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BT602E The Synoptic Gospels

Lecture 12-2: Criteria, Method, and What History Can and Cannot Establish

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BT602E The Synoptic Gospels
제 0 장 · Introduction: Three Gospels, One Subject
  1. Introduction: Three Gospels, One Subject
제 1 장 · Chapter 1: What the Synoptic Gospels Are
  1. Lecture 1-1: Gospel as a Genre: Biography, History, or Something Else
  2. Lecture 1-2: Oral Tradition, Written Sources, and How the Gospels Reached Us
  3. Lecture 1-3: Why Three, and Why They Are Called Synoptic
제 2 장 · Chapter 2: The Synoptic Problem
  1. Lecture 2-1: The Data: Agreements, Disagreements, and Order
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Two-Source Theory and the Case for Q
  3. Lecture 2-3: The Alternatives: Griesbach, Farrer, and the Present State of the Question
제 3 장 · Chapter 3: The World in Which Jesus Taught
  1. Lecture 3-1: Galilee and Judea under Rome
  2. Lecture 3-2: Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes, and the Rest of Second Temple Judaism
  3. Lecture 3-3: Synagogue, Temple, Household: Where the Gospel Scenes Take Place
제 4 장 · Chapter 4: The Gospel of Mark
  1. Lecture 4-1: Structure, Pace, and the Shape of Mark's Story
  2. Lecture 4-2: Mark's Christology and the Question of the Messianic Secret
  3. Lecture 4-3: Discipleship, Failure, and the Ending at 16:8
제 5 장 · Chapter 5: The Gospel of Matthew
  1. Lecture 5-1: Structure, the Five Discourses, and Matthew's Jewish Frame
  2. Lecture 5-2: Fulfilment, Scripture, and the Law in Matthew
  3. Lecture 5-3: The Community Addressed: Church, Mission, and Judgment
제 6 장 · Chapter 6: The Gospel of Luke
  1. Lecture 6-1: Luke's Preface, Sources, and Claim to Orderly Account
  2. Lecture 6-2: Reversal: The Poor, Women, Samaritans, and Outsiders
  3. Lecture 6-3: The Spirit, Prayer, and the Journey to Jerusalem
제 7 장 · Chapter 7: The Kingdom of God
  1. Lecture 7-1: What Jesus Announced, and What His Hearers Would Have Heard
  2. Lecture 7-2: Present, Future, or Both: The Eschatology Debate
  3. Lecture 7-3: The Sermon on the Mount and the Demands of the Kingdom
제 8 장 · Chapter 8: The Parables
  1. Lecture 8-1: How Parables Work, and How They Have Been Misread
  2. Lecture 8-2: Parables of the Kingdom
  3. Lecture 8-3: Parables of Mercy, Warning, and Reversal
제 9 장 · Chapter 9: Miracles, Exorcisms, and Healing
  1. Lecture 9-1: Healings and Nature Miracles in the Synoptic Accounts
  2. Lecture 9-2: Exorcism and the Conflict with Evil
  3. Lecture 9-3: How Historians and Theologians Have Handled the Miracle Accounts
제 10 장 · Chapter 10: Jesus, the Law, the Temple, and Israel
  1. Lecture 10-1: The Sabbath and Purity Controversies
  2. Lecture 10-2: The Temple Action and What It Meant
  3. Lecture 10-3: Jesus and the Restoration of Israel: The Twelve and the Nations
제 11 장 · Chapter 11: Passion, Death, and Resurrection
  1. Lecture 11-1: The Last Supper and the Arrest
  2. Lecture 11-2: Trial, Crucifixion, and the Three Passion Narratives Compared
  3. Lecture 11-3: The Empty Tomb and the Resurrection Accounts
제 12 장 · Chapter 12: The Historical Jesus and the Gospels Today
  1. Lecture 12-1: The Quests for the Historical Jesus, from Reimarus to the Present
  2. Lecture 12-2: Criteria, Method, and What History Can and Cannot Establish
  3. Lecture 12-3: Preaching and Teaching the Synoptic Gospels

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35분

The previous lecture ended with a problem rather than a conclusion: competent scholars working on the same three Gospels have produced portraits of Jesus that contradict one another. This lecture examines the machinery that was supposed to prevent exactly that. From the middle of the twentieth century, historical Jesus research developed a set of tools called the criteria of authenticity — rules for deciding whether a particular saying or deed in the tradition goes back to Jesus himself or was formed later. The criteria were an attempt to make the discipline auditable. Instead of a scholar's intuition, there would be a stated test that any reader could apply and check.

