Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
목차 40
- Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
- Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
- Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
- Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
- Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
- Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
- Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
- Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
- Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
- Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
- Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
- Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
- Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
- Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
- Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
- Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
- Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
- Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
- Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
- Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
- Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
- Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
- Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
- Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
- Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
- Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
- Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
- Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
- Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
- Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
- Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
- Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
- Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
- Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
- Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
- Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
- Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis
Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-2014) shared Moltmann's postwar German context and, like Moltmann, gave eschatology unusual prominence in his theology - but he arrived there by a strikingly different route, and the two theologians, despite being frequently discussed together as representatives of a broadly similar postwar shift, held real and specific disagreements about method that are worth stating rather than flattening into "they basically agreed." Pannenberg's programmatic early work, developed collaboratively with a circle of colleagues including Rolf Rendtorff, Ulrich Wilckens, and Trutz Rendtorff and published as Revelation as History (Offenbarung als Geschichte, 1961), made a claim that ran directly against a current running strong in mid-century Protestant theology, associated especially with Barth's dialectical theology and even more directly with Bultmann's existentialist theology from chapter 4: that revelation is not a special, private, non-historical mode of divine self-disclosure, encountered only in an existential moment of decision or a Word proclaimed and received in faith, but occurs within, and only within, the ordinary public course of history itself - "universal history," open in principle to the same kind of investigation any other historical claim is open to.
The most controversial and best-known consequence of this position is Pannenberg's insistence that the resurrection of Jesus is not simply a matter of private faith, immune by definition from historical argument, but a genuine historical event that can and, Pannenberg argued, should be defended on properly historical grounds - a claim that put him at odds both with theologians who thought historical method could never reach something so theologically freighted and with theologians who thought pinning faith's truth to the outcome of historical argument, of all things, got the relationship between faith and history exactly backward. This lecture works through Pannenberg's argument for universal history as the locus of revelation, his case for treating the resurrection historically, and his central and genuinely difficult concept of "proleptic" disclosure - the claim that a single past event, the resurrection, can disclose in advance the end and meaning of the whole of history that has not yet happened.
이 23분으로 얻는 것
- State Pannenberg's central claim in *Revelation as History* - that revelation occurs in universal history rather than in a private, non-historical encounter - and explain what specifically this claim was written against.
- Explain Pannenberg's argument that the resurrection of Jesus is a historically arguable event, and describe at least one serious objection this argument has drawn, from more than one direction.
- Define "proleptic" in Pannenberg's specific technical sense, and explain how the resurrection functions proleptically in his account of history's meaning.
- Identify at least one specific, real point of difference between Pannenberg's and Moltmann's approaches to history and eschatology, stated fairly to both.
- Place Pannenberg's project in relation to Bultmann's demythologization (chapter 4) and explain what Pannenberg thought that earlier existentialist program had gotten wrong.
who was declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead, Jesus Christ our Lord,
because he has appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness by the man whom he has ordained; of which he has given assurance to all men, in that he has raised him from the dead.
Romans 1:4 (World English Bible)
Pannenberg builds significant weight on this verse's structure: Paul describes Jesus as "declared" (or, in some translations, "appointed" or "designated") Son of God with power specifically by the resurrection - a formula that reads the resurrection not merely as one miracle among others confirming a status Jesus already held all along in some straightforwardly obvious way, but as the decisive historical event through which God publicly vindicated and disclosed who Jesus actually was. For Pannenberg, this is exactly the kind of claim that resists being confined to private, existential meaning: Paul is describing something that, on Paul's own telling, happened in public, disclosed history, with consequences for how Jesus's identity is known, not only felt.
Acts 17:31 (WEB)
Paul's speech at the Areopagus, addressed to a Gentile philosophical audience rather than to fellow Jews already sharing a scriptural framework, is significant to Pannenberg for exactly this reason: Paul here offers the resurrection as public "assurance" - evidence, in effect - to an audience with no prior commitment to Israel's scriptures, rather than treating it as a claim meaningful only within an already-believing community. Pannenberg reads this as biblical warrant for his own conviction that resurrection faith was never, in the New Testament's own self-understanding, a purely private or fideistic matter walled off from ordinary standards of historical argument, even as he readily grants that the New Testament writers did not have modern available to them in the form Pannenberg himself uses it.
1. Against a private, non-historical revelation
To understand what Revelation as History was arguing against, it helps to recall two positions studied earlier in this course. Barth's mature theology of the Word (chapter 3) locates revelation in God's own free, sovereign self-disclosure in Jesus Christ, encountered through Scripture and proclamation by the gift of faith - a revelation that, for Barth, remains God's free act and is not simply identical with, or provable by, the ordinary historical-critical study of events. Bultmann's program of demythologization (chapter 4) goes further in a related direction: for Bultmann, what matters existentially in the resurrection proclamation () is the call to authentic decision it addresses to the hearer now, a meaning Bultmann held could be affirmed with existential seriousness even if the historian's ordinary tools could establish very little, or nothing certain, about what actually happened to Jesus's body - a position Bultmann's sharpest critics, including Barth, argued reduced the resurrection to a subjective event occurring only in the believer's own consciousness.
