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BT602E The Synoptic Gospels

Lecture 8-1: How Parables Work, and How They Have Been Misread

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BT602E The Synoptic Gospels
제 0 장 · Introduction: Three Gospels, One Subject
  1. Introduction: Three Gospels, One Subject
제 1 장 · Chapter 1: What the Synoptic Gospels Are
  1. Lecture 1-1: Gospel as a Genre: Biography, History, or Something Else
  2. Lecture 1-2: Oral Tradition, Written Sources, and How the Gospels Reached Us
  3. Lecture 1-3: Why Three, and Why They Are Called Synoptic
제 2 장 · Chapter 2: The Synoptic Problem
  1. Lecture 2-1: The Data: Agreements, Disagreements, and Order
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Two-Source Theory and the Case for Q
  3. Lecture 2-3: The Alternatives: Griesbach, Farrer, and the Present State of the Question
제 3 장 · Chapter 3: The World in Which Jesus Taught
  1. Lecture 3-1: Galilee and Judea under Rome
  2. Lecture 3-2: Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes, and the Rest of Second Temple Judaism
  3. Lecture 3-3: Synagogue, Temple, Household: Where the Gospel Scenes Take Place
제 4 장 · Chapter 4: The Gospel of Mark
  1. Lecture 4-1: Structure, Pace, and the Shape of Mark's Story
  2. Lecture 4-2: Mark's Christology and the Question of the Messianic Secret
  3. Lecture 4-3: Discipleship, Failure, and the Ending at 16:8
제 5 장 · Chapter 5: The Gospel of Matthew
  1. Lecture 5-1: Structure, the Five Discourses, and Matthew's Jewish Frame
  2. Lecture 5-2: Fulfilment, Scripture, and the Law in Matthew
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Community Addressed: Church, Mission, and Judgment
제 6 장 · Chapter 6: The Gospel of Luke
  1. Lecture 6-1: Luke's Preface, Sources, and Claim to Orderly Account
  2. Lecture 6-2: Reversal: The Poor, Women, Samaritans, and Outsiders
  3. Lecture 6-3: The Spirit, Prayer, and the Journey to Jerusalem
제 7 장 · Chapter 7: The Kingdom of God
  1. Lecture 7-1: What Jesus Announced, and What His Hearers Would Have Heard
  2. Lecture 7-2: Present, Future, or Both: The Eschatology Debate
  3. Lecture 7-3: The Sermon on the Mount and the Demands of the Kingdom
제 8 장 · Chapter 8: The Parables
  1. Lecture 8-1: How Parables Work, and How They Have Been Misread
  2. Lecture 8-2: Parables of the Kingdom
  3. Lecture 8-3: Parables of Mercy, Warning, and Reversal
제 9 장 · Chapter 9: Miracles, Exorcisms, and Healing
  1. Lecture 9-1: Healings and Nature Miracles in the Synoptic Accounts
  2. Lecture 9-2: Exorcism and the Conflict with Evil
  3. Lecture 9-3: How Historians and Theologians Have Handled the Miracle Accounts
제 10 장 · Chapter 10: Jesus, the Law, the Temple, and Israel
  1. Lecture 10-1: The Sabbath and Purity Controversies
  2. Lecture 10-2: The Temple Action and What It Meant
  3. Lecture 10-3: Jesus and the Restoration of Israel: The Twelve and the Nations
제 11 장 · Chapter 11: Passion, Death, and Resurrection
  1. Lecture 11-1: The Last Supper and the Arrest
  2. Lecture 11-2: Trial, Crucifixion, and the Three Passion Narratives Compared
  3. Lecture 11-3: The Empty Tomb and the Resurrection Accounts
제 12 장 · Chapter 12: The Historical Jesus and the Gospels Today
  1. Lecture 12-1: The Quests for the Historical Jesus, from Reimarus to the Present
  2. Lecture 12-2: Criteria, Method, and What History Can and Cannot Establish
  3. Lecture 12-3: Preaching and Teaching the Synoptic Gospels