The lecture argues two things about that attempt. The first is that the criteria were a reasonable response to a real problem and that some of them still do useful work when their limits are understood. The second is that the objections raised against them since the 1990s are serious and, in the case of the criterion of dissimilarity, close to fatal in its classical form. A criterion that certifies as authentic only material unlike Judaism and unlike the early church will, applied consistently, deliver a Jesus who belongs to neither, and that result is historically incredible before any particular text is discussed.

The lecture then takes up the alternative that a number of scholars now propose — an approach built around memory rather than around the extraction of authentic units — and states the objections to it as well. It closes with a separate and older question that is often confused with these: whether historical research can establish, or destroy, what Christian faith holds about Jesus. Martin Kaehler put a distinction on the table in 1892 that has framed the discussion since, and it has been developed and contested in ways that do not line up neatly with confessional boundaries.

This is a lecture in method, not a lecture in conclusions. It will not tell you what Jesus said. It will tell you what kind of argument would be needed to establish that he said it, and what kinds of argument have been shown not to work.

이 35분으로 얻는 것

  • State each of the principal criteria of authenticity — multiple attestation, dissimilarity, embarrassment, Semitic background and Palestinian environment, coherence, rejection and execution — and explain the reasoning that motivates each.
  • Present the main objection to each criterion, and explain in detail why the criterion of dissimilarity has been judged the most damaged.
  • Describe the criterion of historical plausibility proposed by Gerd Theissen and Dagmar Winter, and say what it is meant to repair.
  • Explain Chris Keith's argument that the criteria approach depends on a form-critical model of the tradition that few now hold, and state at least two objections to abandoning the criteria altogether.
  • Distinguish what historical method can establish about Jesus from what it cannot, using Martin Kaehler's distinction and at least two later positions, without treating any one of those positions as the course's verdict.

He said to them, “But who do you say that I am?” Peter answered, “You are the Christ.” — Mark 8:29

World English Bible

He said to them, “But who do you say that I am?” Simon Peter answered, “You are the Christ, the Son of the living God.” — Matthew 16:15-16

WEB

He said to them, “But who do you say that I am?” Peter answered, “The Christ of God.” — Luke 9:20

WEB

As he was going out into the way, one ran to him, knelt before him, and asked him, “Good Teacher, what shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?” Jesus said to him, “Why do you call me good? No one is good except one—God. — Mark 10:17-18

WEB

But of that day or that hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father. — Mark 13:32

WEB

The first three passages are the same question asked once and answered three times, in three forms, and they are a compact demonstration of the problem this lecture addresses. Mark's Peter says "You are the Christ." Matthew's Peter says "You are the Christ, the Son of the living God." Luke's Peter says "The Christ of God." No criterion tells us on its own which of these, if any, reproduces what was said at Caesarea Philippi; what the criteria are supposed to do is to license a judgment about the underlying scene. Mark 10:17-18 and Mark 13:32 are the two standard illustrations of the criterion of embarrassment: sayings in which Jesus declines the word "good" and disclaims knowledge of the day and hour, both of which later writers can be shown to have found awkward, since Matthew rewrites the first and a substantial body of manuscripts omits "nor the Son" from the parallel at Matthew 24:36.

1. Why criteria were invented

The criteria are a child of form criticism. Once the Synoptic tradition was analysed as a collection of small units that had circulated separately and been shaped by their use in early communities — the model described in chapter 1 of this course — a specific consequence followed. If a unit's present form reflects its use in the community, then a scholar who wants to reach behind that use needs a way of distinguishing what the community shaped from what it received.

Before the criteria, the distinguishing was done by judgment. A scholar of good sense would say that a saying "bears the stamp of Jesus" or "reflects the situation of the church," and readers would agree or not depending on whether they trusted the scholar. Schweitzer's criticism of the nineteenth century, discussed in the last lecture, is precisely a criticism of that mode of working: judgment unconstrained by a stated procedure returns what the judge brought.

The criteria were the constraint. Norman Perrin's Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus (1967) gave them their most influential compact statement in English; John P. Meier's A Marginal Jew, volume 1 (1991), gave the most careful and self-critical version, distinguishing primary from secondary criteria and warning at length against mechanical application. It is worth noting that Meier, who used the criteria more extensively than almost anyone, was also unusually explicit about their limits.

