Lecture 4-3: Motive Clauses and the Rhetoric of Command
목차 37
- Lecture 1-1: What This Course Assumes, and What It Is For
- Lecture 1-2: How to Work Through a Verse Without Drowning
- Lecture 1-3: The Tools on Your Desk: Lexicon, Grammar, Concordance, Apparatus
- Lecture 2-1: The Shape of a Hebrew Sentence: Word Order and the Narrative Chain
- Lecture 2-2: Reading Genesis 22:1-14
- Lecture 2-3: Repetition, Wordplay, and What Translation Cannot Carry
- Lecture 3-1: The Verb System in Action: Aspect, Sequence, and the Perfect Problem
- Lecture 3-2: Reading 1 Samuel 17 as Connected Discourse
- Lecture 3-3: Direct Speech, Particles, and the Texture of Dialogue
- Lecture 4-1: Legal Hebrew: Casuistic and Apodictic Formulations
- Lecture 4-2: Reading Deuteronomy 6:4-9
- Lecture 4-3: Motive Clauses and the Rhetoric of Command
- Lecture 5-1: Parallelism, and Why It Is Not Repetition
- Lecture 5-2: Reading Psalm 23 and Psalm 1
- Lecture 5-3: Poetic Vocabulary, Rare Words, and the Limits of the Lexicon
- Lecture 6-1: Prophetic Forms: Oracle, Woe, Vision Report
- Lecture 6-2: Reading Amos 5:18-27
- Lecture 6-3: When the Text Is Hard: Corruption, Conjecture, and the Apparatus
- Lecture 7-1: Koine on the Page: Mark's Sentences and Why They Read as They Do
- Lecture 7-2: Reading Mark 4:35-41
- Lecture 7-3: Aspect Over Time: The Present, Aorist and Imperfect at Work
- Lecture 8-1: A More Literary Koine: Luke's Preface and the Septuagintal Style
- Lecture 8-2: Reading Luke 15:11-24
- Lecture 8-3: Participles: The Engine of Greek Narrative
- Lecture 9-1: Reading a Letter as Argument: Connectives and Signposts
- Lecture 9-2: Reading Galatians 2:15-21
- Lecture 9-3: Cases in Dispute: The Genitive and What Hangs on It
- Lecture 10-1: Long Sentences: Subordination, Anacoluthon, and Keeping the Thread
- Lecture 10-2: Reading Romans 3:21-26
- Lecture 10-3: Conditional Sentences, Questions, and the Diatribe
- Lecture 11-1: Simple Vocabulary, Difficult Meaning: The Johannine Style
- Lecture 11-2: Reading John 1:1-14
- Lecture 11-3: The Article, and What It Does and Does Not Prove
Read a stretch of the Laws of Hammurabi and then a stretch of Deuteronomy, and one difference is obvious before you have thought about it. The Babylonian laws state a case and a ruling and stop. Deuteronomy states a command and then keeps talking: because you were a slave in Egypt; so that it may go well with you; for Yahweh your God is God of gods; lest you forget. The commands come with reasons attached.
Those attached reasons have a name in the scholarly literature — motive clauses — and, importantly for a language course, they are not merely a matter of tone. They are marked grammatically. A small set of particles introduces them: כִּי (ki) in its causal sense, לְמַעַן (lema'an, "so that"), פֶּן (pen, "lest"), עַל־כֵּן (al-ken, "therefore"), along with relative clauses and infinitival constructions. Once you know the markers you can find every motive clause in a chapter in a few minutes, and once you can find them you can see the shape of Deuteronomy's persuasion rather than only its demands.
This lecture does three things. It sets out the grammatical markers and shows each at work in a verse. It classifies the kinds of reason Deuteronomy gives, and asks what each kind assumes about the person being addressed. And it takes up the comparison with other ancient Near Eastern legal collections carefully — because that comparison has been made to carry a great deal of weight, and the weight it can actually bear is less than is often claimed. The lecture ends with the characteristic phraseology of Deuteronomic prose, which is the practical pay-off: it is the most reliable way for a reader to feel where this book's own voice is speaking.
