Christianity helped to carry.
Yi Seung-hun (Yi Sŭng-hun, 1864-1930) — not to be confused with the Catholic Yi Seung-hun baptized in Beijing in 1784, whom you met in Chapter 2 of this course — was a merchant from North Pyongan province who was moved by Ahn's speeches, founded the Osan School in Jeongju in 1907, and became a Christian soon afterwards. Osan combined Bible teaching, modern subjects and a strongly national spirit. Yi Seung-hun would appear again twice in this lecture: as a defendant in 1912 and as a signer in 1919.
Why did Christian institutions carry national feeling so readily? Historians point to several things, and none is enough alone:
- Organization. Churches were the largest voluntary organizations in Korea, with weekly meetings, elected officers, finances and networks reaching from village to city — just what a political movement needs, and just what the colonial state had closed down elsewhere.
- Literacy in Korean. The Protestant churches taught people to read the Korean alphabet (Hangeul) so that they could read the Bible. A reading public is a public that can receive a declaration.
- A new idea of the person. The teaching that each person stands before God, and that a nation's rulers stand under God's judgement, gave some Koreans a way to think about rights and dignity that did not depend on the state.
- The missionaries' foreign status. Western missionaries were citizens of powers Japan did not wish to offend. Their compounds and schools had a degree of protection that purely Korean institutions lacked.
The last point cut both ways. The missionaries' protection depended on their staying out of politics, and most missions told their Korean members to do the same. Some missionaries sympathized privately with Korean hopes; others thought Japanese rule would bring order and development; nearly all feared that political involvement would give the government a pretext to close the churches.
2. The 105-person incident, 1911-1913
In late 1911 the colonial police began arresting hundreds of Koreans in the northwest — the region around Pyongyang and Seoncheon (Sŏnch'ŏn) where Protestantism was strongest. The charge was that they had plotted to assassinate the Governor-General, Terauchi Masatake, during a journey he had made through the region the previous December. Many of the accused were teachers, students and church officers from mission schools and congregations, and many were members of the New People's Association.
At the first trial in 1912, 105 of those indicted were convicted — hence the name by which the case is remembered. The prosecution's evidence consisted largely of confessions, and defendants told the court that those confessions had been extracted by torture. Missionaries collected accounts of the interrogations and sent them abroad, and the case drew criticism in the American and British press. On appeal in 1913, most of the convictions were overturned; six men, including Yi Seung-hun and the Methodist layman Yun Chi-ho (Yun Ch'i-ho), were given prison sentences, and they were released under an amnesty in 1915.
Most historians today regard the alleged plot as having been largely or wholly constructed by the police. The purpose, on this reading, was to break the New People's Association and the Christian networks of the northwest, which the colonial government regarded as the most organized potential opposition in the country. Whatever the truth about particular individuals, the effect is clearer: the government had told Korean Christians that it considered them politically suspect, and Korean Christians had learned that their churches were watched.
Two lessons were drawn from the case, and they pointed in opposite directions. Some Korean Christians concluded that faith and national feeling could not be separated, since the state itself had joined them. Many missionaries concluded that the churches must be kept even more carefully out of politics, so as not to give the government another pretext.
3. March First, 1919
In early 1919 the end of the First World War and the American president Woodrow Wilson's language about the "self-determination" of peoples raised hopes among colonized peoples everywhere. The death of the former Korean emperor Gojong in January 1919, and rumours that he had been poisoned, gave Koreans a moment of shared grief and a great public funeral to gather around.
Leaders of three religious communities planned a declaration of independence together: Cheondogyo (the "Religion of the Heavenly Way", an indigenous Korean religion descended from the Donghak movement), Protestant Christians, and Buddhists. The Declaration was drafted by the writer Choe Nam-seon. Of its thirty-three signers, sixteen were Protestants (Presbyterians and Methodists), fifteen were Cheondogyo leaders and two were Buddhists. Among the Protestants were Gil Seon-ju (Kil Sŏn-ju), the Pyongyang pastor associated with the 1907 revival whom you met in Chapter 4 of this course, and Yi Seung-hun of Osan, who was one of the main organizers on the Christian side.
On 1 March the signers read the Declaration at a restaurant in central Seoul and then informed the police, who arrested them. Nearby, in Pagoda Park (Tapgol Park), students read the Declaration to a crowd, and the demonstrations began. Over the following weeks they spread to hundreds of towns and villages across the peninsula. The demonstrators were overwhelmingly unarmed, and the Declaration's appended pledges asked for order and restraint. The colonial response was severe: soldiers and police fired on crowds, and tens of thousands were arrested. Estimates of the dead range from several hundred (the colonial government's figures) to several thousand (Korean nationalist accounts); the gap itself tells you how contested the record is.
