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CH301E Korean Christianity in Global Perspective

Lecture 5-2: The Shrine Crisis

Contents 27
CH301E Korean Christianity in Global Perspective
Chapter 1 · Chapter 1: Why Korea? Reading Korean Christianity as World Christianity
  1. Lecture 1-1: The Korean Anomaly
  2. Lecture 1-2: The Lens of World Christianity
  3. Lecture 1-3: Reading the Sources Fairly
Chapter 2 · Chapter 2: A Church Without Missionaries - Korean Catholicism, 1784-1886
  1. Lecture 2-1: Books from Beijing
  2. Lecture 2-2: The Ancestral Rites and the Persecutions
  3. Lecture 2-3: The Martyrs and Their Memory
Chapter 3 · Chapter 3: The Bible Before the Missionaries - Protestant Beginnings, 1832-1900
  1. Lecture 3-1: Translation First
  2. Lecture 3-2: The Missionaries Arrive
  3. Lecture 3-3: The Nevius Method
Chapter 4 · Chapter 4: Revival - Wonsan 1903 and Pyongyang 1907
  1. Lecture 4-1: What Happened
  2. Lecture 4-2: Practices Born of Revival
  3. Lecture 4-3: What Did the Revival Do?
Chapter 5 · Chapter 5: Faith Under Empire - The Churches and Japanese Rule, 1905-1945
  1. Lecture 5-1: Churches and the Nation
  2. Lecture 5-2: The Shrine Crisis
  3. Lecture 5-3: Remembering Collaboration and Resistance
Chapter 6 · Chapter 6: Division and War, 1945-1953
  1. Lecture 6-1: The Church of the North
  2. Lecture 6-2: The Korean War
  3. Lecture 6-3: Anticommunism and the Church in North Korea Today
Chapter 7 · Chapter 7: Growth, Division and Democracy, 1953-2000
  1. Lecture 7-1: Explosive Growth
  2. Lecture 7-2: A Church That Keeps Dividing
  3. Lecture 7-3: The Churches and Democratization
Chapter 8 · Chapter 8: From Mission Field to Mission Force - Missions and the Diaspora
  1. Lecture 8-1: Korea as a Sending Church
  2. Lecture 8-2: The Immigrant Church
  3. Lecture 8-3: Korea in Global Christian Networks
Chapter 9 · Chapter 9: Present Tensions and Possible Futures
  1. Lecture 9-1: Growth Stalls
  2. Lecture 9-2: Women in Korean Christianity
  3. Lecture 9-3: Peace, Reconciliation and the World Church

Jump to the key points ↓

27 min

In the 1930s the Japanese colonial government required Korean schools, and then Korean churches, to take part in ceremonies at Shinto shrines: to go to the shrine as a body and bow before it. The government insisted that this was not worship. It was, the authorities said, a civic act of respect for the nation and the imperial house, the equivalent of saluting a flag or standing for an anthem, and therefore something that people of any religion could do without betraying their faith.

Korean churches had to decide whether to believe that. The Catholic Church, guided by an instruction from Rome in 1936, accepted the civic interpretation. The Methodist leadership accepted it. The Presbyterian General Assembly, after years of resistance and under heavy police pressure, voted in September 1938 to declare shrine attendance a patriotic duty. Some missions closed their schools rather than comply. Some pastors and lay Christians refused, went to prison, and a number of them died there, among them the Pyongyang pastor Joo Ki-chul in 1944.

This lecture tries to understand the crisis before it judges it. That means first stating the government's case in its own terms, then each church's reasoning in its own terms, and only then asking what the decisions meant.

What these 27 minutes give you

  • Explain what State Shinto was and why the Japanese government classified shrine ceremonies as civic rather than religious.
  • Describe how the shrine demand reached the Christian schools from 1935 and how the different missions responded.
  • Compare the Catholic (1936), Methodist and Presbyterian (1938) decisions, stating the reasoning of each.
  • Describe the resistance and its cost, with Joo Ki-chul as the main example.
  • Set out the three main ways the 1938 decision has been judged, without choosing among them.

Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego answered the king, Nebuchadnezzar, we have no need to answer you in this matter. If it happens, our God whom we serve is able to deliver us from the burning fiery furnace; and he will deliver us out of your hand, O king. But if not, let it be known to you, O king, that we will not serve your gods, nor worship the golden image which you have set up. — Daniel 3:16-18

World English Bible

Therefore concerning the eating of things sacrificed to idols, we know that no idol is anything in the world, and that there is no other God but one. For though there are things that are called “gods”, whether in the heavens or on earth; as there are many “gods” and many “lords”; yet to us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we for him; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we live through him. However, that knowledge isn’t in all men. But some, with consciousness of the idol until now, eat as of a thing sacrificed to an idol, and their conscience, being weak, is defiled. But food will not commend us to God. For neither, if we don’t eat, are we the worse; nor, if we eat, are we the better. But be careful that by no means does this liberty of yours become a stumbling block to the weak. — 1 Corinthians 8:4-9

WEB

These two passages were the texts around which the shrine argument turned. For those who refused, Daniel 3 was almost a script: a state ceremony, a command to bow, and three young men who would not, "but if not". For those who complied, or who defended compliance, Paul's argument in 1 Corinthians 8 offered a different frame: an idol is "nothing", and an outward act does not in itself make a person guilty of worship — though Paul immediately adds a warning about the conscience of the "weak". Neither side needed to twist Scripture. The dispute was over which situation the shrine really was: Babylon's golden image, or meat bought in the Corinthian market.

1. What the state said the shrine was

Shinto and State Shinto

Shinto is the name for the native religious practices of Japan: the veneration of kami (gods, spirits, ancestors, powers of nature) at shrines. From the Meiji period (after 1868) the Japanese state built on these practices a national system of shrines centred on the imperial house, which historians call State Shinto. Its ceremonies expressed loyalty to the emperor, reverence for the imperial ancestors and the unity of the nation.

The Meiji constitution of 1889 guaranteed freedom of religion, within limits. To reconcile that guarantee with a national shrine system, the government adopted a legal distinction: shrine Shinto was declared "non-religious", a matter of national ritual and morality, separate from the "sect Shinto" groups and from Buddhism and Christianity, which were religions. On this view, a Christian bowing at a national shrine was no more committing idolatry than a citizen standing in silence at a war memorial.

It is important to see that this was not simply a trick invented to trap Christians. Many Japanese — including many Japanese Christians — sincerely accepted the distinction. In 1932, after some Catholic students at Sophia University in Tokyo declined to join a shrine visit, the Archbishop of Tokyo asked the Ministry of Education to state its position, and the ministry replied in writing that the ceremonies were patriotic and educational, not religious. Japanese Protestant leaders largely accepted the same view. The distinction had a long history, and it had the force of law.

But the distinction was also doing political work. In the 1930s, as Japan went to war in Manchuria and then in China, the government made shrine attendance a test of loyalty. In Korea, a colonized country where loyalty could not be assumed, the test mattered more. The colonial authorities built shrines across the peninsula, including the great Chōsen Jingū (Korea Shrine) on Namsan mountain in Seoul, completed in 1925, and they required schools to take pupils to the shrines on set days. Whatever the shrines meant in Japanese law, to many Koreans they meant the empire.

2. The schools, 1935-1938

The crisis broke first in the schools. In November 1935 the governor of South Pyongan province summoned the principals of the schools in Pyongyang, including the mission schools, and directed them to take part in a shrine ceremony. Several missionary principals refused. The best known was George S. McCune, the American Presbyterian president of Union Christian College (Soongsil) in Pyongyang, who was removed from his post and left Korea in 1936.

The Protestant missions then had to decide what to do with their schools as a whole, and they divided:

  • The American Northern Presbyterian mission, strongest in the north, decided after long debate to withdraw from secular education rather than comply. Its schools in Pyongyang, including Soongsil, closed or were handed over in 1938.
  • The American Southern Presbyterian mission, working in the southwest, closed its schools in 1937.
  • The Australian Presbyterian mission in South Gyeongsang province also resisted.
  • The Canadian mission (by then part of the United Church of Canada) and the Methodist missions generally accepted the government's assurance that the ceremonies were civic, and kept their schools open.

