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BT602E The Synoptic Gospels

Lecture 9-3: How Historians and Theologians Have Handled the Miracle Accounts

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BT602E The Synoptic Gospels
제 0 장 · Introduction: Three Gospels, One Subject
  1. Introduction: Three Gospels, One Subject
제 1 장 · Chapter 1: What the Synoptic Gospels Are
  1. Lecture 1-1: Gospel as a Genre: Biography, History, or Something Else
  2. Lecture 1-2: Oral Tradition, Written Sources, and How the Gospels Reached Us
  3. Lecture 1-3: Why Three, and Why They Are Called Synoptic
제 2 장 · Chapter 2: The Synoptic Problem
  1. Lecture 2-1: The Data: Agreements, Disagreements, and Order
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Two-Source Theory and the Case for Q
  3. Lecture 2-3: The Alternatives: Griesbach, Farrer, and the Present State of the Question
제 3 장 · Chapter 3: The World in Which Jesus Taught
  1. Lecture 3-1: Galilee and Judea under Rome
  2. Lecture 3-2: Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes, and the Rest of Second Temple Judaism
  3. Lecture 3-3: Synagogue, Temple, Household: Where the Gospel Scenes Take Place
제 4 장 · Chapter 4: The Gospel of Mark
  1. Lecture 4-1: Structure, Pace, and the Shape of Mark's Story
  2. Lecture 4-2: Mark's Christology and the Question of the Messianic Secret
  3. Lecture 4-3: Discipleship, Failure, and the Ending at 16:8
제 5 장 · Chapter 5: The Gospel of Matthew
  1. Lecture 5-1: Structure, the Five Discourses, and Matthew's Jewish Frame
  2. Lecture 5-2: Fulfilment, Scripture, and the Law in Matthew
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Community Addressed: Church, Mission, and Judgment
제 6 장 · Chapter 6: The Gospel of Luke
  1. Lecture 6-1: Luke's Preface, Sources, and Claim to Orderly Account
  2. Lecture 6-2: Reversal: The Poor, Women, Samaritans, and Outsiders
  3. Lecture 6-3: The Spirit, Prayer, and the Journey to Jerusalem
제 7 장 · Chapter 7: The Kingdom of God
  1. Lecture 7-1: What Jesus Announced, and What His Hearers Would Have Heard
  2. Lecture 7-2: Present, Future, or Both: The Eschatology Debate
  3. Lecture 7-3: The Sermon on the Mount and the Demands of the Kingdom
제 8 장 · Chapter 8: The Parables
  1. Lecture 8-1: How Parables Work, and How They Have Been Misread
  2. Lecture 8-2: Parables of the Kingdom
  3. Lecture 8-3: Parables of Mercy, Warning, and Reversal
제 9 장 · Chapter 9: Miracles, Exorcisms, and Healing
  1. Lecture 9-1: Healings and Nature Miracles in the Synoptic Accounts
  2. Lecture 9-2: Exorcism and the Conflict with Evil
  3. Lecture 9-3: How Historians and Theologians Have Handled the Miracle Accounts
제 10 장 · Chapter 10: Jesus, the Law, the Temple, and Israel
  1. Lecture 10-1: The Sabbath and Purity Controversies
  2. Lecture 10-2: The Temple Action and What It Meant
  3. Lecture 10-3: Jesus and the Restoration of Israel: The Twelve and the Nations
제 11 장 · Chapter 11: Passion, Death, and Resurrection
  1. Lecture 11-1: The Last Supper and the Arrest
  2. Lecture 11-2: Trial, Crucifixion, and the Three Passion Narratives Compared
  3. Lecture 11-3: The Empty Tomb and the Resurrection Accounts
제 12 장 · Chapter 12: The Historical Jesus and the Gospels Today
  1. Lecture 12-1: The Quests for the Historical Jesus, from Reimarus to the Present
  2. Lecture 12-2: Criteria, Method, and What History Can and Cannot Establish
  3. Lecture 12-3: Preaching and Teaching the Synoptic Gospels

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36분

Every reader of the Synoptic Gospels arrives at the miracle accounts with a view about them already in place. That is not a criticism; it is unavoidable. What can be criticised is holding such a view without knowing that one holds it, and without being able to say what it rests on. This lecture is an attempt to make the available positions visible, to state each in the form its own adherents would recognise, and to identify — for each — the premise that is doing the work before any evidence is examined.

