Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
목차 40
- Lecture 1-1: The Turn to the Reasoning Subject
- Lecture 1-2: Kant's Critique and the Limits of Reason
- Lecture 1-3: Hegel and the Historicizing of Doctrine
- Lecture 2-1: Schleiermacher and the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
- Lecture 2-2: Ritschl, Harnack, and the Essence of Christianity
- Lecture 2-3: Troeltsch and the Crisis of Historicism
- Lecture 3-1: The Collapse of Liberal Optimism and Barth's Break with His Teachers
- Lecture 3-2: Barth's Mature Theology of the Word
- Lecture 3-3: The Barth-Brunner Controversy over Natural Theology
- Lecture 4-1: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Turn to Existence
- Lecture 4-2: Bultmann and the Program of Demythologization
- Lecture 4-3: Tillich's Correlation and the Hermeneutical Turn
- Lecture 5-1: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Recovery of Sin as Political Realism
- Lecture 5-2: H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture, and Its Limits
- Lecture 5-3: The Wider Legacy of Christian Realism
- Lecture 6-1: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Prison Writings
- Lecture 6-2: Harvey Cox's The Secular City and the Debate It Provoked
- Lecture 6-3: The "Death of God" Theology of the 1960s
- Lecture 7-1: Process Philosophy's Foundations — Whitehead and Hartshorne
- Lecture 7-2: Process Theology Proper — Cobb, Griffin, and the Problem of Evil
- Lecture 7-3: Open Theism within Evangelicalism
- Lecture 8-1: Jürgen Moltmann — Hope and the Crucified God
- Lecture 8-2: Wolfhart Pannenberg — Revelation as Universal History
- Lecture 8-3: The Second Vatican Council and Catholic Renewal
- Lecture 8-4: Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar — Two Catholic Responses to Modernity
- Lecture 9-1: Rahner's Complaint and the Rule That Answered It
- Lecture 9-2: Zizioulas and the Orthodox Recovery of Personhood
- Lecture 9-3: Social Trinitarianism and the Tritheism Question
- Lecture 10-1: Gutiérrez, Cone, and the Theology of Liberation
- Lecture 10-2: The Global South and the Method of Contextual Theology
- Lecture 10-3: Pentecostal Theology's Academic Emergence and Amos Yong's Pneumatology
- Lecture 11-1: Postmodern Philosophy's Challenge to Enlightenment Reason
- Lecture 11-2: George Lindbeck and the Cultural-Linguistic Model
- Lecture 11-3: Hauerwas's Narrative Ethics and Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy
- Lecture 11-4: The Religious Pluralism Debate
- Lecture 12-1: The New Evangelical Mind — Carl F. H. Henry, J. I. Packer, and the Turn Toward Engagement
- Lecture 12-2: Reformed Epistemology — Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and the Rationality of Belief
- Lecture 12-3: Analytic Theology and Vanhoozer's Doctrine as Drama
- Lecture 12-4: The Contemporary Frontier and Course Synthesis
Chapter 3 traced Karl Barth's revolt against nineteenth-century liberal theology, a revolt fought largely on the question of where theology's authority comes from: God's own self-revelation, Barth insisted, not human religious experience or a rational System built from outside it. This lecture steps back to a different, though related, argument that was already under way while liberal theology was still rising - not chiefly an argument about authority, but about what it even means for a human being to exist, and what kind of truth could possibly address that existence rather than merely describe it from a distance. Two philosophers, writing almost a century apart and never in dialogue with each other, gave later theology - Bultmann above all, studied in the next lecture - the conceptual tools to ask that question in a new way.
Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) wrote as a lone, often bitterly ironic critic of the Danish state church and of the philosophical System he associated above all with Hegel (studied in lecture 1-3). Where Hegel's absolute idealism aimed to comprehend all of reality, including religion, within a single rational, historically unfolding System, Kierkegaard insisted that a System can be built about existence but never entered by an existing individual standing inside it - and that Christian faith, in particular, is not a proposition to be proven or slotted into a philosophical scheme at all, but a passionate, risk-laden decision made by a single person before God. Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), writing as a philosopher rather than a theologian and largely uninterested in Christian doctrine as such, developed in Being and Time (1927) an analysis of human existence (which he called Dasein, "being-there") as a being that always already has a stake in its own being, and that can exist either "authentically," owning its own finite, mortal existence and the possibilities open to it, or "inauthentically," losing itself in the anonymous, undifferentiated crowd he called das Man ("the they"). Bultmann, Heidegger's colleague at Marburg in the 1920s, found in this vocabulary of authentic and inauthentic existence exactly the tool he wanted for reading the New Testament's call to decision - a debt lecture 4-2 traces directly.
