Lecture 4-3: What Did the Revival Do?
Contents 27
- Lecture 1-1: The Korean Anomaly
- Lecture 1-2: The Lens of World Christianity
- Lecture 1-3: Reading the Sources Fairly
- Lecture 2-1: Books from Beijing
- Lecture 2-2: The Ancestral Rites and the Persecutions
- Lecture 2-3: The Martyrs and Their Memory
- Lecture 4-1: What Happened
- Lecture 4-2: Practices Born of Revival
- Lecture 4-3: What Did the Revival Do?
- Lecture 5-1: Churches and the Nation
- Lecture 5-2: The Shrine Crisis
- Lecture 5-3: Remembering Collaboration and Resistance
- Lecture 6-1: The Church of the North
- Lecture 6-2: The Korean War
- Lecture 6-3: Anticommunism and the Church in North Korea Today
- Lecture 7-1: Explosive Growth
- Lecture 7-2: A Church That Keeps Dividing
- Lecture 7-3: The Churches and Democratization
- Lecture 8-1: Korea as a Sending Church
- Lecture 8-2: The Immigrant Church
- Lecture 8-3: Korea in Global Christian Networks
Lectures 4-1 and 4-2 of this course described what happened in the revival and what practices it left. This lecture asks the harder question: what did the revival do to the Korean church, and through the church to Korea? It came, as the chapter overview showed, in the very years when Korea lost its sovereignty — after the protectorate treaty of 1905 and before the annexation of 1910. At the moment when Koreans were asking what to do about their nation, tens of thousands of Korean Protestants were confessing their personal sins and praying through the night. Was that the renewal of a church that would serve the nation for generations, or a turning inward that took the church out of the nation's struggle at the worst possible time? Or is the question itself framed wrongly?
This is a point where readers will not agree. Serious historians, Korean and foreign, Christian and not, give different answers. This lecture sets out three main interpretations, each in its strongest form, with names of real people who hold or have held them. It then offers some evidence that any interpretation has to account for. It does not offer a verdict.
What these 26 minutes give you
- State the political situation of 1905-1910 and the missionaries' stated policy on the church and politics.
- Present, in its strongest form, the reading of the revival as spiritual renewal and church-building.
- Present, in its strongest form, the reading of the revival as depoliticization at the moment Korea lost its sovereignty, including nationalist and Marxist versions.
- Present, in its strongest form, the reading that stresses Korean agency over missionary design.
- Identify evidence that complicates each reading.
Therefore I urge you, brothers, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, which is your spiritual service. Don’t be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind, so that you may prove what is the good, well-pleasing, and perfect will of God. — Romans 12:1-2
World English Bible
He has shown you, O man, what is good. What does Yahweh require of you, but to act justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with your God? — Micah 6:8
WEB
These two passages are here because the two sides of the argument in this lecture each tend to reach for one of them. Those who see the revival as a true renewal of the church stress Paul's call to be "transformed by the renewing of your mind" — an inward change that comes first and changes everything else. Those who see the revival as a turning away from public responsibility stress Micah's "act justly", insisting that faith that does not reach the public world falls short. Neither passage, read carefully, sets inward renewal against public justice: Paul's "living sacrifice" is bodily and social, and Micah's justice is joined to humility before God. Part of the task of this lecture is to see whether the history, too, is less of an either-or than the debate sometimes makes it.
1. The setting: a church in a dying state
In November 1905 Japan forced the Korean government to accept a protectorate. Korean officials who resisted were overridden; some killed themselves in protest. In 1907 King Gojong's secret envoys to The Hague peace conference failed to gain a hearing, and he was forced to abdicate; the Korean army was disbanded; armed resistance by "righteous armies" spread and was crushed over the next several years, with many thousands of Korean fighters killed. Other Koreans took up "patriotic enlightenment" — schools, newspapers, associations for national self-strengthening. In 1909 the former Resident-General Ito Hirobumi was assassinated in Harbin by the Korean patriot An Jung-geun, who was a Catholic. In August 1910 Korea was annexed.
The Protestant church was growing fast in exactly these years. Many Koreans came to the churches with mixed motives: faith, curiosity, the prestige of Western learning, and — this is well documented — the hope that the church could protect them or offer a path to national renewal. The church buildings were among the few places where Koreans could gather freely. Mission schools taught modern subjects and produced many young nationalists. Some church members joined the righteous armies or the enlightenment associations.