이 35분으로 얻는 것
- Identify a motive clause in Hebrew by its introducing particle and mark its boundaries.
- Distinguish the causal, temporal, conditional and complementising uses of כִּי in a legal context, and say what settles which is in play.
- Classify Deuteronomy's motive clauses into at least four kinds and give a Hebrew example of each.
- State what Berend Gemser's comparison of biblical and cuneiform law established, what Rifat Sonsino's response corrected, and which conclusions the comparison does not support.
- Recognise half a dozen characteristic Deuteronomic phrases and explain why recognising them is useful to a reader.
You shall not deprive the foreigner or the fatherless of justice, nor take a widow’s clothing in pledge; — Deuteronomy 24:17
World English Bible
but you shall remember that you were a slave in Egypt, and Yahweh your God redeemed you there. Therefore I command you to do this thing. — Deuteronomy 24:18
WEB
When you reap your harvest in your field, and have forgotten a sheaf in the field, you shall not go again to get it. It shall be for the foreigner, for the fatherless, and for the widow; that Yahweh your God may bless you in all the work of your hands. — Deuteronomy 24:19
WEB
You shall remember that you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and Yahweh your God redeemed you. Therefore I command you this thing today. — Deuteronomy 15:15
WEB
For Yahweh your God, he is God of gods, and Lord of lords, the great God, the mighty, and the awesome, who doesn’t respect persons, nor takes reward. — Deuteronomy 10:17
WEB
He does execute justice for the fatherless and widow, and loves the foreigner, in giving him food and clothing. — Deuteronomy 10:18
WEB
Therefore love the foreigner; for you were foreigners in the land of Egypt. — Deuteronomy 10:19
WEB
Two things are worth noticing in that list before we begin. First, 24:18 and 15:15 are nearly the same sentence, attached to two different laws — the same reason, redeployed. Second, 10:17-19 is a single movement of thought in which a statement about God's character becomes the ground of a command about the treatment of a foreigner; the "therefore" in verse 19 is doing structural work.
1. What a motive clause is, and how to find one
A motive clause is a clause attached to a command that gives a reason for it. That is a functional definition, and functional definitions have soft edges: whether an attached clause is giving a reason or supplying a further provision is sometimes a judgement call, and different scholars have counted differently for exactly that reason. But in the great majority of cases the identification is straightforward, because Hebrew marks the attachment.
Here is the clearest example in the chapter, Deuteronomy 24:17-18. The command:
לֹא וְלֹא
lo tatteh mishpat ger yatom, welo tachavol beged almanah
"you shall not bend the justice of a resident foreigner or an orphan, and you shall not take in pledge the garment of a widow"
Then the reason:
וְזָכַרְתָּ כִּי בְּמִצְרַיִם וַיִּפְדְּךָ אֱלֹהֶיךָ מִשָּׁם עַל־כֵּן אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶת־הַדָּבָר
wezakharta ki eved hayita bemitsrayim, wayyifdekha YHWH eloheikha mish-sham; al-ken anokhi metsawwekha la'asot et-had-davar haz-zeh
"and you shall remember that you were a slave in Egypt, and Yahweh your God redeemed you from there; therefore I am commanding you to do this thing"
Three grammatical observations, each of which repays attention.
(a) The כִּי here is not the כִּי of lecture 4-1. In 4-1 you met כִּי opening the condition of a case law: "when your brother is sold to you." Here it does something else entirely — it introduces the content of what is to be remembered: "remember that you were a slave." That is the complementising use, the one that turns a clause into the object of a verb of perceiving, knowing or saying. Chapter 3-3 dealt with the range of this particle at length. It is worth restating the practical rule here, because legal Hebrew exercises the whole range within a few verses: כִּי after a verb of knowing, seeing, hearing or remembering is almost always "that"; כִּי at the head of a sentence followed by a prefix-form verb, in a legal context, is usually "when/if"; כִּי following a command and giving a ground is "for, because." What settles it is the surroundings, not the particle. Anyone who tells you that כִּי "means because" has collapsed a range into a gloss.
