Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
목차 40
- Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
- Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
- Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
- Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
- Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
- Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
- Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
- Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
- Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
- Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
- Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
- Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
- Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
- Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
- Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
- Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
- Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
- Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
- Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
- Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
- Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
- Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
- Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
- Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
- Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
- Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
- Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
- Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
- Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
- Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
- Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
- Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
- Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
- Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
- Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
- Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
- Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis
By the early 1930s, Karl Barth and Emil Brunner were widely regarded, together, as the two leading voices of the new "dialectical theology" this chapter has been describing — close colleagues who had spent the previous decade agreeing on nearly everything that mattered: the rejection of liberal theology's method, the insistence on God's self-revelation in Christ as theology's proper starting point, the "wholly other" critique of culture-Protestantism. Which is exactly what makes the dispute this lecture covers so striking, and why it was a sharp, personally bitter dispute between two major theologians who agreed on almost everything else: this was not two theologians talking past each other from opposite ends of the theological spectrum. It was a rupture between allies, over a single, precisely defined question, that neither man ever fully repaired in his lifetime.
The question was natural theology — whether human beings, apart from and prior to God's revelation in Christ, retain any capacity, however damaged, to receive or respond to a knowledge of God. In 1934, Brunner published a short, deliberately provocative essay, "Nature and Grace" ("Natur und Gnade"), arguing that some such capacity must be affirmed, on both theological and pastoral grounds. Barth's reply, published the same year, was titled simply "No!" ("Nein!"), and it is remembered as one of the bluntest rejections one major twentieth-century theologian ever delivered to another in print. This lecture states both sides of that dispute as their own proponents would state them, because this is exactly the kind of disagreement this course exists to describe rather than resolve.
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- State Brunner's argument in "Nature and Grace" for a "point of contact" (*Anknüpfungspunkt*) in fallen human nature, including the theological and pastoral reasons Brunner gave for needing one.
- State Barth's argument in "No!" for a near-total rejection of any natural knowledge of God, including why Barth regarded even a "point of contact" limited to something as modest as fallen humanity's bare capacity to be addressed as a dangerous concession.
- Describe Brunner's own constructive proposal of the Word's threefold form (revealed, written, proclaimed) and explain precisely how Brunner's use of that language differs from Barth's use of the same threefold scheme in lecture 3-2.
- Explain why this dispute is best understood as a disagreement between allies over a genuinely difficult theological question, not as an obvious case of one side being simply right — and identify what would need to be true for someone to side with each position.
- Connect this dispute forward to later chapters, where a structurally similar disagreement (how much continuity, if any, exists between general human nature and knowledge of God) recurs in different terms — for example, in the debate over analytic Reformed epistemology in chapter 12.
Both theologians in this controversy appealed to Scripture, and it is worth reading the passages each side emphasized, since the dispute is partly a dispute about how to read Paul.
Romans 1:19-20, central to Brunner's case, reads: "because that which is known of God is revealed in them, for God revealed it to them. For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity; that they may be without excuse." (World English Bible) Brunner read this text as Paul himself affirming exactly the kind of natural knowledge of God — however partial, however insufficient for salvation on its own — that Barth's position seemed to rule out categorically. If Paul can say that God's invisible attributes are "clearly seen" and "perceived" by all people from creation itself, Brunner argued, a theology that denies any natural knowledge of God at all has to explain this text away rather than simply read it.
John 1:14, central to how this chapter has already framed Barth's Christocentric theology in 3-2, reads: "The Word became flesh, and lived among us. We saw his glory, such glory as of the one and only Son of the Father, full of grace and truth." (WEB) Barth's side of the debate does not deny Romans 1:19-20 says what it says; Barth's reply argues instead that whatever natural knowledge Romans 1 describes functions, in Paul's own argument, only to render humanity "without excuse" for its idolatry and unrighteousness — that is, it establishes guilt, not a positive capacity that grace can then build upon. The knowledge that actually saves, on Barth's reading, comes only through the Word becoming flesh in the way John 1:14 describes, which owes nothing to the natural capacity Romans 1 describes and does not need it as a "point of contact" in order to reach a hearer.
Both theologians were reading Paul carefully and neither was inventing a position out of nothing; the disagreement is about what conclusion these texts, read together with the rest of Paul's argument and with each theologian's larger doctrine of sin and grace, actually license.
1. Where the two men agreed
Before describing the break, it is worth being precise about how much common ground Barth and Brunner actually shared, because the sharpness of their dispute is unintelligible without it. Both rejected 's method as described in chapter 2 and in lecture 3-1. Both affirmed that God's decisive, saving self-revelation occurs in Jesus Christ and nowhere else with the same finality. Both were suspicious of natural theology's classical forms — the traditional theistic proofs Kant had already undermined philosophically, as chapter 1 described, and the confident nineteenth-century assumption that human culture and divine purpose run smoothly together, which chapter 3's opening lecture showed collapsing in 1914. Brunner was, if anything, one of Barth's earliest and most effective allies in making dialectical theology's case known internationally; his own early work is deeply indebted to Barth's Romans.