2. The missionaries' policy
The missionaries, for their part, had a clear policy: the church must not become a political body. As early as 1901 the Presbyterian missionaries in council adopted a statement — often called the resolution on the separation of church and politics — declaring in effect that the missionaries would not interfere in affairs of state, that church buildings were not to be used for political meetings, that church members, as citizens, should obey the government, and that the church as a body would not take political sides. (The text was published in Korean church newspapers of the time; it is paraphrased here.)
Why did the missionaries insist on this? Their reasons, stated in their own terms, were several:
- A theological conviction, shared by many Protestants of their time and place, that the church's task was spiritual — the salvation of souls and the building of the church — and that political causes, however just, would corrupt it and divide it.
- Protection of the church. A church seen as a political organization would be treated by the state — first the Korean state, then the Japanese — as a threat, and could be destroyed. The Catholic persecutions of the nineteenth century (Chapter 2 of this course) were a vivid warning.
- Protection of the mission. The missionaries were foreigners under treaty. Political involvement could lead to their expulsion, and their governments (the United States and Britain were on friendly terms with Japan in these years) would not defend them.
- Genuine sympathy, among some missionaries, for Japanese rule, which they saw as bringing order, railways, hygiene and modern government to a state they regarded as corrupt and weak. Other missionaries were sharply critical of Japan. The missionary community was not of one mind.
- Discernment of motives. Missionaries worried that people were joining churches for political protection rather than faith. They wanted to purify the church of what they saw as false motives.
It is against this background that the revival must be read. Here the interpretations divide.
3. Reading 1: Spiritual renewal and church-building
The argument in its strongest form. The revival was, first and foremost, what its participants said it was: a work of God that brought thousands of Koreans to genuine repentance and faith. It transformed the moral life of the churches — confessions of theft, violence, drunkenness and cruelty to wives were followed by restitution and changed behaviour. It healed divisions between Koreans and missionaries. It gave the Korean church a spiritual depth, a habit of prayer, and a body of trained and committed leaders (the first Korean ministers were ordained in the same year) that allowed it to survive the colonial period, the war and division, and to grow into one of the strongest churches in Asia. Without the revival, the Korean church might have remained a small body of people drawn by political hope, and it might have collapsed when that hope failed in 1910. Its long-term fruit — including its contribution to the nation — came from its spiritual strength, not in spite of it.
Who holds it. This is the common reading in Korean evangelical and Pentecostal churches and among many historians of evangelicalism. The missionary eyewitnesses themselves (Blair, Lee and others) held it. Among modern scholars, Timothy S. Lee's Born Again: Evangelicalism in Korea (2010) stresses the revival's role in forming a lasting evangelical identity, though Lee is attentive to its political context; Young-hoon Lee places it at the head of a line of Holy Spirit movements. Many Korean church historians writing within the churches have treated 1907 as the Korean church's spiritual founding.
What this reading must account for. It must explain why the revival coincided so closely with the missionaries' political policy and the loss of sovereignty, and why the missionary accounts are so silent about the political situation. It must reckon with the fact that "church growth" and "spiritual depth" are not easily measured, and that growth after 1907 was uneven (lecture 4-2 of this course on the Million Souls campaign).
4. Reading 2: Depoliticization at the moment Korea lost its sovereignty
The argument in its strongest form. Before 1907, the Korean Protestant church was attracting many Koreans who saw in it a path to national renewal — a community of modern, educated, morally serious people who could rebuild the nation. The missionaries, who wanted to keep the church out of politics and who were on workable terms with Japanese authority, saw this as a danger. The revival, whatever the sincerity of its participants, served the missionaries' goal: it redirected Korean Christians' energy from the nation's sins to their own, from public resistance to private repentance, from the future of Korea to the future of the soul. It taught Korean Christians to see anger at Japan as a sin to be confessed. At the very moment when the nation needed its most organized and modern community to lead resistance, that community was taught that politics was not its business. The revival thus helped make the Korean Protestant church, for decades, a body that could accommodate colonial rule — a pattern that Chapter 5 of this course will follow into the Shinto shrine crisis of the 1930s.
Versions of this reading.