이 24분으로 얻는 것
- State Kierkegaard's distinction between "objective" and "subjective" truth, and explain why he thought Christian faith belongs to the second category without thereby becoming arbitrary or false.
- Explain what Kierkegaard meant by the "leap of faith" and why he aimed this concept specifically against Hegelian System-building.
- Describe Heidegger's distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence in *Being and Time*, using his own terms (*Dasein*, *das Man*) accurately.
- Explain, in outline, why Bultmann later found Heidegger's philosophy useful for interpreting the New Testament - a connection this lecture sets up and lecture 4-2 develops.
- Identify at least one respect in which Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's projects differ from each other, given that Kierkegaard wrote as a Christian and Heidegger explicitly did not write as one.
Joshua said to the people, "You are witnesses against yourselves that you have chosen Yahweh yourselves, to serve him." They said, "We are witnesses." "Now therefore put away the foreign gods which are among you, and incline your heart to Yahweh, the God of Israel." The people said to Joshua, "We will serve Yahweh our God, and we will listen to his voice.
I call heaven and earth to witness against you this day, that I have set before you life and death, the blessing and the curse. Therefore choose life, that you may live, you and your descendants;
Joshua 24:22-24 (World English Bible)
Joshua's renewal at Shechem stages exactly the kind of decision Kierkegaard wanted to put back at the center of Christian existence: not a conclusion reached by weighing historical or metaphysical evidence from a safe, uninvolved distance, but a choice made by a whole people, standing before God, that commits their future. Joshua does not offer Israel a proof that Yahweh exists or an argument that serving him is statistically likely to produce better outcomes than serving the gods of the Amorites; he puts a decision to them and asks them to own it publicly, in their own words, with the consequences of walking away from it made plain in the following verses (24:19-20 warns bluntly that Yahweh "will not forgive your disobedience"). That is decision, not detached contemplation - the same structure Kierkegaard argued Christian faith always has, and academic theology always risks losing.
Deuteronomy 30:19 (WEB)
Moses' charge to Israel makes the same structure even starker: two real, opposed possibilities are set before the hearer, and the hearer is commanded to choose, with no third option of remaining neutral or waiting for further evidence. Kierkegaard would have recognized this as exactly the shape existential decision takes - not a menu of equally comfortable options, but an either/or in which declining to choose is itself a choice, and normally the worse one. His most famous book is literally titled Either/Or (1843), and its central argument is that a genuinely existing individual cannot indefinitely postpone the choice between an aesthetic life organized around pleasure and possibility and an ethical or religious life organized around commitment.
1. Kierkegaard against the System
Søren Kierkegaard wrote nearly all of his major works in Copenhagen in a burst of activity in the 1840s and 1850s, much of it under a series of invented pseudonyms (Johannes Climacus, Johannes de Silentio, Anti-Climacus) that let him present a position without simply asserting it as his own settled view - a literary strategy, "indirect communication," that he thought suited existential truth better than a straightforward treatise could. His target, named and attacked repeatedly, was Hegelian idealism as it had been absorbed into Danish academic theology and culture: the idea that reality, including religious truth, forms a single rational System that a sufficiently disciplined thinker can, in principle, comprehend from the outside, the way a mathematician comprehends a proof.
Kierkegaard's central objection was not that Hegel's System was internally inconsistent - he was willing to grant, for the sake of argument, that it might be logically coherent - but that no human being actually occupies the position the System requires. A System can, perhaps, be built about existence in the abstract; it cannot be built by an existing individual who is still living, still becoming, still facing an open future rather than a completed one. "An existential system is impossible," Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus argues in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), because "existence itself is a system - for God, but it cannot be a system for any existing spirit." The philosopher who claims to have completed the System has, in effect, claimed to have stopped existing - to view life from outside it, as God might, rather than living it from inside, as every actual human being must.
From this diagnosis Kierkegaard drew his famous distinction between objective and subjective truth. Objective truth concerns what is true - a proposition's content, verifiable in principle from any observer's standpoint, the kind of truth mathematics or natural science deals in. Subjective truth concerns how a truth is held by an existing individual - with what degree of passion, risk, and personal appropriation - and Kierkegaard argued that for the questions that actually matter to a living person (above all, questions of how to exist, and whether to trust God), the how of holding a truth matters at least as much as, and sometimes more than, the objective certainty behind it. His famous, deliberately provocative formulation is that "truth is subjectivity" - not a claim that truth is merely whatever anyone happens to feel, which would collapse into precisely the relativism his own writing attacks relentlessly elsewhere, but a claim that for existential truth, an infinite passion held toward an objectively uncertain claim can constitute a truer relation to it than a detached, dispassionate assent to a claim one has never risked anything on.