Two things are worth noticing. First, the division was not simply between courageous and cowardly missions. The Methodists and Canadians argued that closing the schools would abandon thousands of Korean students to purely state education, and that the government's own definition of the ceremony should be taken at face value. The Presbyterians who closed argued that a Christian school that took its pupils to bow at a shrine was teaching them something no Christian school should teach. Second, the division followed theology in part: the missions that closed were, on the whole, the more conservative Presbyterian missions, with a strong view of the first and second commandments; the missions that stayed open were, on the whole, the more liberal or ecumenically minded.

3. The Catholic decision, 1936

The Catholic Church faced the same question and answered it from Rome. On 26 May 1936 the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (Propaganda Fide) issued an instruction to the bishops of Japan and the Japanese-ruled territories, later known by its opening words Pluries instanterque. Resting on the Japanese government's repeated declarations that shrine ceremonies were civil and patriotic, the instruction permitted Catholics to take part in them, as an expression of loyalty to their country, provided that the bishops explained to the faithful that no religious meaning was intended. (Its content is paraphrased in "Going to the Sources" below.)

The Catholic decision should be read in the light of the Chinese Rites Controversy you met in lecture 2-2 of this course. For two centuries Rome had forbidden Chinese Catholics to take part in rites honouring Confucius and the ancestors. In the 1930s it was moving toward a new approach: that ceremonies which a government or society sincerely declared to be civil could be accepted as civil. The 1936 instruction on Japanese shrines was one step; the instruction Plane compertum est of 1939, permitting Catholics in China to take part in Confucian ceremonies and in the rites for the ancestors as civil customs, was the next. For Korean Catholics, whose first martyrs had died in 1791 for refusing the ancestral rites, the change carried a heavy weight of memory, which lecture 2-3 of this course discusses.

The Korean Catholic bishops, most of them foreign missionaries, applied the instruction. Catholics attended shrine ceremonies, and the Catholic Church did not suffer the kind of rupture that the Presbyterians did. Catholic historians differ on how to judge this: some see a sensible application of a principle that the church has since generally endorsed; others argue that the church, having accepted the government's definition, then found itself pulled much further, into public support for Japan's war.

4. The Methodist decision

The Korean Methodist Church had become an autonomous church in 1930, with a Korean general superintendent. Its leadership, having received the government's assurance that the ceremonies were not religious, accepted shrine attendance as a civic duty during the later 1930s, and Methodist schools continued. The Methodist decision was made with less public drama than the Presbyterian one and is, for that reason, less remembered. It was also followed by further accommodation in the war years, when the Methodist Church, like others, was reorganized under Japanese pressure.

5. The Presbyterian General Assembly, September 1938

The Presbyterian Church was the largest Protestant body in Korea and the most resistant. Many of its pastors and elders held that a bow before a shrine was an act of worship before another god, forbidden by the first and second commandments, whatever the government called it. Its strength was in the north, around Pyongyang, where the colonial authorities concentrated their pressure.

That pressure was intense in 1938. Presbyteries were pressed one by one to pass resolutions accepting the shrine; by the summer, many had done so. Police interviewed delegates before the General Assembly met. A leading Japanese Protestant, Tomita Mitsuru, moderator of the Church of Christ in Japan, visited Korea that year and argued to Korean pastors and missionaries that shrine attendance was compatible with Christian faith — a reminder that the civic interpretation was held by Christians as well as by the state.

The 27th General Assembly met at the West Gate (Seomun-bak) Church in Pyongyang in September 1938, with the Korean pastor Hong Taek-gi (Hong T'aek-ki) as moderator and police officers present in the hall. A motion was introduced on behalf of several northern presbyteries declaring that shrine attendance was not a religious act, that it did not conflict with Christian doctrine, and that the church would take part as a patriotic duty. According to the accounts of those present, the moderator put the motion, asked for the "ayes", and declared it carried without for the "noes". Missionaries who rose to protest were ruled out of order. After the session, officers of the Assembly went to the Pyongyang shrine to bow.

Accounts of the meeting come largely from missionaries and from Koreans who later opposed the decision, and historians should weigh them as such. But on the central facts — the police presence, the procedure, the resolution's wording — the sources broadly agree.

