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STEL2E Modern Theology

Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief

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STEL2E Modern Theology
제 0 장 · Introduction: What Is Modern Theology, and Why Study It?
  1. Introduction: What Is Modern Theology, and Why Study It?
제 1 장 · Chapter 1: The Enlightenment Challenge
  1. Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
  2. Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
  3. Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
제 2 장 · Chapter 2: Nineteenth-Century Liberal Theology
  1. Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
  2. Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
  3. Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
제 3 장 · Chapter 3: Neo-Orthodoxy — Barth and Brunner
  1. Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
  2. Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
  3. Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
제 4 장 · Chapter 4: Existentialist and Hermeneutical Theology
  1. Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
  2. Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
  3. Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
제 5 장 · Chapter 5: Christian Realism and Public Theology
  1. Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
  2. Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
제 6 장 · Chapter 6: Secularization and Bonhoeffer's Legacy
  1. Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
  2. Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
  3. Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
제 7 장 · Chapter 7: Rethinking God — Process and Open Theism
  1. Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
  2. Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
  3. Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
제 8 장 · Chapter 8: Hope, the Cross, and Catholic Renewal
  1. Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
  2. Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
  3. Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
  4. Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
제 9 장 · Chapter 9: The Trinitarian Renaissance
  1. Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
  2. Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
  3. Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
제 10 장 · Chapter 10: Liberation, Black, and Global Theologies
  1. Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
  2. Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
  3. Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
제 11 장 · Chapter 11: Postmodernism, Postliberalism, and Pluralism
  1. Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
  2. Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
  3. Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
  4. Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
제 12 장 · Chapter 12: Evangelical Theology and the Contemporary Frontier
  1. Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
  2. Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
  3. Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
  4. Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis

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19분

Lecture 12-1 described new evangelicalism's institutional and intellectual re-engagement with the modern academy. This lecture follows one specific and unusually consequential argument that grew out of that re-engagement: a challenge, mounted from within analytic philosophy's own professional discipline of philosophy of religion, to a long-standing assumption about what it takes for belief in God to count as rational.

That assumption — often called evidentialism — held that a belief is rational only if it is either self-evident, evident to the senses, or properly inferred from beliefs that are; belief in God, on this view, needed to be established by argument from more basic premises before it could count as rational at all, which is why chapter 1's Enlightenment philosophers and chapter 7's process and open theists alike so often framed their disagreements around whether the traditional theistic proofs succeed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, working together at Calvin College in the 1970s before Plantinga's long subsequent career at Notre Dame, argued this assumption was itself neither self-evident nor provable by its own standard — and that belief in God could be rational, indeed warranted, without first passing through an argument at all. The resulting position, "Reformed epistemology," gave evangelical and broadly orthodox theism a philosophical standing within mainstream analytic philosophy of religion it had not held for generations.

이 19분으로 얻는 것

  • State classical evidentialism's demand that belief in God be justified by argument from more basic evidence, and explain why Plantinga judged this demand self-undermining.
  • Explain what it means, on Plantinga's account, for belief in God to be "properly basic," and how this differs from claiming the belief is groundless or arbitrary.
  • Describe Plantinga's "Aquinas/Calvin model" (the *sensus divinitatis*) and his later account of warrant as proper cognitive function aimed at truth.
  • State Nicholas Wolterstorff's parallel and complementary contribution in *Reason within the Bounds of Religion*.
  • State the "Great Pumpkin" objection to properly basic belief and explain Plantinga's answer to it.

Two familiar texts recur in Reformed epistemology's own literature, cited there for a specific and narrower claim than the general doctrine of they might otherwise illustrate.

Romans 1:20 reads: "For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity; that they may be without excuse." (World English Bible) Chapter 3's Barth-Brunner controversy already showed this verse read two different ways — as establishing guilt rather than capacity (Barth) or as evidence for some minimal capacity to be addressed (Brunner). Plantinga's "Aquinas/Calvin model" reads it for a third, narrower purpose: not as a premise in an argument for God's existence, but as scriptural testimony that a knowledge of God arises naturally, without inference, from ordinary perception of the created world — precisely the kind of non-inferential belief-forming process Plantinga's epistemology describes philosophically.

Psalm 19:1 reads: "The heavens declare the glory of God. The expanse shows his handiwork." (WEB) Plantinga cites this verse for the same narrow point: the psalm does not present an argument the reader is meant to reconstruct and evaluate premise by premise, but describes a direct, perceptual response the created world evokes in an observer — the very model of belief-formation Reformed epistemology argues counts as rational without needing to be routed through an inference first.

1. The evidentialist objection, stated in its own strongest form

The philosophical challenge Reformed epistemology answers has a long pedigree, but its clearest modern statement is the British mathematician and philosopher W. K. Clifford's 1877 claim that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." Applied to religious belief, holds that believing in God without first establishing God's existence by argument — from the classical theistic proofs chapter 1 already showed Kant closing off as strict knowledge-claims, or from some other body of evidence — is intellectually irresponsible, however sincerely held. This is not merely a claim that arguments for God's existence would be nice to have; it is the stronger claim that belief without such arguments is positively unjustified, a violation of intellectual duty.