This is the background against which Kierkegaard's most famous phrase, the "leap of faith," has to be read. Kierkegaard did not use that exact phrase as often as later summary accounts suggest, and where the underlying idea does appear - especially in Fear and Trembling (1843), his extended meditation on Abraham's binding of Isaac - it names a movement that cannot be reached by any chain of logical inference, however long. Abraham does not arrive at his willingness to sacrifice Isaac by a process of reasoning that could, in principle, be checked and repeated by any careful thinker; he makes a decision "in virtue of the absurd," trusting God against every rational and ethical consideration available to him, including the ethical demand not to kill his own son. Kierkegaard calls Abraham a "knight of faith" precisely because faith, on his account, is not the conclusion of an argument but a leap - a decisive act of will and trust that a person makes, and must keep making, rather than a state a sufficiently clever argument could induce once and for all.
This is a claim worth stating carefully rather than flattening. Kierkegaard was not an irrationalist arguing that faith is arbitrary or that evidence is worthless; he was a trained philosopher and a serious, if unconventional, reader of classical theology who thought the entire apparatus of "proofs" for Christianity - historical evidences for the resurrection, philosophical arguments for God's existence - misdescribes what Christian faith actually is and does. If Christianity could be established with the same kind of certainty a geometric proof achieves, Kierkegaard argued, in Philosophical Fragments (1844), that faith would no longer be faith; it would be knowledge, and the passionate, risk-taking relationship to God that Scripture actually describes would have been replaced by a much smaller thing - intellectual assent to a well-supported claim.
2. Heidegger and the analysis of Dasein
Martin Heidegger's Being and Time, published in 1927, is a work of philosophy, not theology, and Heidegger insisted throughout his career that his project - a fresh inquiry into the meaning of Being itself, which he thought Western philosophy since Plato had lost sight of by asking only about particular beings rather than Being as such - was not a covert theology and should not be read as one. That insistence should be taken at face value even while noting, as this lecture does, that Heidegger's early theological training (he began as a Catholic seminarian and later moved through Protestant theology before turning fully to philosophy) shaped the questions he thought worth asking, and that his vocabulary proved unusually exportable into theological use once Bultmann picked it up.
Heidegger's analysis begins from what he calls Dasein - literally "being-there," his technical term for the distinctive kind of being that belongs to a human being, chosen partly to avoid the metaphysical baggage already attached to words like "subject" or "consciousness." Dasein's distinguishing feature, for Heidegger, is that it is the one being for whom its own being is an issue: a rock or a hammer simply is what it is, but Dasein exists always already caring about, and having some understanding of, its own existence and its own eventual death. Dasein is "thrown" (geworfen) into a particular time, place, and set of circumstances it did not choose and cannot fully account for, and it exists always already "in-the-world," entangled with things and with other people rather than standing apart from them as a detached observer.
From this starting point Heidegger draws his famous distinction between authentic (eigentlich, literally "own" or "properly one's own") and inauthentic (uneigentlich) existence. Inauthentic existence, for Heidegger, is not a moral failing in the ordinary sense but a description of how Dasein falls, proximally and for the most part, into "the they" (das Man) - the anonymous, undifferentiated public that Dasein absorbs its opinions, its tastes, and even its sense of what "one" does from, losing its own distinctive possibilities in idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity that never really commits to anything. Authentic existence, by contrast, is what becomes possible when Dasein confronts its own finitude directly - above all through what Heidegger calls "anxiety" (Angst, distinct from ordinary fear of some particular object) and through what he calls "being-toward-death," an honest, resolute owning of the fact that one's own death is one's ownmost, non-relational, and certain possibility, which no one else can undergo in one's place. Facing that finitude honestly, rather than fleeing into the anonymous comfort of "the they," is what lets Dasein take hold of its own existence as genuinely its own, choosing its possibilities resolutely rather than drifting through borrowed ones.
Two features of this analysis mattered enormously to the theologian who would put it to new use in the next lecture. First, Heidegger's philosophy is resolutely a philosophy of existence rather than of abstract essence - it asks what it means to exist as this particular, finite, mortal being facing one's own possibilities, not what human nature is in the abstract, which gave Bultmann a vocabulary that seemed to describe the very same territory Scripture's call to decision addresses. Second, Heidegger's distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence is formal rather than substantive: it describes a structure two very different lives could each occupy (Heidegger does not say that only Christians, or only any particular group, can exist authentically), which made the framework portable into a theological reading without automatically dragging in the rest of Heidegger's own philosophical commitments, including commitments Bultmann did not share.