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42분

There is a way of describing parables that most readers of the gospels have absorbed without ever being taught it: a parable is a simple story that illustrates a spiritual truth, and interpreting it means finding out which truth. That description is not exactly wrong, but it is so weak that it permits almost any reading. It cannot tell a good interpretation from a bad one, because on that description any spiritual truth a story can be made to illustrate is a legitimate result. The history of parable interpretation is largely the history of readers noticing this problem and proposing rules to fix it — and then of other readers showing that the rules cut off something the parables actually do.

This lecture argues that the older and better description is the one implied by the Hebrew word behind parabole. A mashal is a comparison used as an instrument. It is thrown at someone. Its native setting in the Hebrew Bible is confrontation, and its most fully narrated example, Nathan before David in 2 Samuel 12, works by concealment: the hearer must not know what the story is about until he has committed himself. On this description, a parable is not primarily a container for information. It is a way of getting a verdict out of someone who would not have given it if asked directly. That is a claim about function, and it can be tested against the gospel parables, several of which end not with a statement but with a question put back to the audience.

The lecture then traces four stages of modern discussion — the allegorical tradition, Adolf Jülicher's attack on it, the eschatological correction of C. H. Dodd and Joachim Jeremias, and the partial rehabilitation of allegory by Craig Blomberg and Klyne Snodgrass — and finally faces the text that makes trouble for all of them, Mark 4:10-12, where the gospel appears to say that parables were spoken in order that outsiders should not understand. Four handlings of that text are set out, with the cost of each. The lecture does not choose between them, and the reader should be suspicious of any treatment that finds the choice easy.

이 42분으로 얻는 것

  • Explain the range of the Hebrew `mashal` and the Greek `parabole`, and show from the Hebrew Bible why "an earthly story with a heavenly meaning" is too narrow a definition.
  • Reconstruct Augustine's allegorical reading of the Good Samaritan and explain what made it a coherent method rather than an arbitrary one, before stating what Jülicher held against it.
  • State Jülicher's threefold classification and his single-point rule accurately, and give the two main objections raised against him in the twentieth century.
  • Describe how Dodd and Jeremias shifted the question from morality to eschatology, and identify the assumption about recoverable original forms on which Jeremias's method depends.
  • Set out at least three different ways of construing Mark 4:11-12 and name a specific cost attaching to each, without presenting one as the settled answer.

When he was alone, those who were around him with the twelve asked him about the parables. He said to them, “To you is given the mystery of the Kingdom of God, but to those who are outside, all things are done in parables, that ‘seeing they may see, and not perceive; and hearing they may hear, and not understand; lest perhaps they should turn again, and their sins should be forgiven them.’” — Mark 4:10-12

World English Bible

He said, “Go, and tell this people, ‘You hear indeed, but don’t understand; and you see indeed, but don’t perceive.’ Make the heart of this people fat. Make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and turn again, and be healed.” — Isaiah 6:9-10

WEB

Therefore I speak to them in parables, because seeing they don’t see, and hearing, they don’t hear, neither do they understand. — Matthew 13:13

WEB

David’s anger was greatly kindled against the man, and he said to Nathan, “As Yahweh lives, the man who has done this is worthy to die! He shall restore the lamb fourfold, because he did this thing, and because he had no pity!” Nathan said to David, “You are the man. This is what Yahweh, the God of Israel, says: ‘I anointed you king over Israel, and I delivered you out of the hand of Saul. — 2 Samuel 12:5-7

WEB

But he, desiring to justify himself, asked Jesus, “Who is my neighbor?” Jesus answered, “A certain man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and he fell among robbers, who both stripped him and beat him, and departed, leaving him half dead. — Luke 10:29-30

