Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
목차 40
- Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
- Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
- Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
- Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
- Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
- Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
- Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
- Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
- Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
- Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
- Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
- Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
- Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
- Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
- Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
- Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
- Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
- Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
- Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
- Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
- Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
- Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
- Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
- Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
- Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
- Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
- Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
- Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
- Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
- Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
- Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
- Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
- Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
- Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
- Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
- Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
- Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis
For most of Christian history, a theologian arguing a point could appeal to a settled hierarchy of authority: Scripture first, then the church's tradition of reading it, then the councils and creeds that tradition had produced, then a teacher's own reasoning working within all of that. A claim did not need to reinvent its own foundation before it could be trusted; it inherited one. In the seventeenth century, two philosophers - writing about knowledge in general, not about theology in particular - each proposed a different starting point, and in doing so each quietly changed what "a good reason to believe something" would mean going forward.
René Descartes (1596-1650) proposed that a thinker should doubt everything that admits of the slightest doubt, in order to discover what, if anything, survives - and found that one thing did: the very act of doubting proved a thinker existed to do the doubting. "Cogito, ergo sum" - "I think, therefore I am" - became the one indubitable foundation from which Descartes then tried to rebuild all other knowledge, including knowledge of God, by reason alone. John Locke (1632-1704), working differently but toward a related conclusion, argued that all human knowledge originates in sense experience rather than in innate ideas implanted at birth; the mind begins as a blank slate (tabula rasa) and everything it comes to know, it comes to know by processing what the senses report. Locke thought this was compatible with Christianity - he wrote a treatise arguing for its "reasonableness" - but the method itself made the individual knower's own careful examination of evidence, rather than an inherited teaching, the place where a claim's credentials had to be checked.
Neither philosopher intended to weaken theology's authority. Descartes remained a professing Catholic to his death and offered his method partly as a more secure foundation for theology, not a rival to it. Locke's tabula rasa was, for him, entirely compatible with a God-given natural order that reason could discover. But the shift both represent - locating the starting point of certain knowledge in the individual reasoning or perceiving subject, rather than in a received body of authoritative teaching - meant that from this point forward, a theological claim's warrant increasingly had to be shown to a reasoning individual on that individual's own terms, rather than simply inherited. This lecture traces that shift and what it began to mean for how theology could make its case.
이 18분으로 얻는 것
- Explain Descartes's method of doubt and why the *cogito* functioned as a new foundation for certainty.
- Explain Locke's empiricism and the role of the *tabula rasa* in his account of knowledge.
- State what both philosophers had in common despite their real differences: locating knowledge's starting point in the individual knowing subject rather than in inherited authority.
- Describe what this shift meant, and did not yet mean, for theology's traditional appeal to Scripture and tradition as sources of authoritative teaching.
Be careful that you don't let anyone rob you through his philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the elements of the world, and not after Christ.
Trust in Yahweh with all your heart, and don't lean on your own understanding. In all your ways acknowledge him, and he will make your paths straight. Don't be wise in your own eyes. Fear Yahweh, and depart from evil.
Colossians 2:8 (World English Bible)
Paul's warning is aimed at a specific danger - a philosophy that operates "after the tradition of men... and not after Christ," displacing Christ rather than serving him - and this chapter takes that warning seriously without treating it as a blanket rule against philosophical reasoning as such. Descartes and Locke were not proposing a philosophy meant to replace Christ; both considered their projects compatible with Christian belief. But Colossians 2:8 names exactly the right question to bring to this lecture and to the whole chapter that follows it: when a new way of establishing what counts as knowledge takes hold, does it leave room for revelation to still say something reason could not have arrived at on its own, or does it quietly become the final court every truth-claim, including revealed ones, now has to pass through?
Proverbs 3:5-7 (WEB)
This passage does not condemn understanding - the book of Proverbs is itself an extended exercise in reasoned reflection - but it refuses to let understanding stand alone, unaccountable to trust in God. Read against Descartes and Locke, it raises the question this course will keep returning to across the next two centuries: is human reason, examined on its own terms, sufficient founding ground for the most important things a person can know, or does wisdom require a trust that reason does not generate for itself and cannot finally replace? Neither Descartes nor Locke framed their projects as rejecting that trust. Whether their method left room for it in practice is a question later chapters - beginning with Kant's critique in the next lecture - will press much harder.
1. Before the shift: authority as inherited
To see what changed, it helps to state plainly what the older picture looked like. A medieval or Reformation-era theologian did not typically begin an argument by asking, from scratch, "how do I know anything at all?" That question was treated as already answered well enough by a received framework: Scripture as the supreme authority, read within a tradition of interpretation, tested against the church's creeds and councils, and reasoned about using tools (chiefly Aristotelian logic and metaphysics) that were themselves received rather than reinvented by each new thinker. Disagreement was common and often sharp - the Reformation itself was a dispute conducted almost entirely in these terms - but the disputants largely agreed on what kind of thing counted as evidence and where ultimate authority sat. What Descartes and Locke did, in different ways, was propose that this starting point itself needed to be examined and re-justified rather than simply inherited.
2. Descartes: doubt as a method, not a conclusion
Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) opens with a startling proposal: since he has occasionally been deceived by his senses, and cannot rule out that an all-powerful deceiver could be feeding him false experiences even now, he will systematically doubt everything that is not absolutely certain, to see what - if anything - survives the process. He doubts the reliability of his senses. He doubts whether the external world exists at all as he perceives it. He even doubts, briefly and famously, whether basic mathematical truths might somehow be false. What he finds he cannot doubt is the act of doubting itself: doubting is a form of thinking, and thinking requires a thinker to do it. From this single point - cogito, ergo sum, "I think, therefore I am" - Descartes tries to rebuild the rest of what can be known, arguing (more controversially, and less persuasively even to many of his contemporaries) that a perfect, non-deceiving God's existence can itself be established by reason from the fact of the thinking self.
