Lecture 9-1: Growth Stalls
Contents 27
- Lecture 1-1: The Korean Anomaly
- Lecture 1-2: The Lens of World Christianity
- Lecture 1-3: Reading the Sources Fairly
- Lecture 2-1: Books from Beijing
- Lecture 2-2: The Ancestral Rites and the Persecutions
- Lecture 2-3: The Martyrs and Their Memory
- Lecture 4-1: What Happened
- Lecture 4-2: Practices Born of Revival
- Lecture 4-3: What Did the Revival Do?
- Lecture 5-1: Churches and the Nation
- Lecture 5-2: The Shrine Crisis
- Lecture 5-3: Remembering Collaboration and Resistance
- Lecture 6-1: The Church of the North
- Lecture 6-2: The Korean War
- Lecture 6-3: Anticommunism and the Church in North Korea Today
- Lecture 7-1: Explosive Growth
- Lecture 7-2: A Church That Keeps Dividing
- Lecture 7-3: The Churches and Democratization
- Lecture 8-1: Korea as a Sending Church
- Lecture 8-2: The Immigrant Church
- Lecture 8-3: Korea in Global Christian Networks
For most of the twentieth century, the most discussed question about Korean Protestantism was how it grew so fast. Since about the 2000s, a different question has taken its place in Korean church media, seminaries and denominational assemblies: why has the growth stopped, and why has the public's view of the church turned so negative?
This lecture looks at that change in four steps. First, it reads the numbers — and shows that different ways of counting Christians give different answers. Second, it looks at the surveys of public trust. Third, it describes the patterns of dispute that Korean church bodies themselves have discussed most: the succession of large congregations from father to son, church finances, and sexual misconduct by clergy. Fourth, it looks at the new religious movements that grew from Korean Protestant soil, what they teach, and how Korean denominations have responded to them.
The lecture describes patterns, not individuals. Where a church body has made a formal judgement, the lecture reports the judgement and who made it. It does not add verdicts of its own.
What these 24 minutes give you
- Explain what the national census, Gallup Korea's surveys and church membership reports each measure, and why they do not always agree.
- Describe the main findings of public-trust surveys of the Protestant church and explain their limits as evidence.
- Explain why hereditary succession in large congregations became a public issue, and describe how some denominations responded.
- Describe the teachings of two or three new religious movements with roots in Korean Protestantism, and report how Korean denominations have judged them without taking those judgements as your own.
- Evaluate competing explanations for the plateau, recognising that none is complete.
Because you say, ‘I am rich, and have gotten riches, and have need of nothing;’ and don’t know that you are the wretched one, miserable, poor, blind, and naked; — Revelation 3:17
World English Bible
As many as I love, I reprove and chasten. Be zealous therefore, and repent. — Revelation 3:19
WEB
For the time has come for judgment to begin with the household of God. If it begins first with us, what will happen to those who don’t obey the Good News of God? — 1 Peter 4:17
WEB
The letter to the church in Laodicea addresses a congregation that judged itself by its wealth. First Peter says that judgement begins "with the household of God" — that the church is the first place where God's standards are applied, not the last. Korean Christians who have criticised their own churches' wealth and scandals have often used exactly these passages. They are placed here for that reason: they show how critics inside the church framed the problem in their own terms. They are not a verdict on any particular church.
1. Counting Christians: three measures that disagree
Anyone who wants to know whether Korean Christianity is growing or shrinking meets a problem at once: the sources disagree. There are three main kinds of evidence, and each measures something different.
The national census. Statistics Korea asks about religion in the population census once every ten years. In the 2005 census, about 18 percent of South Koreans identified as Protestant and about 11 percent as Catholic. In the 2015 census, the Protestant share had risen slightly, to nearly 20 percent (just under 10 million people), which made Protestantism the largest religion for the first time; the Catholic share had fallen to about 8 percent; and for the first time more than half of the population — about 56 percent — said they had no religion.
