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STEL9E Philosophy for Theology: Knowing, Being, Language, Argument and Evil

Lecture 3-1: Being, Substance and Essence

목차 31
STEL9E Philosophy for Theology: Knowing, Being, Language, Argument and Evil
제 0 장 · Introduction: Why Does a Student of Theology Need Philosophy?
  1. Lecture 0: Introduction: Why Does a Student of Theology Need Philosophy?
제 1 장 · Week 1: Philosophy and Theology: A Long Conversation
  1. Lecture 1-1: Why Theology Cannot Avoid Philosophy
  2. Lecture 1-2: Athens and Jerusalem: The Early Church and Greek Thought
  3. Lecture 1-3: From Augustine to Aquinas
  4. Lecture 1-4: Reformation, Enlightenment and Today's Conversation
  5. Lecture 1-5: Practice Lab: My Stance Toward Philosophy
제 2 장 · Week 2: Knowing: Epistemology
  1. Lecture 2-1: Knowing, Believing, Justifying
  2. Lecture 2-2: Reason, Revelation and Faith
  3. Lecture 2-3: Evidence and Basic Beliefs
  4. Lecture 2-4: Testimony, Community and Virtue
  5. Lecture 2-5: Practice Lab: When I Say "I Know"
제 3 장 · Week 3: Being: Metaphysics
  1. Lecture 3-1: Being, Substance and Essence
  2. Lecture 3-2: Cause, Possibility and Necessity
  3. Lecture 3-3: Time, Eternity, Providence and Freedom
  4. Lecture 3-4: Arguments for God, Read Fairly
  5. Lecture 3-5: Practice Lab: What I Take for Granted
제 4 장 · Week 4: Language: How We Speak of God
  1. Lecture 4-1: Speaking of God: Literal and Figurative
  2. Lecture 4-2: Analogy
  3. Lecture 4-3: The Negative Way and Silence
  4. Lecture 4-4: Creeds, Scripture and Translation
  5. Lecture 4-5: Practice Lab: The Words I Use for God
제 5 장 · Week 5: Reading and Writing Arguments
  1. Lecture 5-1: The Bones of an Argument
  2. Lecture 5-2: Induction, Best Explanation and Evidence
  3. Lecture 5-3: Common Fallacies and Traps
  4. Lecture 5-4: Mystery, Paradox and Contradiction
  5. Lecture 5-5: Practice Lab: Drawing the Bones of a Text
제 6 장 · Week 6: Evil, and the Place of Philosophy
  1. Lecture 6-1: The Problem of Evil, Stated Fairly
  2. Lecture 6-2: Ways of Answering: Free Will, Soul-Making and More
  3. Lecture 6-3: Against Theodicy, and the Cross
  4. Lecture 6-4: Neither Enemy nor Servant: Putting the Course Together
  5. Lecture 6-5: Practice Lab: My Philosophy and My Theology on One Page

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25분

Last week we asked what it is to know. This week we ask a different question: what is there to know about, and what does it mean for anything to be? The study of that question is called metaphysics. The word sounds grand, but the questions are plain. What is a thing? What makes it the thing it is? What changes when it changes, and what stays the same? Are there general things, like "redness" or "humanity", or only particular red things and particular human beings?

A student of theology meets these questions even without looking for them. Creeds and textbooks speak of nature, substance and being. This lecture explains what those words meant when they were borrowed, gives a beginner's picture of the old argument about general things, and asks whether such ideas are a tool, a framework or a danger. It uses creation and the incarnation only as examples of philosophical words at work. The doctrines themselves belong to the doctrine courses.

A hard passage may be skipped without losing the rest. The section on general things is the hardest. If it is too heavy for today, read the paragraph that ends it and move on.

이 25분으로 얻는 것

  • Say in one sentence what metaphysics asks, and give an everyday example of a thing and its properties.
  • Explain the difference between essence and accident, using an example of your own.
  • Describe in a beginner's form the two main answers to the problem of general things (realism and nominalism).
  • Name two places where theology has used metaphysical words, and say why the word is a tool and not a proof.
  • Explain why the same borrowed word can be read as a help or as a framework that shapes the doctrine.

