Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
목차 40
- Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
- Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
- Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
- Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
- Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
- Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
- Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
- Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
- Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
- Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
- Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
- Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
- Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
- Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
- Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
- Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
- Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
- Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
- Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
- Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
- Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
- Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
- Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
- Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
- Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
- Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
- Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
- Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
- Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
- Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
- Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
- Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
- Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
- Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
- Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
- Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
- Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis
This chapter's first three lectures traced how postmodern philosophy's critique of Enlightenment reason's claimed neutrality (11-1) became, for postliberal theology, an unexpected ally against apologetic pressure to translate Christian doctrine into a supposedly neutral secular idiom (Lindbeck, 11-2; Hauerwas and Milbank, 11-3). This lecture turns to a very different theological use of a related insight, and to the disagreement that is the single most consequential in the entire chapter.
John Hick and Paul Knitter drew a conclusion from the plurality and historical particularity of the world's religious traditions that runs in the opposite direction from postliberal theology's confident particularism: if every religious tradition's claim to unique, final truth is itself historically and culturally conditioned — a claim not unlike the postmodern critique of metanarratives this chapter opened with — then Christianity's own traditional claim to a uniquely final revelation in Jesus Christ should be reinterpreted, not simply reasserted. Alister McGrath and Lesslie Newbigin answered that the pluralist alternative is not itself free of the same kind of hidden, culturally located assumption pluralism accuses traditional Christian claims of making. This lecture states both positions as their own most careful defenders would state them, and connects the disagreement explicitly to the older exclusivism/inclusivism/pluralism typology that organizes how Christian theology has classified its own possible stances toward other religions.
This lecture declares no winner. This lecture's own final section says so explicitly, and no question in this chapter's quiz requires an answer only one side of this debate could give.
이 26분으로 얻는 것
- State the exclusivism/inclusivism/pluralism typology and place Hick, Knitter, McGrath, and Newbigin correctly within it.
- Describe John Hick's "pluralistic hypothesis," including his account of a move from a Christ-centered to a "Reality-centered" model of the relationship between the world's religions, and the philosophical and religious-experience arguments Hick gave for it.
- Describe Paul Knitter's "mutuality" model and his later "correlational" pluralism, and explain at least one specific way Knitter's proposal builds on, while also revising, Hick's.
- State Alister McGrath's and Lesslie Newbigin's evangelical response to pluralism, including Newbigin's specific missiological argument that the pluralist hypothesis is itself a very Western, Enlightenment-shaped assumption rather than a neutral vantage point above all particular traditions.
- Explain why this course, and this lecture in particular, treats this as a live, three-way debate rather than a settled question, and identify what would need to be true for a fair-minded reader to find each of the three positions persuasive.
This lecture cites scripture used by more than one side of the debate it describes, deliberately, because both sides of this disagreement appeal to biblical texts and neither side treats itself as simply ignoring Scripture.
John 14:6 reads: "Jesus said to him, 'I am the way, the truth, and the life. No one comes to the Father, except through me.'" (World English Bible) This verse, along with Acts 4:12 — "There is salvation in none other, for neither is there any other name under heaven, that is given among men, by which we must be saved!" (WEB) — and 1 Timothy 2:5 — "For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus" (WEB) — are the texts most commonly cited by exclusivist and inclusivist critics of religious pluralism, including McGrath and Newbigin, as stating in the plainest possible terms that the New Testament itself presents Jesus Christ as uniquely and exclusively the way of salvation, in language that a pluralist reinterpretation has to explain rather than simply set aside.
Two further passages are also relevant to this debate and are cited here because a fair statement of Hick's and Knitter's position should show what such readers point to as well. Acts 17:26-27 records part of Paul's speech at the Areopagus in Athens: "He made from one blood every nation of men to dwell on all the surface of the earth, having determined appointed seasons, and the boundaries of their dwellings, that they should seek the Lord, if perhaps they might reach out for him and find him, though he is not far from each one of us." (WEB) And 1 Timothy 2:4 states that God "desires all people to be saved and come to full knowledge of the truth." (WEB) Pluralist and inclusivist readers alike have pointed to texts of this kind — describing God's care for, and nearness to, every nation, and God's desire that all people be saved — as evidence that the New Testament's own witness contains more than the narrowly exclusivist reading of John 14:6 and Acts 4:12 by itself might suggest, even though, as this lecture's third section makes clear, exclusivist and inclusivist readers have their own accounts of how these texts fit together with the ones cited above.
