Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
목차 40
- Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
- Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
- Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
- Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
- Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
- Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
- Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
- Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
- Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
- Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
- Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
- Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
- Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
- Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
- Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
- Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
- Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
- Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
- Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
- Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
- Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
- Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
- Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
- Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
- Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
- Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
- Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
- Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
- Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
- Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
- Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
- Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
- Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
- Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
- Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
- Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
- Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis
Lectures 7-1 and 7-2 traced a revision of classical theism built from philosophy outward: Whitehead's metaphysics first, Christian theology adapted to fit it second. This lecture turns to a movement that describes its own method in almost the opposite order, and it is worth taking that self-description seriously as this lecture's first task, since it is the single most important thing distinguishing open theism from process theology despite the two being frequently, and unfairly to both, treated as interchangeable in popular discussion. Open theism's proponents present their proposal as arising from close, careful exegesis of specific biblical texts — texts describing God relenting, God being surprised, God testing someone "to know" the outcome — read, they argue, on the text's own terms rather than through an inherited philosophical grid open theists say classical theology imported, largely from Greek philosophy, and then required interpreters to read back into Scripture whether or not the plain sense of a given passage actually supported it.
This is a point where readers will not agree. Open theism is not a fringe position outside confessing Christianity; its major proponents, including the theologian this lecture centers on, worked and published as committed evangelicals, several within explicitly evangelical institutions, and the dispute over their proposal has been conducted almost entirely within evangelical publishing houses, evangelical seminaries, and evangelical theological societies — a genuinely internal evangelical argument about how to read the Bible faithfully, not a debate between evangelicals and outsiders. This lecture states both sides as their own defenders state them and does not resolve the dispute, because the dispute is not, at the time of this course's writing, resolved.
이 28분으로 얻는 것
- State the open theist proposal precisely: that God's foreknowledge of what genuinely free creatures will freely choose is open, not exhaustively settled, and explain why open theists say this does not compromise divine omniscience properly defined.
- Identify Clark Pinnock and *The Openness of God* (1994) as the movement's central proponent and its founding text within the evangelical debate, and name at least one other contributing author.
- Explain how open theism differs from process theology on creation, transcendence, and the nature of divine power, correcting the common conflation of the two movements.
- State the classical evangelical reply to open theism, drawing on Aquinas's account of divine eternity and Calvin's doctrine of accommodation, and explain how each is used to answer open theism's biblical argument.
- Explain how Jonah 3:10 and Numbers 23:19 function as the two movements' respective central texts, and why each side reads its opponent's central text as compatible with, rather than a refutation of, its own position.
The two texts this lecture centers on are not, on either side's own account, in real tension with each other as texts; the dispute is over how each text should be integrated with the other and with the wider biblical picture of God's knowledge.
Jonah 3:10 reads: "God saw their works, that they turned from their evil way. God relented of the disaster which he said he would do to them, and he didn't do it." (World English Bible) The verse is direct: God had announced, through Jonah, a specific coming judgment on Nineveh, and then, in response to the city's repentance, did not carry it out — language of God "relenting" (some English versions render the underlying Hebrew as "repented" or "changed his mind") that open theists read as describing a genuine change in God's own intention, responsive to a genuinely unforeseen (by God, before it happened) human choice to repent.
Numbers 23:19 reads: "God is not a man, that he should lie, nor the son of man, that he should repent. Has he said, and will he not do it? Or has he spoken, and will he not make it good?" (WEB) This is Balaam's oracle, refusing King Balak's demand that Balaam curse Israel, and it states directly that God does not "repent" the way a man does, and that what God has spoken, God will reliably "do" and "make good" — language classical theists read as ruling out exactly the kind of genuine, unforeseen change of mind Jonah 3:10 appears, on its surface, to describe, and which this lecture's central task is to show both sides working to reconcile with the other passage rather than simply picking one text over the other.
1. The proposal, stated precisely
, as a distinct, named theological position within evangelicalism, is most closely associated with the collaborative 1994 volume The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God, co-authored by Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger, with Pinnock, a Canadian evangelical theologian who had already built a substantial reputation in evangelical circles through earlier work on biblical authority and soteriology before turning to this proposal, serving as the volume's most prominent and most publicly identified contributor in the debate that followed its publication. John Sanders's own full-length treatment, The God Who Risks: A Theology of (1998), and Gregory Boyd's God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (2000), extended and popularized the proposal further within evangelical churches and seminaries in the years following.