(b) A narrative verb inside a law. וַיִּפְדְּךָ (wayyifdekha, "and he redeemed you") is a wayyiqtol — the narrative chain form from chapter 2 — sitting in the middle of a legal paragraph. It is there because the motive clause is a miniature narrative: it tells, in two clauses, a story about the past. This is a small but real illustration of something the course has been building toward: the verb forms are not partitioned by genre. What changes between genres is what the forms are used to do.
(c) עַל־כֵּן. Literally "upon thus," and functionally "therefore." It marks a conclusion drawn from what precedes. Here it introduces not the command itself but a statement about the commanding: "therefore I am commanding you." Deuteronomy does this repeatedly, and it is a small window into how the book presents itself — not as a set of statutes standing on their own authority but as the speech of somebody who is telling you why he is saying this.
Compare 15:15, attached to the law of release, which is almost word for word the same:
וְזָכַרְתָּ כִּי עֶבֶד הָיִיתָ בְּאֶרֶץ וַיִּפְדְּךָ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ עַל־כֵּן אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ אֶת־הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה הַיּוֹם
wezakharta ki eved hayita be'erets mitsrayim, wayyifdekha YHWH eloheikha; al-ken anokhi metsawwekha et-had-davar haz-zeh hay-yom
"and you shall remember that you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and Yahweh your God redeemed you; therefore I am commanding you this thing today"
The differences are minor — "in the land of Egypt" against "in Egypt," "to do this thing" against "this thing today." The formula is portable, and its portability is itself a datum about the book's composition, whatever one concludes from it.
2. The markers, one by one
כִּי (ki), causal: "for, because." Deuteronomy 10:19:
וַאֲהַבְתֶּם אֶת־הַגֵּר כִּי־גֵרִים בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם
wa'ahavtem et-hagger, ki-gerim heyitem be'erets mitsrayim
"and you (pl.) shall love the resident foreigner, for you (pl.) were resident foreigners in the land of Egypt"
Command, then כִּי, then reason. Note the number: this is one of the plural passages discussed in 4-1 §5, and it sits a few chapters from the resolutely singular Shema.
The same particle can introduce a reason of a quite different kind. In several laws the ground given is simply a characterisation of the act — כִּי יְהוָה (ki to'avat YHWH, "for it is an abomination to Yahweh") — which asserts that the act belongs to a category rather than pointing to a consequence or a memory.
לְמַעַן (lema'an), purposive: "so that, in order that." The tail of Deuteronomy 24:19:
לְמַעַן יְבָרֶכְךָ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּכֹל יָדֶיךָ
lema'an yevarekhekha YHWH eloheikha bekhol ma'aseh yadeikha
"so that Yahweh your God may bless you in all the work of your hands"
And in the law of the bird's nest at 22:7, the reward formula:
לְמַעַן וְהַאֲרַכְתָּ
lema'an yitav lakh weha'arakhta yamim
"so that it may go well with you and you may prolong days"
לְמַעַן is followed by a prefix-form verb and points forward: the reason is a consequence the addressee is invited to want. Note the weqatal וְהַאֲרַכְתָּ continuing the purpose clause — the same form that carries commands, here carrying a promised outcome, which is exactly why 4-1 insisted that the form does not carry its function on its face.
(pen), apprehensive: "lest." Deuteronomy 6:12:
לְךָ פֶּן־תִּשְׁכַּח אֶת־יְהוָה
hishshamer lekha pen-tishkach et-YHWH
"take care for yourself, lest you forget Yahweh"
פֶּן points forward to something the addressee is to avoid, and it is the mirror image of לְמַעַן: one names a desired outcome, the other a feared one. Grammatically both take the prefix form. Rhetorically they address different motives, and a reader who is counting motive clauses in a chapter should count them separately for that reason.