Why were Protestants so prominent? Christians were a small minority — Protestants perhaps one or two per cent of a population of around seventeen million — yet they supplied nearly half the signers and a large share of those imprisoned. Japanese police statistics, as later historians have tabulated them, put Christians at something like a fifth of those in custody in the months after March. Three reasons are usually given: the churches' organization and networks, which carried the Declaration from town to town; the mission schools, whose students and teachers were among the first to march; and the concentration of Protestants in the northwest, where the 105-person case had already politicized them. It is worth adding a fourth reason, which is less flattering to the myth of a uniformly patriotic church: Christian leaders were prominent partly because the planners wanted their networks and their international connections, including the hope that Western Christian opinion would take notice.
4. Jeamni and the churches' losses
The most notorious single atrocity of the spring took place on 15 April 1919 at Jeamni (Cheam-ni), a village in Hwaseong near Suwon, south of Seoul. After demonstrations in the district, Japanese soldiers gathered the men of the village into the Methodist church, opened fire, and set the building alight. Around two dozen people died in the church, and more in a neighbouring village; sources differ on the exact numbers. The Canadian veterinary scientist and missionary Frank W. Schofield, who taught in Seoul, went to the site within days, photographed the ruins and wrote reports that reached the foreign press. The Japanese officer responsible was tried by a military court and, according to most accounts, acquitted.
Across the country, church buildings were damaged or burned, pastors and elders were arrested, and some congregations were broken up for years. The Presbyterian General Assembly reported heavy losses at its meeting in the autumn of 1919 — members arrested in the thousands, dozens killed, church buildings destroyed. Among the Methodists, the most remembered name is Yu Gwan-sun (Yu Kwan-sun), a teenage student at the Methodist Ewha school who helped lead demonstrations in her home district and died in prison in 1920. She has become a national symbol, and it is fair to note that national memory has made her story larger and simpler than the sources alone would.
The missions' public stance remained neutral. But missionaries had watched the violence, and in 1919 the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America published a collection of eyewitness reports, The Korean Situation, which brought the repression before American churchgoers. That publicity is one reason the colonial government shifted to "cultural rule" later that year.
5. Why the Catholic Church stayed out
The Catholic Church in 1919 had perhaps ninety thousand members in Korea — more than the Methodists, and a church with a century of memory behind it. Yet it was almost entirely absent from March First as an institution. The reasons deserve to be stated in the Catholic mission's own terms before they are judged.
The Catholic mission in Korea was led by bishops of the Paris Foreign Missions Society (MEP), above all Bishop Gustave Mutel, Vicar Apostolic of Seoul from 1890 to 1933. Mutel's policy rested on three convictions:
- The church's mission is spiritual. The church exists to save souls and administer the sacraments, not to take sides in questions of government. Mixing the two had, in Mutel's reading of history, always damaged the church.
- The memory of persecution. The Korean Catholic Church had been treated as a political threat by the Joseon state for a century — partly because of Hwang Sa-yeong's "silk letter" of 1801, which had asked for foreign military intervention (see lecture 2-2 of this course). The legal toleration won in 1886 was recent and precious. Mutel was determined never again to give a government reason to see Catholics as rebels.
- Obedience to the established authority. Catholic teaching of the period generally counselled obedience to the de facto government, and the Holy See was cautious about antagonizing Japan, with which it was seeking good relations.
In line with this, Catholic clergy were instructed to stay out of the movement. Seminarians in Seoul and Daegu who took part in demonstrations were disciplined, and some were expelled from the seminary. Individual Catholics did join — the church could not control every member — but there was no Catholic signer and no Catholic organizational role.
This was not the first time Mutel's policy had been tested. In 1909 Ahn Jung-geun (An Chung-gŭn), a Catholic layman baptized as Thomas, shot and killed Itō Hirobumi, the former Japanese Resident-General of Korea, at Harbin in Manchuria. Mutel publicly condemned the act as murder. When a French missionary priest, Father Joseph Wilhelm, travelled to give Ahn the sacraments before his execution in 1910, he did so against Mutel's wishes and was later disciplined. For decades the official Korean Catholic Church kept its distance from Ahn's memory. That changed in the late twentieth century: in 1993 Cardinal Stephen Kim Sou-hwan celebrated a memorial Mass for Ahn and spoke of the church's earlier judgement as a failure to understand him. The historian Franklin Rausch, among others, has studied how Ahn himself tried to reconcile his faith with his act, in the writings he left in prison.