2. The criteria, one by one

Multiple attestation. If a saying or a motif appears in more than one independent source, it is less likely to have been created by any one of them. On the Two-Source Theory, the independent sources available are Mark, the sayings material shared by Matthew and Luke, the special material of Matthew, the special material of Luke, and — for some scholars — John, Paul, and the Gospel of Thomas. The criterion has a second and stronger form, multiple attestation of forms: a motif that appears across parable, aphorism, controversy story, and narrative is unlikely to be the product of a single setting.

The objection is twofold. First, independence is a theoretical construct, and on the Farrer hypothesis — that Luke used Matthew and there was no separate sayings source — one of the supposedly independent witnesses disappears. A criterion whose results shift with an unsettled source theory is not as firm as it looks. Second, multiple attestation shows that a tradition is early and widespread, not that it originates with Jesus; a motif created in the first decade would be multiply attested by the time our sources were written.

Dissimilarity. If a saying cannot be derived from the Judaism of Jesus' time and cannot be explained as a creation of the early church, it is unlikely to come from anywhere except Jesus. In the New Quest this was the workhorse criterion, and its appeal is obvious: it is the one criterion that seems to isolate Jesus from the two environments that might have generated the material.

The objection is now widely regarded as decisive against the criterion in this form, and it has three parts.

Using it to reject

The logical part: dissimilarity can only exclude, never include. Material that passes the test may be authentic, but material that fails it is not thereby shown to be inauthentic — Jesus, being a Jew who founded a movement, would be expected to say a great deal that is continuous with his people's tradition and a great deal that his followers went on repeating. Used as a filter for what to accept, the criterion is defensible; used as a filter for what to reject, it is a mistake, and it was routinely used the second way.

The historical part: a Jesus reconstructed only from doubly dissimilar material is a Jesus with no Jewish context and no explanatory relation to the movement that followed him. That is not a marginal result but an incoherent one, since a historical figure must be intelligible in his setting and must account for what came after.

The consequential part, stated most forcefully by Dagmar Winter and by Jewish scholars including Amy-Jill Levine: the criterion, applied over decades, generated a body of scholarship in which Jesus is defined by his difference from Judaism. Whatever the intentions of individual practitioners, the tool built a contrast into every result, and the historical study of Jesus thereby reinforced a picture of Judaism as the foil rather than the home. This course has flagged that danger at several earlier points; here we can see one of its mechanisms.

Embarrassment. Material that the early church would have found awkward is unlikely to have been invented by it. The standard examples are the baptism of Jesus by John, which requires explanation in Matthew and is handled at increasing distance in Luke and John; the saying at Mark 10:18 declining the address "good"; the disclaimer of knowledge at Mark 13:32; the accusation at Matthew 11:19 that Jesus was a glutton and a drunkard; and the crucifixion itself.

The objections are real but narrower. Embarrassment is judged from our position, not from theirs, and what embarrasses a fourth-century or a twenty-first-century reader may not have embarrassed a first-century one. The argument also proves less than it seems: it shows that a tradition is early and not freely invented, not that it is accurate in detail. And a saying can be awkward for one community and useful for another; Mark 13:32 is inconvenient for a high christology and perfectly serviceable for a community discouraging date-setting.

Semitic background and Palestinian environment. Material showing Aramaic idiom underneath the Greek, or presupposing conditions specific to pre-70 Jewish Palestine — agricultural practice, coinage, village structure, purity concerns — is more likely to be early. Joachim Jeremias made heavy use of this line of argument.

The objection: the earliest church was also Aramaic-speaking and Palestinian. Semitic idiom locates a tradition in the right region and language, not in the right mouth. As a criterion of authenticity it is weak; as a criterion of early date it is useful, which is a different claim.

Coherence. Material that fits well with what has already been established by the other criteria may be accepted. Meier classifies this as strictly secondary and warns that it can only extend a database, never found one.

The objection is straightforward and severe: coherence amplifies whatever the primary criteria produced, including their errors. If dissimilarity has generated a skewed core, coherence will grow that core into a portrait while giving the appearance of accumulating evidence.

Rejection and execution. This is not a criterion for individual sayings but a constraint on the whole reconstruction: whatever Jesus said and did must be sufficient to explain why he was executed by Roman authority as a threat to public order. Sanders makes this constraint central, and it is one of the few tests that operates on a portrait rather than on a unit.

The objection here is not that the constraint is wrong but that it is loose. A great many reconstructions can be made to satisfy it with some ingenuity, and it eliminates only the most anodyne portraits — which is a real service, but a limited one.