WEB

Four of these five passages set up problems this lecture has to solve. Mark 4:10-12 is the hard case, and it is placed first because a treatment of parables that saves it for the end has usually arranged its argument so that the text cannot disturb it. Isaiah 6:9-10 is the passage Mark is quoting, and comparing the two shows immediately that Mark's wording is not simply the Hebrew text: the last clause in Mark speaks of sins being forgiven, where Isaiah speaks of being healed, which points toward the Aramaic Targum tradition and is one piece of evidence in the debate below. Matthew 13:13 is the same saying as Mark's with one decisive difference of conjunction — Mark's "that" (purpose) has become Matthew's "because" (cause) — which shows that a first-century reader already found Mark's version difficult. The Nathan passage gives the mechanism in its clearest form. Luke 10:29-30 is here because it is the parable whose allegorical reading became the standard example of the method, and because the lawyer's self-justifying question is the setting the allegorical reading discards.

1. The word and its range

The Greek parabole is built from two elements meaning "throw" and "alongside": something set beside something else for comparison. In the , the Greek translation of the Hebrew scriptures used by most of the gospel writers and their audiences, parabole is the standard rendering of the Hebrew mashal, and the Hebrew word covers considerably more ground than a modern reader expects.

A mashal can be a short proverb: the book of Proverbs is titled mishle shelomoh, "the proverbs of Solomon." It can be a taunt or a byword — when Israel is warned that it will become a mashal among the nations, the sense is that it will be a cautionary example people point at. It can be a riddle or an obscure saying, paired in Hebrew poetry with chidah, "riddle." It can be an extended allegory: Ezekiel 17, with its two eagles and a vine, is called a mashal and is decoded piece by piece within the chapter itself. And it can be a narrative that traps the hearer, as in 2 Samuel 12.

Two consequences follow, and they pull in opposite directions. The first is that the gospels' use of "parable" for things that are not stories at all — a one-line comparison, an aphorism, a proverb about physicians and the sick — is not sloppiness. It is the ordinary range of the word. The second is that allegory cannot simply be ruled out of the category on definitional grounds. Ezekiel 17 is a mashal and it is an allegory with a key attached. Anyone who wishes to argue that gospel parables are never allegorical has to argue it case by case from the evidence, not from the meaning of the word. This point will matter when we reach Jülicher.

2. Nathan, and what a parable does

David’s anger was greatly kindled against the man, and he said to Nathan, “As Yahweh lives, the man who has done this is worthy to die! — 2 Samuel 12:5 (WEB)

The mechanism here is worth slowing down over, because it is the clearest surviving demonstration of what a mashal was for. Nathan does not accuse. He tells a story about a rich man, a poor man, and a lamb, and he tells it in the ordinary way a legal case might be brought before a king for judgment — which is very likely how David hears it. David gives a ruling. Only then does Nathan supply the identification: "You are the man."

Note what the story has accomplished that a direct accusation could not. David has already conceded the principle. He cannot now argue that taking what belongs to a weaker man is a small matter, because he has just said it is a capital matter. The parable has removed his ability to defend himself before he knew he needed a defence. This is the sense in which a parable puts the hearer in the position of judge and then moves the bench.

Several gospel parables end in exactly this shape. The Good Samaritan ends with a question put back to the questioner — "which of these three do you think seemed to be a neighbor" — and the lawyer answers correctly and is thereby committed. The wicked tenants in Mark 12 ends with a question about what the owner will do, and Mark records that the hearers "perceived that he spoke the parable against them." The two sons in Matthew 21:28-31 ends with "which of the two did the will of his father?" and the answer given by the audience is used against them in the next sentence. These are not stories with a moral appended. They are traps, in the same technical sense that Nathan's story is a trap.

But the qualification has to be made at once, or this becomes one of those elegant single-mechanism accounts that this course takes care to avoid. Not every gospel parable works this way. The mustard seed does not trap anyone. The seed growing by itself does not. The hidden treasure does not. If one insists that all parables are confrontational, one is generalising from the vivid cases. What can be said with more confidence is narrower: a significant subset of the parables — chiefly those told in controversy settings — works by eliciting a judgment, and these are the ones most often flattened when a parable is reduced to a lesson.