עַל־כֵּן (al-ken), consecutive: "therefore." Seen above, in 24:18 and 15:15. It looks backward, drawing a conclusion. In 5:15 it closes the Sabbath commandment: עַל־כֵּן צִוְּךָ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ (al-ken tsiwwekha YHWH eloheikha, "therefore Yahweh your God commanded you") — and it is worth comparing that with the version of the same commandment in Exodus 20, where the reason given is creation rather than the exodus. The two are different reasons attached to the same command. What one makes of that is a question about the composition of the , not a grammatical one, and this course leaves it there; but a reader of the Hebrew who has learned to spot motive clauses will notice the difference unprompted, which is the sort of thing this training is for.
Relative and infinitival constructions. Not every reason is introduced by a particle. Deuteronomy 10:17-18 gives its ground in a series of clauses about God — that he is God of gods, that he does not take a bribe, that he executes justice for orphan and widow and loves the foreigner — and only then, in verse 19, comes the command. The Hebrew of 10:17 begins:
כִּי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם הוּא הָאֱלֹהִים וַאֲדֹנֵי הָאֲדֹנִים
ki YHWH eloheikhem hu elohei ha-elohim wa'adonei ha-adonim
"for Yahweh your God, he is God of gods and Lord of lords"
Two constructions to note. The superlative is formed by the construct chain — the Hebrew way of joining two nouns so that the first depends on the second — with a noun in construct before its own plural: "God of gods," "Lord of lords," meaning the highest of them. And הוּא (hu, "he") stands as a resumptive pronoun after the fronted subject, a construction used to give the subject prominence. Neither is peculiar to law, and both are worth having at your fingertips.
3. The kinds of reason, and what each assumes
Sorting motive clauses by content rather than by particle produces something like the following. The categories overlap — 10:19 belongs to at least two of them at once — and the overlap is not a flaw in the scheme but a feature of the material.
Historical retrospect. "You were a slave in the land of Egypt, and Yahweh your God redeemed you." This is the most frequent single reason in Deuteronomy and it attaches to laws about release of servants (15:15), justice for the vulnerable (24:18), gleaning (24:22) and the Sabbath (5:15). What it assumes about the addressee is striking: it assumes a shared memory, and it addresses the present hearer as though he were personally there. The Hebrew is second person — you were a slave — spoken to a generation that on the book's own account was not. That is not an oversight; it is the mode of the whole book.
Promise of benefit. The לְמַעַן clauses: that Yahweh may bless you, that it may go well with you, that you may live long in the land. These assume an addressee who can be motivated by his own good, and they are unembarrassed about it.
Fear of consequence. The פֶּן clauses, and formulas such as the statement that all Israel shall hear and be afraid, attached to certain penalties. These assume deterrence.
The character of God. Deuteronomy 10:17-19 is the clearest instance: God takes no bribe and executes justice for the orphan, the widow and the foreigner — therefore you are to love the foreigner. The ground is neither memory nor reward but imitation.
Appeal to fellow-feeling. Closely related to historical retrospect but not identical: the reason works by asking the addressee to recall not merely that a thing happened but what it was like. The Code in Exodus 23:9 makes this explicit, telling the addressees that they themselves know the (nefesh) of the foreigner — "you know how it feels," in effect, using the word discussed in lecture 4-2 §3. Deuteronomy 10:19 works the same way with fewer words.
Explanation or definition. The כִּי-clauses that classify an act rather than point to a consequence: it is an abomination, it is a thing not done in Israel. These give a reason of a fifth kind, which is that the act simply is what it is.
Reasons are not minds
A methodological note. The list above is a description of what is in the text; it is not a psychology of ancient Israel and it should not be turned into one. That a book gives reasons of five kinds tells you about the book. Whether the people addressed were actually moved by those reasons, in what proportions, is not recoverable from the text at all.