3. The reformulation: historical plausibility

Gerd Theissen and Dagmar Winter, in Die Kriterienfrage in der Jesusforschung (1997; English translation The Quest for the Plausible Jesus, 2002), proposed replacing dissimilarity with a criterion built on the opposite intuition. Their criterion of historical plausibility has two halves. Plausibility of context: a tradition is more likely authentic if it fits within Judaism of the period, since Jesus was a first-century Jew and an implausible Jew is not a plausible historical figure. Plausibility of effects: a tradition is more likely authentic if it helps explain the movement that followed, though not if it is fully explained by that movement's later interests.

The formulation is elegant, and the build principle of this course requires that elegance be flagged rather than admired. Notice what it does: it inverts dissimilarity's two exclusions into two inclusions while retaining a check against wholesale derivation from later interest. That is a genuinely better instrument. But it also softens the criterion into something closer to a general judgment of fit, and a judgment of fit is exactly what the criteria were invented to replace. Theissen and Winter would answer that the fit is publicly arguable in a way that intuition is not, which is fair; a reader should nonetheless notice that the gain in historical realism is bought with some loss in mechanical checkability.

4. The stronger challenge: abandon the criteria

This is a point where readers will not agree. A group of scholars, of whom Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne are the most prominent organisers, argue that the criteria cannot be repaired and should be abandoned. The argument, set out in Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity (2012), runs as follows.

The criteria presuppose a specific model of the tradition: discrete units, transmitted more or less intact, some of them bearing later community shaping like a coat of paint that a trained eye can strip off to reach an original layer underneath. That model came from classical form criticism. But form criticism's account of transmission has been substantially undermined — by work on oral tradition showing that oral performance does not preserve and then overlay so much as re-perform, and by the recognition that our sources are not sediment but authored texts. If there is no clean original layer beneath the interpretation, then a tool designed to reach it is not merely imprecise; it is aimed at something that does not exist.

Keith's positive proposal is to change the question. Instead of asking "which units are authentic?", ask "how did the Jesus tradition come to look like this?" — treating the Gospels as artefacts of memory and asking what past must be posited to explain the memories we have. This connects to a wider body of work on social memory, drawing on Maurice Halbwachs and later theorists, in which remembering is understood as a present activity performed by communities with present needs, and in which the past constrains but does not dictate the memory. James Dunn's Jesus Remembered (2003) and Dale Allison's Constructing Jesus (2010) reach related conclusions by different routes: Dunn from oral tradition, Allison from the observation that human memory is reliable for gist and unreliable for detail, which suggests working from recurrent patterns across the tradition rather than from individually certified units.

The objections to abandoning the criteria deserve equal weight, and they come from scholars who accept much of the diagnosis.

First, a practical objection: the memory approach tells us what the tradition is but is much less clear about how to adjudicate between rival reconstructions. If two scholars posit different pasts to explain the same memories, memory theory as such does not settle which is better, and the criteria at least offered a shared vocabulary of argument. Second, an objection from practice: working historians in other fields make judgments of the kind the criteria formalise — this detail is unlikely to be invented, that one serves the author's agenda — without supposing they are peeling paint, and it is not obvious that the criteria require the form-critical model as strongly as Keith argues. Meier's own use, case by case and cumulative rather than mechanical, is offered as a counter-example. Third, an objection about consequences: if no unit can be assessed, the field risks retreating into describing the texts, which is valuable but is a different discipline from history.

Where does this leave a student? Not with a verdict. The honest statement of the present situation is that the classical criteria are no longer used with confidence by most specialists, that dissimilarity in particular is widely regarded as discredited in its classical form, that no replacement has achieved consensus, and that a good deal of current work proceeds by cumulative argument about the whole rather than certification of the parts.

5. What history can and cannot establish

This is a different question, and confusing it with the previous one produces a great deal of bad argument in both directions.

Martin Kaehler's short book of 1892, Der sogenannte historische Jesus und der geschichtliche, biblische Christus, translated as The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ, made a distinction that has organised the discussion since. Kaehler was writing against the nineteenth-century lives of Jesus and made two claims. The first is historical: the sources do not permit a biography, so the enterprise is built on sand. The second is theological: even if it succeeded, the resulting figure would not be the object of Christian faith, because faith is directed to the Christ proclaimed in Scripture, and a faith dependent on the shifting results of professorial research would be a faith held hostage to a guild. His phrase, that the historians' Jesus is a modern construction hiding the biblical Christ, is polemical, but the underlying claim is not merely negative: it is that the church's access to Jesus runs through the apostolic proclamation and not around it.

Several positions have developed from and against this.

