Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
목차 40
- Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
- Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
- Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
- Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
- Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
- Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
- Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
- Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
- Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
- Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
- Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
- Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
- Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
- Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
- Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
- Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
- Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
- Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
- Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
- Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
- Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
- Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
- Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
- Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
- Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
- Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
- Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
- Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
- Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
- Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
- Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
- Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
- Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
- Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
- Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
- Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
- Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis
Every theologian this course has covered so far worked, however critically, within a broadly inherited picture of what kind of being God is: a being who does not change, who is not acted upon by anything outside himself, and who stands, in some sense, outside of time altogether rather than living through it the way creatures do. This is the classical doctrine of divine attributes — immutability (God does not change), impassibility (God cannot be made to suffer or be affected by an outside cause), and timeless eternity — worked out with philosophical precision by theologians such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, encountered in earlier courses in this track, and expressed simply and repeatedly across Scripture's own language about God as the one thing about the Creator that never shifts against the world's constant shifting.
This lecture introduces a philosophical system that argues, on independent grounds, that this classical picture is mistaken — not mistaken about some detail of doctrine, but mistaken about what it means to exist at all. Alfred North Whitehead was not a theologian. He began his career as a mathematician and logician, co-authoring the monumental Principia Mathematica with Bertrand Russell, and only in his final English and American academic decades turned to constructing a comprehensive metaphysical system, most fully worked out in Process and Reality (1929), intended to describe the basic structure of reality itself — not Christian reality in particular, but reality as such, from physics to psychology to (almost as a by-product of the larger system) the nature of God. It is important to hold onto that origin: process theology, which 7-2 covers, is what later Christian thinkers built when they picked up Whitehead's already-completed philosophical system and asked what a Christian doctrine of God would look like if it were built consistently on Whiteheadian foundations, rather than a theology that started from Christian conviction and worked toward Whitehead.
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- State, in outline, Whitehead's process metaphysics: reality as fundamentally composed of momentary "actual occasions" of experience rather than enduring, unchanging substances.
- Explain Whitehead's "dipolar" God — the distinction between the primordial pole and the consequent pole — and what work each pole is doing within the wider system.
- Explain why Whitehead's proposal is called "panentheistic," and how this differs both from classical theism (God wholly transcendent over the world) and from pantheism (God simply identical with the world).
- Describe Charles Hartshorne's specific contribution: his systematic development and philosophical defense of dipolar theism, including his argument that the classical attributes are not, on inspection, more perfect than their dipolar alternatives.
- State the classical picture of divine immutability these thinkers were revising, in a form a defender of that classical picture would recognize as fair, using Psalm 90:2 and Malachi 3:6.
The classical claim that process philosophy revises is not a philosophical import into Christian theology from the outside; classical theists have always argued it is a careful inference from what Scripture itself says. Two texts state it with particular directness.
Psalm 90:2 reads: "Before the mountains were born, before you had formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, you are God." (World English Bible) The psalm sets God's own existence against the coming-to-be of the mountains and the world themselves — mountains, in the psalmist's poetic idiom for what is most ancient and permanent within creation, still had a beginning; God did not. Classical theists have read "from everlasting to everlasting" as more than a claim about God's endurance across a very long span of time; taken with the wider tradition's reasoning about what such a claim requires, it has been read as a claim that God's own being does not undergo the kind of successive, moment-by-moment becoming that a creature living through time necessarily does.
Malachi 3:6 reads: "For I, Yahweh, don't change; therefore you, sons of Jacob, are not consumed." (WEB) This is the single most direct first-person statement of divine in the Old Testament, and it is worth noting precisely what work the verse is doing in its own context before it is pressed into a metaphysical claim: Malachi's argument is pastoral and covenantal, not primarily philosophical — because Yahweh's faithfulness to Jacob's descendants does not waver the way human faithfulness does, the nation has survived its own repeated unfaithfulness. Classical theists have argued that this covenantal claim about God's reliability presupposes, and cannot be fully secured without, a deeper claim about God's own unchanging being; process theologians, as this lecture will show, argue that the verse supports covenantal constancy of character and purpose without requiring the far stronger philosophical claim that God's being admits no change whatsoever.
1. A different picture of what exists
Western philosophy since Aristotle has generally taken substances — enduring things that persist through time while undergoing change in their properties, such as a tree that is young and then old while remaining the same tree — as the basic units of reality, with the classical doctrine of God as an unchanging, simple substance building on this same substance metaphysics at its highest, most perfect extreme. Whitehead's Process and Reality rejects substance metaphysics at its root. For Whitehead, what most fundamentally exists is not enduring substances at all but momentary events of experience, which he called "actual occasions" (or, in his more technical term, "actual entities") — each one a brief, self-constituting process of taking in the entire actual world that has already become (what Whitehead called its data, or the world's "settled" past) and synthesizing that data, together with a range of ideal possibilities, into a single new, momentary unity of experience, which then perishes and becomes data for the next occasion in turn. What looks, from ordinary experience, like an enduring object — a tree, a person, a stone — is, on Whitehead's account, actually a tightly linked, temporally ordered society of such occasions, each one arising, briefly existing, and perishing into the next, rather than one single unchanging thing persisting underneath.