6. Those who refused

After 1938, refusal meant confronting not only the state but the church's own governing bodies. Pastors who would not comply were removed by their presbyteries under police pressure; congregations were closed.

Joo Ki-chul (Chu Ki-ch'ŏl, 1897-1944) was pastor of Sanjeonghyeon Church in Pyongyang. He had preached against shrine attendance before 1938 and was arrested several times from that year onward. In 1939 the Pyongyang presbytery removed him from his pulpit, and his church was closed. He spent most of his remaining years in prison, where he was repeatedly tortured, and he died there in April 1944. His family — his wife, Oh Jeong-mo, his elderly mother and his sons — endured poverty and harassment. He is honoured today by Korean Presbyterians of almost every kind, and by the South Korean state as an independence activist; the memory of him is discussed in lecture 5-3 of this course.

Joo was one of a larger number. Korean church histories commonly say that about two thousand Christians were arrested over the shrine question, that some two hundred churches were closed, and that about fifty people died in prison; these figures are widely repeated but their basis is uncertain, and they should be treated as approximate. Among those who survived to be released in 1945 were the pastors Han Sang-dong and Ju Nam-seon, the pastor Son Yang-won (whom you will meet again in lecture 6-2 of this course), and women such as Choe Deok-ji and An I-suk (Ahn Ei-sook), a teacher who went to Tokyo in 1939 to protest before the Japanese Diet and spent the war years in prison; her memoir was later published in English as If I Perish.

Other groups were dissolved outright. The Holiness Church and the Seventh-day Adventists, whose teaching about the return of Christ implied the end of every earthly kingdom including Japan's, were forcibly dissolved in the early 1940s. After Pearl Harbor in December 1941, most remaining American and British missionaries were interned and then repatriated; many had already left under pressure.

7. Judging the decision

This is a point where readers will not agree. Three broad judgements of the 1938 decision are held by serious Christians and historians today.

First: apostasy. On this view, which was held by the released prisoners of 1945 and is held today by many conservative Presbyterians, including the Kosin (Goryeo) church whose origins lecture 5-3 of this course describes, bowing at the shrine was idolatry, whatever the state said. The first and second commandments do not have exceptions for patriotism, and the Assembly's resolution was a public denial of the faith. Daniel 3 is the controlling text. Joo Ki-chul is the model.

Second: coerced survival. On this view, which many church historians of different traditions hold, the Assembly acted under duress so severe that its decision cannot be treated as a free act. The police were in the room; the "noes" were never called; pastors who resisted lost their churches and their freedom. Those who complied did so to keep congregations, schools and families alive. The act was wrong, many of those who take this view say, but its guilt is shared and mitigated, and later generations who never faced the police should be slow to condemn.

Third: a defensible civil act. On this view, the shrine ceremony really could be understood as civil, as the Japanese government, Japanese Christians and the Catholic Church in 1936 all judged; Paul's argument in 1 Corinthians 8 applies. Few Korean Protestants hold this view today in full, but it is closer to the position that the Catholic Church took and has not repudiated in principle, and it deserves to be stated because it was the reasoning of many sincere Christians at the time.

These positions do not map neatly onto denominations. There are Catholics who think their church conceded too much in 1936; there are Presbyterians who think the rhetoric of "apostasy" is too easy for those who were not there. The historian Wi Jo Kang has written of the shrine issue as the defining test of church-state relations in modern Korea; Donald Clark has reconstructed how painfully the missions divided over it. What the historian can say is that each position is making a claim about what the ceremony was — and that the answer depended on whom you asked: the state that defined it, the Japanese Christians who accepted the definition, or the Korean Christians who saw in it the empire that had taken their country.


One demand, several answers: the shrine question, 1935-1945 The state's definition at the top; how each body answered it below State: shrine rites are civic, not religious Attendance required of schools, then churches Catholic, 1936 Rome accepts the civic interpretation; bishops explain intent Churches continue Methodist Leadership accepts government assurance; schools stay open (Canadian mission too) Presbyterian, 1938 After resistance and police pressure, the Assembly votes "civic" "Noes" not called Refusal Some missions close schools; pastors and lay people imprisoned; Joo Ki-chul d. 1944 Later judgements (lecture 5-3): apostasy · coerced survival · a defensible civil act. The four answers above are not a ladder of virtue; each rests on a claim about what the rite was.