God said to Moses, “I AM WHO I AM,” and he said, “You shall tell the children of Israel this: ‘I AM has sent me to you.’”" — Exodus 3:14

World English Bible

For by him all things were created, in the heavens and on the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers; all things have been created through him, and for him." — Colossians 1:16

WEB

He is before all things, and in him all things are held together." — Colossians 1:17

WEB

‘For in him we live, and move, and have our being.’ As some of your own poets have said, ‘For we are also his offspring.’" — Acts 17:28

WEB

The Hebrew words of this answer can be translated in more than one way. Some translators and readers take the sense to be I am who I am, some I will be who I will be. The early Greek translation of the Old Testament put it into a form that a Greek reader could hear as a statement about being. Many Christian writers, ancient and medieval, read the verse as speaking of God's own being. Many modern interpreters read it first as a promise of God's faithful presence with Moses and the people. Both readings have been held by serious believers, and the lecture does not need you to choose one.

What the text says: God names himself to Moses; all things were made through Christ and are held together in him; Paul tells Athenians that human life depends on God, and he borrows words from their own poets. A tradition's reading: many have found in these verses a statement that every created thing depends on God for its being. Others stress that these passages are about God's presence, the person of Christ and the gathering of Jews and Gentiles, and are not lessons in metaphysics. Our judgement: none of these verses is a proof for one theory of being. They are the kind of text that makes a believer ask the metaphysical question, which is not the same as answering it.

1. What metaphysics asks

Look at the cup on a table. You can say many things about it. It is white. It is round. It holds a drink. It was made in a factory. It is chipped. If you drop it, it breaks. Metaphysics steps back from those facts and asks questions about the cup that are so simple that we normally skip them. What is it for the cup to exist? What is a thing, as opposed to the white and the round that we say of it? When the cup is chipped it is still the same cup. When it is smashed it is no longer a cup. What marks that line?

Metaphysics (from a Greek phrase used for the books that came after Aristotle's writings on nature; the word has since come to mean the study of the most general features of what exists) tries to answer such questions in the most general way. It does not ask how a particular cup was made. That is a question for science and craft. It asks what it is for anything to be a thing, to have properties, to change, to depend on something else. It is a beginner's question, in the sense that a child asks it ("But what is a cup?"), and a very hard one, in the sense that thoughtful people have disagreed over it for more than two thousand years.

2. Things and their properties

An everyday way to begin is to separate a thing from its properties. A property is something we say about a thing: white, round, heavy, kind, tall. The cup has these properties, and could change some without ceasing to be the cup. You could paint it blue. It would be the same cup, now blue. This suggests that there is something that stays through the changes, and something that comes and goes.

Many thinkers, starting with Aristotle in ancient Greece, built a picture on this. They used the word substance for the thing that stays, the individual cup or the individual horse or the individual human being, which has the properties. (In everyday English "substance" often means "material", as in "a sticky substance". In this older use it means something else: the thing that stands under its properties, the one that is the owner of them. Keep the older meaning in mind, or the word will mislead you.)

3. Essence and accident

From that picture came another pair of words. An accident (here the word does not mean a collision) is a property that a thing could lose and still be itself: the cup's colour, the horse's age, the pastor's haircut. An essence is what makes a thing the kind of thing it is: what a cup must have to be a cup, or what a human being must have to be a human being. If you take away an accident, the thing remains. If you take away the essence, you no longer have that kind of thing.

This is a useful pair of ideas, and everyone uses them, often without naming them. When we say "a teacher who has lost interest in teaching is no longer much of a teacher" we are saying that something belongs to the essence of a teacher. When we say "he is still himself, only older" we are saying that age is an accident.

The pair is also a disputed pair. Some philosophers hold that things really do have essences, that there is a fact about what a thing must be. Others hold that our sorting of things into kinds is partly a matter of our own purposes and language. A theologian does not have to settle this before reading the Fathers. She does need to know that, when a text speaks of the nature or essence of something, it is working inside this old way of sorting.

An invented example (an invented example). A baker says, "A loaf is only a loaf if it is bread. If I shape dough like a loaf and fill it with sand, it is not a loaf." Another baker says, "I call it a loaf if my customers call it a loaf." The first is speaking like someone who believes in essences. The second is speaking like someone who thinks the kinds are made by our use of words. Neither is stupid, and both can make good bread.