These figures surprised almost everyone. Protestant denominations had been reporting falling membership, so a Protestant rise was unexpected. Catholic diocesan records, on the other hand, showed registered Catholics still increasing, so a Catholic fall was unexpected too. Several explanations have been offered. The 2015 census used a new method, combining administrative registers with a sample survey, so it was not fully comparable with earlier censuses. Some observers suggested that people who belong to new religious movements, or who have left their church but still think of themselves as Christians, may have described themselves as Protestant. Others noted that many people baptised as Catholics no longer practise but still appear in parish registers. Sources differ, and no single explanation has been proved.
Gallup Korea's surveys. The polling company Gallup Korea has run a large survey called Religion of Koreans at intervals since 1984; recent rounds include 2004, 2014 and 2021. These surveys show a clear decline in religious affiliation of any kind. In the 2021 round, only about 40 percent of adults said they had a religion — about 17 percent Protestant, 16 percent Buddhist and 6 percent Catholic. The decline was sharpest among the young: in the same survey, only about one in five people in their twenties reported any religion.
Church reports. Denominations and dioceses publish their own statistics. The largest Presbyterian denominations reported membership peaking around 2010 and falling by hundreds of thousands in the following decade. The Catholic Bishops' Conference of Korea publishes an annual Statistics of the Catholic Church in Korea; it shows registered Catholics at a little over 11 percent of the population in the early 2020s, but also shows the proportion attending Sunday Mass falling, and falling sharply during and after the COVID-19 pandemic.
The three measures answer different questions. The census asks what people call themselves. Gallup asks the same with a different method and a smaller sample. Church reports count registered members, whether or not they attend. When they disagree, the historian's task is not to pick the most convenient figure but to ask what each actually counts.
With that caution, a broad picture holds across all three: Korean Christianity stopped growing as a share of the population somewhere around the 1990s to 2000s, the young are drifting away from all religions faster than their parents, and practice (attendance) is falling faster than identity (what people call themselves).
2. The "Canaan saints"
One group falls between the measures. Korean Protestants coined the term Ganaan seongdo, "Canaan saints", for Christians who still believe but no longer attend a church. The word is a pun: Ganaan (Canaan) read backwards sounds like an naga, "I don't go". The Protestant writer Yang Hee-song made the term widely known in a book on the subject in 2014. Estimates of how many such believers exist vary widely and depend on how the question is asked. The existence of the term matters more than any single figure: it shows that some of what looks like decline is a move away from institutions rather than from faith.
Catholics have their own equivalent, sometimes called naengdam gyoin ("cold-hearted" or lapsed believers) — people who are baptised and registered but no longer practise.
3. The loss of public trust
The Christian Ethics Movement of Korea, a Protestant civic organisation, has commissioned national surveys of public trust in the Protestant church since 2008. The results have been unfavourable throughout. In most rounds, only around a fifth to a third of respondents said they trusted the Protestant church; the exact figure varies from year to year and with the wording of the question. When asked to compare religions, respondents in several of these surveys trusted the Catholic Church and Buddhism more than Protestant churches.
Reading trust surveys
Three cautions are needed. First, trust surveys measure perception, not conduct; a church may be distrusted for reasons that have little to do with how it actually behaves. Second, the surveys are commissioned by a Protestant body that wants the church to reform, and the questions reflect that aim. Third, the fact that such surveys exist and are published widely in Protestant media shows that criticism is coming from inside the church as well as from outside it.
What do respondents give as reasons for distrust? Across the reports, the most common answers concern a gap between what church leaders say and how they live, church finances, and the churches' behaviour toward the wider community — for example, aggressive evangelism or political campaigning.
4. Patterns that church bodies have discussed
Three patterns have been discussed repeatedly in Korean media and in the church bodies themselves. This lecture describes them as patterns. It does not name individuals or congregations.
Hereditary succession. In Korean, seseup ("inheritance") refers to the practice of a senior pastor handing his congregation to his son or son-in-law. In a small rural church, a son who continues his father's work may simply be the only candidate. In a very large urban congregation with a large budget and property, critics argued, succession within one family looks like the transfer of a private business. Supporters of particular successions argued that congregations had voted freely, that the son was qualified, and that continuity served the church.