It is worth being fair to this demand before objecting to it. Evidentialism is not simply hostile to religion; the same standard, consistently applied, would equally forbid unjustified belief in any subject matter, and its defenders present it as a general principle of intellectual honesty rather than an attack targeted specifically at theism. Bertrand Russell, asked what he would say to God if, after death, he discovered God existed after all, reportedly answered that he would say "not enough evidence" — a one-line summary of evidentialism's demand applied consistently to the end.

2. Classical foundationalism and its self-referential problem

Plantinga's central philosophical move, developed across a series of papers beginning in the late 1970s and matured in his 1983 essay "Reason and Belief in God" (co-edited with Wolterstorff in the volume Faith and Rationality), was to examine evidentialism's own underlying epistemological theory — classical foundationalism — and ask whether that theory could meet its own standard. Classical foundationalism holds that a rational belief must either be "properly basic" (self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible — beliefs like simple mathematical truths, immediate sense-experience, or one's own current mental states) or properly inferred from beliefs that are properly basic in that narrow sense.

Plantinga's objection is that the criterion itself — "a belief is properly basic only if it is self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible" — is not itself self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible, nor is it validly inferred from beliefs that are. By classical foundationalism's own stated rule, the rule fails to qualify as rational to believe. This is not, on its own, a proof that belief in God is rational; it is a narrower and more limited result — that the specific philosophical theory used to rule out non-inferential belief in God does not survive being applied to itself, and therefore cannot be assumed as an unexamined starting point the way evidentialist arguments against theism typically had assumed it.

3. Properly basic belief and the sensus divinitatis

Having cleared classical foundationalism's exclusive claim to define rational belief, Plantinga argued positively that belief in God can itself be properly basic — not derived by inference from other beliefs, but formed directly and non-inferentially in appropriate circumstances, the way belief in the reliability of memory, the existence of other minds, or the trustworthiness of ordinary sense perception are typically formed. None of these latter beliefs is normally defended by philosophical argument in everyday life, and none is thereby judged irrational; Plantinga's claim is that belief in God can occupy a structurally similar place.

Plantinga develops this through what he calls, with self-conscious historical borrowing, the "Aquinas/Calvin model" (the "A/C model"): drawing on both Aquinas's claim that a rudimentary knowledge of God is naturally available to human reason and Calvin's opening chapters of the Institutes on the sensus divinitatis — an innate sense of divinity that ordinary experience of the created world, of conscience, or of danger and gratitude naturally triggers, absent the that Plantinga's fuller account, drawing on classical Reformed theology, takes seriously as a complicating factor. On this model, a person who forms the belief "God made this" upon seeing a night sky, or "God disapproves of this" upon behaving cruelly, is not reasoning from premises to a conclusion; the belief simply arises, appropriately, given the circumstances and a properly functioning cognitive faculty aimed at producing true belief in exactly those circumstances.

Plantinga's mature epistemology, developed at length in Warrant and Proper Function (1993) and applied specifically to Christian belief in Warranted Christian Belief (2000), generalizes this into a full theory of warrant: a belief has warrant, and so can constitute knowledge if true, when it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly, in an environment appropriate to those faculties, according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth. For specifically Christian belief — not merely generic theism, but belief in the gospel's specific claims — Plantinga adds what he calls the "extended A/C model": the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit, alongside Scripture, as the specific cognitive process by which warranted Christian belief is produced in a believer, a move that makes his mature epistemology explicitly, rather than only implicitly, a work of Christian philosophical theology rather than a generic defense of theism alone.

4. Wolterstorff's parallel argument

Nicholas Wolterstorff's Reason within the Bounds of Religion (1976) develops a closely related but independently argued case. Where Plantinga's central target is classical foundationalism's theory of proper basicality, Wolterstorff's central target is the broader assumption — traceable to the Enlightenment epistemology chapter 1 introduced — that a scholar's "control beliefs," including religious commitments, ought to be bracketed out of properly scientific or scholarly theorizing as illegitimate bias. Wolterstorff argues this demand for religiously neutral scholarship is itself neither achievable nor even coherently statable as a standard, and that religious commitments may legitimately function as control beliefs shaping which theories a scholar finds acceptable, exactly as other commitments (naturalistic, humanistic, or otherwise) already do for every other scholar, believer or not. Wolterstorff's later Divine Discourse (1995) extends this project into a philosophical account of Scripture as a form of divine speech-act — God appropriating human authors' words as God's own communicative act — a proposal with clear affinities to the doctrine of propositional revelation Henry defended in 12-1, developed with considerably more philosophical technical apparatus.

5. The "Great Pumpkin" objection and Plantinga's answer

Reformed epistemology's best-known criticism, given its memorable name by Plantinga himself in the course of answering it, runs as follows: if belief in God can be properly basic without argument, what principled reason rules out belief in anything at all being properly basic — including, in the comic example Plantinga borrowed from a Peanuts cartoon, belief that the Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween? If proper basicality has no gatekeeping criterion beyond "some people form the belief non-inferentially and sincerely," the position seems to license believing literally anything without argument.