4. General things: realism and nominalism

Here is the hardest part. If you may skip it, skip it, and come back later.

We say "this horse" and "that horse". We also say "horse" for all of them. The word horse seems to name something they share. What is it? Is there really a general thing, horseness, which each horse shares in? Or are there only individual horses, and the word horse is a label we place on them because they resemble one another? This is called the problem of universals (a universal is something that can be found in many places at once, such as redness, or being human).

Two broad answers have been given. They have many versions. We give the simplest forms.

Realism about universals says that general things are real, in some way. Plato, in ancient Greece, is the best known teacher of a strong form: the general things, which he called Forms, exist and are more real than the passing particular things that copy them. Aristotle held a milder form: universals are real, but they are found in the particular things and not in a separate place. Many medieval writers, including Aquinas, followed a form close to Aristotle's. The strength of this view is that it explains why things really do resemble one another, and why we can discover truths that hold for every case. The weak point is that it is hard to say where or what these general things are, and how we know them.

Nominalism says that only individual things exist, and that general words are names (the word comes from the Latin for name) that we give because of likeness. In the later Middle Ages, writers such as William of Ockham gave this view great influence. Its strength is that it is simple and asks us to believe in fewer kinds of things. Its weak point is that it has trouble explaining why one set of things really is alike and another set is not, if the likeness is only in our naming.

Between these two there are many middle positions. A beginner needs only to remember that the question is old, open and not a question that Scripture answers, and that the way a theologian answers it can shape how she reads other words. For instance, whether we say that "humanity" is something real that is shared by all human beings is a question that matters when theologians speak of how a human being relates to the whole human race. We will not take that further here.

5. Where theology borrowed these ideas

Greek-speaking Christians in the early centuries were writing in a world where these words were the common coin of educated talk. When they asked what it means to say that God made all things, they met the question of what it is to be. When they asked how Christ can be both divine and human, they used the words nature and person, words with a history in this kind of reasoning. In lecture 1-2 we saw that they did not copy the words unchanged. They used them and then reshaped them, often to guard something Scripture said.

Two examples show the borrowing, and only the borrowing.

Creation. Scripture says God made heaven and earth (Genesis 1:1). Christians afterwards asked a metaphysical question: out of what? Did God shape a material that was already there, or was nothing there before? A long Christian tradition, ancient and medieval, teaches that God made all things from nothing, so that everything that is depends on God for its existing. The Latin phrase for this is creatio ex nihilo, "creation out of nothing". Here a metaphysical question (what does it mean for a thing to depend wholly on another for its being?) was put to a text, and an answer was given in philosophical words. Whether that answer is the best reading of the text is a question for the doctrine courses. What matters here is to see how the move works.

The . When the early church said that the Son is of one substance with the Father, and that in Christ there are two natures in one person, it was using words from the philosophical world to mark a line against readings it judged to be mistaken. Again, the content belongs to the doctrine courses. Here we only note that the words substance, nature and person are words with a philosophical history, and that the councils both used that history and bent it. Look at Hebrews 1:3 in our translation: "the very image of his substance". Other translations render the same Greek phrase in other words. A student who reads only one English version will meet "substance" in some places and not in others. That is one reason to learn what the word has meant.

A caution: in neither example does this lecture say that the philosophical words prove the doctrine. They are used to say what the church believed it had received. The relation between the words and the belief is one of the long-running questions of this course.

6. Tool or framework?

A tool is something you pick up for a purpose and put down again. A framework is something that shapes the room in which you work. Metaphysical words can be either. Used as tools, they help us to ask exact questions of a text: is this a quality or the thing itself? Does this depend on that, or the other way round? Used as a framework, they can carry in assumptions without our noticing. If a whole way of thinking about "substance" is assumed, a reader may find it hard to see a text that speaks in a different way, such as a story or a promise.

Traditions weigh this differently. Many Catholic writers, following Aquinas, are at home in the language of being, substance and essence, and see it as a long-tested way of speaking truly. Many Orthodox writers use the language of the Fathers but warn that the words point beyond themselves, to a mystery that no concept holds. Many Protestant writers, from the Reformers onward, have been wary of any framework that seems to stand between a believer and the plain word of Scripture, while others have used the old categories carefully and a great deal. These are broad strokes, and each tradition has voices that would qualify them.