3. The allegorical tradition, at its strongest

Augustine's reading of the Good Samaritan, set out in his Questions on the Gospels, is the standard textbook example of allegorical interpretation, and it is usually cited in order to be laughed at. It should first be stated fairly. In Augustine's reading, the man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho is Adam, and by extension humanity; Jerusalem is the city of heavenly peace from which he falls; Jericho, a city associated with the moon and thus with mortality, is what he falls into; the robbers are the devil and his angels; the stripping is the loss of immortality; the priest and the Levite are the priesthood and ministry of the old , which could not heal; the Samaritan is Christ; the binding of wounds is the restraint of sin; the oil is the comfort of hope and the wine the exhortation to work; the beast is the flesh in which Christ came; the inn is the church; the innkeeper is the apostle Paul; and the two denarii are the two commandments of love, or the promise of this life and the life to come.

Why did an interpreter of Augustine's ability read this way? Not from carelessness. Three things supported the method. First, scripture itself sometimes allegorises: Ezekiel 17 decodes its own mashal, and the gospels themselves supply element-by-element interpretations of the sower and of the wheat and the darnel. If the text does it, a reader may reasonably conclude the text invites it. Second, the ancient world read its authoritative texts this way generally; allegorical reading of Homer was a respectable philosophical enterprise centuries before Christian interpreters applied the method to scripture, and Philo of Alexandria applied it to the . Third, and most importantly for Augustine, the method solved a pastoral problem: it made every part of the text useful, and it produced readings that were doctrinally sound because the doctrine was brought to the text and confirmed by it.

That last point is also the objection. A method that reliably confirms what the interpreter already holds is not testing anything. Augustine's Samaritan is a compressed statement of Augustine's soteriology, and there is no result the parable could have produced that would have unsettled it. Notice also what the reading loses: the lawyer's question, the shock of the word "Samaritan," and the closing command to go and do likewise all disappear, because in Augustine's reading no hearer is being asked to do anything. The parable has become a description of salvation rather than a demand.

4. Jülicher's attack

Adolf Jülicher published the first volume of Die Gleichnisreden Jesu in 1888 and the second in 1899, and modern parable study begins there. His argument had a formal and a historical part.

The formal part: Jülicher distinguished three types. A Gleichnis, or similitude, is a comparison drawn from what typically happens — a woman searching for a coin, a farmer sowing. A Parabel, or parable proper, narrates a particular fictional incident — a man who had two sons. A Beispielerzählung, or example story, does not compare at all but presents a case to imitate or avoid; he placed the Good Samaritan, the rich fool, the rich man and Lazarus, and the Pharisee and the tax collector in this last class. Against all of these he set allegory, in which each element points outside the story. His central claim was that a parable, unlike an allegory, has a single point of comparison — a tertium comparationis, a third thing the two compared items share — and that everything else in the story is scenery, present for verisimilitude and carrying no separate meaning. The innkeeper means nothing. The two denarii mean nothing.

The historical part: since the gospels do sometimes supply allegorical interpretations, and since on Jülicher's view Jesus did not speak allegorically, those interpretations must come from elsewhere. He assigned them to the early church, which had received the parables, no longer understood their original settings, and re-read them as coded descriptions of its own situation. Mark 4:14-20, the element-by-element reading of the sower, is his prime exhibit.

Jülicher's achievement was real and lasting. He showed that the allegorical method was unconstrained, that its results tracked the interpreter's theology, and that the parables had been made to say things they could not plausibly have said to a first-century audience in Galilee. Almost no serious interpreter since has returned to Augustine's procedure.