This lecture is not the place to adjudicate that larger exegetical question, which belongs to a course in proper. What matters for a history-of-doctrine course is seeing clearly that every side in this debate reads Scripture, and that the disagreement is not a disagreement between a biblical position and an unbiblical one, but a disagreement about how these several genuinely biblical texts should be read together.
1. The typology this debate presupposes
Christian theological engagement with other religions is conventionally organized, since roughly the 1980s, around a threefold — exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism — and this lecture's whole argument depends on placing its four figures correctly within it before describing what each one actually argued.
Three positions
Exclusivism holds that explicit faith in Jesus Christ is necessary for salvation, and that salvation is not available, in the ordinary course of things, to those who die without it. Inclusivism holds that salvation is achieved through — Christ remains the sole, necessary ground and means of salvation — but that explicit, conscious faith in Christ during this life is not itself strictly necessary for a person to receive salvation through him; God may, on this view, save some who never hear the gospel or belong to another religious tradition, through Christ, even without their explicit knowledge of him (a position with real antecedents already touched in this course, including debate around Rahner's "anonymous Christian" concept from lecture 8-4). Pluralism holds that Christ is not the sole means of salvation at all — that other religious traditions may offer genuine, independent paths to salvation or liberation, valid on their own terms and not merely by an implicit relationship to Christ.
Hick and Knitter, as this lecture will show, are pluralists in this technical sense. McGrath and Newbigin argue against pluralism from what is broadly an inclusivist-leaning evangelical position (Newbigin in particular resists being pinned to a single label within the typology, for reasons this lecture's final section will note), though both write primarily as critics of pluralism specifically rather than as systematic defenders of one alternative label within the typology.
2. John Hick's pluralistic hypothesis
John Hick, a British philosopher of religion who converted from a fairly traditional conservative evangelical background early in his career before moving, across several decades of subsequent work, toward increasingly pluralist positions, developed his mature proposal most fully in An Interpretation of Religion (1989) and in the earlier programmatic essay collection he edited with Knitter, The Myth of Christian Uniqueness (1987).
Hick's argument has several connected strands. The first is broadly philosophical and epistemological: drawing on Kant's own distinction between the phenomenal (things as experienced) and the noumenal (things as they are in themselves) — the same distinction chapter 1 introduced as closing off the traditional theistic proofs — Hick proposed that an ultimate, ineffable divine Reality (which he came to call, deliberately using a term drawn from no single tradition, "the Real") lies beyond full, direct human comprehension in itself, and that the world's great religious traditions each represent different, culturally and historically conditioned human responses to, and partial phenomenal experiences of, that single underlying noumenal Reality, rather than one tradition possessing uniquely direct and complete access to it while all the others do not.
The second strand is what Hick called his "Copernican revolution" in the theology of religions: a proposed shift from a Christ-centered (or, more broadly, a single-tradition-centered) model of the universe of religions, in which Christianity or Christ occupies the fixed, central position around which every other tradition must be judged, toward a "Reality-centered" model, in which the Real itself occupies the center and every particular tradition — Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and others — orbits it as one authentic, but necessarily partial and culturally conditioned, response among several, no one of them uniquely and finally central. On this model, Jesus's own significance is reinterpreted mythologically or metaphorically rather than metaphysically: the classical Christian claim that Jesus is uniquely and literally God incarnate is read by Hick not as a literal metaphysical claim to be either accepted or rejected but as a piece of devotional, "mythological" language — expressing the total, unconditional significance Jesus holds for the community that reveres him, in a way structurally similar to how devotees within other traditions might express comparably total devotion to their own tradition's central figure, without either claim needing to be read as a literal, exclusive metaphysical assertion in competition with the others.
The third strand is broadly empirical and moral: Hick observed that the world's major religious traditions appear, on the available historical and sociological evidence, to produce roughly comparable moral and spiritual fruit — comparable proportions of moral saints and moral failures, comparable depths of genuine spiritual transformation — a rough parity Hick judged difficult to explain if only one tradition in fact possessed uniquely correct and complete access to ultimate reality while every other tradition's spiritual fruit derived, at best, from a fundamentally mistaken picture of reality.
3. Paul Knitter: from mutuality to correlational pluralism
Paul Knitter, a Catholic theologian whose own work has moved through several distinct phases, built directly on Hick's foundational move while developing it in directions of his own, particularly in No Other Name? (1985) and later work. Knitter's earlier "mutuality" model shared Hick's basic pluralist conviction that other religious traditions can offer genuinely independent, valid paths to salvation or liberation, but placed somewhat more emphasis than Hick's more strictly philosophical argument on a practical, ethically driven starting point: Knitter argued, drawing especially on his engagement with (already introduced in lecture 10-1), that the world's religions should be understood as called into a relationship of mutual dialogue and cooperation centered specifically on shared work for justice and the liberation of the poor and oppressed, a shared ethical task Knitter judged more theologically productive as a starting point for interreligious relationship than an abstract philosophical question about which tradition possesses the most accurate metaphysical picture of ultimate Reality.