2. Brunner's case in "Nature and Grace" (1934)
Brunner's 1934 essay argued that Barth's theology, taken to its logical conclusion, denied human beings so much as a capacity to be addressed by God's Word — and Brunner judged this both theologically indefensible and pastorally disastrous. Brunner's argument had several connected parts. First, theologically: Brunner argued that even fallen human nature retains what he called a "point of contact" (Anknüpfungspunkt) for revelation — not a saving knowledge of God, and not an independent path to God that bypasses Christ, but a formal capacity: the fact that a human being is the kind of creature capable of being addressed, of hearing a word and responding to it as a word, of having a conscience that can be convicted, a rational structure that can recognize a claim as a claim. Without some such retained capacity, Brunner argued, it becomes hard to explain how a fallen human being can meaningfully receive revelation at all when it comes, since receiving an address requires some minimal capacity to be one who is addressed.
Second, Brunner appealed to Scripture, including Romans 1:19-20 as read above, arguing that Paul's own account of — however insufficient for salvation — described a real, if limited, natural knowledge that a theology claiming fidelity to Paul could not simply deny. Third, Brunner raised a pastoral and missionary concern: a theology that denied any point of contact whatsoever seemed to leave the church's evangelistic and pastoral task without any account of why or how the gospel could actually reach a hearer, since the hearer would possess, on the strictest reading of Barth's position, literally nothing revelation could connect to.
Brunner was careful to distinguish his proposal from the older natural theology Barth (and Brunner himself) had already rejected. Brunner was not proposing that unaided reason could arrive at saving knowledge of God, and was not reviving the classical proofs. His claim was much narrower: a bare, formal capacity to be addressed, not a positive natural knowledge sufficient for anything beyond establishing guilt (much as Barth himself would grant Romans 1 does).
3. Barth's reply: "No!" (1934)
Barth's response, written quickly and published under the deliberately blunt title "Nein! Antwort an Emil Brunner," rejected Brunner's proposal in its entirety, and did so in language considerably sharper than the theological disagreement alone required — a fact later commentators on the controversy, including some sympathetic to Barth's theological position, have noted with regret, since the personal tone of Barth's reply damaged a friendship that both men are recorded as having found painful for the rest of their lives.
Barth's theological objection to even Brunner's narrow, formal "point of contact" was that any concession here, however small, reopens exactly the door Barth's entire theology of revelation was built to close. If human beings retain any independent capacity, however minimal or formal, that revelation must connect to or presuppose, then revelation is no longer, in Barth's strict sense, purely and exclusively God's own act; it becomes, in however small a degree, cooperative — dependent on something human nature already possesses and that grace merely activates or completes. For Barth, this concession, once made, cannot be contained to the modest scope Brunner intended; it reintroduces, in principle, the same logic Barth judged had let liberal theology drift toward finding God's revelation continuous with, rather than utterly distinct from, human capacities and human culture — the very drift lecture 3-1 traced to catastrophe in 1914. A capacity to be addressed, Barth argued, is not so formal or neutral as Brunner supposed; it already smuggles back in a general anthropology, a doctrine of what a human being fundamentally is, established independently of revelation and prior to it — exactly the move Barth's Christocentric method in lecture 3-2 was built to refuse from the very first sentence of theology.
Barth read Romans 1:19-20 differently from Brunner, as noted above: the natural knowledge Paul describes there functions, in Barth's reading of Paul's larger argument through Romans 1-3, only to establish universal human guilt and render excuse impossible — it is not a positive capacity available for grace to build upon, but evidence offered at humanity's trial. On this reading, "without excuse" is the entire theological payload of the passage; nothing further about a retained capacity for revelation follows from it.
4. Brunner's own constructive proposal: the Word's threefold form
Brunner did not simply defend his 1934 position and stop; across his later work, especially his own three-volume dogmatics, he developed a broader account meant to retain what he judged salvageable from dialectical theology's core insights while making room for the point of contact he continued to defend. Part of that account used the same threefold language of the Word — revealed, written, proclaimed — that lecture 3-2 described in Barth's usage, and it is worth being precise about the difference, since the shared vocabulary can obscure a real difference in what work the vocabulary is doing.
For Barth, as 3-2 explained, the threefold form is strictly ordered and christocentrically controlled: Scripture and preaching are the Word of God only derivatively, only in the event that God's primary self-revelation in Christ takes them up and speaks through them, with no independent standing of their own. Brunner's use of similar categories is looser and, in keeping with his broader position in this controversy, leaves more room for Scripture and proclamation to engage a hearer who already possesses some minimal capacity to receive them as address — the very capacity Barth's account was built to deny needs affirming at all. The overlap in vocabulary between the two theologians should not be read as agreement in substance; it is a case, common enough in the history of doctrine, of two theologians using a shared term to do different theological work.