The lecture also argues for a distinction that is more important than any of the positions it surveys: a judgment made as a historian and a judgment made as a theologian are not the same kind of judgment. The historian, working with the ordinary tools of the discipline, asks what can be established about the past on the basis of available evidence by methods that any competent investigator could apply and check. The theologian asks what these events mean within a framework of belief about God, and may accept as true things the historical method by itself cannot deliver. Confusing the two damages both. A theology that borrows the prestige of historical demonstration for claims history cannot establish is building on a foundation it does not own; a history that quietly restricts in advance what may be concluded, and then presents the restriction as a finding, is doing something less than honest. John P. Meier's careful separation of these layers, whatever one makes of his conclusions, is the methodological contribution of A Marginal Jew that has proved most durable.

The survey runs from David Friedrich Strauss, whose 1835 work broke a deadlock that had held for a century, through Rudolf Bultmann's demythologizing programme and the responses to it, to the present configuration: Meier's use of multiple attestation, Graham Twelftree's and Craig Keener's arguments for stronger conclusions, and Bart Ehrman's contention that the historian's method is by its nature unable to reach a verdict on a miracle. No position is presented here as the correct one. This lecture's own claim — and it is a claim, not a neutral summary — is that the disagreement is less about the evidence than about what the parties think evidence is for, and that a student who has not located the premise has not understood the debate.

이 36분으로 얻는 것

  • Explain the eighteenth-century deadlock between supernaturalist and rationalist readings, and describe how Strauss's category of myth was designed to dissolve rather than settle it.
  • State Bultmann's demythologizing programme accurately, including what it was for, and identify the two main lines of criticism it drew.
  • Describe Meier's application of multiple attestation to the miracle traditions, together with the limit he placed on what the historian may conclude from it.
  • Set out Ehrman's argument that the historical method cannot establish a miracle, and give the strongest reply to it.
  • Distinguish a historical judgment from a theological judgment about the same event, and explain why collapsing the two weakens both.

Jesus answered them, “Go and tell John the things which you have seen and heard: that the blind receive their sight, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised up, and the poor have good news preached to them. Blessed is he who finds no occasion for stumbling in me.” — Luke 7:22-23

World English Bible

He could do no mighty work there, except that he laid his hands on a few sick people, and healed them. He marveled because of their unbelief. He went around the villages teaching. — Mark 6:5-6

WEB

Then certain of the scribes and Pharisees answered, “Teacher, we want to see a sign from you.” But he answered them, “An evil and adulterous generation seeks after a sign, but no sign will be given it but the sign of Jonah the prophet. — Matthew 12:38-39

WEB

These three passages establish the terrain. Luke 7:22 is the closest thing in the Synoptic tradition to a summary of the miracle activity offered by Jesus himself, and it is composed largely of phrases drawn from Isaiah — a fact that cuts in two directions at once, since it can be read as showing the saying's roots in scriptural expectation or as showing it to be a construction from scripture. Mark 6:5 is the account most difficult for a reading that treats the traditions as freely developed by an admiring community, because it says the opposite of what such a development would produce. And Matthew 12:38-39 records a refusal to supply evidence on demand, which is a datum any account of what these narratives are for must accommodate.

1. The deadlock Strauss inherited

By the late eighteenth century, European discussion of the Gospel miracles had settled into a standoff between two parties who shared a crucial assumption.