Pannenberg judged that both of these positions, for different reasons, had ceded too much ground: both, in his reading, had in effect agreed that ordinary historical inquiry could not reach the resurrection's reality, and had then relocated the resurrection's meaning to a place - God's free sovereign act beyond historical proof for Barth, the believer's existential decision for Bultmann - where historical method's limits could no longer threaten it. Pannenberg thought this concession, however differently motivated in each case, was both unnecessary and actually contrary to how the New Testament itself talks about the resurrection, which speaks of appearances to specific named witnesses, at specific times, in ordinary public space - claims of exactly the kind historical method is built to assess, for good or ill.
2. Revelation as universal history
Revelation as History's programmatic claim, developed collaboratively by Pannenberg's circle, is that God's revelation does not occur in a special channel set apart from ordinary history - a private mystical experience, an inspired inner word, an existential encounter accessible only to faith - but within the whole public course of history itself, "universal history" (Universalgeschichte), open in principle to any inquirer regardless of prior faith commitment. This is a bold claim with a specific theological logic behind it: if God is truly the God of all reality, not merely the private object of a believing community's inner experience, then God's self-disclosure ought to be a public matter, available in principle - even if not always accepted - to anyone willing to examine the historical evidence honestly, rather than a privileged experience available only on the inside of an already-existing faith. Pannenberg's Israel-focused predecessor concept for this claim runs through the Old Testament's own historical narratives, which Pannenberg reads as already presenting God's identity as disclosed through Israel's concrete historical experience - the exodus, the exile, the return - rather than through timeless private religious experience abstracted from any particular history.
The most important, and most contested, consequence of locating revelation in universal history this way is that the full meaning of history as a whole cannot, on Pannenberg's account, be known until history itself has reached its end - a position with an obvious problem attached to it, since history plainly has not ended and no historian, however skilled, stands at history's conclusion able to survey the whole of it. Pannenberg's answer to this problem is his doctrine of proleptic revelation, discussed below: one event within history, the resurrection of Jesus, discloses history's end and meaning in advance of that end actually arriving.
3. The resurrection as a historically arguable event
Pannenberg's case that the resurrection is open to historical argument proceeds along two main lines, developed at length in his systematic theology and defended in exchanges with other scholars for decades afterward. First, he argues from the empty tomb tradition and, more heavily, from the tradition of resurrection appearances preserved in multiple, at least partially independent early sources (the Gospels and Paul's own list in 1 Corinthians 15, which Pannenberg treats as an unusually early and well-attested tradition, since Paul explicitly names living witnesses his readers could in principle still consult). Second, and more distinctively, Pannenberg argues that the specific form the resurrection took - as an anticipation, ahead of schedule, of a general resurrection of the dead that Jewish apocalyptic expectation of Pannenberg's period generally expected only at the general end of history - makes the earliest Christian claim historically intelligible in its own first-century Jewish context in a way that alternative explanations (hallucination, deliberate fraud, a later legend growing gradually over decades) each struggle, in different ways, to account for as well, on Pannenberg's assessment of the available evidence.
Critics of the argument
This is a point where readers will not agree. Pannenberg's argument drew serious criticism from more than one direction, and this course states the disagreement without resolving it. Some critics, working broadly within Bultmann's tradition, argued that Pannenberg's whole project misunderstands what kind of claim resurrection faith actually is - that treating the resurrection as a hypothesis to be assessed by ordinary historical-critical method, alongside any other ancient claim, actually diminishes rather than secures its theological significance, and risks making Christian faith hostage to the shifting verdicts of professional historians in a given decade rather than resting on God's own self-authenticating Word. Other critics, working from more conservative or evangelical positions sympathetic in principle to defending the resurrection's historicity, argued that Pannenberg's own specific historical arguments concede too much to historical-critical method's ordinary skeptical presumptions about miracles, and are in any case more philosophically and methodologically complicated - resting on a whole theory of universal history and its meaning - than a more straightforward case for the resurrection's historical credibility needs to be. Pannenberg's own defenders reply that both lines of criticism underestimate how seriously the New Testament's own writers treated the resurrection as a claim about what actually happened, publicly, to a formerly dead man - not a claim any of Pannenberg's critics can simply relocate to safer, unfalsifiable ground without changing what the New Testament itself is claiming.
4. Prolepsis: history's end disclosed in advance
Pannenberg's technical term "prolepsis" (from the Greek for "anticipation") names the specific way he thinks the resurrection functions within universal history. An ordinary event's full meaning, on Pannenberg's account of how meaning works generally, cannot be finally assessed until the larger context it belongs to is complete - a chapter's meaning within a novel becomes fully clear only once the whole novel is read, not partway through. Applied to history as a whole, this creates the problem noted above: history's full meaning cannot be known until history ends, and it has not. Pannenberg's proposal is that the resurrection of Jesus is a genuine exception to this ordinary rule - not because it escapes history altogether, but because it is, in its own specific content, an anticipation within history of history's own end: a single instance of the general resurrection of the dead that Jewish apocalyptic hope expected only at history's final consummation, occurring ahead of schedule, in the middle of ongoing history, for one man. Because the resurrection anticipates history's ending within history's own middle, Pannenberg argues, it discloses - proleptically, in advance - what the end and total meaning of history will turn out to be, without requiring that history have actually ended for that disclosure to be real and available now. This is Pannenberg's most philosophically ambitious move, and also his most distinctive contribution to the postwar conversation about history and revelation: an argument that the whole of universal history's meaning has already been made available, in principle, through a single historical event that both belongs fully to history and simultaneously discloses history's still-unrealized end.