This is a genuinely strange picture to encounter for the first time, and it is worth being honest about that rather than smoothing it into something more familiar than it is. Whitehead was constructing this system to solve problems he thought both classical philosophy and early-twentieth-century physics faced together — how to account for genuine novelty, genuine relationality, and genuine becoming in a universe increasingly described, by the physics of Whitehead's own day, in terms of events and processes rather than fixed, unchanging substances. The theological application of the system came afterward, and largely because Whitehead found that a coherent metaphysical system needs some account of why the process of becoming has the particular order and value-structure it does — a role he assigned, within his own system, to God.
2. The dipolar God
If Whitehead's actual occasions are the basic units of all reality, then God, to remain within the same coherent system rather than being an unexplained exception to it, must also be describable in terms of the same fundamental categories the system uses for everything else — though God is, for Whitehead, a very different kind of actual entity than any finite occasion: not a momentary event that perishes, but an everlasting actual entity with two distinguishable "poles" or aspects.
The primordial pole is God's abstract, unchanging aspect: God's eternal envisioning and ordering of the entire realm of pure possibility (what Whitehead called "eternal objects" — roughly, the full range of forms, qualities, and possible ways anything could be). In this pole, God is unchanging, since the total realm of pure possibility does not itself grow or shrink; God orders it once and for all, functioning within Whitehead's system as the ground of order, value, and the "initial aim" offered to every new actual occasion as it begins its own process of self-formation — God, on this account, does not determine what any occasion will become, but does present each occasion with the best possibility available to it given its actual circumstances, an aim the occasion is then free to take up fully, partially, or to resist.
The consequent pole is God's concrete aspect, and it is the pole doing the work that most sharply distinguishes Whitehead's God from the classical one: God's own actual experience, moment by moment, of everything that happens in the world, taken into God's own life and genuinely affecting it. On Whitehead's system, God is not merely the source of order and possibility standing untouched outside the process; God is also fully within the process, affected by it, genuinely enriched or (Whitehead's later interpreters have debated how far to press this) diminished by what creatures freely do, in a way parallel to — though vastly exceeding in scope — how every finite actual occasion takes in and is shaped by its own actual world. Nothing that happens anywhere is ever lost; it is taken up, "prehended" in Whitehead's technical vocabulary, into God's consequent experience and held there everlastingly, which is the primary sense in which Whitehead's system offers something like an account of everlasting significance or redemption, without appeal to a separate doctrine of an afterlife.
3. Panentheism, not pantheism and not classical transcendence
Panentheism
Whitehead's God, so described, is standardly labeled panentheistic — a term meaning "all in God" — and it is worth being precise about what this claims and what it does not, since it is easy to blur into either of the two positions it is deliberately built to sit between. It is not pantheism, the claim that God simply is the world, with no remainder: Whitehead's God has a primordial pole, an ordering and valuing activity, that is not identical with or reducible to the world's own process. But neither is it 's picture of a God who wholly transcends the world, sufficient in himself, uninvolved in the sense that nothing in the world adds anything to or subtracts anything from who God already fully and eternally is. On Whitehead's account, the world is genuinely "in" God, in the specific sense that everything that happens in the world is taken into and becomes part of God's own consequent experience, while God is also genuinely "more than" the world, in the sense that God's primordial ordering activity is not merely one process among the world's many finite processes but the ground and framework within which all of them occur.
4. Charles Hartshorne and the case for dipolar theism as more coherent, not merely different
If Whitehead supplied the metaphysical system, Charles Hartshorne, his most important American interpreter and a philosopher of religion in his own considerable right across a long career at the University of Chicago and Emory University, supplied much of the argument for why theology specifically should adopt it — and did so as a philosophical argument about coherence and perfection, not primarily as an argument from biblical (that task, as 7-3 will show, fell to a later and more explicitly evangelical group of thinkers working on partly separate grounds).
Hartshorne's central move, developed at length in works such as The Divine Relativity (1948) and Man's Vision of God (1941), was to argue that classical theism's account of a wholly immutable, wholly impassible, unrelated-to-the-world God is not, on careful philosophical inspection, actually the more perfect conception of God it has traditionally been taken to be. Hartshorne pressed a specific argument: a being incapable of being affected by anything outside itself is, in one clear and important sense, a being with a real deficiency rather than a real excellence — such a being cannot genuinely know, love, or respond to what creatures actually do, since genuine knowledge of a changing world, on Hartshorne's account, itself requires a knower whose own state changes as the world changes and is known. A God who cannot be moved by a creature's suffering, on this argument, is not thereby shown to be more loving than a God who can; such a God is shown to be, in a specific philosophical sense, less capable of the relational excellence love actually requires. Hartshorne's proposed solution was dipolar theism itself: God is, in the primordial pole, "absolute" in exactly the respects where classical theism's absoluteness names a genuine excellence (unsurpassable existence, unfailing character, perfect knowledge of all actual possibility), and, in the consequent pole, genuinely "relative" — related to, and really affected by, the actual world — in exactly the respects where Hartshorne argued relativity, not immutability, is the excellence worth having.