4. The comparison with ancient Near Eastern law
Berend Gemser put motive clauses on the scholarly map with a paper delivered to the Copenhagen congress of 1953. He collected the motive clauses in the biblical legal collections, classified them much as §3 does, and set the result beside the cuneiform law collections — chiefly the Laws of Hammurabi. His finding, in outline: motive clauses are frequent in biblical law, most frequent by a wide margin in Deuteronomy, and scarce to absent in the body of the Mesopotamian collections. From this he argued that Israelite law is not legislation of the ordinary kind but instruction — torah — addressed to a people it seeks to persuade rather than merely to bind.
The observation is real and anyone can check it. The proportion is regularly quoted, and it is worth knowing that the exact figures differ from study to study for a mundane reason: they depend on how you delimit an individual law, and there is no agreed way of doing that in a text with no paragraph marks. Roughly, the studies agree that a minority of laws in the Covenant Code and in the priestly material carry motive clauses, that the proportion in Deuteronomy is very much higher — around half by most counts — and that the cuneiform collections have far fewer. Treat the exact percentages as indicative rather than as data.
This is a point where readers will not agree — not about the count, but about what follows from it.
Rifat Sonsino, in Motive Clauses in Hebrew Law (1980), took up Gemser's comparison and corrected it in an important respect. Motive clauses are not absent from cuneiform law. They occur, sparsely, in the Laws of Hammurabi and in Middle Assyrian, Hittite and Neo-Babylonian material — explanatory clauses, statements of purpose, appeals to precedent. The difference between biblical and Mesopotamian law in this respect is therefore one of degree, not of kind, and an argument built on the assumption that the feature is uniquely Israelite is built on sand.
Three further cautions, each of which a careful reader can supply for himself once he has seen it stated.
Genre. Comparing the body of Hammurabi's laws with the body of Deuteronomy's laws may be comparing unlike things. Hammurabi's collection is framed by a prologue and an epilogue that are elaborately motivational — the king's justice, the gods' commission, curses on anyone who alters the stele. The motivation is present; it is positioned differently, at the frame rather than in the individual provisions. Deuteronomy, for its part, presents its laws inside a speech, and a speech gives reasons as a matter of course. Some of the difference in distribution may be a difference in what kind of document each is, rather than a difference in what kind of law each contains.
Preservation. We have what has survived. The cuneiform collections are a fraction of the legal writing of their cultures, and their relationship to actual court practice is itself debated — some Assyriologists argue that the collections are more nearly literary or scholastic than statutory. An argument from what a corpus contains has to reckon with what the corpus is.
The inferential leap. Even granting the difference in degree, the step from "this book attaches reasons more often" to claims about the distinctive nature of Israelite religion, or the moral character of its law, or its concept of the human person, is a long one. It is the same pattern that lecture 4-1 traced from Alt's classification: a countable formal observation, then an inference to something much larger, then the inference becoming what everyone remembers. Moshe Weinfeld built substantially on Gemser in arguing for the humanistic and didactic character of Deuteronomic law; Bernard M. Levinson has approached the same material from the angle of legal revision, arguing that Deuteronomy's rhetoric is bound up with its reworking of earlier law; Assnat Bartor, in Reading Law as Narrative (2010), has read the narrative elements inside the legal texts as literary phenomena in their own right. These are different projects, and a student should know that "motive clause" is a term used in all of them with the same grammatical reference and rather different theoretical baggage.
What survives all the caution is worth having, and it is not small. Deuteronomy argues with its addressee. That is observable in the grammar, it is countable, and it distinguishes this book from its neighbours in the Pentateuch as well as from Hammurabi. A reader who can see the motive clauses is reading the book the way it asks to be read.
5. Deuteronomic style
Motive clauses are one part of a larger phenomenon: Deuteronomy has a recognisable prose style, sermonic in cast, built out of a stock of recurring phrases. Moshe Weinfeld's Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (1972) contains an appendix cataloguing this phraseology, and it remains the standard reference — though its use as a criterion for identifying Deuteronomistic authorship elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible has been much debated, since a phrase can be imitated as well as inherited.