The supernaturalists held that the events occurred as narrated, by direct divine action suspending or overriding the ordinary course of nature. The rationalists, of whom Heinrich Paulus at Heidelberg was the most industrious, held that the events occurred but had ordinary causes that the narrators, lacking the relevant knowledge, misunderstood. Paulus's explanations became a byword: the feeding of the five thousand was a chain of sharing begun when Jesus and the disciples distributed their own provisions; the walking on the water was a misperception of Jesus walking along the shore in mist; the raisings were recoveries from coma.

What both parties assumed is that the narratives are reports of events, differing only over the causal account. Rationalism in particular was, as its critics quickly saw, a strange position: it preserved the historicity of every episode at the price of making the evangelists systematically unobservant, and it made the Gospels a collection of misunderstandings that happened to found a religion.

2. Strauss and the category of myth

David Friedrich Strauss published Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet in 1835, at the age of twenty-seven. It ended his academic career — he was removed from his post at Tübingen and never held another — and it changed the terms of the discussion permanently.

Strauss's move was to reject the assumption both parties shared. The miracle narratives, he argued, are neither accurate reports nor misunderstood reports; they are myth in a technical sense he took some care to define. Myth, for Strauss, is the expression of an idea in narrative form. The early communities held convictions about who Jesus was — that he was the promised one, that in him the expectations of Israel's scriptures were fulfilled — and those convictions generated narratives that clothed the conviction in the form of events. The controlling source of the narratives is thus the Old Testament expectation. Elijah and Elisha raise the dead, feed the hungry from small provisions, and cleanse leprosy; Isaiah announces that the blind will see and the lame walk. Strauss argued, passage by passage, that the Gospel accounts take their specific shape from these precedents.

Three things should be said about Strauss, in this order.

First, the argument is not a refusal to look at evidence; it is an argument from a large body of textual observation, and the observations are frequently correct. The parallels with the Elijah-Elisha cycle are real. Luke's account of the widow's son at Nain is close in specific detail to 1 Kings 17. Luke 7:22, printed above, is largely constructed from Isaianic phrases. These are Strauss's data and they have not gone away.

Second, Strauss was not an atheist polemicist, whatever the reception in 1835 supposed. He was working within a Hegelian framework in which the truth of the idea was what mattered and the historical vehicle was secondary; he held that the idea of the union of divine and human is true, and that its attachment to a single individual is what myth-making does. Whether one finds this satisfying, it is not the position of someone who has simply concluded that religion is false.

Third, the principal weakness is the one that has been pressed most consistently since. The mechanism Strauss requires — a community generating detailed narratives out of scriptural expectation within a few decades, in a setting where people who had known the person were still alive — is asserted rather than demonstrated, and later work on how traditions actually develop, including the studies discussed in lecture 1-2 of this course, has not made it easier to assert. A second weakness is circularity in the identification of myth: a narrative resembling a scriptural precedent is classified as generated by it, but resemblance is also what one would expect if the events were narrated by people who read those scriptures and saw the correspondence.

3. Bultmann and demythologizing

Rudolf Bultmann's programme, set out in the 1941 essay "New Testament and Mythology" and developed thereafter, is regularly summarised as "Bultmann removed the miracles." That summary is wrong in a way worth correcting carefully, because trap six of this course's build principles applies with force here.

Bultmann's starting point is a claim about world-pictures. The New Testament, he held, presents its message within a picture of a three-storeyed universe populated by spirits and open to intervention from above and below — a picture that modern people, who use electric light and radio and modern medicine, cannot in fact hold, whatever they may say. The question this raises is not whether to keep or discard the message but how the message can be stated when the picture in which it was originally stated is no longer available. Demythologizing is not elimination; it is interpretation. The mythological language is to be interpreted for what it says about human existence before God — about the possibility of authentic existence given in the proclamation — rather than discarded as false information about the world.

Bultmann's programme was thus, in his own understanding, a defence of the proclamation and not an attack on it. He held that the alternative was to make faith depend on accepting a cosmology, which would be to demand of the believer a sacrifice not of the will but of the intellect, and which would in any case attach faith to a foundation of historical probabilities that can always be revised.

The criticisms came from two directions and both are substantial.