It is worth stating the classical reply to Hartshorne's argument fairly rather than letting it pass unanswered, since this lecture is describing a live philosophical dispute, not reporting settled history. Classical theists, both Thomist and Reformed, have replied that Hartshorne's argument quietly assumes that love and knowledge, to be genuine, must take the same form in God that they take in creatures — namely, a form involving real change of state in response to new information or new events. Aquinas's and later Reformed accounts of divine knowledge (encountered in earlier courses in this track) argue instead that God's single, eternal act of knowing already and eternally includes everything that will ever happen to any creature, without God's own act of knowing itself needing to change as those events successively unfold in creaturely time — so that God can be said to know, will, and love each actual event of a creature's life fully and truly, without God's own being passing through any process of coming to know what God did not already, eternally know. Whether this classical account of unchanging knowledge of a changing world is coherent, or whether Hartshorne is right that it quietly empties "knowledge" and "love" of content the words ordinarily carry, remains disputed in the philosophy of religion literature and is not a question this course settles.
6. Further Reading
- Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, corrected ed., ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (Free Press, 1978) — Whitehead's own foundational and notoriously difficult statement of the system this lecture summarizes.
- Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God (Yale University Press, 1948) — Hartshorne's central philosophical argument for dipolar theism against classical immutability and .
- Charles Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism (Willett, Clark, 1941) — Hartshorne's earlier and more systematic treatment of the classical divine attributes and his proposed alternatives.
- Donald W. Viney, Charles Hartshorne and the Existence of God (State University of New York Press, 1985) — a scholarly study of Hartshorne's philosophical theology and his arguments for God's existence.
- Thomas Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (University of Notre Dame Press, 2000) — a sustained classical-theist argument for divine impassibility, engaging process and other modern revisionist accounts directly.
핵심 요약
- The classical doctrine says God is immutable (does not change), impassible (cannot be made to suffer by outside causes), and timeless. Defenders cite Psalm 90:2 and Malachi 3:6.
- Whitehead, a mathematician and not a theologian, built a process metaphysics in Process and Reality (1929). Reality is made of momentary "actual occasions" of experience, not enduring substances.
- His God is dipolar. The primordial pole is unchanging and offers each occasion its "initial aim." The consequent pole takes the world's events into God's own experience.
- This is panentheism ("all in God"), which differs from pantheism (God equals the world) and from classical transcendence.
- Hartshorne argued that an unaffected God is less perfect, because love requires being affected. Thomists and Reformed theologians reply that God's eternal knowledge includes everything without changing. The lecture leaves this open.
Topic: Whitehead's process metaphysics and dipolar God, and Hartshorne's argument against classical divine immutability and impassibility.
Remember: Process theology began as a philosophical system that Christians later adapted. Its God is both unchanging in character and ordering, and changing in experience of the world.
Caution: Panentheism is not pantheism. The lecture also does not say who wins between Hartshorne and classical theists, and both sides claim to take love and knowledge seriously.
One line to carry into ministry: When people ask whether God is moved by suffering, state both the classical and process answers fairly, and test each against Scripture.
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묵상 및 토론
- Whitehead constructed his metaphysical system for reasons largely independent of Christian theology, and only later did others adapt it theologically. Does knowing this origin change how much philosophical weight you think the resulting doctrine of God can bear, compared to a doctrine built from the start on biblical exegesis? Why or why not?
- State Hartshorne's argument that an unchanging, unaffected God is, in a specific sense, less perfect than a dipolar one, in a form a defender of Hartshorne's position would recognize as fair. Then state the classical reply in a form a Thomist or Reformed theologian would recognize as fair. Which argument do you find more persuasive, and can you identify precisely where the two sides' underlying assumptions about what "knowledge" or "love" must involve actually diverge?
- Malachi 3:6 grounds Israel's continued existence in the claim that Yahweh "don't change." How much philosophical weight can this single covenantal statement bear? Does it require the full classical doctrine of immutability, or something more modest — and how would you argue for your answer from the text itself rather than from a prior commitment to either position?
- Process philosophy locates God's ordering activity (the primordial pole) and God's relational activity (the consequent pole) within a single system that also describes everything else that exists. What, if anything, is gained theologically by placing God within the same basic metaphysical categories as everything else, and what, if anything, might be lost?