3. Two thinkers, one vocabulary, and a caution about the connection
Kierkegaard died in 1855; Heidegger was born in 1889. They never corresponded, never influenced each other directly, and worked in entirely different centuries, countries, and intellectual contexts - Kierkegaard as a lay Christian writer working largely outside the university, reacting against a specific form of Hegelianism dominant in 1840s Denmark; Heidegger as a professional academic philosopher in Weimar-era Germany, reacting against a specific crisis in the phenomenological movement he inherited from his teacher Edmund Husserl. It would therefore misrepresent the actual history to describe them as founders of a single "existentialist school" working toward a common goal; the label "existentialism" itself was applied to both, along with figures as different as Jean-Paul Sartre and Karl Jaspers, mostly after the fact, and Heidegger himself later resisted the label for his own work.
What connects them, for this course's purposes, is narrower and more defensible: both insisted, against a philosophical mainstream each associated with detached, spectator-style rationality (Hegel's System for Kierkegaard, a long tradition of "objectifying" metaphysics for Heidegger), that human existence has to be understood and addressed from the inside, in terms of decision, finitude, and personal appropriation, rather than described from an external, theoretical standpoint as one more object among others. That shared conviction - not a shared school, a shared method, or a shared conclusion about Christianity - is what Rudolf Bultmann, reading both thinkers seriously, brought together in the next lecture's proposal for interpreting the New Testament.
6. Further Reading
- Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton University Press, 1992).
- Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Alastair Hannay (Penguin Classics, 1985).
- Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Harper Perennial Modern Thought, 2008).
- C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
- Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 2nd edition (Routledge, 2005).
- George Pattison, Kierkegaard and the Quest for Unambiguous Life: Between Romanticism and Modernism (Oxford University Press, 2013).
핵심 요약
- Kierkegaard attacked Hegel's System. A System can be built about existence, he argued, but no living person can stand inside it, because an existing person still faces an open future.
- He separated objective truth (what is true) from subjective truth (how a person holds it). "Truth is subjectivity" does not mean truth is whatever one feels.
- The "leap of faith" is a decision made in trust, not the end of an argument. Kierkegaard was not an irrationalist, but he thought proofs misdescribe faith.
- Heidegger described Dasein ("being-there") as the being that cares about its own being. It lives authentically by facing finitude, or inauthentically by dissolving into das Man ("the they").
- The two men never influenced each other and were not one school. Their shared conviction is that existence must be understood from the inside. Bultmann joined them.
Topic: Kierkegaard and Heidegger, two very different thinkers, argued that human existence must be understood through decision and finitude, not from a detached standpoint.
Remember: For Kierkegaard, faith is a risk-laden personal decision before God, not a conclusion of proof, and the way a truth is held matters as much as its content.
Caution: Do not call them one "existentialist school." Heidegger did not write as a Christian, and Kierkegaard was not arguing that faith is arbitrary or that evidence is worthless.
One line to carry into ministry: Faith is a lived decision before God, so invite people to commit themselves, not only to agree with correct statements.
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묵상 및 토론
- Kierkegaard distinguishes objective truth (what is true) from subjective truth (how a truth is held). Do you find that distinction persuasive as a description of religious faith specifically, or does it risk making faith unaccountable to evidence altogether?
- Joshua 24 and Deuteronomy 30 both stage a decisive either/or before Israel. Does reading these texts through Kierkegaard's category of "decision" illuminate something in them, or does it risk imposing a nineteenth-century philosophical framework onto a very different ancient text? Argue for your own answer.
- Heidegger's distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence is formal - it does not by itself say which lives, or which beliefs, count as authentic. What do you think is gained, and what is put at risk, by borrowing a religiously neutral philosophical framework to describe Christian existence, as Bultmann does in the next lecture?
- Kierkegaard insisted that if Christianity could be proven with the certainty of a geometric proof, it would no longer be faith. Do you agree that certainty and faith are in this kind of tension, or can a person hold well-evidenced belief with the same passionate appropriation Kierkegaard describes?
- This lecture is careful to say that Kierkegaard and Heidegger did not form a single school and never influenced each other directly. Why might it matter, for accurate historical work, to resist collapsing two genuinely different thinkers into one movement just because a later theologian used both?