It matters for this course that Descartes's own stated goal was not skepticism for its own sake but the opposite: he wanted certainty secure enough to withstand any possible doubt, including certainty about God, and he considered his method a service to theology rather than an attack on it. But the structural move is what mattered for everything that followed, regardless of Descartes's intentions. Once "what can I, as an individual, be certain of, starting from nothing I have simply been told?" becomes the operative question, any claim - including a claim resting on Scripture, tradition, or church authority - has to eventually show its credentials to that same standard of individual certainty, rather than being accepted on the authority of who is making it.
3. Locke: knowledge from experience, not from birth
John Locke approached the same underlying question - what can we actually know, and how? - from a different angle in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689). Where some earlier philosophers held that certain ideas (including, for some, an idea of God) were innate, built into the mind from birth, Locke argued at length that no idea is innate: the mind begins as a blank slate, a tabula rasa, and every concept a person holds is built up from sensory experience and the mind's own reflection on that experience. Even abstract or complex ideas, on Locke's account, are ultimately constructed by combining and comparing simpler ideas that trace back to something originally perceived by the senses.
Locke did not consider this account hostile to Christian belief; in The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695) he argued that core Christian claims - centrally, that Jesus is the Messiah - could be shown reasonable on the evidence, particularly the evidence of fulfilled prophecy and miracle, available to careful examination. But the method, again, is the significant thing for this course's purposes. If all knowledge, including knowledge relevant to religious belief, is built up from sense experience examined by an individual mind rather than delivered ready-made by authority or built into the mind at birth, then the individual examining that evidence - not the tradition handing it down - becomes the place where a religious claim's credibility is finally assessed.
4. What the two philosophers shared, and what neither one intended
Descartes and Locke disagreed about a great deal, including about whether any ideas are innate at all - a live and specific dispute in seventeenth-century philosophy that this lecture does not need to resolve to make its point. What matters for the history of theology is what both approaches shared despite that disagreement: each located the beginning of secure knowledge in the individual reasoning or experiencing subject, examined on that subject's own terms, rather than in a body of teaching received on the authority of the community that hands it down.
Reading the thinkers fairly
Neither man intended this as an attack on Christian doctrine, and it is a caricature of both to read them that way. Descartes tried to use his method to prove God's existence more securely than before. Locke tried to use his to show Christianity reasonable rather than merely traditional. Both, in their own minds, were shoring up theology's foundations, not undermining them. But method has consequences its author does not always foresee or intend, and the consequence here was durable: once "does this claim survive an individual reasoning subject's own examination?" becomes the operative test, a claim that used to be secure simply because Scripture stated it, or because the church had always taught it, now has to additionally clear that separate bar. It was not yet clear, at the end of the seventeenth century, how hard that bar would turn out to be to clear. The next lecture turns to the philosopher who made that difficulty explicit and, in doing so, changed the terms of the conversation again.
6. Further Reading
- René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford University Press, 1975).
- John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, as Delivered in the Scriptures, ed. John C. Higgins-Biddle (Oxford University Press, 1999).
- Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford University Press, 1995).
- Nicholas Wolterstorff, John Locke and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
핵심 요약
- Before the seventeenth century, theologians argued within an inherited order of authority: Scripture, then tradition, creeds and councils, then reasoning. A claim did not have to re-justify its own foundation.
- Descartes doubted everything that could be doubted. The act of doubting proved a thinker existed: "I think, therefore I am." He then tried to rebuild knowledge, including knowledge of God.
- Locke argued that no idea is innate. The mind begins as a blank slate, and all knowledge comes from sense experience and reflection on it. He still argued that Christianity is reasonable.
- Neither man meant to weaken theology. Both thought they were strengthening its foundations.
- Both placed the start of secure knowledge in the individual knower. A claim now had to pass that individual's own examination, as well as being taught by Scripture or the church.
Topic: This lecture shows how Descartes and Locke moved the starting point of knowledge from inherited authority to the individual reasoning subject.
Remember: Different methods, same shift: a claim's credentials are checked by the individual knower, not only received from the community that hands it down.
Caution: The lecture does not say Descartes or Locke attacked Christianity. It calls that reading a caricature, since both meant to support theology.
One line to carry into ministry: Expect people to ask for reasons they can examine themselves, and help them as Scripture and tradition invite, without treating the question as hostile.
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묵상 및 토론
- Descartes wanted his method of doubt to produce more secure knowledge of God, not less. In your own words, explain how a method aimed at securing theology's foundation could still end up making theology's claims harder, rather than easier, to establish.
- Locke thought Christianity could be shown "reasonable" by ordinary standards of evidence. What would count as evidence, on Locke's own empiricist terms, for a claim like the resurrection of Jesus - and what kind of claim might empiricism struggle to evaluate on its own terms?
- Colossians 2:8 warns against philosophy "after the tradition of men... and not after Christ." Do you think Descartes's or Locke's project fits that warning, fits Paul's own engagement with Greek philosophy elsewhere, or fits neither cleanly? Defend your answer.
- Proverbs 3:5-7 asks the reader not to "lean on your own understanding." Is that verse in tension with Descartes's and Locke's projects, or compatible with them, if both philosophers considered their own reasoning compatible with trusting God? Explain your reasoning.
- Before reading this lecture, had you thought of "using your own reasoning to evaluate a religious claim" as a specifically modern habit, or simply as how thoughtful people have always approached belief? Has this lecture changed that impression?