The precise claim open theism makes is narrower, and more carefully qualified, than popular summary sometimes suggests, and stating it precisely matters for a fair account of the position. Open theists affirm that God knows, exhaustively and infallibly, everything that is actually knowable: every fact about the past, every fact about the present, and, regarding the future, everything about the future that is already determined or settled — the reliable outworking of physical law, and, importantly, every one of God's own sovereign purposes and promises that God has determined to bring about regardless of creaturely response. What open theists deny is that facts about what a genuinely free creature will, in the future, freely choose to do are yet, at the present moment, true or false facts available to be known by anyone, including God — not because God's knowledge has some external limit imposed on it, but because, on the open theist's own account of libertarian free will (the view, encountered in earlier courses in this track, that a free choice is not causally determined by any prior state of affairs, including a prior true fact about what the choice will be), there simply is no yet-settled fact of the matter about a future free choice for anyone, even an omniscient God, to know until the creature in question actually makes it. Open theists therefore argue their proposal does not deny at all, properly defined: omniscience, on their account, is knowing everything that is true and everything that is knowable, and a genuinely open future free choice is not yet, on their own metaphysics of freedom, the kind of thing that has a determinate truth-value available to be known.
2. The biblical argument
Open theism's proponents present their central argument as arising from the plain sense of a substantial body of biblical texts describing God relenting, changing his mind, responding to unforeseen events, being grieved by how badly something has turned out, or testing someone specifically "to know" what that person will do — texts open theists argue classical theology has, across most of its history, systematically read as anthropomorphic or accommodated language (figures of speech accommodating human limitation, not literal descriptions of God's actual state), a reading strategy open theists say lacks sufficient textual warrant and functions, in practice, to insulate a philosophically inherited doctrine of God from a large and repeated pattern of biblical testimony that, read on its own terms, points the other way. Jonah 3:10, quoted above, is one of this pattern's clearest instances: God announces a specific judgment, the city repents, and God relents — a sequence open theists read as describing a genuine, responsive change in God's own intention, occasioned by a human choice God did not, on the open theist's account, yet know with certainty would occur. Genesis 22:12, where God says to Abraham after the binding of Isaac, "For now I know that you fear God, since you have not withheld your son, your only son, from me" (WEB), is another text open theists press in the same direction: the text's own wording, on a straightforward reading, presents God as coming to know something through the test that God did not, in the same determinate sense, know before it.
Open theism's own stated theological motivation runs alongside this exegetical argument, and it is worth naming, since it connects the position to concerns evangelical readers often bring independently of the specific exegetical debate: open theists argue their account of a God who is genuinely responsive to, and risks something real in relation to, human choices offers a more satisfying account of authentic relationship between God and creatures, of the seriousness of prayer as something that can genuinely move God to act differently than God would otherwise have acted, and of the problem of evil, since on the open view God does not eternally foreknow and therefore does not, in any sense, ordain or permit-with-full-foreknowledge every specific evil that occurs, in contrast to what open theists argue 's exhaustive foreknowledge implies about God's relationship to evil that does occur.
3. Not process theology: the distinction restated
Because open theism and were developed within roughly the same historical decades and both revise the classical doctrine of divine foreknowledge or divine power in some respect, they are frequently conflated in popular and even some scholarly discussion — sometimes by critics deliberately associating open theism with process theology's much more thoroughgoing philosophical revisions in order to discredit open theism by that association. The chapter overview named this distinction; it is worth restating it here, at the point in the chapter where the difference matters most directly.
Open theists affirm creation ex nihilo: the world was freely brought into existence by God out of nothing, rather than existing everlastingly alongside God's own ordering activity as it does within Whitehead's system. Open theists affirm God's genuine transcendence over the world, rather than a panentheistic mutual constitution of God and world. And, most sharply, open theists affirm — indeed, Pinnock and other open theists have explicitly and repeatedly affirmed against process theology specifically — that God retains full coercive power and can, and at decisive moments in biblical history does, act unilaterally and sovereignly, including in ways that override or work independently of creaturely freedom; what open theism denies is not God's power to act decisively, but only the extent of God's advance knowledge of what free creatures will freely do before they do it. An open theist reads Exodus 15's account of Yahweh throwing Pharaoh's army into the sea (lecture 7-2's central text) as a genuine, unilateral, decisive divine act — exactly the kind of action process theology's persuasive-power account has the most difficulty affirming. This is the single clearest test for whether a given proposal belongs to process theology or to open theism: ask whether it denies that God can act with decisive, overriding power, or whether it denies only that God's knowledge of future free choices is exhaustively settled in advance. The first denial is process theology's; the second, and only the second, is open theism's.