The debate reached the denominations. In 2012 the Korean Methodist Church's General Conference adopted a rule restricting the appointment of a retiring pastor's children to the same church, the first major Korean denomination to do so. In 2013 the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Korea (Tonghap) adopted a similar rule. A civic coalition of Protestant groups opposed to hereditary succession was also formed around 2012. How these rules have been applied, and how some large congregations have handled them, has been the subject of long disputes inside the denominations and in church courts.
Finances. Large congregations handle large sums, and many were run with little outside oversight. Disputes over church finances, including cases that reached the civil courts, have been reported regularly in Korean media. A related public debate concerned whether clergy should pay income tax. For decades Korean clergy were not taxed on their income in practice. After years of argument — in which some church leaders supported taxation as a matter of integrity and others opposed it as state interference in religion — clergy income taxation began in 2018.
Sexual misconduct. As in many countries, including in Catholic and Protestant churches in Europe and North America, cases of sexual abuse and misconduct by clergy have been reported in Korea. Korean women's groups within the churches and the Christian Ethics Movement have pressed denominations to establish procedures for reporting and discipline. Critics have argued that church structures which give a senior pastor great authority with little accountability make abuse harder to expose. This connects with lecture 9-2's question of who holds power in the church.
Not the typical church
A caution about these patterns: Korean media report scandals at large churches because they are newsworthy, and scandal is by definition unusual. The great majority of Korean congregations are small; many struggle to pay a pastor at all. The patterns are real and church bodies themselves have acknowledged them, but they are not a description of the typical Korean church.
5. Explaining the plateau
Why did growth stop? Several explanations have been proposed. None is sufficient alone, and each should be weighed.
- The end of the conditions that produced growth. If Korean church growth was tied to rapid urbanisation and social dislocation (see Chapter 7 of this course), then growth would slow once urbanisation was complete. This fits the timing well — perhaps too well. Other societies that urbanised rapidly did not see the same church growth.
- Loss of association with modernity. Andrew Eungi Kim argued that Protestantism grew partly because Koreans associated it with modernisation, education and progress. Once Korea was modern, that association stopped attracting people.
- Self-inflicted damage. Many Korean Christians argue that the church lost trust through its own scandals and its behaviour in public life. The trust surveys support this as a perception. Whether it caused the decline, or accompanied a decline that had other causes, is harder to prove.
- General secularisation among the young. Religious affiliation of all kinds, including Buddhism, is falling among young Koreans. This suggests that part of the Christian decline is part of a wider shift, not specific to the churches.
- Success turning into complacency. Timothy S. Lee, in Born Again: Evangelicalism in Korea (2010), traces how evangelicalism became the dominant form of Korean Protestantism. Several readers have drawn from histories like his the lesson that a church shaped for growth may have less idea what to do when growth ends. This is an interpretation, not a demonstrated cause.
Notice that explanations 1, 2 and 4 would apply regardless of how the churches behaved, while explanation 3 lays the weight on the churches themselves. Church insiders tend to favour explanation 3, because it implies that repentance and reform could change the outcome. Sociologists tend to favour the others. Both groups may be partly right.
6. New religious movements from Korean Protestant soil
Korea's rapid Protestant growth also produced a number of new religious movements that use the Bible and Christian language but teach things that the major denominations reject. Readers in the diaspora may meet some of them, since several are active abroad. The lecture describes three by what they teach, and reports how Korean church bodies have judged them. The word idan ("heterodox teaching", often translated "heresy") in the Korean churches is a formal designation made by a denomination's general assembly after study; it is reported here as the decision of the body that made it.
The Olive Tree movement (Jeondogwan), founded in the 1950s by Park Tae-seon, a former Presbyterian who led large revival meetings. He came to teach that he had a special role in God's purposes, and his followers built self-contained communities with their own factories. The Presbyterian church excluded him in the mid-1950s. The movement declined after his death in 1990. It is significant historically because it drew many of its first members from the ordinary revival culture of 1950s Presbyterian churches.