But two objections have stuck to him. The first concerns his results. When Jülicher extracted the single point of each parable, what he got was a set of general moral and religious maxims: the value of confidence in God, the duty of compassion, the certainty that good will grow. Later critics — Dodd most influentially — observed that this Jesus is a teacher of timeless liberal ethics who says nothing that could not have been said by a thoughtful nineteenth-century German Protestant, and that a Jesus so inoffensive is hard to reconcile with the fact that he was executed. The single-point rule had not so much clarified the parables as neutralised them.

The second objection concerns the rule itself. Jülicher drew his contrast between parable and allegory from Aristotelian rhetorical categories, applied as though they were universal. But the ancient Jewish mashal, as the material surveyed above shows, was not governed by that distinction; a mashal could carry several correspondences at once without ceasing to be a mashal. The rule that a parable has exactly one point turns out to be a nineteenth-century European rule imposed on first-century Jewish material — the same charge Jülicher had made against the allegorists, aimed back at him.

5. Dodd and Jeremias: the eschatological correction

C. H. Dodd's The Parables of the Kingdom (1935) accepted Jülicher's case against allegory and rejected his results. Dodd's argument was that a parable must be placed in the situation in which it was spoken, and that the situation was not a lecture on general religion but a crisis: Jesus was announcing that the reign of God had arrived, and the parables address people who must now decide. Read that way, the parables of growth are not lessons about patience but announcements that the harvest is here. Dodd's own eschatological position — that the kingdom was in a real sense already realised in Jesus' ministry, which is discussed in lecture 7-2 of this course — shaped which parables he emphasised, and readers should notice that.

Joachim Jeremias's Die Gleichnisse Jesu (1947, revised repeatedly) took Dodd's programme and made it a method. Jeremias argued that the parables reached us after passing through a process of transmission in the early church that changed them in describable ways, and he listed the changes as "laws of transformation": translation into Greek, embellishment with details, the influence of Hebrew scripture and folk-story motifs, a shift of audience from Jesus' opponents to the Christian community, a shift of application from crisis to or exhortation, the addition of allegorical interpretation, the collection of parables into groups, and the addition of framing settings. By reversing these, he believed, the interpreter could recover the parable's original form and its original setting in the ministry of Jesus.

The gain is substantial. Jeremias assembled a great deal of information about first-century agriculture, tenancy, wages, and household practice, and much of what he gathered is still used. And he was right that some development took place: the same parable does appear in different Synoptic settings, which means at least one gospel has placed it editorially.

How far can we reconstruct

This is a point where readers will not agree. The disagreement is about how much confidence the method supports. Jeremias held that the original form of most parables is recoverable with reasonable security, and printed reconstructions. Critics — including Charles Carlston and, from a different direction, Bernard Brandon Scott — have argued that the "laws of transformation" were derived from the same material they are then used to correct, which makes the procedure circular, and that a reconstruction dependent on that procedure cannot bear the weight of an argument about what Jesus meant. A middle position, taken by John Donahue among others, is that the gospel forms are what we actually have and should be interpreted as they stand within each gospel, with reconstruction treated as a separate and more speculative task. Note that this middle position does not deny that development occurred; it declines to build on the reconstruction.

6. The partial return of allegory

Two more recent bodies of work have argued that Jülicher's exclusion of allegory went too far, without wishing to return to Augustine.

Craig Blomberg, in Interpreting the Parables, proposed a rule to replace Jülicher's: a parable makes as many main points as it has main characters, which in practice is usually two or three. In the father and two sons there are three principal figures and therefore three claims — about the father, about the younger son, about the . On this account the correspondences are real but limited and controlled by the structure of the narrative, not by the interpreter's imagination. Blomberg's rule has been criticised as arbitrary in its own way, since "main character" is not always obvious and some parables with three characters clearly make one point, but it has the of being a rule that can be checked against a text.