Reading the abstention
How should the Catholic abstention be read? Catholic historians have not spoken with one voice. Some defend Mutel's policy as a responsible protection of a vulnerable church that had already buried thousands of martyrs. Others have judged that the French bishops failed to understand their Korean flock and put the institution ahead of the people. In 2000, as part of the Great Jubilee, the Catholic Bishops' Conference of Korea issued a statement of repentance — Renewal and Reconciliation — which, among other things, acknowledged that the church's leadership had at times hindered the faithful from taking part in the independence movement. The statement is itself a primary source for how memory changes.
6. Assessment: a political choice either way
It would be easy to conclude that the Protestants were political and the Catholics were not. The chapter's principle suggests a different reading. Mutel's policy was a political choice with political effects: it reassured the colonial government, it protected the church's legal position, and it separated Catholic Korea from the largest national event of the era. The Protestant missions' neutrality was likewise a political choice, although many of their Korean members ignored it. And the Korean Protestants who signed the Declaration were making a religious choice as well as a political one — many of them believed that a just God stood against the domination of one people by another.
The historian Chung-shin Park has argued that Korean Protestants' political engagement rose and fell with their institutional interests, not only with their theology. Kenneth Wells has argued that even the Protestants who counselled patience were nationalists of a gradualist kind. Both arguments warn against the neat story in which the church simply equals the nation.
The bars show the thirty-three signers by religion. Remember what they do not show: how many ordinary believers of each tradition marched, or how many stayed home. A chart of signers measures leadership, not the whole community.
5. Going to the Sources
Source: the "Three Open Pledges" appended to the Declaration of Independence, 1 March 1919. The Declaration ends with three short pledges, traditionally attributed to the Buddhist signer Han Yong-un, which set out how the demonstrators were to act. The Korean text is widely printed, and English translations appear in many collections, including Peter H. Lee (ed.), Sources of Korean Tradition, vol. 2 (2000). What follows is a close paraphrase, not an exact translation:
- Our undertaking today is made on behalf of the people's demand for justice, humanity, survival and dignity. Let it express the spirit of freedom, and let no one give way to hostility toward others.
- Let every person, to the last, and to the last moment, make known the people's rightful will.
- Let everything we do respect order, so that our claims and our conduct are honourable and upright to the very end.
- The pledges ask for courage and for restraint at the same time. Why might leaders of three religions, including sixteen Protestants, have found it important to insist on non-violence and order?
- The pledges do not mention God, Christ, the Buddha or the Heavenly Way. What does that suggest about how the signers understood the relation between their different faiths and their common national cause?
- Bishop Mutel would have agreed with the pledges' call for order but not with the act they accompanied. Using this source, explain in your own words where exactly his disagreement lay.
핵심 요약
- Christian schools and churches became centres of national feeling because of their organization, Korean-language literacy, new ideas about the person, and the protection missionaries gave. Ahn Chang-ho and Yi Seung-hun of Osan are examples.
- In the "105-person incident" of 1911-13, police accused Christians of plotting against the Governor-General. Most historians think the plot was largely constructed, and the case pushed Christians and missionaries toward opposite lessons.
- On 1 March 1919, sixteen of the thirty-three signers were Protestants. Protestants were a small minority but were prominent, partly because planners wanted their networks and international connections.
- Churches paid a heavy price in 1919, including the burning of the church at Jeamni. Missionary reports reached the foreign press.
- The Catholic Church stayed out under Bishop Mutel, for three stated reasons: a spiritual mission, memory of persecution, and obedience to established authority. Catholic historians judge this differently, and the Korean bishops later issued a statement of repentance.
- Both the Catholic and the Protestant mission stances were political choices. Chung-shin Park and Kenneth Wells warn against the neat story that the church simply equals the nation.
Topic: This lecture explains how Korean churches came to stand at the centre of the 1919 independence movement, and why the Catholic Church stayed out.
Remember: Sixteen of the thirty-three signers were Protestant, yet the Catholic abstention was a considered policy with its own reasons, not simple timidity.
Caution: The story of a uniformly patriotic church is selective. Many Christians took no part, and a chart of signers measures leadership, not the whole community.
One line to carry into ministry: Before judging another church's choice in a crisis, state its reasons in its own terms and remember that silence is also a choice.
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묵상 및 토론
- Christians were a tiny minority of Koreans in 1919 but nearly half the signers. Does that fact tell us more about the Christians or about the conditions of colonial Korea? What else would you need to know?
- Bishop Mutel believed that keeping the church out of politics protected his flock. The signers believed that silence betrayed the nation. Is there a way to honour what each was trying to protect?
- Ahn Jung-geun's memory was held at arm's length by his church for decades and later embraced. What should a church do when it realizes that it has judged one of its own members too quickly — or too kindly?
- If you belong to a church in the diaspora, how does your congregation remember 1 March? Is the memory Catholic, Protestant, national, or all three?