- The nationalist version. Some Korean church historians, most notably Min Kyoung-bae in his influential surveys of Korean church history (first edition 1972), argued that the revival was genuine spiritual renewal but that it was also shaped and used by the missionaries to "de-nationalize" the church, turning it away from national questions. Min wrote from inside the church and did not deny the revival's spiritual meaning; his concern was its political effect. Chung-shin Park's Protestantism and Politics in Korea (2003) similarly argues that the missionaries' non-political policy, reinforced by the revival, pulled the church away from nationalism — while showing that Korean Christians kept finding their way back.
- The Marxist version. Historians working within a Marxist framework, including the official historiography of North Korea, go further: religion in general, and missionary Christianity in particular, served imperialism by teaching the colonized to accept their condition and look for consolation in the next world. On this reading the revival was a typical instance of religion as ideology, whatever its participants experienced. This version is often held by people who reject Christianity altogether; it should still be stated fairly, because its central question — whose interests did this movement serve? — is one any historian must ask.
What this reading must account for. It must explain why so many revival leaders later took part in resistance: Gil Seon-ju and other Christians signed the 1919 Declaration of Independence, sixteen of the thirty-three signers were Protestants, and Protestants were heavily represented among those arrested (Chapter 5 of this course). It must explain the "105-person incident" of 1911-12, when the colonial police arrested many Christians — largely from the northwest, the heartland of the revival — on charges of a conspiracy against the Governor-General, which suggests that the Japanese authorities themselves did not regard revival Christians as politically harmless. And it must be careful not to treat the participants' own experience as mere false consciousness, which is a claim about their inner lives that the sources cannot prove.
5. Reading 3: Korean agency over missionary design
The argument in its strongest form. Both the first and second readings tend to make the missionaries the main actors — either as instruments of God's work or as managers of Korean politics. But the revival was, in large part, something Koreans did. Korean leaders such as Gil Seon-ju preached, led prayer and shaped the meetings; Korean practices of prayer and devotion gave the revival its forms (lecture 4-2 of this course); and Koreans made of the revival what they chose. Its meaning cannot be read off the missionaries' intentions. Seen this way, the revival was neither simply a spiritual renewal nor simply a depoliticization. It was the moment when Korean Protestants took ownership of their faith, in a Korean idiom, and formed a community with its own leaders, disciplines and inner strength. That community could then act in the nation's crisis in its own way — sometimes by withdrawing, sometimes by resisting, often by building schools and moral character for the long work of national renewal (what Kenneth Wells has called "self-reconstruction nationalism").
Who holds it. Sung-Deuk Oak (The Making of Korean Christianity, 2013) stresses Korean religious practices and Korean agency in the formation of early Protestantism, and warns against reading the revival as a missionary product. Timothy S. Lee's work also gives large place to Korean participants. Kenneth M. Wells (New God, New Nation, 1990) shows that Korean Protestant nationalism often took a moral and educational form that does not look "political" if politics means only armed or open resistance.
What this reading must account for. Its critics point out that the sources for the revival are overwhelmingly missionary sources, so Korean agency is partly inferred rather than documented. They argue that stressing Korean agency can become a way of avoiding the uncomfortable question of missionary influence. And they note that the church leaders who took ownership of the revival also accepted, and taught, the missionaries' policy of non-involvement in politics for long periods.
6. Evidence that complicates every reading
A few pieces of evidence resist any single account and are worth holding together:
- The timing is suggestive but not conclusive. The revival began in 1903, two years before the protectorate, which weakens any claim that it was engineered as a response to it. But its high point came in 1907, the year of the abdication and the army's dissolution.
- Revival Christians later resisted. The northwest — the revival's heartland — produced many of the Christians arrested in 1911-12 and many of the leaders of 1919.
- Revival Christians also accommodated. The same Presbyterian church, with its revival piety intact, voted in 1938 to accept attendance at Shinto shrines (Chapter 5 of this course), though that decision was made under intense coercion three decades later.
- The missionaries were divided. Some sympathized with Japan, some protested Japanese brutality (missionaries helped publicize the atrocities of 1919), and many simply wanted to be left alone to run their churches.
- Catholics faced the same crisis differently. The Catholic church in Korea, under French bishops, also discouraged political involvement, and its leadership was cautious in these years. Yet An Jung-geun, who shot Ito Hirobumi in 1909, was a devout Catholic who saw his act as the duty of a Korean patriot and a Christian; his bishop at the time refused to support him, and the Korean Catholic church revisited his case many decades later, with Cardinal Kim Sou-hwan publicly acknowledging him in the 1990s. The Catholic case shows that the tension between faith, church policy and national resistance was not only a Protestant or revival problem.