From one side, Karl Jaspers argued in an exchange with Bultmann in the 1950s that the programme rested on an inflated and dated confidence about what "the modern world-picture" permits, and that Bultmann had taken a particular philosophical account of reality as though it were a result of science. Others pressed the point that the existentialist categories Bultmann used, drawn from Martin Heidegger, are as much a historically located framework as the one being replaced, so that the operation trades one contingent scheme for another rather than freeing the message from schemes.

From the other side, and from within Bultmann's own school, Ernst Käsemann's 1953 lecture on the historical Jesus argued that a proclamation detached from the historical figure risks becoming a myth in the pejorative sense — an idea with no anchor — and that the church's interest in the earthly Jesus cannot be given up without loss. This objection launched what became known as the new quest, treated in Chapter 12.

Two further observations. Bultmann did not deny that Jesus performed healings and exorcisms; he regarded that much as historically probable, while holding that the significance of the accounts is not to be found at that level. And the disagreement between Bultmann and his critics is not chiefly about the Gospels. It is about what the modern situation requires, which is a philosophical question that Gospel study cannot settle.

4. Meier and multiple attestation

John P. Meier's treatment in A Marginal Jew, volume 2 (1994), devotes several hundred pages to the miracle traditions and is the most methodologically explicit treatment available. Two features of it matter here.

The first is the argument from multiple attestation. Meier observes that miracle-working is attested across every source stratum that a source-critical analysis of the Synoptic tradition identifies — in Mark, in the material common to Matthew and Luke, in material peculiar to Matthew, in material peculiar to Luke, and, on his analysis, in John independently — and across multiple literary forms: narrative accounts, sayings that presuppose the activity, summary statements, and controversy material. Crucially, the strongest instances are those that would embarrass a developing tradition. The Beelzebul controversy presupposes that Jesus performed exorcisms and that his opponents did not deny the fact but disputed its source; the accusation is not something a later community would invent, and it requires the activity. Luke 11:19 concedes that other exorcists were successful. Mark 6:5 records a failure. Meier's conclusion is that the global claim — that Jesus performed deeds his contemporaries regarded as miraculous, particularly healings and exorcisms — is as well attested as anything in the Jesus tradition, better attested than many things widely accepted, and that a historian who accepts other conclusions on similar evidence cannot consistently reject this one.

The second feature is the limit. Meier states repeatedly that the historian as historian can establish that these events were reported and believed by contemporaries and, in specific cases, that something happened for which those present had no ordinary explanation. The historian cannot establish that a miracle in the theological sense occurred, because that judgment requires a premise — that God exists and acts — which is not a historical premise and cannot be reached by historical method. Meier is a Catholic priest who believes the miracles occurred; he insists that this belief is not a conclusion of his historical work.

The distinction is sometimes read as a dodge. It is better read as a discipline. It permits Meier to make a strong historical claim without smuggling in a theological one, and it permits a reader who does not share his theology to accept the historical claim.

5. The stronger claim: Twelftree and Keener

Graham Twelftree and Craig Keener each argue for conclusions beyond Meier's limit, and by different routes.

Twelftree, in Jesus the Exorcist (1993) and Jesus the Miracle Worker (1999), works from the material itself. His argument is that when the criteria normally applied to the Jesus tradition are applied consistently, a substantial number of individual accounts — not merely the global claim — survive as historically probable, and that the distinctive features of Jesus' exorcistic practice noted in lecture 9-2 point to a particular figure rather than to a generalised type. Twelftree also argues, on theological grounds he keeps separate from the historical argument, that the exorcisms are inseparable from the eschatological claim they were said to embody.

Keener's Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Accounts (2 vols., 2011) takes a different route, and its central move is comparative and contemporary rather than exegetical. Keener assembles a very large body of modern testimony to healings from around the world — much of it from the global South, much of it from Christian communities, some of it with medical documentation — and argues two things. First, that the a priori objection deriving from David Hume, that uniform experience is against miracles and no testimony can outweigh it, presupposes what it claims to establish, since "uniform experience" is only uniform if reports to the contrary are excluded in advance. Second, that Western academic scepticism about eyewitness miracle claims reflects the cultural situation of a small and unrepresentative slice of the world's population, and that treating it as the neutral default is itself a parochialism.