A reader will meet these constantly. Among the most frequent:
- בְּכָל־לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל־נַפְשְׁךָ (bekhol-levavkha uvekhol-nafshekha, "with all your levav and with all your nefesh") — the pair from 6:5, recurring throughout the book.
- לְמַעַן יִיטַב לָךְ (lema'an yitav lakh, "so that it may go well with you"), usually joined to a promise of long life in the land.
- הַיּוֹם (hay-yom, "today") — attached to the act of commanding, again and again: what I command you today. The book insists on its own present tense.
- אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ (anokhi metsawwekha, "I am commanding you") — the speaker naming his own act, seen twice in §1.
- The formula for the chosen sanctuary, "the place which Yahweh your God will choose."
- The purge formula, "and you shall burn out the evil from your midst," closing many penal provisions.
- (shema Yisra'el, "hear, Israel") — the call examined in 4-2 §1, used to open major units.
Why does this matter to someone learning to read? Three reasons, in ascending order of usefulness. First, fluency: a phrase you recognise is a phrase you do not have to parse, and Deuteronomy repays reading at speed once you know its furniture. Second, structure: the formulas mark boundaries, and in a text without paragraph divisions they are the most reliable structural signal you have. Third — and this is the one worth remembering — style is how you notice that a voice has entered or left. When a phrase from this stock appears in Joshua, or Jeremiah, or the books of Kings, you have observed something real about the text in front of you. Be careful what you infer from it: the inference from shared phraseology to shared authorship is contested, for good reasons. But the observation itself is available only to a reader who knows the phrases, and it is not available in translation, because a translator will render the same Hebrew formula a dozen different ways as the English context requires.
The top row of the diagram sorts the markers by the direction they point, which is the most useful way to hold them in your head while reading: a backward-pointing marker will be followed by memory or by a statement of fact, a forward-pointing one by an outcome. The middle table sorts by content, and the right-hand column is there to make a point the lecture makes in prose — that giving a reason is a claim about what will move the person addressed, and that the claim differs from row to row. The warning panel is the one part of the diagram to memorise.
6. Further Reading
- Berend Gemser, "The Importance of the Motive Clause in Old Testament Law," in Congress Volume: Copenhagen 1953, VTSup 1 (Brill, 1953), 50-66. Short, readable, and the origin of the whole discussion.
- Rifat Sonsino, Motive Clauses in Hebrew Law: Biblical Forms and Near Eastern Parallels, SBLDS 45 (Scholars Press, 1980). The necessary corrective; read it immediately after Gemser.
- Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Clarendon, 1972). The appendix of Deuteronomic phraseology is the reference work for §5; the argument of the book has been much debated and is worth reading with that debate in view.
- Bernard M. Levinson, Deuteronomy and the of Legal Innovation (Oxford University Press, 1997). Deuteronomy's rhetoric as an instrument of legal revision.
- Assnat Bartor, Reading Law as Narrative: A Study in the Casuistic Laws of the Pentateuch (Society of Biblical Literature, 2010). Attends to the narrative texture inside legal texts — directly relevant to the wayyiqtol inside a motive clause noticed in §1.
- Martha T. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 2nd ed. (Scholars Press, 1997). Read the prologue and epilogue of the Laws of Hammurabi as well as the laws, and the genre caution in §4 will make itself.
- Raymond Westbrook, ed., A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, 2 vols. (Brill, 2003). For the debate over what the cuneiform collections actually were.
- Bruce K. Waltke and M. O'Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax (Eisenbrauns, 1990), §38.3, and Paul Joüon and T. Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 2nd rev. ed. (Pontifical Biblical Institute, 2006), §§168-170, on causal, purpose and result clauses; and the entry for כִּי in BDB, which is long and worth reading through once in full.
핵심 요약
- Deuteronomy 24:17-18 attaches a motive clause with כִּי used complementisingly ("remember that you were a slave," not the conditional כִּי of 4-1), followed by עַל־כֵּן ("therefore I am commanding you") — showing that the same particle's sense in legal Hebrew is settled by its surroundings, never by the particle alone.