Klyne Snodgrass, in Stories with Intent, argues the historical case more thoroughly. He assembles the ancient Jewish and Greco-Roman comparative material and shows that the sharp parable-allegory distinction is not found there; meshalim routinely carried multiple referents, and the rabbinic king-parables are frequently transparent about who the king is. On Snodgrass's account the right question is not "is this allegorical?" but "which correspondences does this story require, and how do we tell?" — and his answer is that a correspondence is warranted when the story could not function without it. If the father in Luke 15 does not correspond to God, the parable is a domestic anecdote with no point; if the innkeeper corresponds to Paul, nothing whatever in the story requires it.

That test is the practical result of the whole history rehearsed above, and it is what this chapter uses.

7. The problem of Mark 4:10-12

Now the hard text. Mark reports that when Jesus was alone, those around him with the twelve asked about the parables, and he replied that the mystery of the kingdom is given to them, while for those outside everything comes in parables — and then a purpose clause: so that seeing they may see and not perceive, and hearing they may hear and not understand, lest they should turn and be forgiven.

Read straightforwardly, this says the parables were told in order to prevent understanding, and thereby to prevent repentance and forgiveness. That reading is hard to reconcile with Mark 4:33, two dozen verses later, which says Jesus spoke the word to them in parables "as they were able to hear it" — a statement about accommodation to the hearers' capacity, which is nearly the opposite claim. It is also hard to reconcile with the parables that visibly do communicate: Mark 12:12 says the hearers understood perfectly well that the parable was against them.

At least four handlings are current. Each has a cost, and the cost should be stated with the proposal.

First: take the purpose clause as genuinely Mark's theology. On this reading, Mark means what he says. The parables function as judgment. This is not arbitrary cruelty but a pattern already present in the prophets — Isaiah 6:9-10 is precisely a commission to preach in a way that hardens — and it is a pattern the early Christians used repeatedly to make sense of the fact that most of Israel had not accepted their message. Mark has taken a scriptural precedent for divine hardening and applied it to Jesus' ministry. This reading is the most straightforward and is held by many commentators, including Joel Marcus in his Mark commentary. Cost: it makes Mark 4:33 hard to explain, it sits uneasily with Mark's own narrative where crowds respond warmly, and it attributes to Jesus a deliberate intention to prevent forgiveness that many readers find theologically intolerable — which is a reason for scrutiny, not by itself a refutation.

Second: the clause is not purpose but result. Greek hina most often introduces purpose, but it can carry a consecutive sense, "with the result that." On this reading, Mark is describing an outcome — the parables did in fact leave outsiders uncomprehending — and not an aim. Cost: this is a minority use of hina, and the following clause, "lest perhaps they should turn again," reinforces rather than softens the sense of intention. The construal is grammatically possible but not the natural one.

Third: an Aramaic source lies behind the Greek and has been mistranslated. T. W. Manson argued that the underlying Aramaic particle de is ambiguous — it can introduce a relative clause ("who see and do not perceive") as well as a purpose clause — and that Mark's Greek translator chose the wrong option. On this reading Jesus was quoting Isaiah descriptively, about people who see without perceiving, and the purposive sense is a translation accident. Cost: the proposal is unverifiable, since no Aramaic source survives; it has few defenders now; and it explains the difficulty by positing exactly the sort of convenient error that the difficulty calls for, which should make a reader cautious.

Fourth: the saying is a retrospective interpretation, formulated after the fact. On this reading the early church, or Mark, faced the question of why Jesus' message had been so widely rejected, found the answer in Isaiah 6 — a text used in the same way elsewhere in the New Testament — and formulated the saying accordingly. What began as an explanation of an outcome has been cast as a statement of purpose. Cost: this is a source-critical judgment, not a reading of the text; it may be right, but it removes the difficulty from Mark's Jesus by relocating it into Mark's community, which is a change of address rather than a solution for anyone reading the gospel as it stands.