The Unification movement, founded in Seoul in 1954 by Sun Myung Moon as the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity. Its main text, the Divine Principle, teaches that involved an illicit sexual relationship, that Jesus's mission was left incomplete because he did not marry, and that a Lord of the Second Advent would complete it through a restored family — a role its members came to identify with Moon and his wife. Its mass weddings became internationally known. Korean Protestant denominations declared its teaching heterodox from early in its history, and it has never been accepted by any major Korean church body.
Shincheonji ("New Heaven and New Earth"), founded in 1984. It teaches that the Book of Revelation is being fulfilled in literal events in Korea today, that its founder is the "promised pastor" who alone can interpret Revelation correctly, and that the 144,000 of Revelation 7 are to be gathered from among its members. Several major Presbyterian general assemblies designated its teaching heterodox in the 1990s. It became widely known outside Korea in February 2020, when a large cluster of COVID-19 infections in the city of Daegu was traced to one of its congregations.
How have the denominations responded? Mainly in three ways: formal designations by general assemblies, warnings and teaching materials for congregations, and ministries that counsel people who leave these movements. Critics — including some Korean Protestants — have observed that designations are sometimes made hastily or used in rivalry between denominations. Historians also note a harder question: most of these movements drew members from ordinary churches, often promising a more serious Bible study or a more certain answer than their members had found. Their growth is therefore partly a mirror held up to the churches they came from.
This course takes no position on the truth of any of these movements' teachings. It reports what they teach and what church bodies have decided.
The three panels are not three measurements of the same thing. Read each for what it counts before comparing them.
5. Going to the Sources
In 2012 the General Conference of the Korean Methodist Church amended the church's Doctrines and Discipline (its book of church law) to restrict hereditary succession. It was widely reported at the time as the first such rule adopted by a major Korean denomination.
Paraphrased, not a quotation: The amendment provides that the children of a retiring pastor, and their spouses, may not be appointed as the next pastor of the same local church immediately after the parent; it applied similar restrictions where the parent was a senior lay elder of that church. The text of the rule is found in the Korean Methodist Church's Doctrines and Discipline as amended in 2012, and the debate was reported in Korean Christian newspapers of that year.
- A rule like this assumes that a problem exists. What problem did the General Conference think it was solving, and why could it not rely on each congregation's own vote?
- What arguments might a congregation that wished to call its retiring pastor's son have made against the rule? Try to state them as strongly as they would.
- A rule written into church law is one kind of evidence; how the rule was later applied is another. What sources would you need to judge whether this rule worked?
In short
- Growth in Korean Christianity has stalled since about the 1990s to 2000s. The census, Gallup Korea and church reports each count something different, so they do not always agree.
- All three measures show the young leaving religion fastest, and attendance falling faster than identity. "Canaan saints" are believers who no longer attend.
- Trust surveys, commissioned by a Protestant body, show low trust in the Protestant church. They measure perception, not conduct.
- Church bodies have discussed hereditary succession, finances and clergy sexual misconduct. These are patterns in some large churches, not a picture of the typical church.
- Five explanations for the plateau are offered, and none is complete. Three new religious movements are described, with denominational judgements reported as theirs.
Topic: This lecture asks why Korean Protestant growth stopped and public trust fell, and describes how church bodies have responded.
Remember: Always ask what a statistic actually counts. Census, survey and membership figures answer different questions.
Caution: The lecture describes patterns and does not name individuals. Scandals are newsworthy because they are unusual, and most Korean congregations are small.
One line to carry into ministry: Read both numbers and criticism honestly, and ask what ordinary churches were or were not giving to people who left.
Check yourself
Not "did you read it" but "can you explain it". Ticks are kept on this device only.
Reflection and discussion
- The lecture says practice is falling faster than identity. Do you know people who still call themselves Christian but no longer attend? What reasons do they give?
- Is the loss of public trust mainly a problem of image, or of conduct? How would you tell the difference?
- Why might people raised in ordinary churches be drawn to movements that their churches reject? What does that suggest about what those churches were — or were not — providing?
- If you had to choose one of the five explanations for the plateau as the most important, which would it be, and what evidence would change your mind?