The first argument has independent philosophical support; the circularity objection to Hume's argument has been pressed by philosophers with no theological stake in the matter. The second is an argument about the sociology of scholarship rather than about the events, and its force depends on whether one thinks the prevalence of a belief bears on its truth. Critics have replied that a large collection of testimony does not by itself establish the causal claim, since the difficulty was never that reports are scarce but that testimony under-determines cause; and that documented cases of recovery, however striking, do not distinguish between an unexplained recovery and a divine act. Keener acknowledges much of this and argues that the burden has been misplaced rather than that it has been discharged. Whatever one concludes, the two volumes changed the discussion by making it harder to assert that the phenomena are confined to the ancient world.

6. Ehrman and methodological restraint

Bart Ehrman states the opposing methodological position as clearly as anyone. The argument is not that miracles are impossible, and Ehrman is explicit that this is not his claim. It is an argument about what the historical method can deliver.

The historian, on this account, works by establishing what most probably happened, given the available evidence. That is what historical argument is: a comparison of relative probabilities. A miracle, by definition, is the least probable of the available explanations — that is what makes it a miracle rather than an ordinary event. Therefore the historian, operating by the canons of the discipline, can never conclude that a miracle is the most probable explanation of a body of evidence, because to do so would be to conclude that the least probable explanation is the most probable one. This holds regardless of the historian's own beliefs. A believing historian and an unbelieving historian, doing history, are equally barred.

The strongest reply comes in two parts, and both should be given.

The first is that the argument as stated may prove too much. If "least probable by definition" bars the conclusion, then the bar is analytic rather than evidential, and no possible evidence could ever move it — which means the method has been defined so as to exclude a class of conclusions in advance rather than deciding against them on the evidence. Several philosophers, including John Earman in Hume's Abject Failure (2000), have argued in probabilistic terms that this reasoning is defective: prior improbability can in principle be overcome by evidence sufficiently improbable on any competing hypothesis, and a method that rules this out has stopped being probabilistic.

The second is that Ehrman's position, if accepted, entails a specific and rather modest conclusion, which is that history is silent here — not that the miracle accounts are legendary. Ehrman himself draws this consequence: he holds, with Meier, that Jesus was widely regarded as a healer and exorcist and that this is historically well grounded. The disagreement between Ehrman and Meier is narrower than students usually suppose. They differ over the theological question and agree about a good deal of the historical one.

This is a point where readers will not agree. The positions, in their own terms:

Five scholarly positions

  • David Friedrich Strauss held that the miracle narratives are mythic expressions of the community's conviction about Jesus, shaped by scriptural precedent, and that neither supernatural nor rationalistic explanation of them as events is required.
  • Rudolf Bultmann held that the accounts belong to a world-picture no longer available, that a historical core of healings and exorcisms is nevertheless probable, and that the task is to interpret what the language says about existence before God rather than to defend or discard it as information.
  • John P. Meier held that the global claim of miracle-working is among the best-attested elements of the Jesus tradition on ordinary historical criteria, and that the historian as historian may go no further than that.
  • Graham Twelftree and Craig Keener hold that stronger conclusions are warranted: Twelftree from the consistent application of the criteria to individual accounts, Keener from the collapse of the a priori objection together with a very large body of contemporary testimony.
  • Bart Ehrman holds that the historical method, being a method of relative probability, cannot in principle deliver the conclusion that a miracle occurred, whatever the historian's own convictions — while agreeing that Jesus was regarded as a healer by his contemporaries.

There is no arbitration between these here, and the quiz for this chapter does not ask for one. What can be said is that the disagreement is not primarily about the texts. All five would give substantially the same account of what Mark 5 says. They differ over what a historian may conclude, and over whether the conclusion a theologian reaches is of the same kind.