7. Asking the question well
Several cautions will help readers think about this dispute rather than simply choose a side:
- "Political" can mean different things. If it means armed resistance or open protest, the revival did turn many Christians away from it. If it includes building schools, training character, creating communities with their own leaders and discipline, and nurturing hope, the picture changes.
- Intentions and effects differ. The missionaries may have intended a non-political church; Koreans may have made something else of it. A movement can serve one purpose for its organizers and another for its participants.
- Hindsight tempts. Historians who know about 1910, 1919 and 1938 can read the revival as the first step toward each of them. People in 1907 did not know any of these things.
- The elegant story should be suspected. "The missionaries used revival to depoliticize Korea" and "God revived Korea to prepare it for suffering" are both elegant. The evidence is messier than either.
This lecture ends where the debate stands: with the question open. The quiz for this chapter will ask you to present the positions, not to choose among them.
5. Going to the Sources
Source: the statement on the church and politics adopted by the council of Presbyterian missionaries in Korea in 1901, often called in Korean histories the "resolution on the separation of church and state." It was published in the Korean-language Presbyterian newspaper Geuriseudo Sinmun (The Christian News) in 1901, and is discussed and partly translated in several studies of the period, including Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (2003). What follows is a paraphrase of its main points; the exact text and date should be checked in the Korean original before it is quoted.
The statement declares that the missionaries have come to Korea to preach the gospel and will not interfere in the affairs of the Korean government. It says that the church is not a place for political discussion and that church buildings must not be used for political meetings or purposes. It urges church members, as subjects of the government, to obey the laws and honour the authorities, while making clear that the church does not forbid members from holding their own political views as private citizens. It warns that anyone who joins the church in hope of political protection or advantage misunderstands what the church is.
- The statement was adopted in 1901, before the revival and before the protectorate. How does that date affect the argument that the revival was a tool of depoliticization?
- The statement distinguishes the church as a body from church members as individual citizens. Is that distinction workable in a colonial situation? How might a Korean church member in 1907 have understood it?
- Read the statement from three positions in turn: a missionary protecting a young church, a Korean patriot in 1905, and a Japanese official. What would each see in it?
In short
- Between the 1905 protectorate and the 1910 annexation, the church grew fast while Korea lost its sovereignty. The missionaries' policy, from 1901, was that the church must not become a political body.
- Reading 1 sees the revival as real spiritual renewal that built a lasting church. Timothy S. Lee and Young-hoon Lee are among its voices, and it must explain the missionaries' silence on politics.
- Reading 2 sees depoliticization, turning energy from public resistance to private repentance. Min Kyoung-bae and Chung-shin Park hold versions of it, and Marxist historians go further.
- Reading 3 stresses Korean agency over missionary design. Sung-Deuk Oak and Kenneth Wells hold it, though its critics note that the sources are mostly missionary.
- Revival Christians both resisted (1911-12, 1919) and accommodated (1938). Catholics faced the same tension, as An Jung-geun's case shows.
- The lecture offers no verdict. "Political" can mean different things, intentions differ from effects, and hindsight tempts.
Topic: This lecture sets out three main interpretations of what the 1907 revival did to the Korean church and nation, and the evidence each must explain.
Remember: Serious historians disagree. Each reading has strengths and must account for evidence that complicates it.
Caution: The lecture does not choose a winner. Elegant stories, whether "missionaries used revival to depoliticize Korea" or "God prepared Korea for suffering", are both messier in the evidence.
One line to carry into ministry: When your church chooses not to take a side, ask honestly what that choice does, and do not set personal repentance against public justice.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- Is it possible for a church to be "non-political"? When a church decides not to take a side, what side, if any, is it taking? Think of an example from your own country or church.
- Personal repentance and public justice are sometimes set against each other. In your own experience, do they compete, or does one lead to the other?
- The revival's participants experienced something they called the work of the Holy Spirit; some historians explain it largely in political and social terms. Can both kinds of explanation be true at once? What would your own tradition say?
- An Jung-geun, a Catholic, assassinated Ito Hirobumi in 1909 and was refused support by his bishop; the church later honoured him. What does his case suggest about how churches judge political acts of their members in hindsight?