Knitter's later "correlational" pluralism, developed especially in Introducing Theologies of Religions (2002) and subsequent work, revised his own earlier position in a specific and traceable way: rather than proposing, as Hick's model can be read as implying, that all traditions are ultimately oriented toward a single, shared underlying Reality that each merely names differently, Knitter's correlational model places greater weight on each tradition retaining its own distinct, non-interchangeable particularity and entering into genuine dialogue and mutual correction with other traditions from within that particularity — a move that brings Knitter's later position, while remaining clearly pluralist in the typology's technical sense, closer in spirit to the postliberal instinct (from 11-2 and 11-3) that a tradition's own particular grammar should not be dissolved into a supposedly more fundamental shared category, even as Knitter continues, unlike Lindbeck or Hauerwas, to affirm that other traditions can offer independently valid paths to salvation rather than only their own internally coherent, but not therefore true, account of things.
4. McGrath and Newbigin's evangelical response
Alister McGrath, an evangelical Anglican theologian and historian of doctrine, has offered a sustained critical response to religious pluralism across several works, including The Twilight of Atheism and material within his wider systematic and historical theology. McGrath's central argument targets Hick's Kantian-derived move directly: if the Real, in itself, genuinely lies beyond all human conceptual access in the way Hick's noumenal/phenomenal distinction requires, McGrath asks, on what actual basis can Hick make any of the specific claims his own hypothesis depends on — that the Real is, for instance, ultimately good, or ultimately one, or the single common referent every tradition's language is in fact directed toward, rather than several traditions naming genuinely different, perhaps even incompatible, realities? Hick's hypothesis, McGrath argues, quietly claims a God's-eye view of the relationship between the Real and its many phenomenal manifestations that Hick's own premise — that the Real cannot be known in itself — should, on its own terms, rule out. This is not, McGrath is careful to note, a claim that Hick is arguing in bad faith; it is a claim that Hick's position, examined closely, is less philosophically stable than it first appears, since it requires exactly the kind of comprehensive, view-from-above vantage point on all the religions at once that its own starting premise about the unknowability of the Real seems to forbid.
Lesslie Newbigin, a British missiologist and bishop who spent several decades as a missionary in India before returning to a British context he found, by contrast, considerably more secular and considerably more religiously plural in its own way, developed a related but distinctively missiological criticism, particularly in The Gospel in a Pluralist Society (1989). Newbigin's specific argument is that the pluralist hypothesis is not itself the neutral, tradition-transcending vantage point above all particular religious claims it presents itself as being; it is, Newbigin argued, itself a very particular, historically and culturally located claim — one that could only have arisen from within a specific modern Western Enlightenment context, with its own particular assumptions about the priority of a supposedly universal rationality over any tradition's own particular, historically embedded claims to truth. On Newbigin's reading, the pluralist hypothesis's confident claim to survey all the world's religions from a position above and outside every one of them is, in substance, exactly the same kind of Enlightenment metanarrative move — a claimed neutral, universal standpoint from which every particular tradition can be relativized and judged — that this chapter's very first lecture described postmodern philosophy as having already dismantled. Newbigin's argument, in other words, turns postmodern philosophy's own critique of Enlightenment universalism back onto religious pluralism itself: if postmodern philosophy is right that there is no view from nowhere, Newbigin asks, why should Hick's "Reality-centered" model, which requires exactly such a view in order to relativize every particular tradition equally, be exempt from that same critique?
5. A debate this course does not resolve
Pluralism and its critics
This is a point where readers will not agree — and this is the most consequential disagreement in this entire chapter. Hick and Knitter argue, from religious-experience, moral, and philosophical grounds, that the plurality and rough moral parity of the world's religious traditions make a confident claim to one tradition's unique and final access to ultimate Reality difficult to sustain honestly, and that the pluralist hypothesis, whatever its difficulties, at least takes seriously the plain evidence of other traditions' genuine spiritual depth in a way exclusivist positions, in their judgment, too easily dismiss. McGrath and Newbigin argue, from philosophical, missiological, and directly exegetical grounds (including the texts cited in this lecture's second section), that the pluralist hypothesis is considerably less neutral than it presents itself as being, that it requires philosophical commitments (a knowable-unknowable Real, a confident view-from-above on all traditions at once) in real tension with its own premises, and that a plain reading of texts like John 14:6 and Acts 4:12 presents an obstacle a pluralist reinterpretation has to work considerably harder to get around than Hick's and Knitter's own accounts, in their judgment, acknowledge.