This is a point where readers will not agree. Some hold that the metaphysical words of the Fathers and the medieval teachers are close to the heart of Christian understanding: the faith asks, in the end, what is real, and these words are among the best answers we have. They add that to drop them is not to avoid metaphysics but to use some other one without noticing. The weak point of this view is that it can make a particular philosophy seem as binding as the gospel, and that the history shows other Christian writers who spoke well without it. Others hold that Scripture speaks in the language of story, promise and , and that the borrowed words should be handled lightly, as scaffolding that may be taken down. Their strength is that they keep the biblical text in front. Their weak point is that, if the scaffolding is removed, the question the scaffolding was built to answer does not go away, and someone must answer it in other words. This course requires less than either side asks: that you can say what a borrowed word meant, see where it is doing work in a text, and say what you think and why, with room to be shown otherwise.

7. Reading Exodus 3:14 with care

Return to the verse at the head of the lecture. Why do we say a reader may find the metaphysical question there, and why must we not say the verse teaches a metaphysics?

Look at what the passage does. Moses asks a question about a name, and the answer is both a name and a refusal to be pinned down by one. The surrounding verses are about God's coming down to rescue a people. A reader who finds in the answer a statement about God's own being is reading in a long and honoured way. A reader who says "the first thing is presence and promise" is also reading in a long and honoured way. Both may be partly right. The honest way to hold the verse is to say which reading you are using, and to keep the other in view.


Diagram 1. A thing, its properties, its kind

WHAT STAYS AND WHAT CHANGES One cup, followed through three changes THE THING this cup (older word: substance) the one that has the properties ACCIDENTS (can change) white, then painted blue whole, then chipped on the table, then on a shelf Still the same cup ESSENCE (what makes it a cup) made to hold a drink Lose this, and it is no longer that kind of thing (Some thinkers dispute this idea.) A borrowed word like substance or nature works inside this way of sorting. Know the sorting before you read the word.

Diagram 2. Two answers about general things

WHAT DOES THE WORD HORSE NAME? The problem of general things, in the simplest form REALISM General things are real in some way. Strength: explains real likeness. Weak point: where are they? How do we know them? NOMINALISM Only individuals exist; general words are names. Strength: simple, few kinds of thing. Weak point: why does one likeness count and another not? Scripture does not settle this. Many middle positions exist.

핵심 요약

  • Metaphysics asks the most general questions about what exists: what a thing is, what stays when it changes, what depends on what.
  • Substance, in the older sense, is the thing that has properties; an accident can change while the thing remains.
  • An essence is what makes a thing the kind of thing it is, though some thinkers dispute that things have essences.
  • Realism holds that general things are real; nominalism holds that only individuals exist and general words are names; Scripture does not settle it.
  • Theology borrowed metaphysical words in speaking of creation and the incarnation, and reshaped them.
  • A borrowed word may be a tool or a framework; traditions weigh this differently.
Front Back
Metaphysics The study of the most general features of what exists: things, properties, change, dependence.
Essence and accident An essence makes a thing the kind of thing it is; an accident is a property it could lose and stay itself.
Realism and nominalism Realism: general things are real in some way. Nominalism: only individuals exist; general words are names.
Tool or framework A tool is used for a purpose and put down; a framework shapes the room in which you work.

One sentence to remember Know what a borrowed word meant before you decide what it is doing in a text.

This week's action Take one word from a creed or textbook (nature, substance, being) and write what it meant in its older use and what you think it adds.

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  • Choose an everyday object. Which of its properties could change while it stayed the same thing? Which could not? What does your answer say about its essence?
  • In your own words, what is the difference between the older meaning of *substance* and the everyday meaning of the word?
  • Which of realism and nominalism do you find easier to understand, and what is the strongest question you could put to it?
  • Exodus 3:14 can be read as a statement about God's being or as a promise of his presence. What would each reading help a reader to see, and what might each hide?
  • Is a borrowed philosophical word in a creed more like a tool or more like a framework? What would you want to know before deciding?

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