One further piece of evidence belongs here, and it is the most secure thing in this section. Matthew, reading Mark, changed the conjunction. Where Mark has "that seeing they may see and not perceive," Matthew has "because seeing they don't see." Mark's purpose has become Matthew's cause: Jesus speaks in parables because the hearers are already unresponsive. Luke, at 8:10, keeps a shorter form closer to Mark's. Whatever one concludes, this much is demonstrable: the difficulty of Mark's formulation was felt within the first century, by a writer who had the text in front of him and altered it.

Two smaller observations. Mark's quotation ends with sins being forgiven, where the Hebrew of Isaiah 6:10 ends with being healed; the Aramaic Targum of Isaiah has a corresponding shift toward forgiveness, which suggests Mark is drawing on an interpretive tradition rather than translating the Hebrew directly. And the "outsiders" of Mark 4:11 are, in the immediate narrative, contrasted with a group that includes the twelve — who in the very next verse are told that they do not understand the parable either. Mark's insider group is not a group of successful interpreters. Whatever the division in 4:11 means, it does not mean that understanding is a possession the disciples securely hold; that is one of the threads running into lecture 4-3 of this course, on and failure in Mark.

8. Rabbinic parables, and a caution about influence

The parable did not stop with Jesus. Rabbinic literature contains hundreds of meshalim, many of them king-parables that begin with a formula meaning "a parable: to what may the matter be compared? To a king who…" These stories share a great deal with the gospel parables in form: everyday settings, royal and household figures, a comparison introduced by a fixed formula, and an application attached. David Stern's Parables in Midrash is the standard study, and comparison with this material has clarified a good deal — for instance, that the appended application is a normal feature of the genre and not necessarily a sign of secondary editing, which weakens one of Jülicher's arguments.

But the comparison must be handled carefully in one specific respect. The rabbinic collections are later than the gospels — the earliest, the Mishnah, was compiled around 200, and most of the parable material is later still. This means that arguments about direction of influence run both ways and settle very little. One cannot show that Jesus was drawing on a fixed rabbinic form, because the form is not documented that early; and one cannot show that the rabbis were drawing on Jesus either. The reasonable conclusion is the modest one: parable-telling was a widespread Jewish practice across a long period, and Jesus stands inside it rather than inventing it. Claims that Jesus' parables are unique in kind — as opposed to distinctive in content and vivid in execution — are difficult to sustain against this material, and a student should treat such claims as requiring evidence.

How many things in the story mean something? The spectrum of parable interpretation, with representative positions every detail means something exactly one point of comparison Augustine inn = the church innkeeper = Paul two denarii = two commandments Snodgrass as many as the story requires; mashal was never restricted to one Blomberg one point per main character, so usually two or three Julicher one tertium comparationis; the rest is scenery The working test used in this chapter A correspondence is warranted when the story stops functioning without it. Without a father who acts like God, Luke 15 has no point. Without an innkeeper who is Paul, Luke 10 works exactly as well.

The line is a spectrum, not a chronology; the positions are placed by how many correspondences each permits, and the dates run from Augustine in the fourth century to Snodgrass in the twenty-first without any tidy progression. Jülicher is set below the line at the far right to show that his position is the endpoint of the spectrum rather than a point along it. The panel states the test that follows from the whole history: not a fixed number of meanings, but a demand that the story itself justify each one.

6. Further Reading

  • Klyne R. Snodgrass, Stories with Intent, 2nd ed. (Eerdmans, 2018), especially the opening chapters on the nature of parables and on parable interpretation before the modern period.
  • David Stern, Parables in Midrash: Narrative and in Rabbinic Literature (Harvard University Press, 1991). The standard study of the rabbinic mashal, and the necessary control on claims about the originality of Jesus' parables.
  • C. H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom, rev. ed. (Nisbet, 1961). Short, still readable, and the book that reintroduced eschatology into the discussion.
  • Joachim Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus, rev. ed., trans. S. H. Hooke (SCM, 1972). Read the section on the "laws of transformation" directly rather than in summary, so as to judge the method for yourself.
  • Madeleine Boucher, The Mysterious Parable: A Literary Study (Catholic Biblical Association, 1977). Argues that the parable-allegory opposition is a category mistake, and treats Mark 4:10-12 at length.
  • Joel Marcus, Mark 1-8, Anchor Yale Bible (Doubleday, 2000). The excursus on the purpose of the parables sets out the case for reading Mark 4:12 as a genuine statement of purpose.
  • Craig L. Blomberg, Interpreting the Parables, 2nd ed. (IVP Academic, 2012), for the case that limited allegorical correspondence is both ancient and controllable.