5. A dispute this course does not resolve
Natural theology debate
This is a point where readers will not agree. Barth and Brunner's dispute over natural theology remains, in the secondary literature on both theologians, a genuinely contested question rather than one where scholarly consensus has settled on a winner. Theologians broadly sympathetic to Barth's overall theological instincts have sometimes judged that Barth was right on the substance but excessively harsh in tone, damaging a valuable theological friendship over a disagreement narrower than the rhetoric suggested. Theologians more sympathetic to Brunner, including a number in the Reformed and evangelical traditions who have found Brunner's account of general revelation useful for apologetics and for accounting for how the gospel meaningfully addresses a hearer, have argued that Barth's rejection, taken to its logical conclusion, makes it difficult to explain even the most basic phenomena of human religious life and moral conscience the New Testament itself seems to presuppose. Others have pointed out that Barth's own later work, including sections of the Church Dogmatics written after 1934, arguably makes room for something not unlike what Brunner had proposed, without ever conceding the point publicly — a suggestion that remains debated rather than established. State this dispute, if asked, as a live disagreement between two serious theological positions, not as a case Barth simply won.
This same structural question — how much continuity, if any, exists between general human capacities and a genuine knowledge of God — will recur later in this course in different vocabulary: in the process-versus-classical-theism debate of chapter 7, in Rahner's transcendental method in chapter 8, and, most directly, in the analytic Reformed epistemology of Plantinga and Wolterstorff in chapter 12, which asks a related but distinct question about whether belief in God can be rational without independent proof.
6. Further Reading
- Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, Natural Theology: Comprising "Nature and Grace" by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply "No!" by Dr. Karl Barth, trans. Peter Fraenkel, intro. John Baillie (Geoffrey Bles, 1946) — the primary texts of the controversy itself, in the standard English translation.
- Alister E. McGrath, Emil Brunner: A Reappraisal (Wiley-Blackwell, 2014) — a major recent scholarly study of Brunner's theology as a whole, including a full treatment of the 1934 controversy.
- John W. Hart, Karl Barth vs. Emil Brunner: The Formation and Dissolution of a Theological Alliance, 1916-1936 (Peter Lang, 2001) — a detailed historical and theological account of the friendship and its breakdown.
- Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God: Dogmatics, Volume I, trans. Olive Wyon (Westminster Press, 1950) — Brunner's own mature systematic statement, including his account of the Word's threefold form.
- Trevor Hart, "A Capacity for Ambiguity? The Barth-Brunner Debate Revisited," Tyndale Bulletin 44, no. 2 (1993) — a scholarly journal article reassessing the terms of the dispute.
핵심 요약
- Barth and Brunner were allies who rejected liberal method and agreed that God's decisive self-revelation is in Christ. Their 1934 dispute was a rupture between friends over one question: natural theology.
- Brunner's "Nature and Grace" argued that fallen humans keep a formal "point of contact" (Anknüpfungspunkt), a bare capacity to be addressed. He gave theological, scriptural (Romans 1:19-20) and pastoral reasons.
- Barth's reply, "No!", said even a formal point of contact makes revelation partly cooperative and brings back a general anthropology. He read Romans 1 as establishing human guilt, not a capacity.
- Both use the Word's threefold form, but Barth orders it strictly under Christ. Brunner's use leaves more room for a hearer who can receive it.
- Scholars still disagree. Some say Barth was right but too harsh, some favour Brunner, and some say Barth's later work makes room for something like Brunner's point. The lecture declares no winner.
Topic: This lecture presents the 1934 dispute between Brunner and Barth over whether fallen humans keep any capacity to receive knowledge of God before revelation.
Remember: The quarrel was narrow and between allies. Brunner defended a bare capacity to be addressed, and Barth rejected it as a concession that reopens the door to human capacities.
Caution: The lecture does not say Barth simply won. Brunner did not propose saving natural knowledge or revive the classical proofs, and the shared threefold vocabulary hides different uses.
One line to carry into ministry: Ask how the gospel reaches real hearers, and keep in mind that serious theologians who agree on Christ can still disagree sharply on this.
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- Brunner argued that denying any point of contact leaves the church's evangelistic task unable to explain how the gospel reaches a hearer at all. Does Barth's position have a good answer to this pastoral objection, or does it treat a practical difficulty as irrelevant to a theological principle it considers non-negotiable?
- Both theologians read Romans 1:19-20 carefully but drew different conclusions from it. Reread the verse's wording. Does the text itself decide between "this describes a retained natural capacity" and "this establishes guilt only," or does the disagreement depend on convictions brought to the text from elsewhere in each theologian's system?
- The lecture noted that Barth's tone in "No!" was harsher than the substance of the disagreement required, in the judgment of later commentators sympathetic to Barth's theology. Should the tone of a theological argument affect how we evaluate its content, or are these separate questions?
- This controversy is described as a structurally similar disagreement to ones that recur later in the course (chapters 7, 8, and 12). Based on what you have read so far, what is the common structure — the same underlying question — that connects a 1934 dispute about a "point of contact" to a dispute among evangelical philosophers decades later about whether belief in God needs prior proof?