Bultmann took Kaehler's second claim further, as described in the last lecture: faith rests on the kerygma, the proclamation, and to seek historical security for it is to seek a work of one's own. Kaesemann accepted the theological point but insisted that some continuity must be demonstrable or the proclamation loses its object. Wolfhart Pannenberg argued the opposite of Bultmann, holding that the Christian claim is a claim about history and must be defensible as such, so that historical inquiry is not a threat to be managed but the arena in which the claim stands or falls. N. T. Wright operates with a similar confidence in a different key. Luke Timothy Johnson, in The Real Jesus (1996), argued that the church's knowledge of Jesus is mediated by the resurrection and the practices of the community, and that historical reconstruction, whatever its scholarly interest, is not the church's source. Dale Allison occupies an uncomfortable and instructive position: he judges the historical evidence to support an apocalyptic prophet whose central expectation was not fulfilled, states plainly the difficulty this creates for a faith he continues to hold, and declines to resolve it neatly.

The confessional traditions do not align with these positions in a simple way, and it would be misleading to suggest they do. Catholic teaching, in Dei Verbum and in the Pontifical Biblical Commission's 1964 instruction on the historical truth of the Gospels, both affirms the historical character of what the Gospels hand on and explicitly recognises three stages — what Jesus did and taught, what the apostles preached, what the evangelists selected and shaped for their communities. Orthodox theology has generally been less engaged with the quest as a project and locates knowledge of Christ in the liturgical and patristic tradition. Protestant positions run across the whole range described above, from Bultmann to Pannenberg to conservative apologetic. Any student who reports that one tradition is "for" and another "against" historical criticism has flattened a complicated map.

What can be said, and what a student should be able to defend, is a distinction of levels. The historian, as historian, works with public evidence and probabilistic argument, and can therefore reach conclusions of the form "it is very likely that Jesus was baptised by John" or "the temple action is well attested and needs explaining." The historian, as historian, cannot license a conclusion of the form "God acted here," because that claim is not the kind of thing public evidence and probability adjudicate — a point on which Meier, Bart Ehrman, and a number of theologians agree while disagreeing about almost everything else. What follows from that limitation is contested: for some it means faith is untouched by history, for others it means faith makes claims that reach beyond what history can reach without contradicting it, and for others still it means the claims should not be made. Those are three different positions and this lecture names them without choosing.

6. A warning about elegance

Two of this lecture's central moves are tidy enough to deserve suspicion, and the course's build principle requires saying so.

The first is the diagnosis that the criteria failed because they inherited a defective model of transmission. That is a clean explanation and it may be correct, but it also has the shape of a story a new movement tells about the movement it replaces. Some of the criteria — embarrassment, rejection and execution — do not obviously depend on the form-critical model at all, and the wholesale diagnosis passes over that.

The second is the level distinction just drawn between historical and theological judgment. It resolves a great deal at once, which is precisely what should make a reader check it. It can be used honestly, and it can also be used to protect a claim from evidence by declaring the evidence irrelevant in advance. Whether a given use is one or the other cannot be settled in general; it has to be examined case by case, which is less satisfying than a rule and more truthful than one.

The diagram tabulates the classical criteria against what each was designed to do and the principal objection to each, with the two proposed responses at the foot.

Criteria of Authenticity: purpose and objection No criterion establishes authenticity by itself; each was answered, and one was answered decisively Criterion Designed to show Principal objection Multiple attestation Not the creation of one source Independence depends on an unsettled source theory Dissimilarity the damaged one Not derivable from Judaism nor from the early church Yields a Jesus detached from his people and from his own movement; excludes, cannot include Embarrassment Not invented, since it caused trouble We judge the embarrassment, not they Semitic background Rooted in pre-70 Jewish Palestine So was the earliest church that transmitted it Coherence Fits an already established core Amplifies the core's errors along with its results Rejection and execution A portrait that explains a crucifixion Loose: many rival portraits can satisfy it Response A: repair Theissen and Winter: historical plausibility - plausible in a Jewish context - plausible as a cause of the movement Cost: trades checkability for realism Response B: replace Keith, Le Donne, Dunn, Allison: memory - ask what past explains these memories - work from patterns, not certified units Cost: weaker means of adjudicating rivals