The diagram deliberately puts the four responses side by side at the same height. Ranking them from "worst" to "best" is the work of judgement, which the lecture leaves to you.


5. Going to the Sources

Here are two short sources, set side by side. Both are paraphrased, not quoted.

Source A: the instruction Pluries instanterque of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 26 May 1936. It was addressed to the bishops of Japan and the territories under Japanese rule, and was published in the Vatican's official gazette, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, in 1936. In substance it says: the Japanese government has repeatedly and publicly declared that the ceremonies at the national shrines are not religious acts but expressions of patriotism — of love for the country and respect for the imperial family and the nation's benefactors. Since this is so, Catholics may take part in them. The bishops should instruct the faithful about the meaning of their participation, so that no one mistakes it for religious worship, and should take care to avoid scandal.

Source B: the resolution of the 27th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Korea, September 1938. It is recorded in the Assembly's minutes (in Korean) and summarized in most histories of the period. In substance it says: we understand that shrine attendance is not a religious act and does not conflict with Christian doctrine; recognizing it as a patriotic national ceremony, we resolve to take part in it willingly and to lead our members to take part, so as to show our loyalty as citizens in the present emergency.

  1. Both documents rest their decision on a claim about what the shrine ceremony is. Whose definition does each accept, and does either one say how it knows the definition is true?
  2. Source A was written by a church authority in Rome, far from the police; Source B was voted in a hall in Pyongyang with police present. Does that difference change how you should read two documents that say similar things?
  3. Source A attaches a condition — the bishops must teach the right intention. Source B speaks of "loyalty" and the "emergency". What does each emphasis tell you about the pressures on its authors?

In short

  • The Japanese government called shrine ceremonies civic, not religious, through the legal idea of "non-religious" State Shinto. Many Japanese Christians accepted this, but the rule also tested loyalty in colonized Korea.
  • The crisis began in the schools in 1935. The American Northern and Southern Presbyterian missions closed their schools. The Canadian and Methodist missions kept theirs open, arguing that the ceremony was civic.
  • Rome's 1936 instruction (Pluries instanterque) let Catholics attend as a civic act if bishops explained that no religious meaning was intended. Catholic historians differ on how to judge it.
  • In September 1938 the Presbyterian General Assembly, with police present, passed a motion accepting shrine attendance. Accounts say the "noes" were not called.
  • Those who refused, such as Joo Ki-chul, who died in prison in 1944, paid heavily. The figures for arrests and deaths are approximate.
  • The 1938 decision is judged in three ways: apostasy, coerced survival, or a defensible civil act. Each rests on a claim about what the ceremony was.

Topic: This lecture explains the 1930s shrine crisis, how Catholic, Methodist and Presbyterian bodies answered the government's demand, and how the 1938 decision is judged.

Remember: Every response rested on a claim about what the shrine ceremony was. The state, Japanese Christians and Korean Christians gave different answers.

Caution: The lecture does not rank the four responses as worst to best. The three judgements do not map neatly onto denominations, and the casualty figures are uncertain.

One line to carry into ministry: Where Christians disagree over a ceremony, ask who defines its meaning, and be slow to condemn those who decided under pressure you never faced.

Review every summary in this course →

Check yourself

Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.

Reflection and discussion

  • The Japanese government, many Japanese Christians and the Catholic Church in 1936 judged the shrine rite civic; many Korean Christians judged it idolatrous. Who has the right to say what a ritual means — the state that commands it, the people who perform it, or the community that watches?
  • Daniel's friends said, "But if not." What would it have meant for an ordinary pastor in 1938, with a congregation, a family and a police officer in the pew, to say the same?
  • The missions that closed their schools and the missions that kept them open were both trying to protect Korean students. Which choice would you have made, and what would you have lost either way?
  • Is there a ceremony in your own society — a pledge, an anthem, a memorial — about which Christians in your church disagree? How do they decide?

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What next

The lecture ends here. What follows was written by its readers.