4. The classical evangelical reply
Classical theists within evangelicalism — a group that, in this specific debate, includes theologians otherwise quite different from one another on many other questions, united here in defending the traditional doctrine of exhaustive divine foreknowledge — have replied to open theism on two main fronts, both drawing on resources this course's companion courses on Aquinas and Calvin have already introduced.
The first reply draws on Aquinas's account of divine eternity: God, on the classical Christian account inherited substantially from Boethius and developed at length by Aquinas, does not exist within time the way creatures do, moving successively from a not-yet-arrived future into a present and then into a receding past, but exists in a single, simple, eternal "now" outside of time altogether, from which every moment of created time — past, present, and future alike, from creation's own temporal vantage point — is, in Aquinas's phrase, "present" to God's single eternal act of knowing, in something like the way (though the analogy is imperfect and classical theists have debated how far to press it) an observer positioned above a road can see the whole road, including its full length ahead and behind any single point on it, at once. On this account, God's knowledge of a creature's future free choice does not involve God peering forward into a not-yet-settled future and correctly guessing, nor does it involve God causally determining the choice in a way that would compromise the creature's freedom; it involves God's single eternal knowing simply including, without succession or futurity from God's own vantage point, the choice the creature does in fact, at their own point within time, freely make. Open theists have replied that this account of timeless eternity is itself a substantial philosophical construction with only thin direct biblical warrant, imported from Greek metaphysics (an echo of the same complaint the chapter opened by naming), and that it does not, on inspection, actually explain how a free choice can be known with certainty prior to its being made without the choice thereby being, in some sense, already fixed — precisely the same kind of objection Hartshorne pressed against classical in 7-1, applied here to classical eternity instead.
The second reply draws on Calvin's doctrine of accommodation, which the earlier course on Calvin covered as an account of scriptural language generally: Scripture, Calvin argued, regularly speaks of God in terms adapted ("accommodated") to human capacity and human modes of understanding, much as a parent uses simplified language with a small child not because the parent's own understanding is simple but because the child's capacity to receive requires it. On this account, texts describing God "relenting," being "grieved," or coming to "know" something through a test are not false, but they are also not literal, univocal descriptions of a real change or a real acquisition of new knowledge within God's own being; they are Scripture's own accommodated way of describing, from within a human, temporally bound narrative perspective, an unchanging God's single eternal will and knowledge as that will and knowledge relate differently to different, successive moments of a genuinely unfolding human story. Read this way, Jonah 3:10 describes, truly and without deception, that Nineveh's situation changed — the disaster that would otherwise have fallen, given the city's prior wickedness, did not fall, given its repentance — without requiring that God's own eternal knowledge or intention underwent any actual change; the change is real and is located in Nineveh, and the text describes it from Nineveh's own narrative vantage point, in the accommodated language Calvin's doctrine argues Scripture regularly and appropriately uses throughout. Open theists have replied that accommodation, applied this broadly and this consistently to every text that seems to favor open theism, risks becoming an unfalsifiable interpretive device — a rule that no biblical text, however clear its surface sense, could ever actually count as evidence against classical theism, since any such text can always be reclassified as accommodated language rather than being allowed to inform the doctrine of God in its own right.
5. Numbers 23:19 and the argument from both directions
Numbers 23:19's claim that God is "not a man, that he should lie... has he said, and will he not do it?" functions, in this debate, as classical theism's own most direct textual counter to open theism's Jonah-centered case, and both sides read it, revealingly, as supporting their own position rather than as a text either side simply concedes to the other. Classical theists read the verse as a direct denial of exactly the kind of genuine change of mind open theists find in Jonah — God, unlike a fickle human being, reliably does what God has said, which classical theists take to describe God's settled, unchanging character and the reliability of God's spoken purposes as such, extending naturally to a settled, unchanging (and therefore already, exhaustively known) future. Open theists reply that Numbers 23:19's own immediate context concerns something narrower and more specific than a general metaphysical claim about all of God's knowledge or all of God's relation to time: Balaam's oracle is about the unconditional reliability of a specific divine blessing already pronounced over Israel, not a general statement that nothing about God's stated intentions ever changes in response to changed human circumstances — noting, in support, that Jeremiah 18:7-10, a text not covered in detail in this lecture, explicitly states as a general principle that God's announced intentions toward a nation, whether for disaster or for good, are conditioned on that nation's own repentance or apostasy, which open theists argue is precisely what happens in the Nineveh narrative and is fully compatible with Numbers 23:19's own narrower claim about the specific, unconditional blessing at stake in that passage.