7. The two layers, and why the distinction matters

The practical payoff of this lecture is a habit of mind, and it can be stated briefly.

When you read a claim about the Gospel miracles, ask which layer it is operating on. "The tradition that Jesus performed exorcisms is multiply attested across independent strata" is a historical claim; it can be checked, argued about, and revised, and one need hold no theological position to assess it. "In the exorcisms the reign of God was breaking into a contested world" is a theological claim; it presupposes convictions about God that no amount of source analysis supplies, and it is not made more secure by being attached to the historical claim.

The danger of collapsing the layers is symmetrical. An apologetic that treats a historical result as though it delivered the theological one has made faith hostage to the next revision of the evidence — and the evidence in this field is revised regularly. A scepticism that treats a methodological restraint as though it were a substantive finding has claimed more than it established, since "history cannot say" is not the same sentence as "it did not happen."

There is a further reason for the caution, and it is the trap this course names first. The account just given is tidy: two layers, cleanly separated, each with its own competence. Real cases are messier. Judgments about what is historically probable are affected by what one thinks possible, and Meier's own line has been criticised on precisely this ground — that a historian who believes God acts and a historian who does not will weigh a given body of evidence differently in practice, however scrupulously they describe their method. The distinction between the layers is a discipline worth keeping, not a wall that guarantees purity. Presenting it as a wall would be an instance of exactly the elegance this course warns against.

The first diagram traces the positions historically, showing what each was reacting against.

Positions on the miracle accounts, and what each answered Each move is a reaction to the previous one — the debate has a shape, not just a list Supernaturalism (18th c.) The events occurred by direct divine action, exactly as narrated. Rationalism (Paulus) The events occurred but had ordinary causes the narrators misunderstood. Strauss 1835 — both share one assumption: that these are reports of events Reject it. They are myth: convictions about Jesus expressed as narrative, shaped by Elijah, Elisha, and Isaiah. Bultmann — demythologizing is interpretation, not deletion Answered by Jaspers (the modern world-picture is itself a philosophy) and Kaesemann (the proclamation needs an anchor). Meier Multiply attested; historian stops at the theological line. Twelftree · Keener Individual accounts survive; the a priori bar is circular. Ehrman Method compares probabilities, so it cannot reach a verdict.

The second diagram separates the two layers of judgment and shows which claims belong on each, together with the two symmetrical failures.

Two layers of judgment Ask of every claim you meet: which layer is this operating on? Historical layer "Attested in every source stratum." "Opponents disputed the source, not the fact." "Mark 6:5 reports a failure — not invented." Checkable, arguable, revisable by anyone. Theological layer "God acted here." "The reign of God was arriving in these acts." "These are signs of the new creation." Rests on convictions history does not supply. Failure mode A Treating a historical result as if it delivered the theological one — faith hostage to the next revision. Failure mode B Treating a methodological restraint as a finding — "history cannot say" is not "it did not happen". Caution: the two layers are a discipline, not a wall. In practice, what a historian thinks possible affects what they weigh as probable.

6. Further Reading

  • David Friedrich Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, trans. George Eliot, ed. Peter C. Hodgson (Fortress, 1972). Read the methodological introduction on myth rather than the whole; the later reception has distorted the argument badly.
  • Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," in New Testament and Mythology and Other Basic Writings, ed. Schubert M. Ogden (Fortress, 1984). The programme in Bultmann's own words, short enough to read in an evening.
  • John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew, vol. 2, Mentor, Message, and Miracles (Doubleday, 1994). Chapters 17 to 23. The introductory discussion of what a historian may and may not conclude is the part to read first.
  • Graham H. Twelftree, Jesus the Miracle Worker (InterVarsity, 1999). The most systematic case for historical conclusions about individual accounts.
  • Craig S. Keener, Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Accounts, 2 vols. (Baker Academic, 2011). Long, and the argument can be grasped from volume 1; the critique of Hume in the opening chapters is the philosophical core.
  • Bart D. Ehrman, Jesus: Apocalyptic Prophet of the New (Oxford, 1999). Sets out the methodological restraint and applies it, while accepting that Jesus was known as a healer.
  • John Earman, Hume's Abject Failure: The Argument against Miracles (Oxford, 2000). A philosopher with no theological stake arguing that Hume's argument is defective as probability reasoning.
  • Dale C. Allison Jr., Constructing Jesus: Memory, Imagination, and History (Baker Academic, 2010). Not principally about miracles, but the most searching recent account of how much any of our methods can actually deliver.