6. Further Reading

  • John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew, vol. 1: The Roots of the Problem and the Person (Doubleday, 1991) — part one sets out the criteria with unusual care about their limits.
  • Norman Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus (Harper & Row, 1967) — the classical statement, worth reading to see the criteria used with full confidence.
  • Gerd Theissen and Dagmar Winter, The Quest for the Plausible Jesus: The Question of Criteria, trans. M. Eugene Boring (Westminster John Knox, 2002).
  • Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne, eds., Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity (T and T Clark, 2012) — includes responses from scholars who disagree with the volume's thesis.
  • Anthony Le Donne, The Historiographical Jesus: Memory, , and the Son of David (Baylor, 2009).
  • Martin Kaehler, The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ, trans. Carl E. Braaten (Fortress, 1964) — short, and the origin of a distinction still in use.
  • Luke Timothy Johnson, The Real Jesus (HarperSanFrancisco, 1996), and Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus: God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (Westminster, 1968) — opposite answers to the same question.
  • Pontifical Biblical Commission, Sancta Mater Ecclesia (1964), on the historical truth of the Gospels — brief, and the clearest official statement of the three-stage model.

핵심 요약

  • The criterion of dissimilarity — authentic only if derivable from neither Judaism nor the early church — is judged the most damaged of all the criteria: it can logically only exclude material, never confirm it, and applied consistently it yields a Jesus detached from both his own Jewish context and the movement he founded, which Dagmar Winter and Amy-Jill Levine argue built an anti-Jewish contrast into decades of scholarly results.
  • The criterion of embarrassment (Jesus refusing the title "good" in Mark 10:18, disclaiming knowledge of "the day or hour" in Mark 13:32) shows a tradition is early and not freely invented, but the objection is that we judge the embarrassment from our own vantage point, not the first century's, and a saying awkward for one community could be perfectly useful to another.
  • Gerd Theissen and Dagmar Winter's "criterion of historical plausibility" inverts dissimilarity into two positive tests — plausible within a Jewish context, and plausible as a cause of the movement that followed — trading dissimilarity's mechanical checkability for a more historically realistic but harder-to-audit judgment of fit.
  • Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne argue the entire criteria approach depends on a form-critical model of clean, discrete units later "painted over" by community shaping, a model that oral-tradition research has substantially undermined; their proposed alternative asks what past must be posited to explain the Gospels as artifacts of communal memory, drawing on James Dunn's and Dale Allison's related but independently argued positions.
  • Martin Kaehler's 1892 distinction between the "historical Jesus" reconstructed by critical method and the "historic, biblical Christ" proclaimed by the church still organizes the debate: Bultmann pushed Kaehler's second claim further (faith rests on proclamation, not historical proof), Pannenberg argued the opposite (Christian claims must be historically defensible), and Dale Allison occupies the uncomfortable middle, stating plainly the difficulty his own historical conclusions create for the faith he continues to hold.

If you remember nothing else from this lecture: The criteria of authenticity were invented to replace a scholar's unconstrained judgment with a stated, checkable test, but the workhorse criterion of the New Quest — dissimilarity from both Judaism and the early church — has been judged close to fatal in its classical form, because a filter that can only exclude material was routinely used to reject it, producing a Jesus with no coherent home in his own century. Peter's three different answers to "who do you say that I am?" across Mark, Matthew, and Luke (Mark 8:29, Matthew 16:15-16, Luke 9:20) illustrate exactly the problem no criterion alone can solve. Proposed replacements — Theissen and Winter's "historical plausibility," or Keith and Le Donne's turn to social memory — repair real defects but at a real cost to how mechanically the results can be checked. And running alongside this entirely is Martin Kaehler's older and separate question, still unresolved a century later: whether the historian's Jesus and the church's Christ are reachable by the same kind of argument at all.

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  • Take Mark 10:18 and apply each criterion to it in turn, stating what each would conclude and how confident that conclusion could be. Where do the criteria disagree with each other?
  • The criterion of dissimilarity was designed to be rigorous and ended by producing a historically implausible figure. What does that tell you about the relation between rigour and reliability in historical argument generally?
  • Theissen and Winter's criterion of historical plausibility is more realistic than what it replaces but harder to check. Is a criterion that cannot be mechanically applied still a criterion, or has it become a name for good judgment?
  • Chris Keith argues that the criteria depend on a model of transmission few now hold. Choose one criterion that seems to you least dependent on that model and make the case for keeping it.
  • Kaehler argued that faith directed at the results of historical research would be hostage to the guild. Pannenberg argued that a faith making historical claims must be defensible historically. Can both be right about different things, and if so, about what?
  • Dale Allison states a historical conclusion he finds difficult for his own faith and declines to resolve the difficulty. Is that intellectual honesty, an evasion, or something else?

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