6. A dispute this course does not resolve
Open theism dispute
This is a point where readers will not agree. Open theism remains a genuine, sharp, ongoing dispute within confessing evangelicalism itself, contested at the level of biblical (does the "relenting" language describe God's real state or an accommodated description of a real change located in the creature?), at the level of philosophical coherence (does timeless eternity actually explain how a free future choice can be certainly known without being thereby determined?), and at the level of theological implication (does open theism's account of divine risk better or worse secure the reliability of God's promises, the seriousness of prayer, and a satisfying answer to the problem of evil, compared with the classical alternative?). Major evangelical seminaries, denominations, and theological societies have taken different institutional positions on whether open theism falls within the bounds of evangelical orthodoxy or outside them, and that institutional disagreement is itself evidence the dispute remains unresolved rather than a matter this course can respectably present as settled in either direction.
6. Further Reading
- Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (InterVarsity Press, 1994) — the founding collaborative statement of open theism within evangelical theology.
- John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence, 2nd ed. (InterVarsity Press, 2007) — the fullest single-author systematic development of open theism's doctrine of providence.
- Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Baker Books, 2000) — an accessible, church-facing statement of the open theist position and its biblical argument.
- Bruce A. Ware, God's Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism (Crossway, 2000) — a sustained classical-theist evangelical critique of open theism, representative of the traditional reply this lecture states.
- John Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism (P&R Publishing, 2001) — a further classical Reformed evangelical engagement with open theism's exegetical and philosophical arguments.
핵심 요약
- Open theism comes from within evangelicalism. Clark Pinnock and others in The Openness of God (1994) argue from close reading of texts where God relents, is grieved, or tests someone "to know."
- Open theists say God knows everything knowable. They deny that a future free choice is yet a fact to be known, so they say omniscience is not denied.
- Open theism is not process theology. Open theists affirm creation from nothing, God's transcendence, and God's full power to act unilaterally. They deny only exhaustive foreknowledge of free choices.
- Classical evangelicals reply with Aquinas on God's timeless eternity and Calvin on accommodation, where Scripture speaks of God in human terms. Open theists answer that both are philosophical devices that are hard to test.
- Jonah 3:10 and Numbers 23:19 are the central texts. The lecture presents the dispute as unresolved, and institutions differ on whether open theism is within evangelical orthodoxy.
Topic: Open theism, its biblical and philosophical case, how it differs from process theology, and the classical evangelical reply.
Remember: Test the two views by one question. Process theology denies that God can act with overriding power. Open theism denies only that God exhaustively knows future free choices in advance.
Caution: The lecture does not declare a winner. Both sides read Jonah 3:10 and Numbers 23:19 as fitting their own view, and the disagreement is among committed evangelicals.
One line to carry into ministry: When people ask whether God changes his mind, show them both texts and both readings, and do not treat open theism and process theology as the same thing.
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묵상 및 토론
- Open theists argue their proposal does not deny divine omniscience, only defines it more carefully as knowledge of everything actually true and knowable. Is this a satisfying reply to the charge that open theism denies omniscience, or does it relocate rather than answer the objection? Defend your answer with reference to the lecture's stated definition.
- Read Jonah 3:10 and Numbers 23:19 side by side. Construct the strongest open theist reading of Numbers 23:19 and the strongest classical reading of Jonah 3:10, each as its own proponents would state it. Which reading do you find handles the other text's language more successfully on its own terms, and why?
- This lecture distinguished open theism from process theology using a specific test: whether a proposal denies decisive divine power (process) or only exhaustive foreknowledge of free choices (open theism). Using that test, explain why an open theist can affirm the Exodus 15 account of God's unilateral action in a way a process theologian, on the account given in 7-2, cannot.
- Calvin's doctrine of accommodation is used by classical theists to explain texts like Jonah 3:10 without conceding real change in God. Open theists worry this makes classical theism's reading of Scripture unfalsifiable. Is there a way to apply accommodation that remains falsifiable — that is, that would, in principle, allow some biblical text to count as real evidence against classical theism? What would such a text have to look like?