핵심 요약

  • Nathan's parable to David (2 Samuel 12:1-7) shows the mechanism of a mashal: it gets a verdict out of the hearer before he knows the story is about him — David condemns the rich man before Nathan says "You are the man."
  • Augustine's allegorical reading of the Good Samaritan (inn = the church, innkeeper = Paul, two denarii = the two commandments) was a coherent method with real precedent (Ezekiel 17's self-decoded allegory), not mere arbitrariness, but it dissolves the lawyer's question and the command to "go and do likewise."
  • Jülicher (Die Gleichnisreden Jesu, 1888-1899) argued every parable has a single point of comparison (tertium comparationis) and assigned allegorical interpretations like Mark 4:14-20 to the early church; critics replied that his single-point rule produced a bland, inoffensive Jesus and imposed a nineteenth-century Aristotelian category onto Jewish meshalim that never respected it.
  • Mark 4:10-12 says parables were given so that outsiders would not understand and be forgiven — in apparent tension with Mark 4:33's "as they were able to hear it" — and Matthew changed Mark's purpose clause ("that") to a causal one ("because"), showing a first-century reader already found the saying difficult.
  • Snodgrass's working test — a correspondence is warranted only when the story stops functioning without it — resolves the allegory question practically: Luke 15's father must correspond to God or the parable has no point, but Luke 10's innkeeper need not correspond to Paul because nothing requires it.

If you remember nothing else from this lecture: A parable (Hebrew mashal) is not a decorative illustration of a truth but an instrument thrown at a hearer to extract a verdict, as Nathan's story to David demonstrates by getting David to condemn himself before he knows the story is about him. Augustine read parables as fully coded allegories; Jülicher attacked that method and insisted on exactly one point per parable, producing a tame, moralizing Jesus that Dodd found hard to square with a crucifixion; Jeremias then tried to strip away the layers of church transmission to recover an original form, a method later critics called circular. The hardest text is Mark 4:10-12, which seems to say parables were told to prevent understanding — Matthew already softened it by changing "that" to "because" — and this lecture's own working rule for how much a parable's details should be pressed is Snodgrass's: a detail matters only if the story cannot function without it.

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묵상 및 토론

  • State Augustine's reading of the Good Samaritan in your own words, as sympathetically as you can, before criticising it. What does the reading gain for a preacher, and what does it lose from Luke 10:29-37?
  • Jülicher's single-point rule produced a Jesus who taught general religious truths. Dodd thought this made the crucifixion inexplicable. Is that a good argument against a reading of the parables? What exactly does it prove, and what does it not?
  • Take one of the four handlings of Mark 4:11-12 described above and argue for it against the others, including the cost this lecture attached to it. Then argue the opposite side. Which argument was harder to make, and why?
  • Matthew changed Mark's "that" to "because." Does the fact that a first-century reader softened Mark's wording count as evidence about what Mark meant, about what Matthew thought Mark meant, or about neither? Be precise.
  • Apply the working test from the diagram to the two denarii in Luke 10:35 and to the father in Luke 15:20. Does the test give a clear answer in both cases? Find a detail in some parable where it does not.
  • The rabbinic parable collections are later than the gospels. Explain carefully why this makes influence arguments weak in both directions, and say what can still legitimately be concluded from the comparison.

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