This lecture does not resolve this disagreement, and neither should a fair-minded reader expect a history-of-doctrine course to resolve it: Hick, Knitter, McGrath, and Newbigin are each stating, in their own terms, positions genuinely held by serious, careful, well-informed theologians who have read each other's work directly and continue to disagree. The debate connects directly to the exclusivism/inclusivism/pluralism typology this lecture opened with, and it remains, at the time of this course's writing, a live three-way conversation within contemporary theology of religions rather than a question any side has settled for the field as a whole.
6. Further Reading
- John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, 2nd ed. (Yale University Press, 2004) — Hick's fullest statement of the pluralistic hypothesis and the "Reality-centered" model.
- John Hick and Paul F. Knitter, eds., The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions (Orbis Books, 1987) — the programmatic essay collection that brought several pluralist theologians' arguments together.
- Paul F. Knitter, Introducing Theologies of Religions (Orbis Books, 2002) — Knitter's own survey of the field, including his later correlational revision of his earlier mutuality model.
- Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society (Eerdmans, 1989) — the primary text of Newbigin's missiological critique of religious pluralism.
- Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology, vol. 1, Nature (Eerdmans, 2001), and Gavin D'Costa, ed., Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions (Orbis Books, 1990) — the second a direct critical response volume to Hick and Knitter's 1987 collection, from several evangelical and Catholic contributors including McGrath's own theological allies.
핵심 요약
- Three positions: exclusivism (explicit faith in Christ is necessary for salvation), inclusivism (salvation is through Christ alone, but explicit faith is not required), and pluralism (other traditions may be independent paths).
- John Hick proposes a "Reality-centered" model in which each religion responds to the unknowable "Real". He reads Jesus's divinity as devotional, mythological language and cites the comparable moral fruit of traditions.
- Paul Knitter began with a "mutuality" model centered on shared work for justice. His later "correlational" model keeps each tradition's particularity while still being pluralist.
- Alister McGrath says Hick's claims about the Real contradict his own premise that the Real cannot be known. Lesslie Newbigin says pluralism is itself a Western, Enlightenment-shaped standpoint.
- Both sides appeal to Scripture, such as John 14:6 and Acts 17:26-27. The lecture declares no winner.
Topic: This lecture sets out the debate between the pluralists Hick and Knitter and the evangelical critics McGrath and Newbigin over Christ and other religions.
Remember: Every side reads Scripture. The dispute is about how several biblical texts should be read together, and serious, informed theologians still disagree.
Caution: Do not treat this as a contest between a biblical and an unbiblical view. McGrath does not accuse Hick of bad faith, and the lecture does not name a winner.
One line to carry into ministry: When you speak about other religions, state each view as its own best defenders would, and be humble about where the Scripture leaves room for debate.
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묵상 및 토론
- Hick's "Copernican revolution" replaces a Christ-centered model of the religions with a Reality-centered one. McGrath objects that this requires Hick to make specific claims about the Real that Hick's own premise (the Real is unknowable in itself) should rule out. Do you find McGrath's objection decisive against Hick's model, or does Hick's account have the resources to answer it?
- Newbigin argues that the pluralist hypothesis is itself a historically and culturally located, Western Enlightenment-shaped claim, using essentially the same kind of critique this chapter's first lecture (11-1) applied to Enlightenment metanarratives generally. Is it fair to turn that critique back onto pluralism itself, or is there a relevant difference between the two cases?
- This lecture cited John 14:6 and Acts 4:12 for the exclusivist/inclusivist side and Acts 17:26-27 and 1 Timothy 2:4 for a more pluralist-friendly reading. Having read all four texts, what do you judge to be the strongest way to read them together — and does your answer depend on convictions you bring to the texts from outside this lecture's own argument?
- Knitter's later "correlational" pluralism moves closer to the postliberal instinct (from 11-2 and 11-3) that a tradition's particularity should not be dissolved into a shared category, while still remaining a pluralist position in the typology's technical sense. Does this revision make Knitter's later position more persuasive than Hick's, in your judgment, or does it create a new tension of its own?