5. Pannenberg and Moltmann: a real, specific difference
Pannenberg and Moltmann are frequently paired as representatives of a shared postwar turn toward eschatology, and the pairing is not wrong - both, working roughly contemporaneously and in conversation with each other's work, gave eschatology a centrality that most earlier twentieth-century Protestant theology had not. But the two theologians pursued genuinely different methods and, at points, disagreed directly. Pannenberg's route runs through universal, public, rationally arguable history: the resurrection matters because it can, in principle, be defended to any honest inquirer using ordinary historical method, and Pannenberg was consistently uneasy with theological moves that seemed to place faith's object beyond the reach of rational, public argument, a category in which he sometimes placed elements of both Barth's and Moltmann's own methods. Moltmann's route, by contrast, runs through the cross's specific, Christologically concentrated disclosure of God's own suffering being, argued primarily from Scripture and Trinitarian doctrine rather than from a case for universal historical method's capacity to secure theological claims; Moltmann was, in turn, more willing than Pannenberg to let hope's biblical content outrun what a strictly historical-critical argument alone could establish. The two theologians corresponded and engaged each other's published work directly across their careers, and neither treated the other as simply mistaken across the board - but the difference in method is real, not merely a difference in emphasis, and a fair account of this postwar moment in Protestant theology has to keep both routes distinct rather than treating "eschatology mattered again" as though it settled how theology should proceed from there.
6. Further Reading
- Wolfhart Pannenberg, ed., Revelation as History, trans. David Granskou (Macmillan, 1968; German original 1961).
- Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus - God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe, 2nd ed. (Westminster Press, 1977; German original 1964).
- Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 3 vols., trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Eerdmans, 1991-1998).
- Stanley J. Grenz, Reason for Hope: The Systematic Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg (Oxford University Press, 1990).
- Iain Taylor, Pannenberg on the Triune God (T&T Clark, 2007).
- N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Fortress Press, 2003) — a major later historical argument for the resurrection, engaging some of the same evidentiary questions Pannenberg raised.
핵심 요약
- Pannenberg argued in Revelation as History (1961) that revelation happens in the public course of "universal history," open to any honest inquirer, not in a private or purely existential encounter.
- He judged that both Barth and Bultmann had conceded too much by placing the resurrection beyond historical inquiry, in God's free act or in the believer's decision.
- He defended the resurrection as historically arguable, using the appearance traditions, including 1 Corinthians 15, and its fit with Jewish expectation of a general resurrection. Bultmannian and conservative critics both objected.
- "Prolepsis" means anticipation. The resurrection is the end of history happening ahead of time for one man, so it discloses history's meaning before history ends.
- Pannenberg and Moltmann both made eschatology central but differed in method. Pannenberg relied on public historical argument, while Moltmann argued from the cross and Scripture and let hope outrun historical proof.
Topic: Pannenberg's claim that God is revealed in universal history, and that the resurrection can be argued historically and discloses history's end in advance.
Remember: Pannenberg thought faith should not be walled off from public argument. The resurrection, as an anticipation of the end, makes history's whole meaning available now.
Caution: Critics disagree from two sides. Some say historical method diminishes the resurrection, and others say his arguments concede too much to skepticism. The lecture does not settle this, and Pannenberg and Moltmann are not simply allies.
One line to carry into ministry: Be ready to say that the resurrection is a claim about what happened publicly, and be honest that Christians disagree about how to defend it.
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묵상 및 토론
- Pannenberg argued that the resurrection should be defended by ordinary historical method, open to any honest inquirer. State the strongest objection to this from within the Bultmann tradition, and then state the strongest objection from a more conservative direction. Which concern do you find more serious?
- Explain "prolepsis" in your own words, using an everyday example of a whole whose meaning is only clear once complete, before applying the concept back to Pannenberg's argument about the resurrection.
- Romans 1:4 says Jesus was "declared" Son of God "by the resurrection." How does Pannenberg use the structure of this verse to argue that the resurrection is not merely confirming evidence for a status Jesus already obviously held, but a genuinely revelatory event?
- This lecture names a real, specific methodological difference between Pannenberg and Moltmann, even though both are often grouped together as part of the same postwar shift toward eschatology. Restate that difference in your own words. Do you think the difference is more significant than what the two theologians share, or less?
- Pannenberg thought Bultmann's demythologization (chapter 4) had conceded too much ground by relocating the resurrection's meaning to the believer's existential decision. Do you find Pannenberg's alternative - grounding the resurrection's meaning in public historical argument instead - more or less vulnerable to the kind of criticism Bultmann's approach faced? Explain your reasoning.