핵심 요약

  • David Friedrich Strauss's Das Leben Jesu (1835) rejected the shared assumption of supernaturalists and rationalists that the miracle accounts report events at all, arguing instead that they are myth generated by scriptural expectation — Elijah, Elisha, and Isaiah's oracles shaping narratives like the widow's son at Nain (close to 1 Kings 17) — a move that ended his academic career.
  • Bultmann's demythologizing was interpretation, not deletion: he held a historical core of healings and exorcisms probable, but argued the mythological three-storey cosmology in which they are described must be reinterpreted for what it says about human existence before God, since modern people cannot actually inhabit that cosmology.
  • Meier's argument from multiple attestation holds that miracle-working is attested across every source stratum and several literary forms, including material that would embarrass a later community (the Beelzebul accusation presupposes exorcisms actually occurred); but he insists the historian as historian cannot conclude a theological miracle occurred, only that contemporaries believed something inexplicable had happened.
  • Ehrman argues a miracle is by definition the least probable explanation available, so the historical method — which compares relative probabilities — can never conclude one is the most probable account of the evidence, regardless of the historian's own beliefs; Earman replies this makes the method analytic rather than genuinely evidential.
  • Keener's Miracles (2011) argues Hume's claim that "uniform experience" rules out miracle testimony is circular since it excludes contrary reports in advance, and assembles a large body of contemporary global-South healing testimony to challenge Western academic scepticism as itself a parochial default.

If you remember nothing else from this lecture: Every reader already holds a view of the miracle accounts, and this lecture's real subject is learning to name the premise doing the work before any evidence is examined. Strauss broke the eighteenth-century deadlock between supernaturalists and rationalists by denying both shared assumption that these are event-reports at all, calling them myths generated from scriptural precedent; Bultmann later held a historical core probable but insisted the mythological cosmology be reinterpreted rather than defended or discarded; Meier showed miracle-working is about as well attested as anything in the Jesus tradition while insisting history alone cannot certify a theological miracle; and Ehrman countered that the historical method, being comparative probability, can never rule a miracle the most probable explanation by definition, a claim Earman calls analytic rather than evidential. The lecture's real payoff is the distinction itself: "Jesus was widely regarded as an exorcist" is a historical claim anyone can check, while "the reign of God broke in through the exorcisms" is a theological claim resting on convictions no source analysis supplies — and collapsing the two weakens both.

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  • Luke 7:22 is composed largely of phrases from Isaiah. Strauss took this as evidence that the tradition was generated by scriptural expectation. Give the strongest alternative account of the same observation, and say what evidence would distinguish between the two.
  • Bultmann held both that a historical core of healings and exorcisms is probable and that the accounts must be demythologized. Explain how those two claims fit together in his programme, and whether you find the combination stable.
  • Ehrman argues that a miracle is by definition the least probable explanation, so a historian cannot conclude that one occurred. Is this an argument about evidence or about the definition of the method? Does the distinction matter to its force?
  • Meier believes the miracles occurred and holds that his historical work does not establish this. Some readers regard that as intellectual honesty and others as an artificial division. Argue for each verdict.
  • Keener's *Miracles* rests substantially on a very large body of contemporary testimony. What would a critic have to show in order to defeat that argument, and what would a defender have to show in order to complete it?
  • Take one specific account — the stilling of the storm, or the healing at Bethsaida in Mark 8:22-26 — and write two paragraphs about it, one strictly on the historical layer and one strictly on the theological layer. Where did you find yourself wanting to cross over, and why?

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