- The forward-pointing markers לְמַעַן ("so that," Deuteronomy 24:19, 22:7) and פֶּן ("lest," Deuteronomy 6:12) are grammatical mirror images, one naming a desired outcome and one a feared one, and both take the prefix-form verb.
- Berend Gemser's 1953 Copenhagen paper found motive clauses far more frequent in Deuteronomy (roughly half its laws) than in the Mesopotamian collections, and used this to argue Israelite law functions as persuasive torah rather than bare legislation; Rifat Sonsino's Motive Clauses in Hebrew Law (1980) corrected this by showing such clauses do occur, sparsely, in Hammurabi and Hittite/Assyrian law, making the difference one of degree, not kind.
- Motive clauses sort into (at least) five content-kinds illustrated from the set texts: historical retrospect ("you were a slave in Egypt," Deuteronomy 24:18/15:15), promise of benefit (לְמַעַן clauses), fear of consequence (פֶּן clauses), the character of God (Deuteronomy 10:17-19), and classification of an act as "an abomination."
- Deuteronomy's recurring formulas — הַיּוֹם ("today") attached to the act of commanding, אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ ("I am commanding you"), and the pairing בְּכָל־לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל־נַפְשְׁךָ from 6:5 — are catalogued in Weinfeld's Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (1972) and function as structural markers in a text with no paragraph divisions, though using them to argue for common authorship elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible is contested.
If you remember nothing else from this lecture: Deuteronomy attaches reasons to its commands using a small, identifiable set of particles — כִּי looking backward ("for, because"), לְמַעַן and פֶּן looking forward as mirror images ("so that" / "lest"), and עַל־כֵּן drawing a conclusion, as in Deuteronomy 24:17-18's "you shall not bend justice... [because] you were a slave in Egypt... therefore I am commanding you." Gemser first showed these motive clauses are far more common in Deuteronomy than in cuneiform law like Hammurabi's, but Sonsino corrected the conclusion Gemser drew from it: the clauses appear in Mesopotamian law too, so the real difference is one of degree, not a uniquely Israelite feature. The reasons themselves fall into recognizable kinds — memory of slavery in Egypt, promised blessing, feared consequence, the character of God, or bare classification of an act as an abomination — and Deuteronomy's recurring phrases like "today" and "I am commanding you" are the most reliable signal of where the book's own voice is speaking.
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묵상 및 토론
- Reading exercise. Take Deuteronomy 24 in Hebrew and find every motive clause in the chapter. For each, write down the particle (or note that there is none), the boundaries of the clause, and which of the six kinds in §3 it belongs to. Where you are unsure whether a clause is a motive clause or a further provision, say what makes it unclear.
- Reading exercise. Find every occurrence of כִּי in Deuteronomy 15 and classify each as conditional, complementising ("that"), causal, or something else. How many are genuinely ambiguous, and what did you use to decide the rest?
- Deuteronomy 5:15 gives the exodus as the reason for the Sabbath command; Exodus 20:11 gives creation. Set out what a reader can legitimately say about that difference on the basis of the Hebrew alone, and where the legitimate observations stop and a hypothesis begins.
- §4 lists three cautions about the comparison with cuneiform law: genre, preservation, and the inferential leap. Which of the three do you think is the most damaging to Gemser's conclusion, and why? Could any of them be tested?
- The motive clause in 24:18 addresses a hearer as though he had personally been a slave in Egypt. What kind of speech does that presuppose, and how does it fit with the *Numeruswechsel* discussed in lecture 4-1 §5? Do the singular passages and the plural passages use historical retrospect differently? Check before answering.
- §5 says that Deuteronomic phraseology is invisible in translation because a translator renders the same formula differently as English context requires. Test this. Pick one formula, find five of its occurrences, and compare how one English version renders each. Then say what a reader of that version could and could not have noticed.