Plantinga's answer distinguishes two different claims critics tend to run together. He is not claiming that any non-inferentially formed belief, held with sufficient sincerity, is automatically warranted; he is claiming that criteria for which beliefs can be properly basic should be built up inductively, from a survey of clear and uncontroversial cases (memory beliefs, perceptual beliefs, beliefs about other minds), rather than stipulated in advance by a philosophical theory with no independent of its own — which is precisely the procedure classical foundationalism had failed to follow correctly. On Plantinga's account, whether belief in the Great Pumpkin could be properly basic is not settled by definition; it depends on whether there is, in fact, a properly functioning cognitive faculty, operating in an appropriate environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth, that reliably produces Great-Pumpkin belief in the relevant circumstances — a claim Plantinga judges has no serious support, unlike the case he makes at length for the sensus divinitatis. Properly basic, in other words, does not mean groundless; it means not grounded in propositional argument, while still being subject to defeat by counter-evidence and still answerable to a real, examinable account of the cognitive process that produced it.

6. Institutional consequence

The wider significance of this argument for the story this chapter is telling is institutional as much as philosophical. The Society of Christian Philosophers, founded in 1978 with Plantinga and Wolterstorff among its leading figures, and the flagship journal Faith and Philosophy that followed in 1984, gave theistic and specifically Christian philosophy a home within the mainstream, secular discipline of analytic philosophy that it had largely lacked for decades — not by winning the classical theistic proofs chapter 1 described Kant as closing off, but by successfully challenging the epistemological framework that had made those proofs seem like the only available route to rational belief in the first place.

Two Accounts of Rational Belief in God Classical evidentialism against Reformed epistemology Classical Evidentialism Belief in God is rational only if inferred from self-evident, sense-evident, or incorrigible premises (Clifford, 1877) Requires the theistic proofs chapter 1 showed Kant closing off Reformed Epistemology Belief in God can be properly basic — formed non-inferentially, like memory or perceptual belief (Plantinga's A/C model) Still subject to defeat, still answerable to a real truth-aimed process ≠ Plantinga's objection: evidentialism's own criterion for rational belief fails its own test

6. Further Reading

  • Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford University Press, 1993) — Plantinga's general theory of warrant.
  • Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford University Press, 2000) — the extended A/C model applied specifically to Christian belief.
  • Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds., Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (University of Notre Dame Press, 1983) — the volume containing Plantinga's founding essay "Reason and Belief in God."
  • Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion, 2nd ed. (Eerdmans, 1984) — Wolterstorff's critique of neutral, control-belief-free scholarship.
  • Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks (Cambridge University Press, 1995) — Wolterstorff's philosophical account of Scripture as divine speech-act.

핵심 요약

  • Evidentialism says belief is rational only if it is self-evident, evident to the senses, or properly inferred from such beliefs. W. K. Clifford held that believing on insufficient evidence is wrong.
  • Alvin Plantinga argued that classical foundationalism's own criterion fails its own test. This does not prove God's existence, but it removes an unexamined starting point against belief in God.
  • Belief in God can be "properly basic", formed directly like memory or sense perception. Plantinga's Aquinas/Calvin model uses the sensus divinitatis, an innate sense of God, with warrant as proper cognitive function aimed at truth.
  • Nicholas Wolterstorff argued that religious "control beliefs" may legitimately shape scholarship, since religiously neutral scholarship is unattainable.
  • In the "Great Pumpkin" objection, Plantinga replies that basic-belief criteria come from clear cases. "Properly basic" does not mean groundless.

Topic: This lecture explains Reformed epistemology, the argument by Plantinga and Wolterstorff that belief in God can be rational without first being proved by argument.

Remember: "Properly basic" means not grounded in an argument. The belief can still be defeated by counter-evidence and must come from a properly working, truth-aimed process.

Caution: Plantinga's objection to foundationalism is limited. It is not a proof that belief in God is rational. The lecture also asks whether it refutes evidentialism or only one version.

One line to carry into ministry: Do not feel that faith is worthless until you win every argument, and do not claim that faith needs no honest scrutiny.

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  • Plantinga argues that classical foundationalism's own criterion for proper basicality does not meet its own standard. Restate this argument in your own words. Is it a knockdown refutation of evidentialism, or does it only show that one particular version of evidentialism needs a better foundation of its own?
  • Explain, using the "Great Pumpkin" objection and Plantinga's answer to it, why "properly basic" does not mean "believed without any possible challenge."
  • Compare Plantinga's *sensus divinitatis* to Brunner's "point of contact" from lecture 3-3. Both appeal to something like a natural human capacity related to knowledge of God — are they making the same claim, or different claims answering different questions?
  • Wolterstorff argues that "control beliefs," including religious commitments, legitimately shape scholarly theorizing. What would a critic committed to religiously neutral scholarship say in response, and how might Wolterstorff answer that critic in turn?

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